SOCIETY
Long-Term Adaptation:
How Past Crisis Experience Helps Russians Stay Optimistic
How Past Crisis Experience Helps Russians Stay Optimistic
August 23, 2024
Denis Volkov
Director of the Levada Center (Moscow)
Based on Levada Center surveys and focus groups over the years, sociologist Denis Volkov looks at how Russian society reacted to various crises since the 1990s and how this helps to explain the calm and even optimistic mood among Russians amid the special military operation.
The original text in Russian was published in the magazine Gorby. We are republishing a shortened version here with permission from the editors.
In 2022, after the launch of what the Russian government calls the “special military operation” in Ukraine, followed by the first Western sanctions against Russia, we observed all the signs of panic. The first wave of emigration began, while there was a run on banks, with people withdrawing not just foreign currency but also rubles.
Participants in our focus groups in February-March 2022 talked a lot about a return to the 1990s, about the fact that they would again have to grow potatoes to feed themselves, barter, get around on horses and make moonshine.
After a couple of months, at the end of spring, the anxious conversations in our focus groups gave way to the usual complaints about rising prices, but without signs of panic and stress. People had started to adapt, which was reflected in cash flowing black to banks. All economic sentiment indicators began to rise again.
Had the banking system and economy failed to withstand the shock from the sanctions and the onslaught of panic, we would have completely different sentiment and a completely different situation today. But this was not the case, and economic perceptions have been improving across almost all indicators for two and a half years now.
To understand how the adaptation to the new reality took place and succeeded, we shall look at the main economic sentiment indicators tracked by the Levada Center, many of which allow us to place what we are seeing today in the context of the last 25-30 years. This long-term perspective helps us to explain the current socioeconomic optimism among the masses, an important component of the high support for the regime and its special military operation.
Adaptation on a personal level
Throughout the 1990s, amid the fundamental transformation from the planned economy to a market-based system, most of our respondents were dissatisfied with how they were living, with dissatisfaction peaking at 66% at the beginning of 1992 and at the end of 1998. After the 1998 crisis, the figure began to gradually decline, reaching a low of 15% at the beginning of 2014.
On the rise was the number of Russians who reported satisfaction with how they were living. Positive responses began to prevail from the late 2000s, apart from the post-crisis years of 2009 and 2015-16. From the end of 2017, the balance of satisfaction/dissatisfaction tilted toward the former, with the highest number of positive responses seen the year before the pandemic. Though the optimism considerably declined, the balance never went negative, and since 2021 the share of Russians satisfied with how they are living has been growing, a trend that still holds today. The response “things are not so bad, we can survive” was given by almost 50% of respondents in June 2024, while another 20% responded that “everything is fine.”
In 2022, after the launch of what the Russian government calls the “special military operation” in Ukraine, followed by the first Western sanctions against Russia, we observed all the signs of panic. The first wave of emigration began, while there was a run on banks, with people withdrawing not just foreign currency but also rubles.
Participants in our focus groups in February-March 2022 talked a lot about a return to the 1990s, about the fact that they would again have to grow potatoes to feed themselves, barter, get around on horses and make moonshine.
After a couple of months, at the end of spring, the anxious conversations in our focus groups gave way to the usual complaints about rising prices, but without signs of panic and stress. People had started to adapt, which was reflected in cash flowing black to banks. All economic sentiment indicators began to rise again.
Had the banking system and economy failed to withstand the shock from the sanctions and the onslaught of panic, we would have completely different sentiment and a completely different situation today. But this was not the case, and economic perceptions have been improving across almost all indicators for two and a half years now.
To understand how the adaptation to the new reality took place and succeeded, we shall look at the main economic sentiment indicators tracked by the Levada Center, many of which allow us to place what we are seeing today in the context of the last 25-30 years. This long-term perspective helps us to explain the current socioeconomic optimism among the masses, an important component of the high support for the regime and its special military operation.
