Politics
‘The State of the Regime has not Changed Qualitatively. It is Quite Stable and Resilient’
August 30, 2024
- Stanislav Belkovsky
Political analyst
- Yevgeny Senshin
Journalist
Political analyst Stanislav Belkovsky shares his thoughts on the strength of Vladimir Putin’s regime, the results of Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk, the prospects for peace talks and whether the Russian opposition abroad can make regime change in Russia happen.
The original interview in Russian was published in Russian in Republic. A shortened version is being republished here with their permission.
A map of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Region. August 2024. Source: Wiki Commons
How would you describe the current state of the political regime in Russia, considering the Ukrainian army’s incursion into Kursk Region?
I believe that the state of the regime has not changed qualitatively. It is quite stable and resilient. The possibility of a palace coup always exists, but I have never considered it high, and I do not see any groups currently that have enough consolidated resources – primarily the political will – to remove Vladimir Putin from power. He remains the exclusive arbiter of the Russian ruling elite.
For his part, Putin continues to tighten the screws and toughen the regime so as to minimize the possibilities to destabilize it from within. The main part of this harder line is restricting freedom of speech. By blocking the internet in various ways and building a digital concentration camp of the Chinese type, among other things. This will continue at an accelerated pace. The exact timeline is difficult to predict, but the trend itself is obvious, and [the project] will be pursued.
Therefore, I think the regime can only be destabilized by “black swan” events that affect it from within, such as Putin’s death. They may certainly happen, but we do not know when or why. I do not see any other reasons for a near-term collapse of this regime by inertia.
Several months ago, Sergei Shoigu was removed [as defense minister], then the arrests of his deputies and other officials in the Ministry of Defense began. Could this group of people and the military in general harbor a grudge against Putin? Or do you not see any stirrings there?
No, I do not see any stirrings there.
I believe that the state of the regime has not changed qualitatively. It is quite stable and resilient. The possibility of a palace coup always exists, but I have never considered it high, and I do not see any groups currently that have enough consolidated resources – primarily the political will – to remove Vladimir Putin from power. He remains the exclusive arbiter of the Russian ruling elite.
For his part, Putin continues to tighten the screws and toughen the regime so as to minimize the possibilities to destabilize it from within. The main part of this harder line is restricting freedom of speech. By blocking the internet in various ways and building a digital concentration camp of the Chinese type, among other things. This will continue at an accelerated pace. The exact timeline is difficult to predict, but the trend itself is obvious, and [the project] will be pursued.
Therefore, I think the regime can only be destabilized by “black swan” events that affect it from within, such as Putin’s death. They may certainly happen, but we do not know when or why. I do not see any other reasons for a near-term collapse of this regime by inertia.
Several months ago, Sergei Shoigu was removed [as defense minister], then the arrests of his deputies and other officials in the Ministry of Defense began. Could this group of people and the military in general harbor a grudge against Putin? Or do you not see any stirrings there?
No, I do not see any stirrings there.
“But military leaders brought up in the Soviet system, who went to the General Staff Military Academy, never had political agency; it was nipped in the bud right away. They never could and still cannot challenge the political leadership.”
They can take their discontent as far as they like, but not to the point of regime change. The rebellion was organized by Yevgeny Prigozhin, but he was not a career military man – he was a swashbuckling businessman. Career military men have never been capable of anything like that, and they are not capable now, regardless of their feelings on one thing or another.
We hear more and more talk about Putin’s depression, confusion and irritability around the Ukrainian army’s offensive in Kursk Region. What do you think about that?
Of course, Putin is very concerned about what is happening in Kursk Region, but he is behaving as he always does in such situations, starting with the first critical situation of his presidency – the disaster with the nuclear-powered submarine Kursk, giving symbolical significance to the current Kursk situation.
Whenever something like this happens, he goes into hiding, or at least does everything he can to divert public attention from what is happening. That is exactly what he is doing now. There is nothing new in his behavior during an emergency.
We hear more and more talk about Putin’s depression, confusion and irritability around the Ukrainian army’s offensive in Kursk Region. What do you think about that?
Of course, Putin is very concerned about what is happening in Kursk Region, but he is behaving as he always does in such situations, starting with the first critical situation of his presidency – the disaster with the nuclear-powered submarine Kursk, giving symbolical significance to the current Kursk situation.
