SOCIETY
‘Insurance Against desertion’: How the Kremlin Is Pressuring Mobilized and Contract Soldiers
February 3, 2025
  • Mikhail Tegin
    Journalist
Journalist Mikhail Tegin looks at how the Russian authorities are using financial blackmail and intimidation to enforce discipline among, and increase the number of, troops in Ukraine.
The original text in Russian was published in Republic and is being republished here with small changes and their permission.

The latest regulations devised by the Russian Defense Ministry entail depriving mobilized men of their pay as punishment for bad behavior, like failure to follow orders or other gross misconduct within a unit, as well as desertion and surrender and where soldiers have been accused of committing crimes.

This is not the first such document: a draft order was previously issued by the ministry that tightened military law concerning contract soldiers.
“Lawyers and human rights activists are certain that these are tools to force soldiers to fall into line, with putting a halt to the flow of deserters a key objective.”
But the authorities also want to save money. Overall, judging by the recent tightening of military law, one gets the impression the Kremlin may be preparing for a new wave of mobilization.

‘Better to get sent to jail’

The new draft order has been published on the official legal information portal. The Defense Ministry seeks to expand the list of reasons for which payments to mobilized men and their relatives, or both, can be withheld. It thus wants to amend its 2022 order on monthly “social payments” to mobilized soldiers.

In the original version, such reasons were formulated in general terms or were not mentioned at all. Listed were only desertion and evasion of service “by means of self-mutilation or otherwise,” for example, feigning illness. Now, other reasons are being added and formalized, including: going AWOL (in simple terms, desertion), being under investigation in connection with Article 332 of the Russian Criminal Code (failure to comply with the order of a commander), being in correctional custody and being detained or arrested for serious or especially serious crimes (for example, self-mutilation).

Correctional custody is a disciplinary measure in the army. It is interpreted more broadly than failure to comply with a commander’s order, though it includes this. It may result from violating the regimen of a military unit or just showing disrespect to superiors. The punishment is confinement for a period of time and being kept “in an isolated place,” as follows from the Russian army’s internal service regulations.
Russian military presence in Ukraine, spring of 2022. Photo: social media
Of particular note in the new regulations is the clause on “conducting investigative measures in relation to a serviceman” under Article 332 of the Criminal Code. As Yevgeny Smirnov, a lawyer for the human rights group Department One, noted in an interview with Republic, this wording entails investigations for failure to comply with a commander’s order:

Not following an order is a way to avoid the meat grinder on the battlefield with relatively “light” consequences, as it is better to get sent to prison… for not following an order than to go to the front line and die there. And for not following an order, they put you in prison for relatively short sentences. There are various sentences: two, three or four years in a penal colony or in an ordinary-regime colony.

There could be thousands of cases, he adds: since the start of the war, Russian military courts have heard more than 10,000 cases of soldiers’ refusing to obey orders from commanders or going AWOL. According to Smirnov, “this is the reason why [people in the Defense Ministry] included this in the draft order.”

‘For any failure to perform military service’

The Russian Defense Ministry had already issued draft resolutions and orders similar to this document, in particular in autumn 2024. One of them targets contract servicemen. They were to be deprived of their signing bonus for violations of military law.

According to lawyers, this primarily concerns cases brought under the Criminal Code articles for going AWOL (Article 337) and failing to comply with an order (Article 332) – these are the two “desertion” articles that are usually brought against soldiers who run away from a unit or do not return after leave.
“The resolution in question makes ‘any evasion of service’ (though there is no specific list of violations) punishable by withholding pay.”
Another order came into effect in March 2024. It entails depriving a serviceman of “monetary allowances” (denezhnoye dovol’stviye) for the period of his unauthorized absence from a unit or place of service. The only exceptions are cases when a soldier is considered sick. The state does not “particularly advertise” all these regulations, and those who sign up to make money do not know about the risks of losing their due payments, notes Yevgeny Smirnov.