Adaptation on a personal level
Throughout the 1990s, amid the fundamental transformation from the planned economy to a market-based system, most of our respondents were dissatisfied with how they were living, with dissatisfaction peaking at 66% at the beginning of 1992 and at the end of 1998. After the 1998 crisis, the figure began to gradually decline, reaching a low of 15% at the beginning of 2014.
On the rise was the number of Russians who reported satisfaction with how they were living. Positive responses began to prevail from the late 2000s, apart from the post-crisis years of 2009 and 2015-16. From the end of 2017, the balance of satisfaction/dissatisfaction tilted toward the former, with the highest number of positive responses seen the year before the pandemic. Though the optimism considerably declined, the balance never went negative, and since 2021 the share of Russians satisfied with how they are living has been growing, a trend that still holds today. The response “things are not so bad, we can survive” was given by almost 50% of respondents in June 2024, while another 20% responded that “everything is fine.”
“The upshot is that people were more prepared for each new crisis, while the positive perceptions of their personal situation today represent a continuation of the trend that began 7-8 years ago.”
You might say that Russian families, having accumulated experience in dealing with challenges, have grown increasingly robust to external shocks.
The overall dynamic is a slow transition by the majority from an “unbearable” to a “tolerable” situation and from a “tolerable” to a “good” one. As participants in various group discussions often say with regard to the current moment: “is this really a crisis?”; “we survived the 90s and we will survive this too.”
In the 1990s, the majority of respondents, when asked about their mood, said they felt tension and irritation, with 68% saying this at the height of the economic crisis in September 1998. Since the beginning of the 2000s and to this day, a “normal, level” mood has prevailed, except for autumn of 2022, when the announcement of the partial mobilization caused enormous stress across society. However, when fears of a larger mobilization proved overblown, people had already settled down by the beginning of 2023.
That said, it is precisely a “level” mood that prevails, not enthusiasm or exaltation. Moreover, it prevails today in a situation where the majority of the country is not required to actively participate in the conflict.
People can go about their ordinary lives, as evidenced by the crowded summer verandas of cafes, the rather modest presence of Z symbols in urban spaces, and holiday and public events like Moscow festivals or the St Petersburg Scarlet Sails celebration for high school graduates.
Russians getting richer
Before the mid-2000s, the structure of the Russian population was dominated by low-income groups. In the fall of 1998, the share of responses like “not enough money even for food” and “only enough money for food”peaked at a whopping 78% of respondents.
In subsequent years, this figure saw a continual decline – with a short break in the post-crisis year of 2009 – until 2014, when it troughed at 15%. Then, amid new economic headwinds, the number of poor began to increase again each year, reaching almost a quarter of the population in 2020 (23%); since then, it has declined 1-2 percentage points a year, including during the period of the special military operation. At the beginning of 2024, 17% described themselves as “disadvantaged” (including 4% who say they do not have enough money even for food).
At the same time, since the late 1990s, the share of Russians who, by their own account, “have enough money for food and clothing” has gradually increased. In the late 2000s, this group became the biggest in the population structure, reaching half of all respondents by 2010, after which it remained at 53-55% until 2017, when it began to shrink due to an expanding share of financially secure (obespechennyye) Russians.
As for the financially secure groups (reflected in the responses “we can easily buy durable goods” and “we can afford very expensive things”), whereas in 1998 they were only 4% of the population, by 2008 their share had more than quadrupled to 17%. Over the next decade, this figure fluctuated, but from 2018-19 there has been steady growth, and today the financially secure share of the population is about 40%. It seems that this at least partially explains the stability of positive views about the political regime.
In the last 2-3 years, improvements in well-being are reported primarily by respondents who previously could only afford food or only food and clothing but can now “easily afford” durable goods. Meanwhile, the share of the most well-off – who can be classified as the “urban middle class” – for the fourth year now has stagnated at 7-8% of the population, following rapid growth before the pandemic.
