Society
Kremlin Pressure on Media and Journalists Intensifies in 2024
January 28, 2025
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Anna Telegina
Legal journalist
Legal journalist Anna Telegina discusses how the Russian government uses lawfare to persecute journalists. Last year, she points out, showed that legislators and law enforcement officials still have much scope to ramp up repression.
The original text in Russian was published in the Moscow Times and is being republished here with their permission.
One of the main instruments used by the Kremlin to pressure journalists, media outlets and bloggers remains the register of “foreign agents.” That said, the expansion of this blacklist slowed a little in 2024.
Galina Timchenko, cofounder and publisher of Meduza, a Russian- and English-language news site. Meduza was designated a "foreign agent" in 2021, followed by Timchenko in 2024. Source: Wiki Commons
Foreign agents: More fines and bans
Last year, 163 names were added to the foreign agent list, versus 229 additions in 2023. By end-2024, the list included a total of 688 organizations, associations and individuals. Among them, according to the Mass Media Defense Center (MMDC), were 160 journalists, 63 media outlets and 43 bloggers.
The fewer additions last year are hardly attributable to liberalization at the Justice Ministry. That is borne out by new measures against those already on the list: the Duma spent 2024 tightening the relevant legislation, mostly trying to deprive foreign agents of any opportunity to earn money.
Advertising on the platforms of foreign agents, along with advertising of foreign agents themselves on Russian platforms, was banned in March, while MPs adopted a law in December that mandated special bank accounts for foreign agents, through which they are now to receive income from copyrights, real estate sales, interest on deposits, etc.
In the latter case, they will be able to receive this money only when their foreign agent status is removed. Yet this does not happen often: in the whole of 2024, only five people managed to have their names cleared.
The number of fines for violations of foreign agent legislation, under Article 19.34 of the Code of Administrative Offenses, has also increased, rising from 368 in 2023 to 556 in 2024. Forty percent of the administrative cases were launched against journalists and bloggers. These violations include failure to put the “foreign agent” boilerplate in communications and failure to file reports with the Justice Ministry.
Last year, 163 names were added to the foreign agent list, versus 229 additions in 2023. By end-2024, the list included a total of 688 organizations, associations and individuals. Among them, according to the Mass Media Defense Center (MMDC), were 160 journalists, 63 media outlets and 43 bloggers.
The fewer additions last year are hardly attributable to liberalization at the Justice Ministry. That is borne out by new measures against those already on the list: the Duma spent 2024 tightening the relevant legislation, mostly trying to deprive foreign agents of any opportunity to earn money.
Advertising on the platforms of foreign agents, along with advertising of foreign agents themselves on Russian platforms, was banned in March, while MPs adopted a law in December that mandated special bank accounts for foreign agents, through which they are now to receive income from copyrights, real estate sales, interest on deposits, etc.
In the latter case, they will be able to receive this money only when their foreign agent status is removed. Yet this does not happen often: in the whole of 2024, only five people managed to have their names cleared.
The number of fines for violations of foreign agent legislation, under Article 19.34 of the Code of Administrative Offenses, has also increased, rising from 368 in 2023 to 556 in 2024. Forty percent of the administrative cases were launched against journalists and bloggers. These violations include failure to put the “foreign agent” boilerplate in communications and failure to file reports with the Justice Ministry.
“A new, important trend is fines on so-called ‘foreign agent participants’ – people who have or had a connection with unregistered public associations listed as ‘foreign agents’.”
More than 50 such cases were recorded in 2024.
Another trend: repeat prosecution of journalists and bloggers for violating foreign agent legislation. Recall that three violations in the span of a year mean a criminal case can be opened – or shelved until needed. In total, at least 16 such criminal cases against journalists, under Article 330.1 of the Criminal Code, were recorded in 2024. Still, there are many more opportunities for the authorities to bring criminal charges against foreign agents for “maliciously evading” their obligations. Before 2024, only one criminal case under Article 330.1 had been recorded.
Another trend: repeat prosecution of journalists and bloggers for violating foreign agent legislation. Recall that three violations in the span of a year mean a criminal case can be opened – or shelved until needed. In total, at least 16 such criminal cases against journalists, under Article 330.1 of the Criminal Code, were recorded in 2024. Still, there are many more opportunities for the authorities to bring criminal charges against foreign agents for “maliciously evading” their obligations. Before 2024, only one criminal case under Article 330.1 had been recorded.
