SOCIETY
Three Years of Military Hostilities
March 27, 2025
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Denis Volkov
Director of the Levada Center (Moscow)
Sociologist and Levada Center director Denis Volkov sums up three years of studying public opinion about the special operation and explains the main reasons for the stability of mass assessments.
The original text in Russian was published in Gorby. A shortened version is republished here with the author’s permission
Throughout the three years since the start of the special operation, we at the Levada Center have been closely monitoring public sentiment, tracking dozens of different indicators every month — government ratings, economic assessments, general sentiments, attitudes toward the special operation itself, assessments of current events. The material accumulated to date allows us to describe in detail how Russian society understands the essence of the situation, how it is experiencing this conflict, and how it is adapting to changing living conditions.
Public opinion on the special operation is mixed, but people's attitudes towards the conflict have changed little over the past three years, which also requires explanation.
The latest anniversary of the outbreak of the conflict, as well as timid hopes that it may be nearing an end, give rise to a conversation about the imprint these events have left on public opinion.
From shock to routine
From the first day and for several weeks after, the military actions almost completely captured the attention of Russians. People told focus groups that they could not tear themselves away from their smartphones, followed the news on TV, and that all conversations were consumed by the event. They were afraid of the uncertainty—what would happen next and how it would affect their lives.
The start of the special operation led to the first wave of departures among the westernized residents of the largest cities. But these events did not cause any serious changes in the daily attitudes of the majority; they were observed as if from the sidelines.
The main changes that we recorded in the surveys of that time were rising government ratings, people unifying “around the flag,” and the growth of national-patriotic sentiments. In this regard, they usually talk about the strengthening of Vladimir Putin's rating, but at the time, the assessments of all state institutions rose synchronously.
Among politicians, those who took a tough nationalist position came to the fore, while opposition politicians, on the contrary, began to fall into obscurity.
Incidentally, similar processes of national-patriotic consolidation took place in Ukraine, the most striking evidence of which is the sharp increase in the rating of Volodymyr Zelensky from 37% in February to 90% in March 2022 (according to data from KIIS —Kyiv International Institute of Sociology).
In focus groups at that time, respondents argued that “the West is dragging us into war” and that “we will have to respond.” The majority of the population—following the Russian elites and the narratives of the central Russian media—perceived the current conflict as a confrontation between Russia and the West, a proxy war that the West is waging against Russia through the hands of Ukrainians.
Subsequent Western sanctions and NATO arms supplies to Ukraine further convinced the Russians that this version of events was correct.
Throughout the three years since the start of the special operation, we at the Levada Center have been closely monitoring public sentiment, tracking dozens of different indicators every month — government ratings, economic assessments, general sentiments, attitudes toward the special operation itself, assessments of current events. The material accumulated to date allows us to describe in detail how Russian society understands the essence of the situation, how it is experiencing this conflict, and how it is adapting to changing living conditions.
Public opinion on the special operation is mixed, but people's attitudes towards the conflict have changed little over the past three years, which also requires explanation.
The latest anniversary of the outbreak of the conflict, as well as timid hopes that it may be nearing an end, give rise to a conversation about the imprint these events have left on public opinion.
From shock to routine
From the first day and for several weeks after, the military actions almost completely captured the attention of Russians. People told focus groups that they could not tear themselves away from their smartphones, followed the news on TV, and that all conversations were consumed by the event. They were afraid of the uncertainty—what would happen next and how it would affect their lives.
The start of the special operation led to the first wave of departures among the westernized residents of the largest cities. But these events did not cause any serious changes in the daily attitudes of the majority; they were observed as if from the sidelines.
The main changes that we recorded in the surveys of that time were rising government ratings, people unifying “around the flag,” and the growth of national-patriotic sentiments. In this regard, they usually talk about the strengthening of Vladimir Putin's rating, but at the time, the assessments of all state institutions rose synchronously.
Among politicians, those who took a tough nationalist position came to the fore, while opposition politicians, on the contrary, began to fall into obscurity.
Incidentally, similar processes of national-patriotic consolidation took place in Ukraine, the most striking evidence of which is the sharp increase in the rating of Volodymyr Zelensky from 37% in February to 90% in March 2022 (according to data from KIIS —Kyiv International Institute of Sociology).
In focus groups at that time, respondents argued that “the West is dragging us into war” and that “we will have to respond.” The majority of the population—following the Russian elites and the narratives of the central Russian media—perceived the current conflict as a confrontation between Russia and the West, a proxy war that the West is waging against Russia through the hands of Ukrainians.