The overall dynamic is a slow transition by the majority from an “unbearable” to a “tolerable” situation and from a “tolerable” to a “good” one. As participants in various group discussions often say with regard to the current moment: “is this really a crisis?”; “we survived the 90s and we will survive this too.”
In the 1990s, the majority of respondents, when asked about their mood, said they felt tension and irritation, with 68% saying this at the height of the economic crisis in September 1998. Since the beginning of the 2000s and to this day, a “normal, level” mood has prevailed, except for autumn of 2022, when the announcement of the partial mobilization caused enormous stress across society. However, when fears of a larger mobilization proved overblown, people had already settled down by the beginning of 2023.
That said, it is precisely a “level” mood that prevails, not enthusiasm or exaltation. Moreover, it prevails today in a situation where the majority of the country is not required to actively participate in the conflict.
People can go about their ordinary lives, as evidenced by the crowded summer verandas of cafes, the rather modest presence of Z symbols in urban spaces, and holiday and public events like Moscow festivals or the St Petersburg Scarlet Sails celebration for high school graduates.
Russians getting richer
Before the mid-2000s, the structure of the Russian population was dominated by low-income groups. In the fall of 1998, the share of responses like “not enough money even for food” and “only enough money for food”peaked at a whopping 78% of respondents.
In subsequent years, this figure saw a continual decline – with a short break in the post-crisis year of 2009 – until 2014, when it troughed at 15%. Then, amid new economic headwinds, the number of poor began to increase again each year, reaching almost a quarter of the population in 2020 (23%); since then, it has declined 1-2 percentage points a year, including during the period of the special military operation. At the beginning of 2024, 17% described themselves as “disadvantaged” (including 4% who say they do not have enough money even for food).
At the same time, since the late 1990s, the share of Russians who, by their own account, “have enough money for food and clothing” has gradually increased. In the late 2000s, this group became the biggest in the population structure, reaching half of all respondents by 2010, after which it remained at 53-55% until 2017, when it began to shrink due to an expanding share of financially secure (obespechennyye) Russians.
As for the financially secure groups (reflected in the responses “we can easily buy durable goods” and “we can afford very expensive things”), whereas in 1998 they were only 4% of the population, by 2008 their share had more than quadrupled to 17%. Over the next decade, this figure fluctuated, but from 2018-19 there has been steady growth, and today the financially secure share of the population is about 40%. It seems that this at least partially explains the stability of positive views about the political regime.
In the last 2-3 years, improvements in well-being are reported primarily by respondents who previously could only afford food or only food and clothing but can now “easily afford” durable goods. Meanwhile, the share of the most well-off – who can be classified as the “urban middle class” – for the fourth year now has stagnated at 7-8% of the population, following rapid growth before the pandemic.
New residential buildings in Moscow. A large-scale preferential mortgage program ran from 2020 to July 2024, though some benefits for homebuyers are still in effect. Source: Telegram
Where the increase in prosperity comes from
Our respondents who report an improvement in their financial situation (today they are about a quarter of the population, and for the first time since 2008 they outnumber those who report a deterioration in their financial situation) offer several reasons for this.
First of all, it is rising incomes, salaries and pensions (69%), getting a new, well-paid job (13%), and new opportunities for purchasing real estate, taking trips and buying household appliances (11%). In response to a more general question about improvements in their quality of life, most respondents also speak of financial well-being and stability (66%), but also healthy relationships in their family (16%), a good job (12%), and improved living conditions and/or the purchase of a new home (8%). This gives us some clues about where today’s rising prosperity and optimism come from.
The higher incomes reported by respondents is driven by several factors: the indexation of wages and pensions (this is noted primarily outside big cities, where the standard of living is significantly lower than in Moscow, St Petersburg and other cities with at least a million residents), as well as the expansion of social programs, including child benefits and “preferential” and “family” mortgages.