Whenever something like this happens, he goes into hiding, or at least does everything he can to divert public attention from what is happening. That is exactly what he is doing now. There is nothing new in his behavior during an emergency.
Vladimir Putin unexpectedly visited Beslan on August 20, 2024, to commemorate the loss of 334 people, 186 of them children, in a terrorist attack in 2004.
Source: Social Media
Source: Social Media
Since the submarine disaster in August-September 2000] he has done this repeatedly, including during the Beslan school hostage crisis, when he behaved in the same way in public until the crisis was resolved – resolved in the bloodiest way.
Only after this did Putin, feeling like the victor, appear on television, using the terrorist attack in Beslan as a pretext for abolishing gubernatorial elections. Of course… the Kremlin had been thinking about abolishing gubernatorial elections since the late 1990s, but Beslan served as a pretext for it.
In these moments, Putin always thinks about threats to his own security and focuses on them. His physical security is the key to the survival of the current political system.
The famous comment [by current Duma Speaker] Vyacheslav Volodin that “there is Putin, there is Russia; if there is no Putin, there is no Russia” is largely true, if by Russia we mean the current Russian state and the political system that has developed over the last quarter century.
So, of course, Putin is worried and concerned, but he is counting on being a lucky man and having a lot left in the tank in terms of physical strength and time, [which gives him confidence that] he will come out of this situation unscathed.
In your view, what is behind the attack on Kursk Region?
The incursion into Kursk Region demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the Russian military machine – this was one of its most important goals.
Note that before the Ukrainian army attacked Kursk Region, we were talking mostly about Ukraine’s problems: its war fatigue, mobilization crisis, lack of soldiers, weapons shortages and so on.
Since the start of the Kursk operation, we have been discussing mostly the problems of Russia and the Russian armed forces, which had never gone away; rather we had just forgotten about them for a while. Regular troops have manpower problems. When it counted, there were none in Kursk Region. Another problem is the need to use [in the military operation] conscripts and FSB border guards. Another is the weakness and ineffectiveness of Chechen units, which again turned out to be largely a media phenomenon, good for TikTok but not real combat.
This is yet more evidence that to continue the special operation, Vladimir Putin may need partial mobilization soon, a new wave of it. Because the number of volunteer contract soldiers is greatly exaggerated, and the quality of the people who appear on the front lines from the Russian side is declining every day.
Only after this did Putin, feeling like the victor, appear on television, using the terrorist attack in Beslan as a pretext for abolishing gubernatorial elections. Of course… the Kremlin had been thinking about abolishing gubernatorial elections since the late 1990s, but Beslan served as a pretext for it.
In these moments, Putin always thinks about threats to his own security and focuses on them. His physical security is the key to the survival of the current political system.
The famous comment [by current Duma Speaker] Vyacheslav Volodin that “there is Putin, there is Russia; if there is no Putin, there is no Russia” is largely true, if by Russia we mean the current Russian state and the political system that has developed over the last quarter century.
So, of course, Putin is worried and concerned, but he is counting on being a lucky man and having a lot left in the tank in terms of physical strength and time, [which gives him confidence that] he will come out of this situation unscathed.
In your view, what is behind the attack on Kursk Region?
The incursion into Kursk Region demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the Russian military machine – this was one of its most important goals.
Note that before the Ukrainian army attacked Kursk Region, we were talking mostly about Ukraine’s problems: its war fatigue, mobilization crisis, lack of soldiers, weapons shortages and so on.
Since the start of the Kursk operation, we have been discussing mostly the problems of Russia and the Russian armed forces, which had never gone away; rather we had just forgotten about them for a while. Regular troops have manpower problems. When it counted, there were none in Kursk Region. Another problem is the need to use [in the military operation] conscripts and FSB border guards. Another is the weakness and ineffectiveness of Chechen units, which again turned out to be largely a media phenomenon, good for TikTok but not real combat.
This is yet more evidence that to continue the special operation, Vladimir Putin may need partial mobilization soon, a new wave of it. Because the number of volunteer contract soldiers is greatly exaggerated, and the quality of the people who appear on the front lines from the Russian side is declining every day.
“With its incursion, the Ukrainian army has succeeded in dispelling the feeling that Russia is close to achieving a military victory over Ukraine and therefore that potential ceasefire negotiations can be conducted by the Kremlin from a position of strength.”