Subsequent Western sanctions and NATO arms supplies to Ukraine further convinced the Russians that this version of events was correct.
“In this understanding of the situation, Russia appears, if not as a victim, then as a country defending itself from a stronger adversary. In the eyes of the majority, this lends additional legitimacy to the actions of the Russian leadership.”
Protest against war in Ukraine in Moscow (24 February 2022). Source: Wiki Commons
The initial shock was briefly supplemented by economic concerns: general uncertainty, Western sanctions, and restrictions on currency transactions pushed people with savings — and they are a minority in Russia — to withdraw money from banks.
Focus groups began to talk about the prospect of returning to the 90s, switching to “foraging for food” (this is when Alexander Prokhanov’s comment about the chipmunk people who collect mushrooms, berries, and nuts was born), and young people mourned the departure of Coca-Cola, McDonald’s, and Ikea from Russia.
But by mid-spring 2022, these conversations had died down, and the first signs of adaptation to the new situation appeared. The government's efforts to stabilize the economy and the resourcefulness of Russian businesses, which managed to establish parallel imports, began to take effect.
Prices have risen — but when have they not? Subjective assessments of the economic situation by respondents, which had been improving for 2-3 years before the beginning of 2022, froze for only 1-2 months and began to rise again (and only began to decline after the presidential elections in the spring of 2024).
The most severe source of stress recorded by the surveys was caused by the partial mobilization.
In just a few weeks — from August to September 2022 — the number of people experiencing a “normal, even-keeled mood” decreased by one and a half times: from 64 to 45%.
Focus groups began to talk about the prospect of returning to the 90s, switching to “foraging for food” (this is when Alexander Prokhanov’s comment about the chipmunk people who collect mushrooms, berries, and nuts was born), and young people mourned the departure of Coca-Cola, McDonald’s, and Ikea from Russia.
But by mid-spring 2022, these conversations had died down, and the first signs of adaptation to the new situation appeared. The government's efforts to stabilize the economy and the resourcefulness of Russian businesses, which managed to establish parallel imports, began to take effect.
Prices have risen — but when have they not? Subjective assessments of the economic situation by respondents, which had been improving for 2-3 years before the beginning of 2022, froze for only 1-2 months and began to rise again (and only began to decline after the presidential elections in the spring of 2024).
The most severe source of stress recorded by the surveys was caused by the partial mobilization.
In just a few weeks — from August to September 2022 — the number of people experiencing a “normal, even-keeled mood” decreased by one and a half times: from 64 to 45%.
“We have not seen such a sharp, one-time deterioration in public sentiment in more than thirty years of sociological measurements.”
Russian men flee Ukraine War mobilization. The queue to the checkpoint "Upper Lars" on the Russian-Georgian border. Archives.
At the same time, the number of supporters of peace negotiations increased — from 48% in September to 57% in October 2022 (the figure didn’t rise this high again until the end of 2023), and the government's ratings decreased, albeit slightly.
The resulting panic led to a second wave of departures from Russia. This time, it was primarily men subject to conscription who fled, alone or with their families.
The special operation has instantly transformed from a distant border conflict that only created minor economic inconveniences, into a real threat to Russian men and a threat to the usual way of life of most Russian families.
However, the completion of the partial mobilization and the subsequent transition to the formation of a volunteer army soothed public opinion — the mood returned to normal by the beginning of 2023. By this time, for most Russians, military operations had become a routine that you only had to watch from the periphery, in part so as to not weigh your soul down with unnecessary worries — after all, it is impossible to influence the situation.
The fear of mobilization returned briefly only after the attack on the Kursk Oblast, which reminded the majority that the conflict could escalate at any moment. Other events — such as the withdrawal of the Russian army in the fall of 2022, the mutiny of Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2023, the capture of Bakhmut and Avdiivka by Russian troops, or the use of Oreshnik in late 2024 — although named by respondents as important events of their time, had virtually no impact on public sentiment. They turned out to be purely media stories, which the majority watched with interest, but with great detachment.
The resulting panic led to a second wave of departures from Russia. This time, it was primarily men subject to conscription who fled, alone or with their families.
The special operation has instantly transformed from a distant border conflict that only created minor economic inconveniences, into a real threat to Russian men and a threat to the usual way of life of most Russian families.
However, the completion of the partial mobilization and the subsequent transition to the formation of a volunteer army soothed public opinion — the mood returned to normal by the beginning of 2023. By this time, for most Russians, military operations had become a routine that you only had to watch from the periphery, in part so as to not weigh your soul down with unnecessary worries — after all, it is impossible to influence the situation.
