SOCIETY
What the Kursk Raid Means for the Kremlin’s Efforts to Maintain Socioeconomic Stability
September 4, 2024
Denis Volkov
Director of the Levada Center (Moscow)
The latest Levada Center monthly surveys, conducted weeks after the Ukrainian army attacked Kursk Region,have recorded rising anxiety, though it is currently at much lower levels than during the partial mobilization in the autumn of 2022. Perhaps a more alarming sign for the authorities, as Levada Center Director Denis Volkov points out, is deteriorating assessments of the economy.
The original text in Russian was published in Forbes. A slightly amended version is being reprinted here with their permission.
A map of military operations in Kursk Region. August-September 2024. Source: Wiki Commons
Ukraine’s attack on Kursk Region came as a shock to most Russians. In the first days after August 6, when Ukrainian troops crossed the border, confusion was evident, even in pro-war Telegram channels, where squabbles ensued about what was happening and who was to blame. People wondered: how could this happen?
As always in times of crisis, the public has started to pay much greater attention to what is going on. Data analyst Boris Ovchinnikov, having studied the frequency of queries on Yandex News, claims that the raid into Kursk Region is the fifth most significant event since February 2022, behind only the start of what the Russian government calls its “special military operation” in Ukraine, the announcement of mobilization, the rebellion of Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack.
Amid continued confidence that the special operation is going well for Russia – two thirds of respondents said so in July – the news about the Ukrainian army crossing the border came like a bolt from the blue. In focus groups, respondents said: “nobody expected that this would happen in the third year of the special operation;” “it is incomprehensible that the Ukrainians could advance so deeply.”
As always in times of crisis, the public has started to pay much greater attention to what is going on. Data analyst Boris Ovchinnikov, having studied the frequency of queries on Yandex News, claims that the raid into Kursk Region is the fifth most significant event since February 2022, behind only the start of what the Russian government calls its “special military operation” in Ukraine, the announcement of mobilization, the rebellion of Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack.
Amid continued confidence that the special operation is going well for Russia – two thirds of respondents said so in July – the news about the Ukrainian army crossing the border came like a bolt from the blue. In focus groups, respondents said: “nobody expected that this would happen in the third year of the special operation;” “it is incomprehensible that the Ukrainians could advance so deeply.”
“Yet public opinion polls suggest that Russian society has already managed to digest this shock.”
As of the end of August, about half of those surveyed continued to closely monitor the situation around Kursk. This is primarily older Russians, who always follow the news, mainly through television; they are twice as likely as young people to be interested in what is happening in Kursk. The rest of the country had only heard a few words about it.
Overall, the number of Russians well informed about the Ukrainian army’s incursion is generally in line with the number of those who usually follow the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Overall attention on the conflict has remained virtually unchanged over the past month — about half of those surveyed said they were following Russia-Ukraine events “very” or “fairly” closely. This suggests that three weeks after the fighting in Kursk Region began, the peak of attention and interest had already passed. Nevertheless, anxiety remains.
Overall, the number of Russians well informed about the Ukrainian army’s incursion is generally in line with the number of those who usually follow the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Overall attention on the conflict has remained virtually unchanged over the past month — about half of those surveyed said they were following Russia-Ukraine events “very” or “fairly” closely. This suggests that three weeks after the fighting in Kursk Region began, the peak of attention and interest had already passed. Nevertheless, anxiety remains.
A house damaged during the Ukrainian raid into Kursk Region. Published by Kursk Acting Governor Alexei Smirnov on Telegram. August 2024. Source: Wiki Commons
What exactly concerns Russians?
The vast majority of respondents (90%) say they feel anxiety about the attack on Kursk Region, with almost two thirds reporting strong anxiety. The essence of these concerns is well reflected by open-ended questions (when respondents are required to give an answer in their own words rather than choose from prompts). Only 5% found it difficult to explain the reasons for their anxiety. This is an extremely high figure for an open-ended survey, indicating a high degree of respondents’ emotional engagement with the topic.
Our data shows that Russians are primarily concerned about civilian casualties (41% of all responses). Otherrespondents emphasized the cruelty of Ukrainian soldiers toward Russians, as well as the very fact of an attack on Russian territory (25%).
About one in ten respondents (9%) said that they worry about the fighting getting closer and closer to them: “they will reach us soon;” “it could hit us;” “it could affect us.”
