Politics
Peace Talks Do Not Mean That Peace is Close
March 25, 2025
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Sergei Shelin
Journalist, independent analyst
Journalist Sergei Shelin argues that, given the divergence of goals between Russia and Ukraine and the unusual intermediary—such as U.S. figure Donald Trump—the resolution of the crisis is unlikely to be swift or stable
The original text in Russian was published in The Moscow Times and republished here with minor changes and with author’s permission.
Let us not exaggerate the impact of Donald Trump on the course of the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation. The prospects, if not for peace, then at least for a truce, ultimately depend on the willingness of both parties to end the war.
No peace talks can lead to substantial results unless all participants have actually decided to reach an agreement and have an idea of how to do it. Not to mention that at the current stage of the Russo-Ukrainian War, Trump's America is only one of the parties involved and at the moment, not even the main one.
Therefore, let us first look at how the goals of the main participants in the conflict have changed during the course of the war.
No peace talks can lead to substantial results unless all participants have actually decided to reach an agreement and have an idea of how to do it. Not to mention that at the current stage of the Russo-Ukrainian War, Trump's America is only one of the parties involved and at the moment, not even the main one.
Therefore, let us first look at how the goals of the main participants in the conflict have changed during the course of the war.
Saudi, Russian and United States officials meeting in Riyadh, February 18, 2025. Source: Wiki Commons
A Strong Leader and Weak Subjects
Three years ago, Putin launched the invasion with three goals in mind: overthrowing the ruling regime in Ukraine, annexing as many Ukrainian regions as possible, and turning the rest of the country into a vassal—disarmed, Russified, and isolated from the West.
This campaign (initially intended to be short-term), was apparently presented to Putin as the first stage of a large-scale rollback of NATO toward the West. The ultimatum presented to NATO two months before the attack on Ukraine ordered it to retreat to the old borderlines established during the Soviet empire. Putin perceived Ukraine as the vanguard of an alliance of all his personal enemies, led by America at the time.
The ultimate goal was to subdue all of these enemies, not just Kyiv.
The war with Ukraine did not go as he planned, but Putin has reaffirmed its initial objectives over and over again over these three years, almost without any amendments. And he has never made any indication that he has stricken the second, anti-NATO stage of his strategic plan from the agenda.
The Russian elite and the lower classes have been completely obedient for the last three years. They did not ask for this war, but when it began, they adapted to it and found a high degree of meaning in it. For the most part, they did not go as far as Putin: they did not seek to fight the entire united West and were not very eager to conquer Ukraine as a whole.
In addition, since mid-2024, the Russian regime has been under new kinds of pressure.
Firstly, the Russian economy began to falter. As is often the case in warring countries, inflation is on the rise. The population's standard of living has begun to decline. The technocrats who run the economy complain increasingly of imbalances.
Secondly, the Russian population’s general weariness of the war was converted into a widespread desire for it to end somehow, by combining victory with prudence, so to speak. That is, they want Russia to appropriate the conquered lands, calm down and not stake any other claims for now.
Putin could not have been unaware of the population’s desires. But there is no evidence that he is ready to give in to them. He may have stopped demanding Russification in the non-annexed regions of Ukraine, but in all other respects, he has continued to stand his ground without softening. And he waited it out—in the end, he was not the one who backed down, but the American enemy.
Putin’s Points
With the election of President Trump last year, Putin has good reason to believe that the second phase of his plan is already half-fulfilled. The United States is no longer his number-one personal threat. The Russian leader has not yet decided what to do with Europe, but he may be waiting for a retreat from that side as well.
Three years ago, Putin launched the invasion with three goals in mind: overthrowing the ruling regime in Ukraine, annexing as many Ukrainian regions as possible, and turning the rest of the country into a vassal—disarmed, Russified, and isolated from the West.
This campaign (initially intended to be short-term), was apparently presented to Putin as the first stage of a large-scale rollback of NATO toward the West. The ultimatum presented to NATO two months before the attack on Ukraine ordered it to retreat to the old borderlines established during the Soviet empire. Putin perceived Ukraine as the vanguard of an alliance of all his personal enemies, led by America at the time.
The ultimate goal was to subdue all of these enemies, not just Kyiv.
The war with Ukraine did not go as he planned, but Putin has reaffirmed its initial objectives over and over again over these three years, almost without any amendments. And he has never made any indication that he has stricken the second, anti-NATO stage of his strategic plan from the agenda.
