SOCIETY
Russians Want the Ukraine Conflict to End – but Without Concessions from Russia
January 31, 2025
- Alexei LevinsonDirector of research at the Levada Center
Sociologist Alexei Levinson breaks down Levada Center research on what Russians think about the potential use of nuclear weapons by Russia and how public perceptions are changing amid the militarization of the country.
The original text in Russian was published on Gorby.media and is being republished here with the author’s permission.
In wartime, few women take up arms, yet it is them who raise soldiers, see them off and are the first to mourn those who do not come back. The conflict in Ukraine is no exception.
Below we explore women’s views on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which has expanded more and lasted longer than many thought. This is based on the results of a survey conducted by the Levada Center at the end of October.
Older women are a major force
Recall that women make up the majority of the adult population of Russia. They are slightly more than half of the overall population. In younger age groups, the numbers of men and women are about the same. (Sometimes women are the minority, but these are very small groups numerically.) What is important for us is that among Russians over 40, women predominate. And the older the age group, the more pronounced this predominance is, extending to double, triple the numbers of men among the oldest groups. In addition, note that older groups are much bigger than younger ones – such is Russia’s current demographic situation.
The numerical predominance of older women, along with the small number of young people (of both sexes), comes alongside the fact that the country’s leadership consists of older men.
The small numbers of young people, who are the hardest to control, are a particular concern for this older leadership – after all, it needs young men to fill the ranks of the army. Against this backdrop, it seeks political support from mothers and grandmothers. It makes the ethos of older women exemplary, if not normative, for the whole of society.
In wartime, few women take up arms, yet it is them who raise soldiers, see them off and are the first to mourn those who do not come back. The conflict in Ukraine is no exception.
Below we explore women’s views on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which has expanded more and lasted longer than many thought. This is based on the results of a survey conducted by the Levada Center at the end of October.
Older women are a major force
Recall that women make up the majority of the adult population of Russia. They are slightly more than half of the overall population. In younger age groups, the numbers of men and women are about the same. (Sometimes women are the minority, but these are very small groups numerically.) What is important for us is that among Russians over 40, women predominate. And the older the age group, the more pronounced this predominance is, extending to double, triple the numbers of men among the oldest groups. In addition, note that older groups are much bigger than younger ones – such is Russia’s current demographic situation.
The numerical predominance of older women, along with the small number of young people (of both sexes), comes alongside the fact that the country’s leadership consists of older men.
The small numbers of young people, who are the hardest to control, are a particular concern for this older leadership – after all, it needs young men to fill the ranks of the army. Against this backdrop, it seeks political support from mothers and grandmothers. It makes the ethos of older women exemplary, if not normative, for the whole of society.
“Pensioners and especially female pensioners, who get their income and news from the state, are the least independent, most passive and most loyal segment of the population.”
Shelled apartment building in Mariupol, March 2022. Source: Wiki Commons
They are completely loyal and devoted to the man who symbolizes the state in their eyes – the president. They are unhappy, as all the reforms, as they see things, have made things only worse for them. Their old age is not easy, and everything good in their lives happened in the distant Soviet past. Their lot is to endure. This complex of “loyalty plus despondency plus readiness to endure” is held up to the rest of society as, so to speak, a normative/modal condition. (Your personal well-being is your business; you can be cheerful and happy on your own, as a private person; there is no point in worrying about politics; if you depend on the state, this is how you should act.)
Our surveys show the whole picture as it takes shape based on the responses of individuals, questioned one by one by our interviewers. During interviews, people take on alternating roles, as individuals, subjects or citizens, as they understand those things.
Among the first questions is one about respondents’ mood in recent days. The response “I feel tension, irritation” is given by women of all ages more often than men, and most often by older women. In the 50+ group, it is at least a quarter of women, while another one in 20 admits feeling “fear, melancholy.” The older the respondent, the more frequent such responses are. They are answering as individuals.
Right after that they are asked: “do you generally approve or disapprove of Vladimir Putin’s performance as president?” The question calls for a response at the “state level.” After all, we are talking about the man who governs all of Russia.