[For Ukraine] the main goal of the incursion is to move to negotiations as quickly as possible, just not on the terms announced by Vladimir Putin in mid-June before the peace conference in Burgenstock, Switzerland. Recall that this is the complete withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the annexed regions, including the transfer of Kherson and (especially) Zaporizhzhia to Russia; Ukraine’s official renunciation of ambitions to join NATO; the implementation of other provisions concerning [Ukrainian] domestic policy that were part of the Istanbul agreements of 2022; and, finally, the lifting of all sanctions against Russia.
The Kursk operation has shown these terms to be not entirely realistic. One reason being that the military capabilities of contemporary Russia – its having the resources necessary for a military victory – were exaggerated.
Of course, all sides are tired of this war. The US administration is doubly interested in the start of peace negotiations this autumn, before November 5. Because it is important for Joe Biden and Kamala Harris to take away one of Donald Trump’s key trump cards, showing that the world does not need his peacemaking efforts and that those of the current administration are effective.
This combination of factors means that there is a high probability that negotiations could begin this autumn. Some components of the peace process will at least be discussed, for example, a general, “all-for-all” POW swap.
So, in your view, has the moment come when Putin will have to swallow his pride and arrogance?
Putin is not going to apologize for anything. Besides, he can spin anything as his own victory with the help of the information machine under his control. It is not a problem for him. Of course, he will seek revenge for all the attempts to humiliate him.
[We have seen reports] about Russian drones flying over nuclear power plants in Germany – an asymmetrical response from Putin.
But this is all escalation that must precede negotiations. It is happening to show that the peace process is necessary and inevitable, since neither side will be able to survive this war if it goes on for a long time still.
Indian Prime Minister Modi visited Kyiv, and Chinese Premier Li Qiang visited Moscow. How do you assess the efforts of these countries in the negotiation process?
In general, a lot depends on China and India, since today they are the key economic partners of Russia, while China is also a military partner. Though it does not officially supply Russia with lethal weapons, [Beijing] greatly facilitates the transfer of weapons and military technologies to Russia, circumventing US sanctions. The positions of China and India are basically that this war must end in the foreseeable future. And Moscow cannot ignore their point of view.
The Kursk operation has shown these terms to be not entirely realistic. One reason being that the military capabilities of contemporary Russia – its having the resources necessary for a military victory – were exaggerated.
Of course, all sides are tired of this war. The US administration is doubly interested in the start of peace negotiations this autumn, before November 5. Because it is important for Joe Biden and Kamala Harris to take away one of Donald Trump’s key trump cards, showing that the world does not need his peacemaking efforts and that those of the current administration are effective.
This combination of factors means that there is a high probability that negotiations could begin this autumn. Some components of the peace process will at least be discussed, for example, a general, “all-for-all” POW swap.
So, in your view, has the moment come when Putin will have to swallow his pride and arrogance?
Putin is not going to apologize for anything. Besides, he can spin anything as his own victory with the help of the information machine under his control. It is not a problem for him. Of course, he will seek revenge for all the attempts to humiliate him.
[We have seen reports] about Russian drones flying over nuclear power plants in Germany – an asymmetrical response from Putin.
But this is all escalation that must precede negotiations. It is happening to show that the peace process is necessary and inevitable, since neither side will be able to survive this war if it goes on for a long time still.
Indian Prime Minister Modi visited Kyiv, and Chinese Premier Li Qiang visited Moscow. How do you assess the efforts of these countries in the negotiation process?
In general, a lot depends on China and India, since today they are the key economic partners of Russia, while China is also a military partner. Though it does not officially supply Russia with lethal weapons, [Beijing] greatly facilitates the transfer of weapons and military technologies to Russia, circumventing US sanctions. The positions of China and India are basically that this war must end in the foreseeable future. And Moscow cannot ignore their point of view.
“The Chinese position is echoed, in particular, by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko.While heavily dependent on Moscow, he is a vassal of Beijing first and foremost.”
Alexander Lukashenko gives an interview to Russian TV. August 15, 2024. Source: Youtube
And if we look at his recent interview with Kremlin television journalist and Duma Deputy Yevgeny Popov, Lukashenko quite clearly laid out his position, which “completely coincidentally” coincides with China’s. Belarus will not participate in the war, which is why it is inflating the military threat from Ukraine and keeping its combat-ready units on the border with Ukraine, thereby getting around Vladimir Putin’s wishes to send those units into real combat somewhere, including Kursk Region.