The Russian elite and the lower classes have been completely obedient for the last three years. They did not ask for this war, but when it began, they adapted to it and found a high degree of meaning in it. For the most part, they did not go as far as Putin: they did not seek to fight the entire united West and were not very eager to conquer Ukraine as a whole.
In addition, since mid-2024, the Russian regime has been under new kinds of pressure.
Firstly, the Russian economy began to falter. As is often the case in warring countries, inflation is on the rise. The population's standard of living has begun to decline. The technocrats who run the economy complain increasingly of imbalances.
Secondly, the Russian population’s general weariness of the war was converted into a widespread desire for it to end somehow, by combining victory with prudence, so to speak. That is, they want Russia to appropriate the conquered lands, calm down and not stake any other claims for now.
Putin could not have been unaware of the population’s desires. But there is no evidence that he is ready to give in to them. He may have stopped demanding Russification in the non-annexed regions of Ukraine, but in all other respects, he has continued to stand his ground without softening. And he waited it out—in the end, he was not the one who backed down, but the American enemy.
Putin’s Points
With the election of President Trump last year, Putin has good reason to believe that the second phase of his plan is already half-fulfilled. The United States is no longer his number-one personal threat. The Russian leader has not yet decided what to do with Europe, but he may be waiting for a retreat from that side as well.
“In light of these advantageous new circumstances, Putin has no reason to curtail his appetites for Ukraine.”
Therefore, in a conversation with Trump on March 18, Putin confirmed his demands on all points. Unlike the much less definite official statement released by the US following the conversation, the Russian communiqué was quite clear. Putin demanded the liquidation of Ukraine's military potential ("a complete cessation of foreign military aid...a halt to forced mobilization in Ukraine and to the rearmament of the Armed Forces of Ukraine"), as well as a change of power in the country (so that there would be "no risks associated with the inability of the Kyiv regime to negotiate").
Russian invasion of Ukraine – ongoing military conflict in Eastern Europe since 2022. Source: Wiki Commons
Putin made his third point about annexations public the following day through a state media reporter: “The talks concern the fact that what Russia has achieved cannot be taken away and that Crimea, Sevastopol and four known territories should be recognized as part of Russia: the Luhansk and Donetsk republics, the Kherson and Zaporizhia regions. If this happens in the near future, Russia…will not lay claim to Odessa and other territories that currently belong to Ukraine. But this point may also change…”
As we can see, Putin’s demands are now the same as they were on February 24, 2022.
Let’s compare them to Ukraine’s current demands.
One Goal Remains Unachieved, the Other is Irrevocable
Two months after the invasion began, the Ukrainian authorities rejected the so-called Istanbul Agreements, which were drawn up on the basis of Putin’s aforementioned demands.
Their goals for the war have since become joining Ukraine into the West and expelling Russia from all Ukrainian territories it has occupied since 2014, including Crimea. Or, at a minimum, returning to the dividing lines of February 24, 2022.
As we can see, Putin’s demands are now the same as they were on February 24, 2022.
Let’s compare them to Ukraine’s current demands.
One Goal Remains Unachieved, the Other is Irrevocable
Two months after the invasion began, the Ukrainian authorities rejected the so-called Istanbul Agreements, which were drawn up on the basis of Putin’s aforementioned demands.
Their goals for the war have since become joining Ukraine into the West and expelling Russia from all Ukrainian territories it has occupied since 2014, including Crimea. Or, at a minimum, returning to the dividing lines of February 24, 2022.
“This plan relied on exaggerated notions of Western aid, as well as a belief in the importance of the international legitimacy of Ukraine's pre-war borders.”
In reality, the fact that Russian annexations and occupations were not recognized by other countries meant only that if the Ukrainians themselves got their old borders back, the global community would not dispute this fact. But the actual borders of Ukraine and Russia were to be determined by soldiers on the front lines, not by UN General Assemblies or those sitting at the negotiation tables.
After the failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the summer of 2023, it became clear that the hope of returning to the old dividing lines had not come to fruition. Sooner or later, the Ukrainian authorities had to admit this and agree to a ceasefire along the front lines.
Over the past year, Ukraine’s Western friends have repeatedly hinted that this is the only way to end the war. Trump was not the first to acknowledge this inevitability. But he has presented it as a unique recipe for salvation and distanced himself from the other, most important goal of this war: integrating Ukraine into the West and protecting it from Russian dictates.