The official statistics about unprecedentedly low unemployment are confirmed by our research. Our index tracking fear of unemployment is at all-time lows today. In the last 2-3 years, the number of Russians who say that the opportunities for earning money are changing for the better has grown significantly for the first time in 15 years (again, primarily outside of big cities). (This is in part due to the acute labor shortage in Russia amid the special military operation (see Russia.Poston the acute labor shortage here).
In addition, concerns about most socioeconomic problems have noticeably decreased since 2021. The exceptions are concerns about the inflation, which remain persistently high, and about migration, as well as fears of bombings and terrorist attacks (concerns about both have jumped recently).
Another significant factor in the rising prosperity is payments to soldiers fighting in the special military operation, as evidenced by conversations with focus group participants and objective data. A poster in the Nizhny Novgorod railway station that your author saw with his own eyes says that a man serving in Ukraine is paid RUB 210,000 monthly (four times the salary that focus groups participants consider good) with recruits entitled to a one-time payment of RUB 1.1 million.
Note that most government support measures target more vulnerable segments of the population, and our data suggests that such payments boost positive sentiment and support for the authorities. Journalist investigations convincingly show that the majority of volunteers for the special operation come from Russia’s poorest regions, where it is much harder to realize one’s potential and find high salaries, while the money that contract soldiers and their families receive represents a big bump to the family budget.
Our respondents who report an improvement in their financial situation (today they are about a quarter of the population, and for the first time since 2008 they outnumber those who report a deterioration in their financial situation) offer several reasons for this.
First of all, it is rising incomes, salaries and pensions (69%), getting a new, well-paid job (13%), and new opportunities for purchasing real estate, taking trips and buying household appliances (11%). In response to a more general question about improvements in their quality of life, most respondents also speak of financial well-being and stability (66%), but also healthy relationships in their family (16%), a good job (12%), and improved living conditions and/or the purchase of a new home (8%). This gives us some clues about where today’s rising prosperity and optimism come from.
The higher incomes reported by respondents is driven by several factors: the indexation of wages and pensions (this is noted primarily outside big cities, where the standard of living is significantly lower than in Moscow, St Petersburg and other cities with at least a million residents), as well as the expansion of social programs, including child benefits and “preferential” and “family” mortgages.
The official statistics about unprecedentedly low unemployment are confirmed by our research. Our index tracking fear of unemployment is at all-time lows today. In the last 2-3 years, the number of Russians who say that the opportunities for earning money are changing for the better has grown significantly for the first time in 15 years (again, primarily outside of big cities). (This is in part due to the acute labor shortage in Russia amid the special military operation (see Russia.Poston the acute labor shortage here).
In addition, concerns about most socioeconomic problems have noticeably decreased since 2021. The exceptions are concerns about the inflation, which remain persistently high, and about migration, as well as fears of bombings and terrorist attacks (concerns about both have jumped recently).
Another significant factor in the rising prosperity is payments to soldiers fighting in the special military operation, as evidenced by conversations with focus group participants and objective data. A poster in the Nizhny Novgorod railway station that your author saw with his own eyes says that a man serving in Ukraine is paid RUB 210,000 monthly (four times the salary that focus groups participants consider good) with recruits entitled to a one-time payment of RUB 1.1 million.
Note that most government support measures target more vulnerable segments of the population, and our data suggests that such payments boost positive sentiment and support for the authorities. Journalist investigations convincingly show that the majority of volunteers for the special operation come from Russia’s poorest regions, where it is much harder to realize one’s potential and find high salaries, while the money that contract soldiers and their families receive represents a big bump to the family budget.
Kyzyl, the capital of Tyva, one of the poorest regions in Russia. Source: Wiki Commons
Expectations as an important source of optimism
Another important source of optimism that we come across in our research is positive expectations about the future. The number of responses “[my] financial situation will improve” bounced back quickly after the 1998 crisis and within a decade, at the beginning of 2008, had risen from 2% to 28%.