Over the last couple of months, a major advertising campaign offering unimaginable one-time bonuses for signing a contract [to fight in Ukraine] has been carried out in Russian cities and villages. How effective do you think such campaigns are – is it still possible to recruit men in the towns and villages? And will there be enough money?
This campaign is not very effective today. When Putin doubled the bonus for contract soldiers and instructed the regions to do the same at their own expense, there was a small bump in the number of people ready to sign up. But after some time, all the interest and enthusiasm faded.
For one, it turned out that there is no money in regional budgets to implement this decree. Only the federal budget has the money. For another, military leaders drew Putin’s attention to the clearly unfair situation for mobilized soldiers, who fight practically for free. This situation demotivates mobilized soldiers. So, this measure has failed to deliver any particular result, though it has shown the scale of the problems.
Doubling the bonuses means there is no one left, no one is going to fight. The Kremlin has come much closer to the dilemma of whether to call a new mobilization or not. To ratchet up the pressure on Ukraine and demonstrate Russia’s readiness to win the war in the foreseeable future, it makes sense. That said, Vladimir Putin categorically does not want to conduct another mobilization. This is one of the factors pushing for ceasefire negotiations.
Over the last couple of months, a major advertising campaign offering unimaginable one-time bonuses for signing a contract [to fight in Ukraine] has been carried out in Russian cities and villages. How effective do you think such campaigns are – is it still possible to recruit men in the towns and villages? And will there be enough money?
This campaign is not very effective today. When Putin doubled the bonus for contract soldiers and instructed the regions to do the same at their own expense, there was a small bump in the number of people ready to sign up. But after some time, all the interest and enthusiasm faded.
For one, it turned out that there is no money in regional budgets to implement this decree. Only the federal budget has the money. For another, military leaders drew Putin’s attention to the clearly unfair situation for mobilized soldiers, who fight practically for free. This situation demotivates mobilized soldiers. So, this measure has failed to deliver any particular result, though it has shown the scale of the problems.
Doubling the bonuses means there is no one left, no one is going to fight. The Kremlin has come much closer to the dilemma of whether to call a new mobilization or not. To ratchet up the pressure on Ukraine and demonstrate Russia’s readiness to win the war in the foreseeable future, it makes sense. That said, Vladimir Putin categorically does not want to conduct another mobilization. This is one of the factors pushing for ceasefire negotiations.
“But if peace negotiations do not start in the coming months, then mobilization will happen – there’s no getting around it.”
To some extent, the blogs of voenkory can be seen as an indicator of what is really happening at the front. What is the general mood among pro-war bloggers and pundits today?
It is basically back where it was in August 2022. That is, pro-war bloggers and voenkory are reporting the depressing state of the Russian armed forces, that the war is not being won but rather turning into a stalemate. This is one of the results of the Kursk incursion.
Everyone is again talking about how, even after the reshuffle at the top of the Russian Defense Ministry, nothing has changed qualitatively: there are no troops, there is no one to fight, Russia is not keeping up with Ukraine in terms of drones, and so on. And most importantly, there is a shortage of officers, since their number was drastically reduced under the military reform carried out by former Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov. But that was Putin’s military reform, not Serdyukov’s. It was carried out in line with Vladimir Putin’s idea that the Russian army should not be constantly expecting a major war with the West, as was the case in Soviet times, but a sufficiently mobile force able to carry out special military operations when necessary.
That is why the war in Ukraine is called that. It was not supposed to be a large, full-scale war; it was supposed to be a rather swift operation to overthrow the regime in Kyiv. But, as we know, the initial plan failed, and what had been conceived as a special operation/blitzkrieg turned into a full-scale war, which was not Putin’s original intention, of course.
It is basically back where it was in August 2022. That is, pro-war bloggers and voenkory are reporting the depressing state of the Russian armed forces, that the war is not being won but rather turning into a stalemate. This is one of the results of the Kursk incursion.