The fear of mobilization returned briefly only after the attack on the Kursk Oblast, which reminded the majority that the conflict could escalate at any moment. Other events — such as the withdrawal of the Russian army in the fall of 2022, the mutiny of Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2023, the capture of Bakhmut and Avdiivka by Russian troops, or the use of Oreshnik in late 2024 — although named by respondents as important events of their time, had virtually no impact on public sentiment. They turned out to be purely media stories, which the majority watched with interest, but with great detachment.
“Only those events of the special operation that people could relate to and considered a real threat to their own way of life had the greatest influence on public opinion.”
The ability to distance oneself, to close oneself off from what was happening, or to watch events from the outside allowed most to survive the conflict, including the increasing number of casualties on the Russian side.
Attitude toward losses
Although in Russia, only official data from the Russian Ministry of Defense is permitted in the media, the intensity of the military actions and their duration nevertheless give reason to assume that the losses are serious.
At the same time, no mass protest movement on this issue has been observed in Russia, if we do not count individual protests by the wives of those mobilized (see Russia.Post about it here), which, however, remain small in number and have not resonated in any noticeable way among the majority of the population.
Although the numbers of casualties are not published, officials do not conceal the fact that there are losses, but in the public sphere, the glorification of the dead prevails. The president regularly meets with the families of the dead, “glory alleys” lined with trees named after the fallen fighters are being opened in cities, schools are being named after graduates who died during the special operation, memorial plaques are being unveiled, and in Moscow on Varvarka, a spontaneous memorial to the Wagner fighters has been erected.
Personal experiences are pushed into the private sphere. In focus groups, conversations about losses arise from time to time, especially if there are those present who have lost a relative or friend. However, this does not happen often. In people's minds, the fighting in Ukraine is carried out mainly by professional soldiers and volunteers. This means that this is their job, their choice, they knew what they were getting into.
Supporting "our own" and the "war party"
When opening a conversation in our surveys about the scale of support for the Ukrainian policy of the Russian authorities, it is necessary to note that we ask about “support for the actions of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine.”
The media — not only the Russia official media but also in foreign media — often like to cite the upper limit of support, which was on average around 75% over almost three years of measurements (in some months it reached 80%, but never fell below 70%).
Attitude toward losses
Although in Russia, only official data from the Russian Ministry of Defense is permitted in the media, the intensity of the military actions and their duration nevertheless give reason to assume that the losses are serious.
At the same time, no mass protest movement on this issue has been observed in Russia, if we do not count individual protests by the wives of those mobilized (see Russia.Post about it here), which, however, remain small in number and have not resonated in any noticeable way among the majority of the population.
Although the numbers of casualties are not published, officials do not conceal the fact that there are losses, but in the public sphere, the glorification of the dead prevails. The president regularly meets with the families of the dead, “glory alleys” lined with trees named after the fallen fighters are being opened in cities, schools are being named after graduates who died during the special operation, memorial plaques are being unveiled, and in Moscow on Varvarka, a spontaneous memorial to the Wagner fighters has been erected.
Personal experiences are pushed into the private sphere. In focus groups, conversations about losses arise from time to time, especially if there are those present who have lost a relative or friend. However, this does not happen often. In people's minds, the fighting in Ukraine is carried out mainly by professional soldiers and volunteers. This means that this is their job, their choice, they knew what they were getting into.
Supporting "our own" and the "war party"
When opening a conversation in our surveys about the scale of support for the Ukrainian policy of the Russian authorities, it is necessary to note that we ask about “support for the actions of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine.”
The media — not only the Russia official media but also in foreign media — often like to cite the upper limit of support, which was on average around 75% over almost three years of measurements (in some months it reached 80%, but never fell below 70%).
“However, throughout the conflict, noticeably fewer people spoke about full, unconditional support for the Russian military — on average, about 45% of respondents responded ‘I fully support’.”
The movement of soldiers’ wives and relatives Put’ Domoy (“Way Home”). The signs read "justice means demobilization for the mobilized" (left) and "it's time for the mobilized to come home" (right). Moscow, November 2023. Source: Telegram-channel Istories_media
More often, such answers are given by men, older respondents and television viewers, but particularly long-time supporters of the government.
Another 30% of Russians choose the answer “I somewhat support” — weaker support with various reservations. Women and young respondents answer this way more often, justifying their position as follows: “it’s terrible that people are dying, but perhaps it couldn’t have been done any other way.” Support in this group is situational, inconsistent and unstable, and when the situation changes, it can be replaced by cautious disagreement.