Naturally, it is primarily residents of the regions neighboring Kursk – in Voronezh, Orel and Tula, not to mention Bryansk and Belgorod – who have such concerns. In addition, 3% of respondents had relatives and friends living in Kursk Region for whom they are worried.
At the same time, the majority of Russians who live far away from the fighting and who do not have relatives living or serving in Kursk Region can look at events there with a rather detached attitude. They say bluntly: “it is far from me;” “it does not interest me.”
A tenth of Russians expressed alarm and even outrage at the fact that the Russian government and army “missed” the Ukrainian raid and generally were unprepared for it. Our respondents said: “our leadership overlooked a lot of things;” “we did not expect it, but it turns out that the Ukrainians had been preparing for the incursion for two months;” “we made the Surovikin line in the new territories, but in our own regions they counted on some red lines [to stop the Ukrainians];” “what worries me most is that we have borders like ‘please, come in’ – it should not be like that.”
The vast majority of respondents (90%) say they feel anxiety about the attack on Kursk Region, with almost two thirds reporting strong anxiety. The essence of these concerns is well reflected by open-ended questions (when respondents are required to give an answer in their own words rather than choose from prompts). Only 5% found it difficult to explain the reasons for their anxiety. This is an extremely high figure for an open-ended survey, indicating a high degree of respondents’ emotional engagement with the topic.
Our data shows that Russians are primarily concerned about civilian casualties (41% of all responses). Otherrespondents emphasized the cruelty of Ukrainian soldiers toward Russians, as well as the very fact of an attack on Russian territory (25%).
About one in ten respondents (9%) said that they worry about the fighting getting closer and closer to them: “they will reach us soon;” “it could hit us;” “it could affect us.”
Naturally, it is primarily residents of the regions neighboring Kursk – in Voronezh, Orel and Tula, not to mention Bryansk and Belgorod – who have such concerns. In addition, 3% of respondents had relatives and friends living in Kursk Region for whom they are worried.
At the same time, the majority of Russians who live far away from the fighting and who do not have relatives living or serving in Kursk Region can look at events there with a rather detached attitude. They say bluntly: “it is far from me;” “it does not interest me.”
A tenth of Russians expressed alarm and even outrage at the fact that the Russian government and army “missed” the Ukrainian raid and generally were unprepared for it. Our respondents said: “our leadership overlooked a lot of things;” “we did not expect it, but it turns out that the Ukrainians had been preparing for the incursion for two months;” “we made the Surovikin line in the new territories, but in our own regions they counted on some red lines [to stop the Ukrainians];” “what worries me most is that we have borders like ‘please, come in’ – it should not be like that.”
“Note that respondents are more likely to criticize the military, border guards and intelligence services than Russia’s leadership.”
Damage from Ukrainian shelling of Belgorod on December 30, 2023. Source: VK
As expected, suspicions of corruption have emerged: “either not all the information is getting to the leadership or there is a real money-grab there;” “big money was invested in defense, in the border areas. But [the Ukrainians] just walked in. This is worrying. They could go deeper and deeper.”
In addition, focus group discussions show that people are having trouble finding someone to blame for the current situation, since corruption investigations and resignations in the Ministry of Defense have been going on for more than a month. It turns out that measures have already been taken.
Only a few people named a new wave of mobilization in response to the open-ended question about what concerns them, though a direct question about it (“are you afraid of mobilization or not?”) shows that anxiety around the issue has risen in the country, albeit not dramatically. The share of respondents fearing general mobilization rose from 34% in February 2024 to 46% at the end of August, with half of them deeply worried.
They are primarily young people of draft age and women – mothers and grandmothers of potential conscripts – as well as anti-regime Russians, many of whom opposed the conflict from the very beginning.
Yet these fears are still below the levels of autumn 2022, when two thirds of Russians feared general mobilization. Overall, respondents do not expect another wave of mobilization: amid the fairly elevated fears, expectations that mobilization will actually be announced is much lower – only a quarter of our respondents think so, which, nevertheless, is about six percentage points higher than in February. Meanwhile, 19% now believe mobilization is necessary, versus 12% at the beginning of the year.
Corruption, migrants more concerning than the special operation
In terms of sentiment, our monthly survey recorded a rise in the overall level of anxiety: negative sentiment rose from 18% in July to 24% at the end of August. Nevertheless, “calm” moods still predominate, with the recent growth in negative sentiment incomparable to that during the partial mobilization in the autumn of 2022, when it more than doubled in just a month – from 21% in August to 47% at the end of September.