These outlooks have fluctuated too, though since late 2016 we have seen rising positive expectations, which, after a short pause during the pandemic, continue to this day. Since the beginning of 2022, the share of positive expectations has exceeded that of negative ones (30% versus 10% in June 2024, with “[my] situation will not change” answers predominating).
A more general question about how respondents’ families will be doing in a year shows even more optimism – both compared to perceptions of things currently and general expectations of changes in their personal financial situation. Since the middle of 2023, positive responses have begun to prevail even over “the situation will not change.”
Focus group discussions of current problems and concerns also often demonstrate a gap between negative responses about the present and fairly positive expectations for the future. Participants often say that they will be able to adapt to the prevailing circumstances and turn difficulties to their advantage.
Situation in the family vs situation in the country
Though people are optimistic about their personal situation, they may remain anxious about developments outside their own small world, where the majority does not have the power to change anything.
Today, about half of our respondents believe that “hard times are still ahead” – such attitudes spread after the pension reform in 2018 and have not dissipated since. As focus group participants repeat: since 2018, we have had the pension reform, the pandemic, the special military operation – what’s next?
Another important source of optimism that we come across in our research is positive expectations about the future. The number of responses “[my] financial situation will improve” bounced back quickly after the 1998 crisis and within a decade, at the beginning of 2008, had risen from 2% to 28%.
These outlooks have fluctuated too, though since late 2016 we have seen rising positive expectations, which, after a short pause during the pandemic, continue to this day. Since the beginning of 2022, the share of positive expectations has exceeded that of negative ones (30% versus 10% in June 2024, with “[my] situation will not change” answers predominating).
A more general question about how respondents’ families will be doing in a year shows even more optimism – both compared to perceptions of things currently and general expectations of changes in their personal financial situation. Since the middle of 2023, positive responses have begun to prevail even over “the situation will not change.”
Focus group discussions of current problems and concerns also often demonstrate a gap between negative responses about the present and fairly positive expectations for the future. Participants often say that they will be able to adapt to the prevailing circumstances and turn difficulties to their advantage.
Situation in the family vs situation in the country
Though people are optimistic about their personal situation, they may remain anxious about developments outside their own small world, where the majority does not have the power to change anything.
Today, about half of our respondents believe that “hard times are still ahead” – such attitudes spread after the pension reform in 2018 and have not dissipated since. As focus group participants repeat: since 2018, we have had the pension reform, the pandemic, the special military operation – what’s next?
“Discrepancy between optimism about own life and expected turbulence for country is no accident or mistake.”
Scarlet Sails, an annual celebration for high school graduates, is celebrated in St Petersburg at the end of June, during the white nights. Pictured: Scarlet Sails 2024. Source: VK
Your author has many times observed this discrepancy during focus group discussions: people complain for a long time about high prices and low wages, voice concerns about the conflict, the potential mobilization of relatives, “screws being tightened” and poverty in the province around their hometown, and recall terrible news they heard on TV, before stating at the end that they are doing more or less OK, “one shouldn’t complain” and “I can survive” – just like in the abovementioned survey.
The following answers can be considered typical : “I am satisfied with my life, because actually all the difficulties that I named do not directly affect me at the moment: I have a job, I have the awareness and understanding of what I will do next” or “I live my life adjusting and adapting to the given circumstances, and in any situation I find resources that I can use to help me.”
The gap between the personal and the general is clearly visible in the responses to the question of whether the coming year will be calm or stressful. In the last few years – since 2018 – twice as many people have been confident that the coming year will be “calm” for themselves personally than for the country as a whole.
Russian families seem to have accumulated sufficient resources that allow them to look to the future quite optimistically, despite all the ups and downs. This optimism may fluctuate considerably – as happened following the announcement of mobilization – yet if immediate sacrifices and active engagement with the state are not required from a person, the optimism quickly returns.
