Society
Russian Education Further Transforming into Kremlin Ideological Instrument
February 6, 2025
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Sergey Chernyshov
Historian, researcher at Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Historian Sergey Chernyshov examines how and why Russian educators have rallied around the flag since the start of the war in Ukraine, as well as the resilience of school and university students to the increasingly stifling environment of ideological indoctrination in the classroom.
Every day in Russia, about 2 million schoolteachers, college professors and university lecturers walk into classrooms and interact with students. Their combined audience is in line with that of the Russian media, yet it is deemed inappropriate to discuss their work critically.
Pro-Kremlin researchers and journalists believe that Russian educators are raising a new, patriotic generation. Opposition and foreign experts, meanwhile, tend to talk about schools and universities as victims of state violence that do not believe government propaganda and do what is asked of them out of fear of persecution.
Since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war three years ago, enough data has emerged about the scale of repression, the effectiveness of state propaganda in schools and universities, and the level (and nature) of support among educators themselves for the aggression against Ukraine to test these claims.
There has been much research showing that current state propaganda around the war resonates with the values and convictions of Russian educators. The teaching community – at schools and universities – has never been known for liberalism or humanism and has uncritically accepted Kremlin declarations about a “revival of Russia’s greatness” and “total war with the West for the survival of Russian civilization.”
That said, it seems this toxic environment has yet to translate into firm views among school and university students about the war, Russia’s place in the world, etc.
School, the totalitarian state and war
Prominent educational theorists do not provide an answer to the question of how to see schools and universities operating in a totalitarian state, especially one at war.
The father of modern education, John Amos Comenius, reduced the function of education to the reproduction of society. Philosopher Michel Foucault considered schools to be one of the key repressive institutions of society – along with prisons, hospitals and army barracks. On the other hand, the ideologues behind what became known as research, Wilhelm von Humboldt and Friedrich Schleiermacher, believed that a university (whether in Berlin or elsewhere) should transform society. Meanwhile, the 20th-century philosopher Ivan Illich criticized institutional schooling as “the reproductive organ of a consumer society.”
How should we assess the role of education in the reproduction of a repressive or totalitarian political system, for example, in the rise of National Socialism in Germany in the 1930s? Even Karl Jaspers, who was not shy about criticizing his own people, stumbled over this question, leaving out an analysis of schools and universities in his book The Question of German Guilt.
Contemporary Russian historian Nikolai Epple, in his book An Inconvenient Past, discusses the institutions for the inculcation of a militarized collective memory in Russia, analyzing everything from the media to neighbors – without mentioning educational institutions, however.
The paradigm of “education as a victim” explains little about the past or the present. It fails to account for the current commitment of Russian educators to militaristic propaganda. Even researchers who intentionally collected evidence of state repression in education managed to find only 200 such cases across the entire country since the war started, with most of the accused getting off with fines.
Of the more than 1,000 scholars and university professors who signed an open letter against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at the beginning of the war, 99% continue to work inside Russia without any problems.
Thus, it seems quite plausible that no arm-twisting was needed to get many Russian educators to spread the state’s militaristic propaganda.
Pro-Kremlin researchers and journalists believe that Russian educators are raising a new, patriotic generation. Opposition and foreign experts, meanwhile, tend to talk about schools and universities as victims of state violence that do not believe government propaganda and do what is asked of them out of fear of persecution.
Since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war three years ago, enough data has emerged about the scale of repression, the effectiveness of state propaganda in schools and universities, and the level (and nature) of support among educators themselves for the aggression against Ukraine to test these claims.
There has been much research showing that current state propaganda around the war resonates with the values and convictions of Russian educators. The teaching community – at schools and universities – has never been known for liberalism or humanism and has uncritically accepted Kremlin declarations about a “revival of Russia’s greatness” and “total war with the West for the survival of Russian civilization.”
That said, it seems this toxic environment has yet to translate into firm views among school and university students about the war, Russia’s place in the world, etc.
School, the totalitarian state and war
Prominent educational theorists do not provide an answer to the question of how to see schools and universities operating in a totalitarian state, especially one at war.
