SOCIETY
The ‘TV Party’ is Not Going Away
July 29, 2024
Denis Volkov
Director of the Levada Center (Moscow)
Based on years of public opinion surveys, sociologist and Levada Center Director Denis Volkov explores media consumption patterns in Russia, pointing out that online sources of information have not diminished the influence of television and are now being developed by the state, too.
The original text in Russian was published in the magazine Gorby. We are republishing it here with permission from the editors.
At the Levada Center, we have been monitoring the audience of Russians who get news from the internet for more than 20 years and the audiences of the main sources of news for more than 15 years. A decade ago, in June 2014, our first large study of the Russian media landscape was published.
We have traced the evolution of the main sources for obtaining information and how these changes have affected mass perceptions about current events.
Contours of the Russian media landscape
Our long-time regular surveys show that there has been a very gradual decline in television news audiences over the past 10 years. Whereas in the 1990s and 2000s television was the main source of news for 90% of Russians, from the mid-2010s the situation began to gradually change: as of today, the share of such people has decreased by about a quarter, to 65% of the country’s adult population.
Nevertheless, a sharp drop in the number of television viewers has not been observed. Most people are in no hurry to give up their old habits, and in most Russian families the TV stays on in the background, in the living room or kitchen, while watching the evening news remains a ritual.
Over the last two years, the role of Russian television in covering and discussing current events has actually expanded: with the outbreak of hostilities, a significant number of our respondents say that given the international conflict, official sources should be listened to. This is observed in both public opinion polls and focus groups.
There have been much bigger changes with the print media. Over the past 15 years, the audience of newspapers has decreased sixfold, from 37% to 5-6%. That follows an even bigger decline: earlier research shows that back in the early 1990s, newspapers were just as important a source of information for the average person as television: in 1990, 90% of RSFSR residents read the press more or less regularly.
In the 2000s, newspapers were first squeezed by television and then replaced by online publications, whose audience in the last 15 years has gone from 9% to 28-30% today (again, this is the share of respondents who say that online publications are an important source of information for them).
The growth of social media as a source of information has been faster: its audience has tripled in just 13 years, jumping from 14% in 2011 to 38-40% today. Finally, the rise of Telegram channels has been even more rapid, the number of readers growing from 1% five years ago to a quarter of the population now (this figure should be distinguished from the total number of Telegram users, which in May 2024 was about half the population).
At the Levada Center, we have been monitoring the audience of Russians who get news from the internet for more than 20 years and the audiences of the main sources of news for more than 15 years. A decade ago, in June 2014, our first large study of the Russian media landscape was published.
We have traced the evolution of the main sources for obtaining information and how these changes have affected mass perceptions about current events.
Contours of the Russian media landscape
Our long-time regular surveys show that there has been a very gradual decline in television news audiences over the past 10 years. Whereas in the 1990s and 2000s television was the main source of news for 90% of Russians, from the mid-2010s the situation began to gradually change: as of today, the share of such people has decreased by about a quarter, to 65% of the country’s adult population.
Nevertheless, a sharp drop in the number of television viewers has not been observed. Most people are in no hurry to give up their old habits, and in most Russian families the TV stays on in the background, in the living room or kitchen, while watching the evening news remains a ritual.
Over the last two years, the role of Russian television in covering and discussing current events has actually expanded: with the outbreak of hostilities, a significant number of our respondents say that given the international conflict, official sources should be listened to. This is observed in both public opinion polls and focus groups.
There have been much bigger changes with the print media. Over the past 15 years, the audience of newspapers has decreased sixfold, from 37% to 5-6%. That follows an even bigger decline: earlier research shows that back in the early 1990s, newspapers were just as important a source of information for the average person as television: in 1990, 90% of RSFSR residents read the press more or less regularly.
In the 2000s, newspapers were first squeezed by television and then replaced by online publications, whose audience in the last 15 years has gone from 9% to 28-30% today (again, this is the share of respondents who say that online publications are an important source of information for them).