On average, across the entire array of respondents, 84% voiced approval (that figure has roughly held steady for almost all 32 months of the special military operation). But among women aged 65+ – the biggest group in the data when broken down by gender and age – the figure reaches 89%. They are the most worried and the melancholiest, and they seek to show even to interviewers that they want to rally even more around the main symbol of the state.
Several questions are asked about the army, for example, “to what extent do you think the army is trustworthy?” The response “quite trustworthy” was given by 69% of respondents – 72% of men and 67% of women. While only 55% of middle-aged women said they fully trusted the army, the figure in the 65+ group of women was 80%.
It seems that in some cases the responses are determined by gender, in others by age. Technically, this is true. Essentially, however, we are dealing with a variation of status/role complexes, where gender is one of the components.
Reaching retirement age, especially when pensioners no longer work and are most likely lonely, undergirds their low status. For women, the role of “little old lady” lowers this status even more.
The fact that interviewers pay them a visit and give them the opportunity to express their view on a “state” issue prompts them to back the president and army rhetorically. (Let’s note in passing that the issue here is not their desire to give a socially acceptable or “correct” response – they give the one that they find “correct” for themselves.)
Our surveys show the whole picture as it takes shape based on the responses of individuals, questioned one by one by our interviewers. During interviews, people take on alternating roles, as individuals, subjects or citizens, as they understand those things.
Among the first questions is one about respondents’ mood in recent days. The response “I feel tension, irritation” is given by women of all ages more often than men, and most often by older women. In the 50+ group, it is at least a quarter of women, while another one in 20 admits feeling “fear, melancholy.” The older the respondent, the more frequent such responses are. They are answering as individuals.
Right after that they are asked: “do you generally approve or disapprove of Vladimir Putin’s performance as president?” The question calls for a response at the “state level.” After all, we are talking about the man who governs all of Russia.
On average, across the entire array of respondents, 84% voiced approval (that figure has roughly held steady for almost all 32 months of the special military operation). But among women aged 65+ – the biggest group in the data when broken down by gender and age – the figure reaches 89%. They are the most worried and the melancholiest, and they seek to show even to interviewers that they want to rally even more around the main symbol of the state.
Several questions are asked about the army, for example, “to what extent do you think the army is trustworthy?” The response “quite trustworthy” was given by 69% of respondents – 72% of men and 67% of women. While only 55% of middle-aged women said they fully trusted the army, the figure in the 65+ group of women was 80%.
It seems that in some cases the responses are determined by gender, in others by age. Technically, this is true. Essentially, however, we are dealing with a variation of status/role complexes, where gender is one of the components.
Reaching retirement age, especially when pensioners no longer work and are most likely lonely, undergirds their low status. For women, the role of “little old lady” lowers this status even more.
The fact that interviewers pay them a visit and give them the opportunity to express their view on a “state” issue prompts them to back the president and army rhetorically. (Let’s note in passing that the issue here is not their desire to give a socially acceptable or “correct” response – they give the one that they find “correct” for themselves.)
A building in Avdiivka (Donetsk Region) after a Russian missile strike. May 2023. Source: Wiki Commons
Special military operation as a problem ‘for the future’
Women around 40 behave differently. In this age group, there are many educated, skilled women who work as specialists. They do not command people; they manage processes. This makes them more responsible in general. What is important, however, is they have grown-up children – already grown-up, but still children – and they still feel responsibility for them as mothers. And this potentially puts them in conflict with the state, which could take their sons and send them to Ukraine.
For these women, their maternal role leads them to trust the army less (rhetorically) than men of the same age, by a ratio of 2-3 to 1. (These women also disapprove of the president’s performance more often.) The conflict and the army are what worry them most of all. It is personal for them.
Interviewers then ask about approval of the actions of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine. Overall, 76% of respondents expressed approval (this has roughly been the figure for many months now) – 82% of men and 71% of women. In most age groups, such a gender asymmetry exists, and the conventional wisdom that women do not like war seems applicable. Yet this explanation can be put aside when it comes to the youngest age group.