The father of modern education, John Amos Comenius, reduced the function of education to the reproduction of society. Philosopher Michel Foucault considered schools to be one of the key repressive institutions of society – along with prisons, hospitals and army barracks. On the other hand, the ideologues behind what became known as research, Wilhelm von Humboldt and Friedrich Schleiermacher, believed that a university (whether in Berlin or elsewhere) should transform society. Meanwhile, the 20th-century philosopher Ivan Illich criticized institutional schooling as “the reproductive organ of a consumer society.”
How should we assess the role of education in the reproduction of a repressive or totalitarian political system, for example, in the rise of National Socialism in Germany in the 1930s? Even Karl Jaspers, who was not shy about criticizing his own people, stumbled over this question, leaving out an analysis of schools and universities in his book The Question of German Guilt.
Contemporary Russian historian Nikolai Epple, in his book An Inconvenient Past, discusses the institutions for the inculcation of a militarized collective memory in Russia, analyzing everything from the media to neighbors – without mentioning educational institutions, however.
The paradigm of “education as a victim” explains little about the past or the present. It fails to account for the current commitment of Russian educators to militaristic propaganda. Even researchers who intentionally collected evidence of state repression in education managed to find only 200 such cases across the entire country since the war started, with most of the accused getting off with fines.
Of the more than 1,000 scholars and university professors who signed an open letter against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at the beginning of the war, 99% continue to work inside Russia without any problems.
Thus, it seems quite plausible that no arm-twisting was needed to get many Russian educators to spread the state’s militaristic propaganda.
In Russian schools, "Desks of Heroes" are being set up to honor veterans, including those who fought in the "special military operation." Pictured is one in Bratsk, Irkutsk Region. Source: VK
Promotion of war in Russian education
Before moving on to an analysis of the motivations of Russian educators in this regard, let us briefly look at what, in fact, they are doing.
In March 2024, Russian Education Minister Sergei Kravtsov announced the country had succeeded in creating a “sovereign education system” and cited its main elements: “returning” “character building” in schools (vospitatel’naya rabota; the most infamous being “Conversations about Important Things”); raising the national flag in a ceremony; introducing “new” subjects like “Fundamentals of Security and Defense of the Motherland” to replace “Fundamentals of Safety and Wellness” (launched after the collapse of the USSR) and a Soviet-style “Labor” course to replace “Technology” (also introduced in the early 1990s); and bringing back a single state curriculum.
The main problem is not even that war propaganda has taken root in Russian schools; it is that schools seem to have degenerated to the most dismal times of the Brezhnev-era stagnation half a century ago – where children are supposed to study the speeches of the country’s leader (Putin’s interview with Tucker Carlson has been recommended as a reliable source of information), participate in the so-called Movement of the First (Dvizheniye pervykh; essentially a revived Pioneer organization), distribute draft notices during mobilization and weave camouflage nets for the army.
The same can be said about Russian universities. As in schools, “character building” has been resurrected, with each university required to have a vice-rector for it, as well as a Movement of the First branch. Whereas schools have “Conversations about Important Things,” universities are obligated to teach the propagandistic course “Fundamentals of Russian Statehood” (see Russia.Post about it here). Even higher education in Russia is to become “sovereign”: starting next year, Russian universities will finally abandon the bachelor’s and master’s degrees introduced in the early 1990s and switch back to the old system of “higher education” and “specialized higher education.”
Before moving on to an analysis of the motivations of Russian educators in this regard, let us briefly look at what, in fact, they are doing.
In March 2024, Russian Education Minister Sergei Kravtsov announced the country had succeeded in creating a “sovereign education system” and cited its main elements: “returning” “character building” in schools (vospitatel’naya rabota; the most infamous being “Conversations about Important Things”); raising the national flag in a ceremony; introducing “new” subjects like “Fundamentals of Security and Defense of the Motherland” to replace “Fundamentals of Safety and Wellness” (launched after the collapse of the USSR) and a Soviet-style “Labor” course to replace “Technology” (also introduced in the early 1990s); and bringing back a single state curriculum.
The main problem is not even that war propaganda has taken root in Russian schools; it is that schools seem to have degenerated to the most dismal times of the Brezhnev-era stagnation half a century ago – where children are supposed to study the speeches of the country’s leader (Putin’s interview with Tucker Carlson has been recommended as a reliable source of information), participate in the so-called Movement of the First (Dvizheniye pervykh; essentially a revived Pioneer organization), distribute draft notices during mobilization and weave camouflage nets for the army.
