SOCIETY
Why Most New Emigrants Are Not Going Back to Russia Anytime Soon
February 7, 2025

  • Vladimir Ruvinsky

    Journalist

Journalist Vladimir Ruvinsky observes that though some Russian officials want recent emigrants to return home to support the economy, after two or three years of emigration these people’s ties to their homeland have weakened and they no longer feel like just relokanty.
The original text in Russian was published in the Moscow Times and is being republished here with the author’s permission.

The Russian government really wants the (majority of) Russians who left after February 24, 2022, to come back to Russia. A significant portion have already done so. Yet most of the latest wave of Russian emigration (in a broad, historical perspective) is unlikely to return – even if the Kremlin ends its war against Ukraine.

In the first year of Vladimir Putin's full-scale war, which featured military mobilization, about a million people hurriedly left Russia. Between 15% and 45% have returned – 2024 is even being hailed as the “year of return.”

Why do Russians go back?

Judging by individual accounts, there is no single reason for this. Most often, returning Russians say they had no other choice, having faced difficult financial, living and social conditions, refusals to extend their residence permits and trouble with transferring money.

There are also cases where people go back to regain a high level of income, social and professional status, comfort and service. Their working and living conditions in Europe turned out to be underwhelming. Still others returned to be with elderly parents and children or because of their own health problems, treatment for which they could not afford abroad.

Against this backdrop, it would seem quite likely that a spike in returns, which experts say may follow the end of fighting in Ukraine, will materialize. Especially since in Europe, for example, there is an official list of services that cannot be provided to Russian citizens. There is also a list of Russian companies for which it is prohibited to work.

Nevertheless, conversations with so-called “economic emigrants,” IT workers and others who left for seemingly nonpolitical reasons, as well as sociological studies of the so-called fifth wave of Russian emigration commonly (seen as starting in the 2010s), paint a more complex picture.

It seems that after three years of war, almost everyone who wanted to return to Russia has already done so or will do so in the near term. The rest – the majority – are unlikely to do so.

Bringing back emigrants is a top priority for the government

The outflow of a huge number of skilled workers came as a huge shock to Russia’s financial and economic authorities. They “understand perfectly well that the country needs this human capital,” Alexander Auzan, head of the economics department at Moscow State University, told the Russian version of Forbes.

According to Auzan, none other than Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, the Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry of Finance (as well as the Ministry of Digital Development) lobbied for economic ties with emigrants to be spared so that “people valuable to the country could continue to work for it.” Remotely – as long as they stayed with Russian companies. The expectation has been that emigrants will gradually come home.
“This part of the government is trying to prevent another round of mobilization on the scale of autumn 2022 and a new outflow of skilled workers, which would be another major blow to the economy.”
A friendly tour of a mountain in Tbilisi, which a group of Russian emigres cleared of rubbish, and transformed into a pop-up community space. Published with the photographer's permission.
This is one of the reasons why they are ready to spend trillions of rubles on what is essentially a hired, contract army and why they promise various benefits to emigrants who return, including draft exemptions.

But there are certainly other power centers in Russia. Recall how the Ukraine war began: Putin and the security and military officials close to him made the decision to invade behind the scenes, without consulting anyone else, including the government. And now, whether they have a draft exemption or not, men are rounded up for the war at large private industrial firms on orders “from above,” news of which is hushed up.

The issue of emigrants is a political one, and it is not for the “economic bloc” to decide, as an economist with knowledge of the situation told your author. There are those in Russia’s military-political leadership who would like to force emigrants to return. The Duma has repeatedly proposed banning emigrants from working remotely and punishing them for activism abroad.

For example, IT specialists who work with government systems or handle personal data are essentially barred from working remotely from abroad. There is no single approach, but most courts believe that it is a violation of a work contract to work from abroad.

An end or stop to the war would remove, at least for a time, the risk of ending up in a trench in eastern Ukraine or a casket marked Cargo 200. But just the prospect of physical security will not be enough for most emigrants – guarantees of monetary and career incentives for returning to Russia are needed.
“In the three years of war, many emigrants have had time to think through and start implementing their plans, meaning they now have conditions and motivation to stay abroad.”
Reasons not to return to Russia

Predictions for a mass return to Russia of skilled workers, primarily IT specialists, seem to be based on a not entirely correct, even erroneous, understanding of the motivations for their departure in general.

The initial emigration after February 24, 2022, is often seen as antiwar, ideologically motivated Russians, mainly from Moscow and St Petersburg, while after mobilization in September 2022, it was supposedly Russians from the provinces who left, fearing for their lives. The latter are widely expected to be the first to return to Russia after the war ends.