Women around 40 behave differently. In this age group, there are many educated, skilled women who work as specialists. They do not command people; they manage processes. This makes them more responsible in general. What is important, however, is they have grown-up children – already grown-up, but still children – and they still feel responsibility for them as mothers. And this potentially puts them in conflict with the state, which could take their sons and send them to Ukraine.
For these women, their maternal role leads them to trust the army less (rhetorically) than men of the same age, by a ratio of 2-3 to 1. (These women also disapprove of the president’s performance more often.) The conflict and the army are what worry them most of all. It is personal for them.
Interviewers then ask about approval of the actions of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine. Overall, 76% of respondents expressed approval (this has roughly been the figure for many months now) – 82% of men and 71% of women. In most age groups, such a gender asymmetry exists, and the conventional wisdom that women do not like war seems applicable. Yet this explanation can be put aside when it comes to the youngest age group.
“In the youngest age group, which is the smallest numerically, both young men – who have the highest risk of being drafted – and young women – who will see them off – show significantly reduced support for the Ukraine conflict, at 65% and 60%, respectively.”
True, young women are more critical than young men (the gap is five percentage points), but the latter stand out more from the overall male average than the former do from the female average (the gap is 17 percentage points for men and 11 for women). This means that the special military operation is a problem for the younger generation. In this sense, it would be right to call it a problem for the future of Russia.
The older men are, the less likely they are to end up on the front line and the more actively they express approval of the actions of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine (in the oldest group, nine out of every 10 men). Their enthusiasm is shared by most women of the same age (78% among women 65+).
Nevertheless, women are more circumspect in their support for prosecuting the Ukraine conflict than men. This is further reflected in responses to other questions about the special military operation. For example, 62% of men and 58% of women consider it successful.
The older men are, the less likely they are to end up on the front line and the more actively they express approval of the actions of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine (in the oldest group, nine out of every 10 men). Their enthusiasm is shared by most women of the same age (78% among women 65+).
Nevertheless, women are more circumspect in their support for prosecuting the Ukraine conflict than men. This is further reflected in responses to other questions about the special military operation. For example, 62% of men and 58% of women consider it successful.
A building in Myrnohrad (a city in Donetsk Region) after Russian bombing. August 17, 2024. Source: Wiki Commons
War fatigue?
In the halls of power, as well as in the mass media, the possibility of ending the conflict in Ukraine is increasingly being discussed. The Levada Center has asked Russians about this before. Thus, it did not surprise us that in October, when choosing between “continuing military operations” or “starting peace talks,” 45% of men and 62% of women chose the latter.
Driving these responses, it would seem, was the much-discussed “war fatigue.” It seems natural that this condition would be more common among women.
We believe that “fatigue” should be understood as the spread of the view that the conflict must be stopped at any cost, that the goal of stopping the conflict is more important than those for which it was begun in the first place. Whether this is the case currently can be determined by a small experiment conducted during the October survey. Two questions were asked, one after the other.
The first was: “if President Putin decided this week to end the armed conflict with Ukraine, would you support or not support this decision?” Sixty-five percent of men and 79% of women said they would support that decision (27% and 13%, respectively, said they would not). Note that among the youngest group of women, the figure reached 90% support. It would seem that the absolute majority of Russians, led by women, are ready for an immediate end to the special military operation.
However, after this question, another was asked, and the responses show that public opinion regarding potentially ending the special military operation is not so clearcut. The second question added a key condition:“if President Putin decided this week to end the armed conflict with Ukraine and return to Ukraine the territories incorporated into Russia, would you support or not support this decision?”
Men’s responses flipped: 24% said they would support that decision, while 68% would not. Women expressed more support, at 36%, but the majority (54%) still would not back the president in this hypothetical scenario.
The idea of peace at the cost of returning territory is most supported by the youngest group of women, yet even among them it does not have the support of the majority (47%). The least supportive of the idea are women aged 65+ (24%).
This pair of questions was asked several months before, and the latest results are similar. Thus, public opinion on this matter can be seen as stable. Responses to another, “control” question confirm this.