A society of tepid optimism
Our long-term observations indicate a trend of gradual improvement in socioeconomic perceptions – from the lows during the financial crisis of 1998 to the highs in early 2008, and through the new crises in 2009 and 2014-15 to the present day. Still, the latest spurt of growth across many indicators began back in 2018-19, after the economy and population were able to adapt to the first sanctions against Russia, introduced by Western countries in response to Crimea.
Since the start of the special military operation, the country’s adaptation to the numerous waves of sanctions has been broadly successful, thanks to previous experience in overcoming crises (including living under sanctions) and Russian families’ accumulated resources.
The following answers can be considered typical : “I am satisfied with my life, because actually all the difficulties that I named do not directly affect me at the moment: I have a job, I have the awareness and understanding of what I will do next” or “I live my life adjusting and adapting to the given circumstances, and in any situation I find resources that I can use to help me.”
The gap between the personal and the general is clearly visible in the responses to the question of whether the coming year will be calm or stressful. In the last few years – since 2018 – twice as many people have been confident that the coming year will be “calm” for themselves personally than for the country as a whole.
Russian families seem to have accumulated sufficient resources that allow them to look to the future quite optimistically, despite all the ups and downs. This optimism may fluctuate considerably – as happened following the announcement of mobilization – yet if immediate sacrifices and active engagement with the state are not required from a person, the optimism quickly returns.
A society of tepid optimism
Our long-term observations indicate a trend of gradual improvement in socioeconomic perceptions – from the lows during the financial crisis of 1998 to the highs in early 2008, and through the new crises in 2009 and 2014-15 to the present day. Still, the latest spurt of growth across many indicators began back in 2018-19, after the economy and population were able to adapt to the first sanctions against Russia, introduced by Western countries in response to Crimea.
Since the start of the special military operation, the country’s adaptation to the numerous waves of sanctions has been broadly successful, thanks to previous experience in overcoming crises (including living under sanctions) and Russian families’ accumulated resources.
“The fact that the majority of the country is not directly involved in the conflict and can live a more or less normal life also helps Russians accept what is happening.”
At this point, the large-scale government spending to index wages and pensions and expand various social programs has played an important role in this adaptation. From this support – as was the case with pandemic-era measures – poorer Russians have benefited more. The main indicator of this is that the share of the most vulnerable people in the Russian population continues to decline, while the number of financially secure people among those who recently considered themselves poor is growing. Meanwhile, the authorities have left the urban middle class to deal with any problems on its own, and its share of the population has stagnated over the last 3-4 years.
Optimism about the future helps people maintain a positive outlook. At the same time, the driver of this optimism is not the confidence that tomorrow will be better or that the situation will improve, as many are afraid that difficult times are still ahead and that the economy will stumble; rather, it is mainly the confidence among individuals that they personally will be able to adapt to negative changes and even turn them to their advantage – thanks to their accumulated experience, skills, and resources, as well as the support of their friends and family, and sometimes the state.
We should not forget that though socioeconomic perceptions today are generally at their most positive levels in the last 10-15 years, restrained responses (“I can survive,” “my mood is normal,” “the situation has not changed”) predominate in our research. Negative perceptions are also present and account for a fifth of respondents.
If the economic situation worsens significantly or government support for large swaths of the population dries up, these negative responses may increase again.
Optimism about the future helps people maintain a positive outlook. At the same time, the driver of this optimism is not the confidence that tomorrow will be better or that the situation will improve, as many are afraid that difficult times are still ahead and that the economy will stumble; rather, it is mainly the confidence among individuals that they personally will be able to adapt to negative changes and even turn them to their advantage – thanks to their accumulated experience, skills, and resources, as well as the support of their friends and family, and sometimes the state.
We should not forget that though socioeconomic perceptions today are generally at their most positive levels in the last 10-15 years, restrained responses (“I can survive,” “my mood is normal,” “the situation has not changed”) predominate in our research. Negative perceptions are also present and account for a fifth of respondents.
If the economic situation worsens significantly or government support for large swaths of the population dries up, these negative responses may increase again.
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