Politics
Could a European Army Result from a Ukraine Peace Deal?
January 24, 2025
- Alexander GoltsJournalist
Journalist Alexander Golts looks at the prospects of a European peacekeeping operation in Ukraine without US participation, as Trump has indicated. That, Golts argues, would require colossal changes in the military organization of European states.
Invasion of Ukraine. Map of January 6, 2025. Source: Wiki Commons
In yellow: Continuously controlled by Ukraine;
In pink: Currently occupied or controlled by Russia;
In blue: Formerly occupied by Russia or Ukrainian-occupied Russian territory
In yellow: Continuously controlled by Ukraine;
In pink: Currently occupied or controlled by Russia;
In blue: Formerly occupied by Russia or Ukrainian-occupied Russian territory
Donald Trump, who called himself a “peacemaker” in his inauguration speech, did not even mention the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the largest on the European continent since World War II.
Apparently, the 47th president of the US did not want anyone to remember his campaign promise to end the war before even taking office. When he was finally asked about this, he first joked that he had half a day left and then said that he intended to meet with Vladimir Putin in the near future to discuss a “deal,” which the master of the Kremlin, however, may not want.
Trump’s statement implied that he intended to incline his Russian counterpart to call off his aggression. Putin, in his words, is “destroying Russia by not making a deal.” Trump warned of high tariffs and further sanctions. At the same time, he is said to be aiming now to end the war within 100 days.
Mysterious deal
The irony of the situation is that the essence of a “deal” that would end the Russia-Ukraine conflict is a mystery for everyone, including, seemingly, Trump himself.
First off, it is unclear what exactly is on the table – whether it is simply a cessation of hostilities, some sort of ceasefire or a peace treaty.
It remains to be seen what kind of settlement Washington intends to propose.
Hints about what the formula might look like can be found in an article written in spring 2024 by retired Lt General Keith Kellogg, who is now Trump’s envoy for the Ukraine-Russia war, and Fred Fleitz, also a security official from the first Trump term. Nevertheless, the text is devoted mainly to criticism of the Biden administration’s approach to the war in Ukraine.
To sum up, the US goal looks like a ceasefire, which would be followed by efforts to reach a peace agreement, if circumstances are favorable. Ukraine is being asked to accept the loss of some territory, rejecting in principle attempts to recover it by force. In addition, Ukrainian membership in NATO is to be shelved for decades. In return, the US is to continue to supply weapons to Kyiv and provide it with certain security guarantees.
After Trump won the presidential election, this plan was fleshed out a bit. In particular, citing the president-elect’s staff, it was reported that an 800-mile demilitarized zone is planned.
Apparently, the 47th president of the US did not want anyone to remember his campaign promise to end the war before even taking office. When he was finally asked about this, he first joked that he had half a day left and then said that he intended to meet with Vladimir Putin in the near future to discuss a “deal,” which the master of the Kremlin, however, may not want.
Trump’s statement implied that he intended to incline his Russian counterpart to call off his aggression. Putin, in his words, is “destroying Russia by not making a deal.” Trump warned of high tariffs and further sanctions. At the same time, he is said to be aiming now to end the war within 100 days.
Mysterious deal
The irony of the situation is that the essence of a “deal” that would end the Russia-Ukraine conflict is a mystery for everyone, including, seemingly, Trump himself.
First off, it is unclear what exactly is on the table – whether it is simply a cessation of hostilities, some sort of ceasefire or a peace treaty.
It remains to be seen what kind of settlement Washington intends to propose.
Hints about what the formula might look like can be found in an article written in spring 2024 by retired Lt General Keith Kellogg, who is now Trump’s envoy for the Ukraine-Russia war, and Fred Fleitz, also a security official from the first Trump term. Nevertheless, the text is devoted mainly to criticism of the Biden administration’s approach to the war in Ukraine.
To sum up, the US goal looks like a ceasefire, which would be followed by efforts to reach a peace agreement, if circumstances are favorable. Ukraine is being asked to accept the loss of some territory, rejecting in principle attempts to recover it by force. In addition, Ukrainian membership in NATO is to be shelved for decades. In return, the US is to continue to supply weapons to Kyiv and provide it with certain security guarantees.
After Trump won the presidential election, this plan was fleshed out a bit. In particular, citing the president-elect’s staff, it was reported that an 800-mile demilitarized zone is planned.
“As for security guarantees, Washington believes they should be backed up by troops from European NATO member states, since the idea of US boots on the ground in Ukraine is completely unacceptable to Trump.”
That Washington is pushing this idea is indicated by the numerous reports of secret talks between British and French leaders on deploying troops to Ukraine.