At the same time, among Russians’ main concerns the Russia-Ukraine conflict has gradually fallen from its traditional second place – after inflation – to third or fourth. Corruption and migrants have moved up their list of concerns, the latter after the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in particular.
This summer, for the first time in many months, we have also seen a deterioration in perceptions of the economy. The long-term stable trend of improving socioeconomic indicators – for example, our respondents’ assessments of their own financial situation and the outlook for the Russian economy in one year and five, among other measures – came to a halt in June, when the optimism dropped slightly, followed by another decline in August.
This suggests that the Russia-Ukraine conflict has finally become routinized. Though it may trigger anxiety, it is still in the background of Russians’ everyday life, whereas everyday problems are at the fore for most the country. One focus group participant summed this up: “all these attacks on cities bordering Ukraine are already seen as routine.” But life, as they say, goes on: “of course, this is our misfortune – the military operation. At the same time, our government has not forgotten about organizing everyday life, about holding events for people.”
Indeed, in the everyday appearance of Russian cities today there is little to suggest that fierce battles are taking place somewhere on the southwestern border – perhaps only the advertisements promising multimillion-ruble payments to men who are ready to sign a contract and go to Ukraine.
In addition, focus group discussions show that people are having trouble finding someone to blame for the current situation, since corruption investigations and resignations in the Ministry of Defense have been going on for more than a month. It turns out that measures have already been taken.
Only a few people named a new wave of mobilization in response to the open-ended question about what concerns them, though a direct question about it (“are you afraid of mobilization or not?”) shows that anxiety around the issue has risen in the country, albeit not dramatically. The share of respondents fearing general mobilization rose from 34% in February 2024 to 46% at the end of August, with half of them deeply worried.
They are primarily young people of draft age and women – mothers and grandmothers of potential conscripts – as well as anti-regime Russians, many of whom opposed the conflict from the very beginning.
Yet these fears are still below the levels of autumn 2022, when two thirds of Russians feared general mobilization. Overall, respondents do not expect another wave of mobilization: amid the fairly elevated fears, expectations that mobilization will actually be announced is much lower – only a quarter of our respondents think so, which, nevertheless, is about six percentage points higher than in February. Meanwhile, 19% now believe mobilization is necessary, versus 12% at the beginning of the year.
Corruption, migrants more concerning than the special operation
In terms of sentiment, our monthly survey recorded a rise in the overall level of anxiety: negative sentiment rose from 18% in July to 24% at the end of August. Nevertheless, “calm” moods still predominate, with the recent growth in negative sentiment incomparable to that during the partial mobilization in the autumn of 2022, when it more than doubled in just a month – from 21% in August to 47% at the end of September.
At the same time, among Russians’ main concerns the Russia-Ukraine conflict has gradually fallen from its traditional second place – after inflation – to third or fourth. Corruption and migrants have moved up their list of concerns, the latter after the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in particular.
This summer, for the first time in many months, we have also seen a deterioration in perceptions of the economy. The long-term stable trend of improving socioeconomic indicators – for example, our respondents’ assessments of their own financial situation and the outlook for the Russian economy in one year and five, among other measures – came to a halt in June, when the optimism dropped slightly, followed by another decline in August.
This suggests that the Russia-Ukraine conflict has finally become routinized. Though it may trigger anxiety, it is still in the background of Russians’ everyday life, whereas everyday problems are at the fore for most the country. One focus group participant summed this up: “all these attacks on cities bordering Ukraine are already seen as routine.” But life, as they say, goes on: “of course, this is our misfortune – the military operation. At the same time, our government has not forgotten about organizing everyday life, about holding events for people.”
Indeed, in the everyday appearance of Russian cities today there is little to suggest that fierce battles are taking place somewhere on the southwestern border – perhaps only the advertisements promising multimillion-ruble payments to men who are ready to sign a contract and go to Ukraine.
“Though it has already been said many times, it is worth underlining again that the possibility for the majority to live an ordinary, more or less normal life is one of the main reasons for the persistent calm in society.”
It is also worth repeating that in shaping public opinion in Russia, as in any country, the central media plays a key role. Sentiment largely depends on the tone the media chooses to cover events. After the Ukrainian attack on Kursk Region, the main message coming out of the biggest Russian news outlets was that the necessary measures had been taken, military reinforcements had been sent to help the border guards and people were being evacuated. In other words, the situation was under control. And, apparently, it worked.