The growth of social media as a source of information has been faster: its audience has tripled in just 13 years, jumping from 14% in 2011 to 38-40% today. Finally, the rise of Telegram channels has been even more rapid, the number of readers growing from 1% five years ago to a quarter of the population now (this figure should be distinguished from the total number of Telegram users, which in May 2024 was about half the population).
“The popularity of Telegram channels soared in the spring of 2022, with the number of readers going from 5% to 15%, after the special operation got underway, foreign social networks were blocked and a number of well-known independent publications disappeared.”
In July 2024, the Russian authorities began to slow YouTube. Source: YouTube
Russians who wanted to know what was happening around them flocked to Telegram channels for alternative information and updates from the front, including from so-called voenkory (“military correspondents”) and pro-war Telegram channels linked to Wagner PMC and the like.
YouTube remains a less popular source of news and analysis: today about 15% of Russians use it in this capacity (compared to YouTube’s total daily audience in Russia, which is more than a third of the population, having tripled from 15% to 37% in the last six years).
YouTube saw a massive influx of professional journalists, along with a flourishing of channels about society and politics, in 2017-19, when a critical mass of potential viewers formed. Up to 2021, the number of YouTube users grew rapidly, but then the pace slowed. In addition, not all YouTube users use it as a source of political news – many people watch it for entertainment and educational content.
The level of trust in a news source is generally lower than the size of its audience, but overall the proportions between news sources hold. By and large, if people watch or read it, it means they trust it. Meanwhile, if a person primarily relies on one source of information, then it does not matter whether he trusts it or not: the source, like it or not, still shapes his worldview for lack of an alternative.
In focus groups, your author repeatedly heard from respondents that they try to use alternative sources, consider different points of view and read between the lines. However, surveys suggest that this is common only among the minority of people who are purposefully trying to gain an understanding of what is happening around them. The majority – whether in Russia or elsewhere – simply are not in the habit of doing it, as it is difficult, requires effort and takes time that they do not have.
YouTube remains a less popular source of news and analysis: today about 15% of Russians use it in this capacity (compared to YouTube’s total daily audience in Russia, which is more than a third of the population, having tripled from 15% to 37% in the last six years).
YouTube saw a massive influx of professional journalists, along with a flourishing of channels about society and politics, in 2017-19, when a critical mass of potential viewers formed. Up to 2021, the number of YouTube users grew rapidly, but then the pace slowed. In addition, not all YouTube users use it as a source of political news – many people watch it for entertainment and educational content.
The level of trust in a news source is generally lower than the size of its audience, but overall the proportions between news sources hold. By and large, if people watch or read it, it means they trust it. Meanwhile, if a person primarily relies on one source of information, then it does not matter whether he trusts it or not: the source, like it or not, still shapes his worldview for lack of an alternative.
In focus groups, your author repeatedly heard from respondents that they try to use alternative sources, consider different points of view and read between the lines. However, surveys suggest that this is common only among the minority of people who are purposefully trying to gain an understanding of what is happening around them. The majority – whether in Russia or elsewhere – simply are not in the habit of doing it, as it is difficult, requires effort and takes time that they do not have.
“Today, about half of Russians trust television. Amid the fighting in Ukraine, this trust increased as people began to consume more television news.”
Vladimir Solovyov (left) is the most popular current events journalist even among Russians who get news only online. Solovyov has been under Western sanctions since the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. Source: Wiki Commons
Significantly fewer people trust online sources: for example, 18% trust Telegram channels, about 16-17% trust online publications and social media and 7% trust YouTube channels. Indeed, trust in most online sources has been declining over the past 2-3 years.
“The internet is a big dump,” as our older respondents say. In addition, amid the special operation in Ukraine, a significant number of Russians suspect that “enemy propaganda” is being spread on the internet, concluding that you cannot let down your guard there.