Note that there are no signals yet that the Kremlin might agree to the terms that Trump will supposedly offer. At a Russian Security Council meeting on the day of Trump’s inauguration, Putin rather definitively stated: “concerning the resolution of the situation itself, I would like to reiterate that its objective should not be a temporary ceasefire or a pause [for Ukraine] to regroup forces and rearm for the eventual continuation of the conflict, but rather a lasting peace founded on respect for the legitimate interests of all individuals and peoples residing in this region.”
The Russian leader has repeatedly indicated his precondition that Kyiv must voluntarily renounce its claim to five regions: Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. Moreover, Ukrainian troops must withdraw even from areas that they currently control.
Of course, the Kremlin maintains that a NATO military presence in Ukraine is unacceptable in principle. Indeed, fears of NATO on Russia’s southwestern border were probably one of the main reasons for the Russian invasion in the first place.
If talks, or the “deal” Trump talks about, result in NATO troops on Ukrainian territory, it will be hard, if not impossible,for the Kremlin to spin the cessation of hostilities as a Russian victory.
Yet let’s assume that Trump manages to force Putin to agree to his terms. In that case, Western countries will face new problems, however.
How to protect Ukraine
If Trump really insists that European troops are deployed to Ukraine – with demonstrative US nonparticipation – then he will have – intentionally or unknowingly – touched one of the most sensitive points in relations between the US and Western Europe.
Certainly, Trump’s “deal,” if it materializes, will need to include security guarantees for Kyiv. Otherwise, Ukraine will be defenseless against further Russian aggression, as happened a decade ago after the Minsk agreements.
But this is a serious challenge for European countries – a massive operation will be required.
Note that there are no signals yet that the Kremlin might agree to the terms that Trump will supposedly offer. At a Russian Security Council meeting on the day of Trump’s inauguration, Putin rather definitively stated: “concerning the resolution of the situation itself, I would like to reiterate that its objective should not be a temporary ceasefire or a pause [for Ukraine] to regroup forces and rearm for the eventual continuation of the conflict, but rather a lasting peace founded on respect for the legitimate interests of all individuals and peoples residing in this region.”
The Russian leader has repeatedly indicated his precondition that Kyiv must voluntarily renounce its claim to five regions: Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. Moreover, Ukrainian troops must withdraw even from areas that they currently control.
Of course, the Kremlin maintains that a NATO military presence in Ukraine is unacceptable in principle. Indeed, fears of NATO on Russia’s southwestern border were probably one of the main reasons for the Russian invasion in the first place.
If talks, or the “deal” Trump talks about, result in NATO troops on Ukrainian territory, it will be hard, if not impossible,for the Kremlin to spin the cessation of hostilities as a Russian victory.
Yet let’s assume that Trump manages to force Putin to agree to his terms. In that case, Western countries will face new problems, however.
How to protect Ukraine
If Trump really insists that European troops are deployed to Ukraine – with demonstrative US nonparticipation – then he will have – intentionally or unknowingly – touched one of the most sensitive points in relations between the US and Western Europe.
Certainly, Trump’s “deal,” if it materializes, will need to include security guarantees for Kyiv. Otherwise, Ukraine will be defenseless against further Russian aggression, as happened a decade ago after the Minsk agreements.
But this is a serious challenge for European countries – a massive operation will be required.
The demilitarized zone dividing the Korean peninsula was established under the provisions of the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement. It has served ever since as a buffer zone between North and South Korea. Source: Wiki Commons
A relevant example is the armistice agreement that ended the Korean War more than 70 years ago (see Russia.Post on parallels between the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the Korean War).
Importantly, due to the irreconcilable positions of the sides, the armistice did not in principle concern any political issues. It was a purely military document; its only aim was to end military actions (and this is precisely what Trump is trying to achieve, judging by his rhetoric). To do that, a military demarcation line, which mostly ran along the front line, and a demilitarized zone were established.
The demilitarized zone was envisaged as a fortified buffer zone, 2.5 miles (4.0 kilometers) in width, between the two Koreas, while the demarcation line was about 250 kilometers long. A US-South Korea security treaty was soon signed. Under the treaty, the security of South Korea was guaranteed by a US contingent of 28,500 troops, which, in the event of a surprise attack by North Korea, would be reinforced with soldiers based in Japan.
Importantly, due to the irreconcilable positions of the sides, the armistice did not in principle concern any political issues. It was a purely military document; its only aim was to end military actions (and this is precisely what Trump is trying to achieve, judging by his rhetoric). To do that, a military demarcation line, which mostly ran along the front line, and a demilitarized zone were established.
The demilitarized zone was envisaged as a fortified buffer zone, 2.5 miles (4.0 kilometers) in width, between the two Koreas, while the demarcation line was about 250 kilometers long. A US-South Korea security treaty was soon signed. Under the treaty, the security of South Korea was guaranteed by a US contingent of 28,500 troops, which, in the event of a surprise attack by North Korea, would be reinforced with soldiers based in Japan.