The same can be said about Russian universities. As in schools, “character building” has been resurrected, with each university required to have a vice-rector for it, as well as a Movement of the First branch. Whereas schools have “Conversations about Important Things,” universities are obligated to teach the propagandistic course “Fundamentals of Russian Statehood” (see Russia.Post about it here). Even higher education in Russia is to become “sovereign”: starting next year, Russian universities will finally abandon the bachelor’s and master’s degrees introduced in the early 1990s and switch back to the old system of “higher education” and “specialized higher education.”
“In just three years of war, both schools and universities in Russia have methodically been transformed into bastions of support for the Kremlin. This is not just about militaristic propaganda but also about archaizing the country’s education system in general.”
Ekaterina Mizulina, who leads the so-called Safe Internet League, an organization leading the charge in internet censorship, meets with St Petersburg State University students in December 2023. Source: VK
‘Traditional values’ and Russian educators
Today, enough data has been collected to allow us to assert that all these government initiatives have fallen on fertile ground – Russian educators readily accept the “rising from our knees” policy abroad and the “strong hand” policy at home.
As research from previous years shows, Russian teachers as a community hold “traditional values” in the sense in which this term is used in today’s Russia. In other words, they are generally not committed to the values of a “happy private life,” instead favoring a “strong state” and seeing the collapse of the USSR as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe.”
In the conditions of the Kremlin’s war of aggression that has lasted for three years, teachers have consistently supported many of the Russian government’s militaristic policies.
According to the state pollster VTsIOM, 89% of teachers unconditionally support the current “policy of protecting traditional spiritual and moral values in Russia” (read: “militaristic propaganda”). Whether you believe the VTsIOM figures or not, over the past three years many studies have been conducted in different Russian regions showing exactly the same results: teachers are happy to feel involved in something “great,” advocate more “character building” and are keen to “objectively inform schoolchildren about the special military operation.”
In relation to the war in particular, Russian teachers seem to have staked out a position similar to that described in several field studies by the Public Sociology Laboratory (see, for example, here): they actively organize the mandated militaristic events (from “Conversations about Important Things” to weaving camouflage nets) not because they are staunch supporters of the war, but because they are doing what the state expects of them.
Generally, this position is met with understanding from parents, who agree that schoolchildren should be shown videos about the special operation and that schools (as well as universities) should introduce “Fundamentals of Russian Statehood.”
How effective is state propaganda in schools and universities?
The reality is that the war in Ukraine worries both school and university students in Russia. For example, a large survey of young people in central Russia and Crimea in 2023 showed that 47% of girls and 34% of boys experience subjective stress, which the survey’s authors attribute to the war. Young people who believe that something has changed in their lives since the start of the war are 50% less likely to make long-term plans.
Russian youth have differing opinions about the war. According to a 2023 study by Tomsk University, about half of young people are not interested in the war at all, while the other half closely follow news about it. Separately, almost half report severe stress and serious thoughts about emigrating, while the other half say nothing has changed for them.
According to Levada Center polling, young people least follow news about the war across all age groups. Moreover, the numbers have been decreasing, amounting to no more than 25% at the end of last year, with those who followed developments “closely” at no more than 5% of young people overall. This seems to be what Alexei Levinson of the Levada Center (see Russia.Post here) is referring to when he writes: “… young people, who are the hardest to control, are a particular concern for this older leadership – after all, it needs young men to fill the ranks of the army.”
As for schoolchildren , the Russian Academy of Education, based on its (above-cited) survey in which 1.7 million Russian schoolchildren took part, reports that they generally perceive “Conversations about Important Things” positively and are ready for “active dialogue about traditional values.”
Even though these “Conversations about Important Things” were likely started to generate support for the war among schoolchildren, the few surveys looking at the attitudes of school and university students to the special military operation show that their support is by no means unambiguous.