Give Nothing and Take Everything
This bloody war could have been avoided if Ukraine had agreed to the role of Putin's satellite, a second Belarus.
After the failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the summer of 2023, it became clear that the hope of returning to the old dividing lines had not come to fruition. Sooner or later, the Ukrainian authorities had to admit this and agree to a ceasefire along the front lines.
Over the past year, Ukraine’s Western friends have repeatedly hinted that this is the only way to end the war. Trump was not the first to acknowledge this inevitability. But he has presented it as a unique recipe for salvation and distanced himself from the other, most important goal of this war: integrating Ukraine into the West and protecting it from Russian dictates.
Give Nothing and Take Everything
This bloody war could have been avoided if Ukraine had agreed to the role of Putin's satellite, a second Belarus.
“If there is to be any sense to this war, it is as a war for independence, for Ukraine's right to national self-determination.”
Hence, there is a limit to the concessions any Ukrainian national regime can make, no matter who is heading it. Kyiv will have to agree to an actual loss of territories. It will likely have to officially agree not to attempt to return them by military means in the future.
But Ukraine cannot give up the right to the army it needs, nor the military and economic integration with the West. It is also objectionable to give up legal rights to lost lands. Why legalize forcible seizure?
This is the limit to the concessions that the Ukrainian national state can make without losing itself. Comparing these with Putin's demands makes it obvious that the goals of the two parties are currently incompatible.
Ukraine is ready to acknowledge the realities of war, but Putin's Russia is not. Putin, like three years ago, wants to give nothing and take everything.
Trump's mediation—at least for now—has not brought about any noticeable shifts in the appetites of his Russian counterpart.
The sole achievement has been a mutual renunciation of strikes on energy systems, which, by and large, is more advantageous for Russia, whose oil refineries and fuel tanks have been burning every week, than for Ukraine, for whom 80 percent of pre-war energy infrastructure has already been destroyed, while the new infrastructure is hidden as safely as possible.
Steps towards a truce can only be taken by Putin, and his regime now has arguably more objective reasons for ending the war than justifications for continuing it.
The overzealous and super aggressive Russians will be against it. But there are not so many of them, they are not organized, and if something happens, the Kremlin will be able to pacify them. And the strengthening of the ruble, the growth of stocks and the decline in inflation, which are now happening contrary to economic logic, speak to the enthusiasm with which the national economy and the majority of citizens of the Russian Federation respond even to the very vague prospects of ending the war.
But Putin is driven not so much by objective considerations as by personal obsession, the expectation that Trump will be compliant, and the belief that he has enough resources and people to continue the war in the coming months.
For peace talks to bring us closer to peace, Putin must do something he has never done before throughout the course of the war: change his goals.
But Ukraine cannot give up the right to the army it needs, nor the military and economic integration with the West. It is also objectionable to give up legal rights to lost lands. Why legalize forcible seizure?
This is the limit to the concessions that the Ukrainian national state can make without losing itself. Comparing these with Putin's demands makes it obvious that the goals of the two parties are currently incompatible.
Ukraine is ready to acknowledge the realities of war, but Putin's Russia is not. Putin, like three years ago, wants to give nothing and take everything.
Trump's mediation—at least for now—has not brought about any noticeable shifts in the appetites of his Russian counterpart.
The sole achievement has been a mutual renunciation of strikes on energy systems, which, by and large, is more advantageous for Russia, whose oil refineries and fuel tanks have been burning every week, than for Ukraine, for whom 80 percent of pre-war energy infrastructure has already been destroyed, while the new infrastructure is hidden as safely as possible.
Steps towards a truce can only be taken by Putin, and his regime now has arguably more objective reasons for ending the war than justifications for continuing it.
The overzealous and super aggressive Russians will be against it. But there are not so many of them, they are not organized, and if something happens, the Kremlin will be able to pacify them. And the strengthening of the ruble, the growth of stocks and the decline in inflation, which are now happening contrary to economic logic, speak to the enthusiasm with which the national economy and the majority of citizens of the Russian Federation respond even to the very vague prospects of ending the war.
But Putin is driven not so much by objective considerations as by personal obsession, the expectation that Trump will be compliant, and the belief that he has enough resources and people to continue the war in the coming months.
For peace talks to bring us closer to peace, Putin must do something he has never done before throughout the course of the war: change his goals.
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