“If we extrapolate the situation of 70 years ago to today’s Ukraine, the demarcation line will be approximately 1,200 kilometers.”
Moreover, because modern weapons have a significantly greater range than during the Korean War, the demilitarized zone needs to be significantly wider.
Given the size of Ukraine and the length of the front line, a minimum of 150,000-180,000 troops will be needed to guarantee the country’s security. From this point of view, one cannot but agree with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who claims that a peace agreement will require 200,000 peacekeepers. Yet the relatively small armies of European NATO member states (180,000 for the UK, 203,850 for France, 180,000 for Germany) make a European peacekeeping contingent a big ask.
70 years under the US umbrella
In fact, it was precisely this circumstance – the limited resources of the democratic states of Europe to confront a major aggressor – that was one of the main reasons that NATO was created.
Over the more than 70 years of the alliance’s existence, the question of independent (without US participation) military operations by European NATO member states has come up several times. This first was in the early 1950s, almost right after NATO was founded.
The Korean War had started, and Washington was discussing redeploying US troops from Europe to the Korean Peninsula. This led to concerns that the USSR would try to take advantage of the situation and engage in aggression in Europe, where there would be no one to defend the European democracies. Against this backdrop, it was proposed to rearm West Germany, which alone could provide the necessary number of troops.
This assumed that the newly proclaimed West Germany with its army, which was then being set up, would be admitted into NATO – a prospect that seemed unacceptable less than a decade after the end of World War II.
As a result, the idea emerged for the European Defense Community (EDC), under which a pan-European army was to be created, with the West Germans to make up the main force. However, French MPs, wishing to postpone the militarization of Germany, voted against the EDC. In the end, West Germany joined NATO directly, bypassing the EDC.
The question of a European army outside of NATO inevitably arose whenever disagreements between the US and its Old-World allies intensified. For example, such discussions took place in 1998, when France and the UK signed the Saint-Malo declaration, which promised a shared European defense strategy and was meant to lay the groundwork for an EU military force.
It was then that Brussels began to discuss the possibility of creating so-called “European cells” within NATO. This was about command structures and military units capable of operating, if necessary, without direct US participation. These ideas encountered rather strong resistance from Washington.
There were two reasons given. First, Washington was concerned that military autonomy for Europe would undermine US authority in NATO and threaten the cohesion of the alliance. Second, the US reasonably believed that the creation of relatively autonomous European structures within the alliance would result in significant additional costs for the US. In the end, the “European cells” idea did not gain traction.
Given the size of Ukraine and the length of the front line, a minimum of 150,000-180,000 troops will be needed to guarantee the country’s security. From this point of view, one cannot but agree with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who claims that a peace agreement will require 200,000 peacekeepers. Yet the relatively small armies of European NATO member states (180,000 for the UK, 203,850 for France, 180,000 for Germany) make a European peacekeeping contingent a big ask.
70 years under the US umbrella
In fact, it was precisely this circumstance – the limited resources of the democratic states of Europe to confront a major aggressor – that was one of the main reasons that NATO was created.
Over the more than 70 years of the alliance’s existence, the question of independent (without US participation) military operations by European NATO member states has come up several times. This first was in the early 1950s, almost right after NATO was founded.
The Korean War had started, and Washington was discussing redeploying US troops from Europe to the Korean Peninsula. This led to concerns that the USSR would try to take advantage of the situation and engage in aggression in Europe, where there would be no one to defend the European democracies. Against this backdrop, it was proposed to rearm West Germany, which alone could provide the necessary number of troops.
This assumed that the newly proclaimed West Germany with its army, which was then being set up, would be admitted into NATO – a prospect that seemed unacceptable less than a decade after the end of World War II.
As a result, the idea emerged for the European Defense Community (EDC), under which a pan-European army was to be created, with the West Germans to make up the main force. However, French MPs, wishing to postpone the militarization of Germany, voted against the EDC. In the end, West Germany joined NATO directly, bypassing the EDC.
The question of a European army outside of NATO inevitably arose whenever disagreements between the US and its Old-World allies intensified. For example, such discussions took place in 1998, when France and the UK signed the Saint-Malo declaration, which promised a shared European defense strategy and was meant to lay the groundwork for an EU military force.
It was then that Brussels began to discuss the possibility of creating so-called “European cells” within NATO. This was about command structures and military units capable of operating, if necessary, without direct US participation. These ideas encountered rather strong resistance from Washington.
There were two reasons given. First, Washington was concerned that military autonomy for Europe would undermine US authority in NATO and threaten the cohesion of the alliance. Second, the US reasonably believed that the creation of relatively autonomous European structures within the alliance would result in significant additional costs for the US. In the end, the “European cells” idea did not gain traction.