Overlapping audiences
Amid the rapid rise of the internet and social media in Russia, by the end of 2021 and the beginning of 2022, according to our surveys, the internet had caught up with television as the main provider of news for people, overtaking it at the beginning of 2024 (when all the various online sources that respondents use, like websites, social networks, and YouTube and Telegram channels, are taken together).
However, the television and internet audiences overlap in many ways. Slightly more than half of Russians who get news from various online sources continue to also watch TV news programs and talk shows. And this is important because television shapes a person’s views to a greater extent than the internet does.
About a third of Russians get news almost exclusively from television, meaning their views on current events are strongly influenced by what is said and shown on TV. Two thirds of them are 55 years old or older and three quarters live outside big cities. Among these people, support for the authorities, the special operation in Ukraine and the results of past presidential elections is most pronounced (at about 90% for each point).
Another third of the population gets news from both television and the internet, using various online sources. Their views, reading of the situation in the country and attitude toward the authorities should be more diverse, it would seem, but this is not the case – the opinions across both the abovementioned groups on most social and political issues are practically indistinguishable. Despite the growth in the number of active internet users, television clearly surpasses the internet in its ability to influence andindoctrinate and continues to shape the worldview and political attitudes of most Russians.
This is evidenced, in particular, by the journalists, presenters and bloggers covering social and political issues whom respondents say they follow. The most mentioned are invariably the hosts of top-rated television programs – Vladimir Solovyov, Olga Skabeeva, Dmitri Kiselev and others – the same as it was seven years ago, despite the rise of the internet.
“The internet is a big dump,” as our older respondents say. In addition, amid the special operation in Ukraine, a significant number of Russians suspect that “enemy propaganda” is being spread on the internet, concluding that you cannot let down your guard there.
Overlapping audiences
Amid the rapid rise of the internet and social media in Russia, by the end of 2021 and the beginning of 2022, according to our surveys, the internet had caught up with television as the main provider of news for people, overtaking it at the beginning of 2024 (when all the various online sources that respondents use, like websites, social networks, and YouTube and Telegram channels, are taken together).
However, the television and internet audiences overlap in many ways. Slightly more than half of Russians who get news from various online sources continue to also watch TV news programs and talk shows. And this is important because television shapes a person’s views to a greater extent than the internet does.
About a third of Russians get news almost exclusively from television, meaning their views on current events are strongly influenced by what is said and shown on TV. Two thirds of them are 55 years old or older and three quarters live outside big cities. Among these people, support for the authorities, the special operation in Ukraine and the results of past presidential elections is most pronounced (at about 90% for each point).
Another third of the population gets news from both television and the internet, using various online sources. Their views, reading of the situation in the country and attitude toward the authorities should be more diverse, it would seem, but this is not the case – the opinions across both the abovementioned groups on most social and political issues are practically indistinguishable. Despite the growth in the number of active internet users, television clearly surpasses the internet in its ability to influence andindoctrinate and continues to shape the worldview and political attitudes of most Russians.
This is evidenced, in particular, by the journalists, presenters and bloggers covering social and political issues whom respondents say they follow. The most mentioned are invariably the hosts of top-rated television programs – Vladimir Solovyov, Olga Skabeeva, Dmitri Kiselev and others – the same as it was seven years ago, despite the rise of the internet.
Yuri Dud (right) runs a YouTube channel, vDud, where he interviews famous people and makes documentaries. As of March 2024, the channel had 10.3 million subscribers and 2.1 billion views. In the photo, Dud' is interviewing Alexei Navalny and his wife Yulia in October 2020. Source: YouTube
Big-name bloggers like Yuri Dud or Ilya Varlamov have always been much less popular among the mass audience, one reason simply being that they are not on TV. Against the backdrop of the special operation in Ukraine, the popularity of most of them has even declined (just as interest has dropped in opposition politicians and points of view different than the official line). In the battle for viewers and readers today, they have lost ground to the heroes of our time – voenkory – like Alexander Sladkov or Alexander Kots.