A distribution point for humanitarian aid for Kursk residents. August 2024. Source: Wiki Commons
The political impact of Kursk
Polls show that the events in Kursk Region have had a very limited impact on political ratings. The president’s job approval remained virtually unchanged in August versus the previous month at 85% (down two percentage points). Little changed was also the job approval of the government (down three percentage points) and the parliament (down two percentage points), with both ratings still in positive territory.
That said, there has been a gradual decline for 2-3 months now. This may be attributable to a general buildup of problems, as well as a gradual fading of the atmosphere surrounding the presidential election in March, which in Russia is traditionally accompanied by additional social support measures and stories about how everything is generally going well in the lives of people.
Against the backdrop of the attack on Kursk, support for the Russian army actually rose slightly (to 78%). And most importantly, whereas a month before the attack support for an imminent end to the conflict through peace talks peaked at 58% and that for continuing the special operation bottomed at 34%, since Kursk the number of doves has noticeably gone down.
Now, the ratio of doves to hawks is 49% to 41%. The widely circulated footage of Ukrainian soldiers shooting at fleeing Kursk residents, as well as the cases of looting and abuse of Russian citizens caught on video, has played a role in this.
The position of the Kremlin has also helped shape public opinion: after Vladimir Putin spoke about the possibility of Russia-Ukraine talks in June, we observed the highest public support for peace negotiations.However, it significantly decreased after Putin’s statement on August 12 that negotiations “are out of the question.”
Overall, public sentiment today looks like it did in the spring of 2023 – after the first Ukrainian sabotage operations in Russia, the beginning of mass shelling of Belgorod Region and the first strikes of Ukrainian drones in Russian regions. Like today, there was a slight drop in political ratings, along with rising bitterness toward Ukraine and declining numbers of Russians ready for negotiations. Hostility toward Ukraine was especially acute in the Russian border regions that were attacked. The same thing is happening now.
In our analysis of public sentiment in spring 2023, we concluded that the sustainability of popular perceptions and assessments would depend on the ability of the authorities to maintain socioeconomic stability and avoid direct involvement of a growing share of the population in the conflict for as long as possible. The authorities succeeded back then. Yet against the current backdrop – with the first signs of rising socioeconomic pessimism and the spread of the conflict to Russian territory – this may prove a more difficult task.
Polls show that the events in Kursk Region have had a very limited impact on political ratings. The president’s job approval remained virtually unchanged in August versus the previous month at 85% (down two percentage points). Little changed was also the job approval of the government (down three percentage points) and the parliament (down two percentage points), with both ratings still in positive territory.
That said, there has been a gradual decline for 2-3 months now. This may be attributable to a general buildup of problems, as well as a gradual fading of the atmosphere surrounding the presidential election in March, which in Russia is traditionally accompanied by additional social support measures and stories about how everything is generally going well in the lives of people.
Against the backdrop of the attack on Kursk, support for the Russian army actually rose slightly (to 78%). And most importantly, whereas a month before the attack support for an imminent end to the conflict through peace talks peaked at 58% and that for continuing the special operation bottomed at 34%, since Kursk the number of doves has noticeably gone down.
Now, the ratio of doves to hawks is 49% to 41%. The widely circulated footage of Ukrainian soldiers shooting at fleeing Kursk residents, as well as the cases of looting and abuse of Russian citizens caught on video, has played a role in this.
The position of the Kremlin has also helped shape public opinion: after Vladimir Putin spoke about the possibility of Russia-Ukraine talks in June, we observed the highest public support for peace negotiations.However, it significantly decreased after Putin’s statement on August 12 that negotiations “are out of the question.”
Overall, public sentiment today looks like it did in the spring of 2023 – after the first Ukrainian sabotage operations in Russia, the beginning of mass shelling of Belgorod Region and the first strikes of Ukrainian drones in Russian regions. Like today, there was a slight drop in political ratings, along with rising bitterness toward Ukraine and declining numbers of Russians ready for negotiations. Hostility toward Ukraine was especially acute in the Russian border regions that were attacked. The same thing is happening now.
In our analysis of public sentiment in spring 2023, we concluded that the sustainability of popular perceptions and assessments would depend on the ability of the authorities to maintain socioeconomic stability and avoid direct involvement of a growing share of the population in the conflict for as long as possible. The authorities succeeded back then. Yet against the current backdrop – with the first signs of rising socioeconomic pessimism and the spread of the conflict to Russian territory – this may prove a more difficult task.
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