Legalization of ‘pits and basements’

Smirnov attributes the latest draft order from the Defense Ministry in part to the Kremlin’s desire to “blackmail soldiers with the ruble” and thus tighten discipline. Ivan Chuvilyaev of the Idite Lesom (“get lost”) human rights project agrees. In his view, the emphasis on punishment for violations of discipline and evasion of service in the new Defense Ministry order is a clear signal meant to intimidate mobilized soldiers and tighten control over their ranks.

Men who have already been forced to go to Ukraine and are tempted to run away are told: “if you behave badly, we will not give you any pay.” This is a measure of intimidation that can be [seen as] a kind of insurance against desertion.

The exact number of Russian servicemen who have deserted remains unknown. Idite Lesom has already helped more than 600 contract soldiers to desert, the project’s director, Grigory Sverdlin, said previously. Mediazona estimates that 10,308 criminal cases for refusal to serve were filed in Russian military courts in 2024 — almost double the previous-year figure (5,517).

Sverdlin’s colleague Chuvilyaev argues the above mentioned orders essentially “legalize what already exists” – the so-called pits and basements, where soldiers are put for punishment. Officially, this is prohibited, yet from time to time, cases of mistreatment of soldiers are publicized, including cruelty or humiliation, or both, especially in more closed military units. For example, in January local authorities in Tyva started investigating the beating of contract soldiers using electric shockers and truncheons.There have also been cases where commanders shot their soldiers for not following orders.

‘Every penny counts now’

The order of the Defense Ministry also reflects efforts to save money on everything.
“The state uses any excuse to get out of paying money to people fighting in Ukraine.”
Flyer for contract service in the "special operation." Text on the flyer: "Join the army of victory. One-time payment of 4 million rubles (over $37,000 USD), salaries starting at 260,000 rubles per month (about $2,400 USD). Guaranteed by the state". Source: VK
“They are saving on both mobilized and contract soldiers, on everyone who is fighting in the war – every penny counts now,” Smirnov of Department One points out.

This could run to tens of millions of rubles: in December 2023, the Defense Ministry reported that since the beginning of the war, more than 640,000 men had signed contracts to serve, while about 300,000 had been called up through mobilization. Dmitri Medvedev, now the deputy chair of Russia’s Security Council, recently claimed about 450,000 people had signed contracts in 2024. He says the Kremlin wants to recruit the same number in 2025.

The average monthly salary of a contract soldier is about RUB 210k, with the exact amount depending on his rank and position. According to a November 2022 presidential decree (No. 787), mobilized soldiers are entitled to a one-time payment of RUB 195k (about $2k).

Men who sign a contract for a year or more “to carry out the tasks of the special military operation on the territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics and Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions” receive a signing bonus of RUB 400k (about $4k).
Smirnov argues the authorities are taking advantage of vulnerable groups of people who simply have no choice but to go to Ukraine. They might owe money on loans or for alimony, not to mention men who have been accused of committing a crime. The authorities have “reformatted the legislation, effectively trampling the entire institution of criminal liability,” says Smirnov. He adds: “even before a verdict is passed, the defendant can ‘volunteer’ to go to fight, and then all legal proceedings in his case are terminated and ‘zeroed.’”

This law came into force in autumn 2024. Defendants in criminal cases are to be released from liability at the trial stage if they sign a contract with the Defense Ministry or were called up during mobilization. Smirnov notes:

Men from these vulnerable groups go to war to try to survive or give their families the opportunity to survive. So that their children have at least some chance of getting into a university. Now, they have no chance to get full scholarships, as many universities have students who get them under various quotas.

Chuvilyaev agrees that contract soldiers are primarily men who find themselves in difficult situations and need money. That is why the authorities are trying to pressure them with money.

After the “partial mobilization” in 2022, the Kremlin is keen to avoid obvious and intensive mobilization steps, yet the legislation around mobilization is constantly being updated. Chuvilyaev warns:

A register of electronic draft notices has been created, restrictions are being devised for men who can be mobilized, who can receive a draft notice – a ban on leaving the country, on driving a vehicle and so on down the list. That is, the state is at least legally preparing for another possible phase of mobilization.
Share this article
Read More
You consent to processing your personal data and accept our privacy policy