Significant differences from the views of the majority are observed only among respondents who do not watch TV at all and get information mainly from the internet. But they make up only about 28% of the country’s population – certainly a significant figure, but still a minority. This audience, as one might expect, is disproportionately comprised of residents of Russia’s major cities and people with higher education; more than two thirds are Russians aged 45 or younger. Support for Vladimir Putin here is on average about half what it is among TV viewers.
Significant differences from the views of the majority are observed only among respondents who do not watch TV at all and get information mainly from the internet. But they make up only about 28% of the country’s population – certainly a significant figure, but still a minority. This audience, as one might expect, is disproportionately comprised of residents of Russia’s major cities and people with higher education; more than two thirds are Russians aged 45 or younger. Support for Vladimir Putin here is on average about half what it is among TV viewers.
“Viewers of politics-focused YouTube channels are the most critical of the authorities, the special operation and the incorporation of Crimea into Russia.”
The influence of television
The informed public, which constantly follows the news and is therefore capable of making its own judgments, is a minority in any society. Russia is not an exception, and, according to various surveys, it fluctuates in a range of 25-30%. Meanwhile, the majority in a society, as a rule, is very dependent on the dominant discourse in the media. And if at some point a consensus is established in the media about something, the majority uncritically assimilates this view as its own.
Television is the preferred source for obtaining information not only in Russia. In our country, however, its influence is magnified by the fact that there is no diversity of or competition between meaningful points of view on current events. The “consensus” is set at and pushed from the top, and federal TV channels broadcast it as the single, official line.
Unlike nonconflicting and monolithic Russian television, the internet consists of many disparate sources of varying quality.
You need to be able to make sense of this variety, and not everyone can. Older Russians, many of whom are just beginning to learn how to use the internet, do so with great difficulty and do not feel confident online. From this lack of confidence largely stems the widespread support in Russian society for various types of restrictions, blocking and censorship. For these people, television is much simpler, closer and more familiar. Besides, many older Russians believe “if they say it on TV, it means it’s true.”
Young people, who by default feel themselves at home online and watch TV much less often, and thus are less intensively indoctrinated, often do not have the necessary experience, skills and interest to independently make sense of political issues, however. Therefore, they often just borrow opinions about current events from adults, their parents or teachers, many of whom – as we have shown – rely on television for their own views and judgments. The circle closes.
The state goes online
As the internet and social media in Russia have developed, the state has shown an increasing interest in regulating and controlling these spheres. Others have written about troll factories and surveillance technologies, but here we shall limit ourselves to examples that were reflected in our research.
With regard to internet resources (though this is true with regard to other media and NGOs, too), the following rule seems to apply: as long as the project is small and insignificant, the authorities do not pay attention to it. But as soon as its audience and influence begin to grow, it increasingly comes under the state’s microscope. An example could be the replacement of the editorial staff at Lenta.ru in March 2014, against the backdrop of the first phase of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. At that time, Lenta.ru was one of the most popular news sites on the Russian internet, second only to Yandex.News (the long fight for control over which also ended in a victory for the authorities, in the fall of 2022, after the start of the special operation).
Even though the scandal around the replacement of the Lenta.ru editorial staff was widely covered by the publication itself, with statements from the sacked journalists still up on the site, the majority of Lenta.ru readers were indifferent or simply did not notice. Judging by our 2016 survey, they continued to read Lenta.ru as if nothing had happened and did not follow the journalists to their new project, Meduza (an “undesirable organization” in Russia since January 2023), which had to attract and cultivate a new audience.
A similar situation is playing out today:
The informed public, which constantly follows the news and is therefore capable of making its own judgments, is a minority in any society. Russia is not an exception, and, according to various surveys, it fluctuates in a range of 25-30%. Meanwhile, the majority in a society, as a rule, is very dependent on the dominant discourse in the media. And if at some point a consensus is established in the media about something, the majority uncritically assimilates this view as its own.
Television is the preferred source for obtaining information not only in Russia. In our country, however, its influence is magnified by the fact that there is no diversity of or competition between meaningful points of view on current events. The “consensus” is set at and pushed from the top, and federal TV channels broadcast it as the single, official line.