“Moreover, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the apparent disappearance of a direct military threat, European NATO member states largely lost interest in developing and improving their defense capabilities.”
Western Europe got used to enjoying the economic and other fruits of peace and seemed blissfully unaware that wars had not stopped in the rest of the world – which meant that sooner or later a war could impinge on its prosperous existence. Western European capitals paid no heed to the regular calls of NATO secretaries-general to increase military spending to at least 2% of GDP.
The alarm bells went off only during Trump’s first term. In 2018, he literally jolted US allies by declaring at the NATO summit in Brussels that it was time to pay the US to defend them, threatening to leave the alliance otherwise. At that time, however, the Europeans managed to walk back the US president. For example, they recalled that European countries had sent contingents to Afghanistan to support the US mission there. Plus, post-Crimea, NATO member states actually began to ramp up their military spending.
The alarm bells went off only during Trump’s first term. In 2018, he literally jolted US allies by declaring at the NATO summit in Brussels that it was time to pay the US to defend them, threatening to leave the alliance otherwise. At that time, however, the Europeans managed to walk back the US president. For example, they recalled that European countries had sent contingents to Afghanistan to support the US mission there. Plus, post-Crimea, NATO member states actually began to ramp up their military spending.
The July 2024 NATO summit in Washington. Article 5 of the NATO founding treaty says "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all." The first and only time that Article 5 was invoked was in response to the 9/11 terrorist attack in the US. Source: Wiki Commons
Defense without America
Now, the idea of forcing allies to pay the highest possible price for US protection has been firmly ingrained in Trump’s mind. He brought it up more than once in the last election campaign, threating to “encourage [the Russians] to do whatever the hell they want” if the Europeans refused to pay up.
In 2024, this threat sounds completely different than the saber-rattling in 2018, in my view. Having won the election, Trump specified his demands: he now says that European NATO member states should increase their defense spending to as much as 5% of GDP. This is hardly realistic. But today, with serious discussions taking place about the possibility of Russian aggression against the alliance, the Europeans are forced to take Trump’s escapades seriously. Thus, preparation for a likely peacekeeping operation in Ukraine will be the first test of European readiness for self-defense.
Carrying out such an operation will require colossal changes in the military organization of European countries. Of course, it would be relatively easier within the framework of NATO, given still-critical US logistical, airlift and strategic reconnaissance support. In this case, the alliance will have to return to the idea of “European cells.” If the US insists on complete nonparticipation in enforcing security guarantees for Ukraine, the question of creating a de facto European army will come to the fore.
Then, the conversation will turn to creating within the EU (including the UK, of course) a unified military command, along with staff structures, which would be tasked with planning both the operation itself and the possible reinforcement of the deployed contingent in the event of a crisis. In addition, logistics and intelligence would have to be set up.
Long before the operation, the military units that are to carry it out must be determined. Ideally, this would be multinational units already created under the joint command of NATO armed forces in Europe, such as Multinational Corps Northeast. Keeping the peace in Ukraine entails tasks of unprecedented difficulty.
If the Europeans can handle them, they might as the logical question: “do we really need NATO?”
Now, the idea of forcing allies to pay the highest possible price for US protection has been firmly ingrained in Trump’s mind. He brought it up more than once in the last election campaign, threating to “encourage [the Russians] to do whatever the hell they want” if the Europeans refused to pay up.
In 2024, this threat sounds completely different than the saber-rattling in 2018, in my view. Having won the election, Trump specified his demands: he now says that European NATO member states should increase their defense spending to as much as 5% of GDP. This is hardly realistic. But today, with serious discussions taking place about the possibility of Russian aggression against the alliance, the Europeans are forced to take Trump’s escapades seriously. Thus, preparation for a likely peacekeeping operation in Ukraine will be the first test of European readiness for self-defense.
Carrying out such an operation will require colossal changes in the military organization of European countries. Of course, it would be relatively easier within the framework of NATO, given still-critical US logistical, airlift and strategic reconnaissance support. In this case, the alliance will have to return to the idea of “European cells.” If the US insists on complete nonparticipation in enforcing security guarantees for Ukraine, the question of creating a de facto European army will come to the fore.
Then, the conversation will turn to creating within the EU (including the UK, of course) a unified military command, along with staff structures, which would be tasked with planning both the operation itself and the possible reinforcement of the deployed contingent in the event of a crisis. In addition, logistics and intelligence would have to be set up.
Long before the operation, the military units that are to carry it out must be determined. Ideally, this would be multinational units already created under the joint command of NATO armed forces in Europe, such as Multinational Corps Northeast. Keeping the peace in Ukraine entails tasks of unprecedented difficulty.
If the Europeans can handle them, they might as the logical question: “do we really need NATO?”
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