When people talk about supporting the Russian military, they primarily mean supporting "their own kind" rather than supporting military actions as such. Respondents were sometimes even surprised by the question: "Who else should we support?" These are "our boys,” "our warriors,” "we support our own.”
For most Russians who are not directly involved in the conflict and follow the news through the media (mainly on television), the special operation is like a sports match in which they can root for their home team.
The idea that Russia launched a special operation to protect the Russian-speaking population of Donbass — for three years this has been considered the main goal behind the start of the conflict — convinces Russians of the legitimacy of the military actions; let us recall the succinct propaganda cliché: “We don’t abandon our own.”
Moreover, the very word “special operation” for many Russians means limited military actions (as opposed to a full-scale war) aimed almost exclusively at the Ukrainian army and military facilities.
Finally, people in the weak support category often explain that they are “just simple people,” “the higher-ups know better,” “if Putin decided so, then he had his reasons,” “we will never know the whole truth anyway.” All of this helps people come to terms with the terrible, traumatic news.
Another 30% of Russians choose the answer “I somewhat support” — weaker support with various reservations. Women and young respondents answer this way more often, justifying their position as follows: “it’s terrible that people are dying, but perhaps it couldn’t have been done any other way.” Support in this group is situational, inconsistent and unstable, and when the situation changes, it can be replaced by cautious disagreement.
When people talk about supporting the Russian military, they primarily mean supporting "their own kind" rather than supporting military actions as such. Respondents were sometimes even surprised by the question: "Who else should we support?" These are "our boys,” "our warriors,” "we support our own.”
For most Russians who are not directly involved in the conflict and follow the news through the media (mainly on television), the special operation is like a sports match in which they can root for their home team.
The idea that Russia launched a special operation to protect the Russian-speaking population of Donbass — for three years this has been considered the main goal behind the start of the conflict — convinces Russians of the legitimacy of the military actions; let us recall the succinct propaganda cliché: “We don’t abandon our own.”
Moreover, the very word “special operation” for many Russians means limited military actions (as opposed to a full-scale war) aimed almost exclusively at the Ukrainian army and military facilities.
Finally, people in the weak support category often explain that they are “just simple people,” “the higher-ups know better,” “if Putin decided so, then he had his reasons,” “we will never know the whole truth anyway.” All of this helps people come to terms with the terrible, traumatic news.
Igor Strelkov. Source: Wiki Commons
At the same time, only about 20-25% of Russians demonstrate the most firm pro-war position (depending on the wording of the question, these figures are also quite stable)— those who have been answering all this time that "a ceasefire is now unacceptable under any circumstances." These are again, first of all, older men, television viewers and supporters of the authorities.
I added "long-time" here, because if they're supporting the government now, they're technically government supporters, but what I think is being said here is that they have been supporters of the government for a long time, since before the war.
Their main arguments, heard in focus groups in response to open questions, are usually as follows: “we need to finish what we started,” “we need to go all the way, otherwise what was the point of all these sacrifices,” “we can only accept victory,” “we can’t let the enemy regroup,” “there’s no one to negotiate with.”
The so-called opposition “from the right” — people who support the continuation of military action and at the same time do not support the government, personified by Igor Strelkov (Girkin), currently serving his sentence in a penal colony — RP) — is practically indistinguishable in polls. This position may be clearly represented in pro-war Telegram channels, but, judging by the polls, it is shared by no more than 5% of Russians.
A few words should be said about public assistance to the front.
I added "long-time" here, because if they're supporting the government now, they're technically government supporters, but what I think is being said here is that they have been supporters of the government for a long time, since before the war.
Their main arguments, heard in focus groups in response to open questions, are usually as follows: “we need to finish what we started,” “we need to go all the way, otherwise what was the point of all these sacrifices,” “we can only accept victory,” “we can’t let the enemy regroup,” “there’s no one to negotiate with.”
The so-called opposition “from the right” — people who support the continuation of military action and at the same time do not support the government, personified by Igor Strelkov (Girkin), currently serving his sentence in a penal colony — RP) — is practically indistinguishable in polls. This position may be clearly represented in pro-war Telegram channels, but, judging by the polls, it is shared by no more than 5% of Russians.
A few words should be said about public assistance to the front.
“The number of Russians participating in the collection of monetary or material assistance for participants in the special operation is approximately 40%.”