Unlike nonconflicting and monolithic Russian television, the internet consists of many disparate sources of varying quality.
You need to be able to make sense of this variety, and not everyone can. Older Russians, many of whom are just beginning to learn how to use the internet, do so with great difficulty and do not feel confident online. From this lack of confidence largely stems the widespread support in Russian society for various types of restrictions, blocking and censorship. For these people, television is much simpler, closer and more familiar. Besides, many older Russians believe “if they say it on TV, it means it’s true.”
Young people, who by default feel themselves at home online and watch TV much less often, and thus are less intensively indoctrinated, often do not have the necessary experience, skills and interest to independently make sense of political issues, however. Therefore, they often just borrow opinions about current events from adults, their parents or teachers, many of whom – as we have shown – rely on television for their own views and judgments. The circle closes.
The state goes online
As the internet and social media in Russia have developed, the state has shown an increasing interest in regulating and controlling these spheres. Others have written about troll factories and surveillance technologies, but here we shall limit ourselves to examples that were reflected in our research.
With regard to internet resources (though this is true with regard to other media and NGOs, too), the following rule seems to apply: as long as the project is small and insignificant, the authorities do not pay attention to it. But as soon as its audience and influence begin to grow, it increasingly comes under the state’s microscope. An example could be the replacement of the editorial staff at Lenta.ru in March 2014, against the backdrop of the first phase of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. At that time, Lenta.ru was one of the most popular news sites on the Russian internet, second only to Yandex.News (the long fight for control over which also ended in a victory for the authorities, in the fall of 2022, after the start of the special operation).
Even though the scandal around the replacement of the Lenta.ru editorial staff was widely covered by the publication itself, with statements from the sacked journalists still up on the site, the majority of Lenta.ru readers were indifferent or simply did not notice. Judging by our 2016 survey, they continued to read Lenta.ru as if nothing had happened and did not follow the journalists to their new project, Meduza (an “undesirable organization” in Russia since January 2023), which had to attract and cultivate a new audience.
A similar situation is playing out today:
“The rise in the number of blocked internet resources has not led to a proliferation of VPN users – their share has fluctuated around a quarter of the population for the past three years.”
VPNs are used primarily by young people from the biggest cities, which resembles the audience that does not watch TV. Nevertheless, in their views and judgements, VPN users are only slightly more oppositional (both in their own words and in answers to other questions); independent bloggers and journalists are only slightly more popular with them than on average in the country. It seems that most VPN users are not reading news from alternative sources but consuming entertainment that is blocked by the Russian authorities or restricted under Western sanctions. And though the awareness is growing that it is possible to get around such restrictions, most people do not see the need for this – the average person is content with what is openly available.
The blocking of foreign social media hardly caused a stir in Russia, perhaps because some of these platforms were relatively marginal: at the peak of their popularity, the regular audience of Facebook and Twitter was barely above 10% and 5% of the population, respectively (today both are used by 2% of Russians). The biggest shock should have been caused by the blocking of Instagram, whose audience had been rapidly growing: in 2018-21 it more than doubled, going from 13% to 31% of the population; however, after Instagram was blocked, it halved in just a year, to 16% (today it is 14%).
Though there have been a lot of rumors recently about YouTube potentially being blocked, the authorities have not yet decided on such a step – perhaps because there is no domestic alternative yet. Today, YouTube’s regular audience is 37% of the population, with the closest analogue, Rutube, yet to take off (today only 2-3% of Russians regularly visit the platform). However, if the functions of YouTube can be handled by VK, Russia’s most popular social network, which is regularly used by half the country and which has been recruiting famous bloggers for years, it will be much more realistic to block YouTube.
An alternative to a complete block would be for YouTube to give in to Russian government demands to remove supposedly objectionable content. In this case, there would be no need to ban the entire platform. Reports that YouTube warned the human rights project OVD-Info of an impending block, for instance, may indicate that the second scenario is more likely.