Your author has repeatedly seen the faultiness of this understanding when talking to Russians now living in various countries. Sure, mobilization might have been the trigger for fleeing to Georgia, Kazakhstan or Armenia – but often the basis for that decision was disagreement with the actions of the Russian state. The same is true of educated and financially secure Russians who left Russia for new jobs in Western countries.

This is also evidenced by surveys of emigrants conducted by the OutRush project (see Russia.Post here). They show that people from the initial outflow in spring 2022 (after the start of the war) and the subsequent one in autumn 2022 (after the start of mobilization) equally volunteer, participate in activism and protests, and donate to antiwar initiatives while abroad.

Disagreement with the Kremlin’s policies and the general direction of the country’s development is a fundamental reason not to go back to Russia. Few emigrants are ready to return to a militarizing country that now counts North Korea and Iran as friends and has an archaic economy, which looks bound to stagnate further. It will likely take the entire working life of young and middle-aged emigrants for Russia to pull itself out of the mess, and they hardly want that.
“In other words, what is important for emigrants is not only an end to the war – which depends entirely on Putin – but also an end to the Kremlin’s existential struggle against the West.”
The pedestrian street Knez Mihailova in Belgrade. Serbia has seen a large influx of Russians since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Photo by Anna Zelinskaya, published with her permission.
For many, a critical condition for their returning to Russia is Putin’s departure from power (possibly around the end of his fifth term in 2030) or at least a softening of the political regime, but the chances of either scenario now look grim.

Reasons to remain abroad

For many emigrants, one of the threads – or rather chains – connecting them to their homeland is employment in Russian companies. The government hopes that over time they will come to their senses and come home.

According to OutRush data, however, whereas 43% of respondents worked in Russian companies before they left the country, the figure had plummeted to 13% by summer 2023. In other words, two thirds of the Russians who had been working in Russian companies before leaving Russia ditched them for employment in foreign firms. And this trend continues. Meanwhile, there are no examples of Russians going home after changing employers in favor a foreign one.

In addition, surveys show that after a drop-off in 2022, incomes of the poorest emigrants have stabilized, while the standard of living for fifth-wave emigrants has improved. Sure, there are Russians waiting out the war outside of Russia, who might have to go back if their sources of income back home are cut off. But this is a small percentage of emigration, and with each year of the war their numbers dwindle.

Research on fifth-wave emigrants conducted by sociologist and demographer Lyubov Borusyak shows that the process of moving from one country to another has slowed, as many Russians have managed to end up where they want to be – as a rule, Europe (see Russia.Post here).

Your author knows of many IT specialists, mainly those without children, who have adapted to life in Asia and are in no hurry to go back to Russia. Meanwhile, other IT-sector emigrants are still thinking about moving: for example, those who now live in Eastern Europe are trying to move further west and looking for a new foreign employer.

Thus, there are important arguments both against returning to Russia and for staying abroad, like new jobs and plans.
“Families with younger children are definitely not planning to go back, especially if the children have already started kindergarten or school abroad, where after a year or two they usually adapt and start speaking the local language.”
It’s harder for teenagers, who have returned in some cases. Businesspeople – those who have a family and children – have begun buying real estate abroad and taking out mortgages. People in their 20s and 30s generally have fewer worries and things that would keep them in Russia – the Kremlin will hardly bring them back with talk of Russia’s great past.

By now, stable Russian diasporas have already formed in various countries, with active communication and interaction taking root. That is unusual for previous waves of Russian emigration, where emigrants were known to cross the street when they saw their kin.

This is no longer the case. The Russian-speaking diaspora in Portugal, for example, comprises Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians, with their own services for dining, cleaning, repair, music and drawing lessons, etc., opening and operating. A Russian emigrant community has also sprouted in Serbia, the UAE and the Netherlands.

While Putin is waging his war, emigrants are not sitting still – they have been actively looking for a new country, housing and work and thinking about what to do next. As a result, they have started considering themselves not relokanty but full-fledged emigrants. In interviews with Borusyak, they say they have left Russia for the long haul. Now, these people are the majority of Russians abroad. Many have a couple of years left until they can obtain foreign citizenship or permanent residence, so there is no point in going back to Russia now.

Sociologist Margarita Zavadskaya of OutRush argues that the probability of return for Russians who have lived abroad for more than two years tends toward zero. Few emigrants are now ready to say where they will settle permanently – but it is unlikely to be Putin’s Russia.
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