For example, a study of schoolchildren in Obninsk, a city outside of Moscow, revealed that only about 30% have a positive attitude to the war, with as many as 20% voicing a negative attitude. In addition, a survey of university students in Nizhny Novgorod Region showed that just 27% consider the war “definitely necessary,” versus 19% who rejected the necessity of the war, 31% who found it too hard to answer and 20% who refused to participate in the survey.
In other words, Russian school and university students are – at least for now – far from the unanimity about the country’s direction displayed by Russian educators and Russian government officials. The attitudes of young people to the war, in fact, differ little from those that have crystallized in Russian society as a whole. Perhaps this is good news. Perhaps too little time has passed to say anything for certain – education is not a field where results are visible in a few months or even in a few years.
Today, enough data has been collected to allow us to assert that all these government initiatives have fallen on fertile ground – Russian educators readily accept the “rising from our knees” policy abroad and the “strong hand” policy at home.
As research from previous years shows, Russian teachers as a community hold “traditional values” in the sense in which this term is used in today’s Russia. In other words, they are generally not committed to the values of a “happy private life,” instead favoring a “strong state” and seeing the collapse of the USSR as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe.”
In the conditions of the Kremlin’s war of aggression that has lasted for three years, teachers have consistently supported many of the Russian government’s militaristic policies.
According to the state pollster VTsIOM, 89% of teachers unconditionally support the current “policy of protecting traditional spiritual and moral values in Russia” (read: “militaristic propaganda”). Whether you believe the VTsIOM figures or not, over the past three years many studies have been conducted in different Russian regions showing exactly the same results: teachers are happy to feel involved in something “great,” advocate more “character building” and are keen to “objectively inform schoolchildren about the special military operation.”
In relation to the war in particular, Russian teachers seem to have staked out a position similar to that described in several field studies by the Public Sociology Laboratory (see, for example, here): they actively organize the mandated militaristic events (from “Conversations about Important Things” to weaving camouflage nets) not because they are staunch supporters of the war, but because they are doing what the state expects of them.
Generally, this position is met with understanding from parents, who agree that schoolchildren should be shown videos about the special operation and that schools (as well as universities) should introduce “Fundamentals of Russian Statehood.”
How effective is state propaganda in schools and universities?
The reality is that the war in Ukraine worries both school and university students in Russia. For example, a large survey of young people in central Russia and Crimea in 2023 showed that 47% of girls and 34% of boys experience subjective stress, which the survey’s authors attribute to the war. Young people who believe that something has changed in their lives since the start of the war are 50% less likely to make long-term plans.
Russian youth have differing opinions about the war. According to a 2023 study by Tomsk University, about half of young people are not interested in the war at all, while the other half closely follow news about it. Separately, almost half report severe stress and serious thoughts about emigrating, while the other half say nothing has changed for them.
According to Levada Center polling, young people least follow news about the war across all age groups. Moreover, the numbers have been decreasing, amounting to no more than 25% at the end of last year, with those who followed developments “closely” at no more than 5% of young people overall. This seems to be what Alexei Levinson of the Levada Center (see Russia.Post here) is referring to when he writes: “… young people, who are the hardest to control, are a particular concern for this older leadership – after all, it needs young men to fill the ranks of the army.”
As for schoolchildren , the Russian Academy of Education, based on its (above-cited) survey in which 1.7 million Russian schoolchildren took part, reports that they generally perceive “Conversations about Important Things” positively and are ready for “active dialogue about traditional values.”
Even though these “Conversations about Important Things” were likely started to generate support for the war among schoolchildren, the few surveys looking at the attitudes of school and university students to the special military operation show that their support is by no means unambiguous.
For example, a study of schoolchildren in Obninsk, a city outside of Moscow, revealed that only about 30% have a positive attitude to the war, with as many as 20% voicing a negative attitude. In addition, a survey of university students in Nizhny Novgorod Region showed that just 27% consider the war “definitely necessary,” versus 19% who rejected the necessity of the war, 31% who found it too hard to answer and 20% who refused to participate in the survey.
In other words, Russian school and university students are – at least for now – far from the unanimity about the country’s direction displayed by Russian educators and Russian government officials. The attitudes of young people to the war, in fact, differ little from those that have crystallized in Russian society as a whole. Perhaps this is good news. Perhaps too little time has passed to say anything for certain – education is not a field where results are visible in a few months or even in a few years.
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