Russians were asked: “do you think that to end military operations and sign a peace agreement [with] Ukraine, Russia should make certain concessions to Ukraine?”
In the halls of power, as well as in the mass media, the possibility of ending the conflict in Ukraine is increasingly being discussed. The Levada Center has asked Russians about this before. Thus, it did not surprise us that in October, when choosing between “continuing military operations” or “starting peace talks,” 45% of men and 62% of women chose the latter.
Driving these responses, it would seem, was the much-discussed “war fatigue.” It seems natural that this condition would be more common among women.
We believe that “fatigue” should be understood as the spread of the view that the conflict must be stopped at any cost, that the goal of stopping the conflict is more important than those for which it was begun in the first place. Whether this is the case currently can be determined by a small experiment conducted during the October survey. Two questions were asked, one after the other.
The first was: “if President Putin decided this week to end the armed conflict with Ukraine, would you support or not support this decision?” Sixty-five percent of men and 79% of women said they would support that decision (27% and 13%, respectively, said they would not). Note that among the youngest group of women, the figure reached 90% support. It would seem that the absolute majority of Russians, led by women, are ready for an immediate end to the special military operation.
However, after this question, another was asked, and the responses show that public opinion regarding potentially ending the special military operation is not so clearcut. The second question added a key condition:“if President Putin decided this week to end the armed conflict with Ukraine and return to Ukraine the territories incorporated into Russia, would you support or not support this decision?”
Men’s responses flipped: 24% said they would support that decision, while 68% would not. Women expressed more support, at 36%, but the majority (54%) still would not back the president in this hypothetical scenario.
The idea of peace at the cost of returning territory is most supported by the youngest group of women, yet even among them it does not have the support of the majority (47%). The least supportive of the idea are women aged 65+ (24%).
This pair of questions was asked several months before, and the latest results are similar. Thus, public opinion on this matter can be seen as stable. Responses to another, “control” question confirm this.
Russians were asked: “do you think that to end military operations and sign a peace agreement [with] Ukraine, Russia should make certain concessions to Ukraine?”
“A resounding ‘no’ to concessions to Ukraine was voiced by 77% of men and 65% of women. Fifty-nine percent in the youngest group of women were opposed, rising to 71% in the oldest group.”
Map of Ukraine conflict as of January 28, 2025. Source: Wiki Commons
We have presented these results not to discuss the outlook for “peace in exchange for territory.” (President Putin made the regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia part of Russia in October 2022, urgently amending the Constitution to do so, in order to make their return to Kyiv impossible.) This article is rather about the state of public opinion, not political science. Public opinion can be studied regardless of how realistic the prospects that people discuss are.
Overall, for most Russian men and women, the very idea of Russia’s making concessions is unacceptable.
Though there is talk about rare metals and other natural resources in these regions, along with certain industrial infrastructure, it is not about material issues for the general public. Russian society, as the abovementioned experiment shows, is driven here by something else – what Lenin called “the national pride of the Great Russians.”
The level of solidarity, as reflected in the data, is quite high. Clearly, “finders keepers” is a norm of the national culture and is seen as self-evident. That fifth or sixth of the population who are ready to “give it back” are marginal.
What does the majority want? They are for peace, but their peace plan is for the special military operation to stop and for them to feel like victors. And since women are supposed to be more dovish, they are for this more then than men.
Overall, for most Russian men and women, the very idea of Russia’s making concessions is unacceptable.
Though there is talk about rare metals and other natural resources in these regions, along with certain industrial infrastructure, it is not about material issues for the general public. Russian society, as the abovementioned experiment shows, is driven here by something else – what Lenin called “the national pride of the Great Russians.”
The level of solidarity, as reflected in the data, is quite high. Clearly, “finders keepers” is a norm of the national culture and is seen as self-evident. That fifth or sixth of the population who are ready to “give it back” are marginal.
What does the majority want? They are for peace, but their peace plan is for the special military operation to stop and for them to feel like victors. And since women are supposed to be more dovish, they are for this more then than men.
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