Among them there are most certainly committed activists, but such an impressive figure was most likely achieved thanks to the mediation of state and near-state structures, such as budgetary institutions and church parishes, which pushed people to participate as much as they could.
It would be wrong to identify all those involved in helping participants of the special operation as part of the "war party" — those who support negotiations and continuation of military actions both help soldiers equally. However, citizens who support the special operation participate in fundraising one and a half to two times more often than those who do not support it. Women are more likely to participate than men. Residents of small towns and settlements participate more often than residents of the largest cities (48% versus 22%).
Dissenters and the "peace party"
Throughout the conflict, the proportion of Russians who openly do not support the actions of the Russian military averaged around 18–20%. Within this group are also those who take an uncompromising anti-war position, comprising 8–9% of Russians — these are the people with the most consistent anti-war stances.
Often, this position is coupled with hardline anti-Putin views, as well as sympathies for Ukraine and the West. Their main source of information is the internet and vlogs.
The remaining 9-10% of Russians demonstrate rather weak, less consistent disagreement with the Russian government's position on Ukraine, which is not necessarily accompanied by pro-Ukrainian and pro-Western sympathies. This position is typical of the youngest Russians surveyed, who are mostly apolitical, do not watch TV and learn what is happening from the internet, so they are outside the dominant information agenda and are less indoctrinated. In groups, they explain their views approximately as follows: "I do not understand how anything can be solved through military action,” "I am for peace around the world.”
At the same time, the "peace party" is much broader than the indicated 1/5 of the population with an anti-war position. Thus, support for the end of military actions has been high almost from the very beginning (we have regularly been posing questions about this since the fall of 2022). During this time, on average, about 52% of Russians regularly spoke out in favor of the transition to peace negotiations (the maximum level of 58% was observed in the summer of 2024 for two months before the Ukrainian army's offensive on the Kursk Oblast).
This is a very amorphous and heterogeneous group, uniting people with different political sympathies, with different understandings of the reasons for what is happening, but predominantly those loyal to the authorities.
It should also be noted that among Russians who approve of the president's activities, about half have been in favor of ending the conflict as soon as possible and transitioning to peace talks from the very beginning, but with one important caveat: it is up to the president to decide when and under what conditions. It is wrong to identify the "peace party" entirely with Russians who hold strong anti-war convictions and pro-Ukrainian or pro-Western sympathies.
It would be wrong to identify all those involved in helping participants of the special operation as part of the "war party" — those who support negotiations and continuation of military actions both help soldiers equally. However, citizens who support the special operation participate in fundraising one and a half to two times more often than those who do not support it. Women are more likely to participate than men. Residents of small towns and settlements participate more often than residents of the largest cities (48% versus 22%).
Dissenters and the "peace party"
Throughout the conflict, the proportion of Russians who openly do not support the actions of the Russian military averaged around 18–20%. Within this group are also those who take an uncompromising anti-war position, comprising 8–9% of Russians — these are the people with the most consistent anti-war stances.
Often, this position is coupled with hardline anti-Putin views, as well as sympathies for Ukraine and the West. Their main source of information is the internet and vlogs.
The remaining 9-10% of Russians demonstrate rather weak, less consistent disagreement with the Russian government's position on Ukraine, which is not necessarily accompanied by pro-Ukrainian and pro-Western sympathies. This position is typical of the youngest Russians surveyed, who are mostly apolitical, do not watch TV and learn what is happening from the internet, so they are outside the dominant information agenda and are less indoctrinated. In groups, they explain their views approximately as follows: "I do not understand how anything can be solved through military action,” "I am for peace around the world.”
At the same time, the "peace party" is much broader than the indicated 1/5 of the population with an anti-war position. Thus, support for the end of military actions has been high almost from the very beginning (we have regularly been posing questions about this since the fall of 2022). During this time, on average, about 52% of Russians regularly spoke out in favor of the transition to peace negotiations (the maximum level of 58% was observed in the summer of 2024 for two months before the Ukrainian army's offensive on the Kursk Oblast).
This is a very amorphous and heterogeneous group, uniting people with different political sympathies, with different understandings of the reasons for what is happening, but predominantly those loyal to the authorities.
It should also be noted that among Russians who approve of the president's activities, about half have been in favor of ending the conflict as soon as possible and transitioning to peace talks from the very beginning, but with one important caveat: it is up to the president to decide when and under what conditions. It is wrong to identify the "peace party" entirely with Russians who hold strong anti-war convictions and pro-Ukrainian or pro-Western sympathies.