Dmitri Muratov, editor-in-chief of Novaya Gazeta, one of the leading nongovernmental newspapers in Russia. Muratov was a corecipient of the 2021 Nobel Peace Prize but was labeled a “foreign agent" in 2023.
Source: Wiki Commons
Source: Wiki Commons
‘Undesirable’ media
For media outlets that are not intimidated by the “foreign agent” label, the Russian government has created another: “undesirable organization.” Over the past year, that list has increased by 165 entities (in total, there were 195 media outlets listed as “undesirable” at end-2024). Among them are the Moscow Times, DOXA, RFE/RL, Sota and Belsat TV.
Putting a media outlet on this list gives the authorities the opportunity to outlaw its activities entirely and, if the media outlet continues to operate, to hold accountable those affiliated with it. MMDC has recorded at least 79 fines for working for “undesirable” media outlets, speaking to them as experts or linking to their work.
This uptick in punishment for such offenses was another feature of 2024. Considering how easy it is for the authorities to punish a journalist or expert who publishes under his or her own name in an undesirable media outlet, we should expect a further rise in the number of cases.
From journalists to extremists
Twenty twenty-four also saw a widening of “anti-extremism” legislation. In December, the Duma expanded the criteria for including people in the country’s list of “terrorists and extremists.”
In addition, the Kremlin’s financial intelligence service, Rosfinmonitoring, will be able to block the bank accounts of Russians if they are accused of spreading faking information about the army, discrediting the army or demonstrating “extremist symbols.” The latter, from end-2024, includes the rainbow flag – this comes after the nonexistent “international LGBT movement” was officially designated as “extremist.”
Special mention should also be made of journalist Alexander Nevzorov: his family has been labeled an “extremist organization.” Nevzorov’s mother-in-law even had her house and land confiscated. So far, this is an isolated case, but the precedent has been set.
At the year-end, the Russian Supreme Court outdid itself by designating the Komi Daily website, dedicated to culture and life in the region, as a “terrorist organization.” Note that out of the 45 criminal cases against journalists recorded in 2024, at least 15 were for “extremism.” At least eight of them faced charges under Article 282.1 of the Criminal Code – “organization of an extremist community” – for their alleged cooperation with Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation (also known as FBK). The seven others were accused of “justifying terrorism” (Article 205.2 of the Criminal Code).
Blocking and throttling sites
In 2024, the authorities continued blocking independent publications that had miraculously stayed out of the crosshairs during the first two years of war. At the request of an unnamed government agency, which is often the Prosecutor General, at least 38 media projects were blocked.
To this should be added the 81 European media outlets that have had their websites blocked at the behest of the Russian Foreign Ministry.
But blocking is not always an effective measure, especially considering that VPN apps are now widespread – even among Russians who had no idea what they were before.
For media outlets that are not intimidated by the “foreign agent” label, the Russian government has created another: “undesirable organization.” Over the past year, that list has increased by 165 entities (in total, there were 195 media outlets listed as “undesirable” at end-2024). Among them are the Moscow Times, DOXA, RFE/RL, Sota and Belsat TV.
Putting a media outlet on this list gives the authorities the opportunity to outlaw its activities entirely and, if the media outlet continues to operate, to hold accountable those affiliated with it. MMDC has recorded at least 79 fines for working for “undesirable” media outlets, speaking to them as experts or linking to their work.
This uptick in punishment for such offenses was another feature of 2024. Considering how easy it is for the authorities to punish a journalist or expert who publishes under his or her own name in an undesirable media outlet, we should expect a further rise in the number of cases.
From journalists to extremists
Twenty twenty-four also saw a widening of “anti-extremism” legislation. In December, the Duma expanded the criteria for including people in the country’s list of “terrorists and extremists.”
In addition, the Kremlin’s financial intelligence service, Rosfinmonitoring, will be able to block the bank accounts of Russians if they are accused of spreading faking information about the army, discrediting the army or demonstrating “extremist symbols.” The latter, from end-2024, includes the rainbow flag – this comes after the nonexistent “international LGBT movement” was officially designated as “extremist.”