Finally, independent bloggers and journalists who continue to broadcast to Russian audiences are facing more and more problems. They are labeled “foreign agents,” meaning no Russian company may legally place advertisements with them, a significant financial blow. In parallel, major figures from Russian television are actively going online. With extensive resources, they are gradually beginning to beat independent bloggers and journalists at their own game. For example, Vladimir Solovyov is the most popular current events journalist even among Russians who get news only online (though his popularity with the television audience is three times higher).
In conclusion, there have been noticeable changes in Russians’ news consumption habits over the past 15 years. The share of television as a news source during this period fell by a third. The combined share of various online sources, meanwhile, has risen, this year surpassing the television audience. Still, the audiences largely overlap, with only 28% of Russians getting news exclusively online, without watching TV.
That is why the role of television in shaping ideas about what is happening in the country and the world, as well as the political attitudes of the majority in Russia, remains decisive – this is evidenced by the results of our surveys.
In addition, as the government tightens its grip on the internet – by shutting down publications, replacing the editorial staff of online projects, blocking sites and foreign social media, pushing their audiences to domestic analogues, marginalizing independent journalists and bloggers, and supporting the move online by key figures from the state media – the Russian internet will gradually start to look like Russian television.
The longer this continues, the less sense there will be in juxtaposing the “TV party” and the “internet party.”
The blocking of foreign social media hardly caused a stir in Russia, perhaps because some of these platforms were relatively marginal: at the peak of their popularity, the regular audience of Facebook and Twitter was barely above 10% and 5% of the population, respectively (today both are used by 2% of Russians). The biggest shock should have been caused by the blocking of Instagram, whose audience had been rapidly growing: in 2018-21 it more than doubled, going from 13% to 31% of the population; however, after Instagram was blocked, it halved in just a year, to 16% (today it is 14%).
Though there have been a lot of rumors recently about YouTube potentially being blocked, the authorities have not yet decided on such a step – perhaps because there is no domestic alternative yet. Today, YouTube’s regular audience is 37% of the population, with the closest analogue, Rutube, yet to take off (today only 2-3% of Russians regularly visit the platform). However, if the functions of YouTube can be handled by VK, Russia’s most popular social network, which is regularly used by half the country and which has been recruiting famous bloggers for years, it will be much more realistic to block YouTube.
An alternative to a complete block would be for YouTube to give in to Russian government demands to remove supposedly objectionable content. In this case, there would be no need to ban the entire platform. Reports that YouTube warned the human rights project OVD-Info of an impending block, for instance, may indicate that the second scenario is more likely.
Finally, independent bloggers and journalists who continue to broadcast to Russian audiences are facing more and more problems. They are labeled “foreign agents,” meaning no Russian company may legally place advertisements with them, a significant financial blow. In parallel, major figures from Russian television are actively going online. With extensive resources, they are gradually beginning to beat independent bloggers and journalists at their own game. For example, Vladimir Solovyov is the most popular current events journalist even among Russians who get news only online (though his popularity with the television audience is three times higher).
In conclusion, there have been noticeable changes in Russians’ news consumption habits over the past 15 years. The share of television as a news source during this period fell by a third. The combined share of various online sources, meanwhile, has risen, this year surpassing the television audience. Still, the audiences largely overlap, with only 28% of Russians getting news exclusively online, without watching TV.
That is why the role of television in shaping ideas about what is happening in the country and the world, as well as the political attitudes of the majority in Russia, remains decisive – this is evidenced by the results of our surveys.
In addition, as the government tightens its grip on the internet – by shutting down publications, replacing the editorial staff of online projects, blocking sites and foreign social media, pushing their audiences to domestic analogues, marginalizing independent journalists and bloggers, and supporting the move online by key figures from the state media – the Russian internet will gradually start to look like Russian television.
The longer this continues, the less sense there will be in juxtaposing the “TV party” and the “internet party.”
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