Everyone is again talking about how, even after the reshuffle at the top of the Russian Defense Ministry, nothing has changed qualitatively: there are no troops, there is no one to fight, Russia is not keeping up with Ukraine in terms of drones, and so on. And most importantly, there is a shortage of officers, since their number was drastically reduced under the military reform carried out by former Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov. But that was Putin’s military reform, not Serdyukov’s. It was carried out in line with Vladimir Putin’s idea that the Russian army should not be constantly expecting a major war with the West, as was the case in Soviet times, but a sufficiently mobile force able to carry out special military operations when necessary.
That is why the war in Ukraine is called that. It was not supposed to be a large, full-scale war; it was supposed to be a rather swift operation to overthrow the regime in Kyiv. But, as we know, the initial plan failed, and what had been conceived as a special operation/blitzkrieg turned into a full-scale war, which was not Putin’s original intention, of course.
“But as it happens, Russia again needs an army like the Soviet one, constantly ready for and capable of fighting a full-scale war with the West. There are no resources for this, however, and most importantly there are no officers.”
This is what pro-war bloggers and voenkory constantly talk about. Overall, they have become an inharmonious but loud chorus of criticism around the army and its leadership, which is also, I repeat, an indirect result of the Ukrainian army’s operation in Kursk Region.
Let’s talk about the opposition. Has the recent release of opposition figures [in the prisoner swap] benefited the opposition? And how, in your view, should a member of the Russian opposition, a “good Russian,” relate to the offensive in Kursk and to the Ukrainian army in general?
The release of Russian prisoners is already very positive. At the same time, the Russian opposition as a single entity does not exist today. It is a loose conglomerate of people and structures, many of which are fighting mainly for Western funding.
There can be no practical scenario for regime change in Russia in general and among the opposition in particular. There can be no effective opposition under a totalitarian regime in the first place
Let’s talk about the opposition. Has the recent release of opposition figures [in the prisoner swap] benefited the opposition? And how, in your view, should a member of the Russian opposition, a “good Russian,” relate to the offensive in Kursk and to the Ukrainian army in general?
The release of Russian prisoners is already very positive. At the same time, the Russian opposition as a single entity does not exist today. It is a loose conglomerate of people and structures, many of which are fighting mainly for Western funding.
There can be no practical scenario for regime change in Russia in general and among the opposition in particular. There can be no effective opposition under a totalitarian regime in the first place
Russian political prisoners, along with American citizens, who were freed in the large-scale prisoner swap between Russia and the US. August 1, 2024. Source: Wiki Commons
The Russian opposition is rather a kind of intellectual and moral cloud. There are strong, exciting figures. I would highlight Vladimir Kara-Murza. But this in no way advances regime change in Russia, which will happen for completely different, internal reasons, not due to actions of the Russian opposition, which is currently abroad. I think that the key figures of the Russian opposition understand this perfectly well. In particular, in an interview with Yuri Dud, Ilya Yashin says that he wants to be not so much a political leader as a moral and intellectual leader of a generation. And that is a much more realistic objective than any of the stories about political battles in currently totalitarian Russia.
On the one hand, we know that political changes and reforms in Russia often follow military defeats. This was the case after the lost Crimean War and after the lost Russo-Japanese War at the beginning of the 20th century.
On the other hand, the Russian opposition cannot take the position that Russia should be destroyed and carved up or that Russians should be killed or banned in Europe. But how to navigate between these poles is a separate, complex and serious question.
Of course, no Russian politician can associate himself with Ukrainian public opinion. Since Ukraine is the target of an aggressive war launched by Russia, and in Ukraine there can be no positive view of any Russian politician or any Russian public figure.
Of course, a Russian oppositionist must focus on public opinion in Russia and among his fellow Russians in the broadest sense of the word “Russian.”
On the one hand, we know that political changes and reforms in Russia often follow military defeats. This was the case after the lost Crimean War and after the lost Russo-Japanese War at the beginning of the 20th century.
On the other hand, the Russian opposition cannot take the position that Russia should be destroyed and carved up or that Russians should be killed or banned in Europe. But how to navigate between these poles is a separate, complex and serious question.
Of course, no Russian politician can associate himself with Ukrainian public opinion. Since Ukraine is the target of an aggressive war launched by Russia, and in Ukraine there can be no positive view of any Russian politician or any Russian public figure.
Of course, a Russian oppositionist must focus on public opinion in Russia and among his fellow Russians in the broadest sense of the word “Russian.”
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