Special mention should also be made of journalist Alexander Nevzorov: his family has been labeled an “extremist organization.” Nevzorov’s mother-in-law even had her house and land confiscated. So far, this is an isolated case, but the precedent has been set.
At the year-end, the Russian Supreme Court outdid itself by designating the Komi Daily website, dedicated to culture and life in the region, as a “terrorist organization.” Note that out of the 45 criminal cases against journalists recorded in 2024, at least 15 were for “extremism.” At least eight of them faced charges under Article 282.1 of the Criminal Code – “organization of an extremist community” – for their alleged cooperation with Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation (also known as FBK). The seven others were accused of “justifying terrorism” (Article 205.2 of the Criminal Code).
Blocking and throttling sites
In 2024, the authorities continued blocking independent publications that had miraculously stayed out of the crosshairs during the first two years of war. At the request of an unnamed government agency, which is often the Prosecutor General, at least 38 media projects were blocked.
To this should be added the 81 European media outlets that have had their websites blocked at the behest of the Russian Foreign Ministry.
But blocking is not always an effective measure, especially considering that VPN apps are now widespread – even among Russians who had no idea what they were before.
“To complement website blocking, the authorities have started targeting access to prohibited content.”
First, in the spring, MPs outlawed spreading information about how to bypass blocks. Then, in the autumn, a ban on “scientific, technical and statistical information” about VPN services was introduced. Now, for example, it is against the law in Russia to publish data on Russians’ use of VPN.
In 2024, the Russian communications regulator, Roskomnadzor, began going after messengers, blocking Viber, Signal and Discord. It added several others, including WhatsApp, to its register of “information dissemination organizers.” This means that the owners of these messengers are required to install equipment on their servers that gives Russian security services access to them. Refusal to do so results in the messengers being blocked in Russia.
In October, Roskomnadzor published a draft directive that would give it the authority to throttle sites in Russia without providing an explanation as to why. Despite the draft status of the document, Roskomnadzor had begun this back in the summer, making YouTube its first victim.
True, Roskomnadzor did offer an explanation, fingering Google, which supposedly had not updated its equipment. Yet after this, the regulator – showing its hand – threatened Russian internet providers that tried to counteract the slowdown of the popular site.
As far as we know, even now there are still small providers in the provinces that continue to provide access to the mobile version of YouTube, despite the ban.
In 2024, the Russian communications regulator, Roskomnadzor, began going after messengers, blocking Viber, Signal and Discord. It added several others, including WhatsApp, to its register of “information dissemination organizers.” This means that the owners of these messengers are required to install equipment on their servers that gives Russian security services access to them. Refusal to do so results in the messengers being blocked in Russia.
In October, Roskomnadzor published a draft directive that would give it the authority to throttle sites in Russia without providing an explanation as to why. Despite the draft status of the document, Roskomnadzor had begun this back in the summer, making YouTube its first victim.
True, Roskomnadzor did offer an explanation, fingering Google, which supposedly had not updated its equipment. Yet after this, the regulator – showing its hand – threatened Russian internet providers that tried to counteract the slowdown of the popular site.
As far as we know, even now there are still small providers in the provinces that continue to provide access to the mobile version of YouTube, despite the ban.
“This is probably the first example of silent resistance from the Russian internet industry, which is losing customers due to government restrictions.”
This is likely the only positive trend we have unearthed.
In the summer, news broke about another ban in relation to blocked media outlets: the Duma took up a bill that basically prohibits Russians from placing ads on blocked sites. It has yet to pass the second and third readings, but if adopted, it would make advertising on Instagram impossible, among other things. This would deal a major blow to Russian small businesses, which still actively use the banned social network for promotions and sales. Perhaps for this reason, the Duma is in no hurry to pass the bill.
In the summer, news broke about another ban in relation to blocked media outlets: the Duma took up a bill that basically prohibits Russians from placing ads on blocked sites. It has yet to pass the second and third readings, but if adopted, it would make advertising on Instagram impossible, among other things. This would deal a major blow to Russian small businesses, which still actively use the banned social network for promotions and sales. Perhaps for this reason, the Duma is in no hurry to pass the bill.
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