“Throughout the conflict, the ‘peace party’ numerically outnumbered the ‘war party’ by an average of 15 percentage points; in some months, the gap reached 24 percentage points.”
On March 12, Vladimir Putin visited the Kursk region for the first time since August 2024, when the region was partially occupied by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Source: Kremlin.ru
The main argument among advocates of peace is: "many people are dying,” "great losses,” "casualties on both sides" and therefore "enough is enough,” "it's time to put an end to this.” And implicitly: ‘I wish it would end sooner, so that I wouldn't have to participate in it and risk my life.’ It can be said that the growth in the number of supporters of negotiations is the main indicator of weariness and fatigue related to the military actions.
The dynamics of support for peace talks suggests that the “peace party” shrinks at the moments of the most intense fighting — for example, after the start of Ukrainian drone raids on Russian cities, shelling of border towns in the spring of 2023, raids by Ukrainian sabotage groups in the Belgorod region in the spring of 2024, and the Ukrainian army’s attack on the Kursk region in August 2024. Such events are more likely to harden public opinion.
Public opinion also, at least in part, follows the rhetoric of the authorities, and when top officials talk a lot about the need for peace talks, support for this idea increases, and vice versa. For example, a fairly long decline in the number of supporters of peace talks was observed throughout the presidential election campaign — from 57% in November 2023 to 48% in March 2024.
Reasons for stable attitudes
When studying the dynamics of public assessments of the special operation, the stability we observed is striking. Over the past three years in Russia, the indicators of support and understandings of the reasons and essence of the situation have remained practically unchanged.
This is all the more noticeable against the backdrop of significant shifts in public opinion in Ukraine, where the president’s rating has significantly decreased over the past year (from 77% to 52% in 2024 alone, according to KIIS), the willingness to give up some territories in order to end the conflict has increased, and the proportion of supporters of peace talks has exceeded the number of opponents for the first time.
There is always a temptation to explain the stability of Russian public opinion by citing the inherent patience that is a feature of the Russian national character.
However, there is a more rational explanation that follows from our description of the situation and is the result of a consistent and rather successful policy of the Russian authorities, which allows the majority of the population not to directly participate in the conflict and maintain a sense of “life as usual,” combined with the dominant role of the official media in interpreting the events. The last two explanations were discussed in detail in our previous articles for “Gorby” (see republication in Russia.Post here and here.
Taken together, these factors — the preservation of a more or less normal life far from the front line and even an improvement in the economic situation for the less well-off, but largest strata of the population, as well as the increasing dependence of the majority of Russians on the interpretations of the official media — have kept public sentiment stable throughout the past three years.
The dynamics of support for peace talks suggests that the “peace party” shrinks at the moments of the most intense fighting — for example, after the start of Ukrainian drone raids on Russian cities, shelling of border towns in the spring of 2023, raids by Ukrainian sabotage groups in the Belgorod region in the spring of 2024, and the Ukrainian army’s attack on the Kursk region in August 2024. Such events are more likely to harden public opinion.
Public opinion also, at least in part, follows the rhetoric of the authorities, and when top officials talk a lot about the need for peace talks, support for this idea increases, and vice versa. For example, a fairly long decline in the number of supporters of peace talks was observed throughout the presidential election campaign — from 57% in November 2023 to 48% in March 2024.
Reasons for stable attitudes
When studying the dynamics of public assessments of the special operation, the stability we observed is striking. Over the past three years in Russia, the indicators of support and understandings of the reasons and essence of the situation have remained practically unchanged.
This is all the more noticeable against the backdrop of significant shifts in public opinion in Ukraine, where the president’s rating has significantly decreased over the past year (from 77% to 52% in 2024 alone, according to KIIS), the willingness to give up some territories in order to end the conflict has increased, and the proportion of supporters of peace talks has exceeded the number of opponents for the first time.
There is always a temptation to explain the stability of Russian public opinion by citing the inherent patience that is a feature of the Russian national character.
However, there is a more rational explanation that follows from our description of the situation and is the result of a consistent and rather successful policy of the Russian authorities, which allows the majority of the population not to directly participate in the conflict and maintain a sense of “life as usual,” combined with the dominant role of the official media in interpreting the events. The last two explanations were discussed in detail in our previous articles for “Gorby” (see republication in Russia.Post here and here.
Taken together, these factors — the preservation of a more or less normal life far from the front line and even an improvement in the economic situation for the less well-off, but largest strata of the population, as well as the increasing dependence of the majority of Russians on the interpretations of the official media — have kept public sentiment stable throughout the past three years.
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