Politics
Will Banning the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Unite Ukraine’s Orthodox Churches?
September 3, 2024
- Nikolay MitrokhinАcademic Researcher, Research Center for East European Studies at the University of Bremen (Germany)
Researcher Nikolay Mitrokhin looks at the recent law effectively banning the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. He sees the allegations of its close ties with Russia to be unfounded, likely motivated by political and economic considerations, and lays out healthier scenarios for the unification of the Orthodox churches in Ukraine.
On August 24, Ukraine’s Independence Day, President Volodymyr Zelensky signed into law a controversial measure banning religious organizations linked to the Russian Orthodox Church from operating in Ukraine (Russia.Post published an op-ed on the new law here). The law is seen as targeting the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), the country’s largest religious organization, which officially has more than 10,000 parishes and monasteries currently.
The new law will disappoint Ukrainian radicals, however. It does not entail immediately shutting down the UOC but rather lays out a lengthy procedure whereby the state is to investigate any religious organization suspected of having ties to Russia. If that investigation finds violations, an order is to be issued for the violator to sever such ties, with nine months given to do so.
But even after that, each UOC community would have to be banned as a separate legal entity and could challenge the ban in court. Thus, a decision to de facto ban the UOC is unlikely before May 2025, while individual UOC communities could resist until at least mid-2026. Ten thousand cases to close parish and monastic communities would tax the country’s courts, even if the president’s office completely controlled the judicial system, which is not the case at this point. Note that for “historically significant” buildings – about 30% of UOC churches – the law makes an exception, laying out a simplified procedure to confiscate them.
Why did Zelensky feel the need to address the issue of “spiritual security” in the third year of the war? The new law has alarmed not only Russian propagandists but also Western audiences (including the World Council of Churches), as well as Pope Francis, who, commenting on the law, called for “no Christian Church [to] be abolished directly or indirectly.”
There is no guarantee that the law will not become an excuse for dividing-up the property of a weakened Church (as happened during the redistribution of parishes in Western Ukraine in 1989-92 and in 2018-19).
The new law will disappoint Ukrainian radicals, however. It does not entail immediately shutting down the UOC but rather lays out a lengthy procedure whereby the state is to investigate any religious organization suspected of having ties to Russia. If that investigation finds violations, an order is to be issued for the violator to sever such ties, with nine months given to do so.
But even after that, each UOC community would have to be banned as a separate legal entity and could challenge the ban in court. Thus, a decision to de facto ban the UOC is unlikely before May 2025, while individual UOC communities could resist until at least mid-2026. Ten thousand cases to close parish and monastic communities would tax the country’s courts, even if the president’s office completely controlled the judicial system, which is not the case at this point. Note that for “historically significant” buildings – about 30% of UOC churches – the law makes an exception, laying out a simplified procedure to confiscate them.
Why did Zelensky feel the need to address the issue of “spiritual security” in the third year of the war? The new law has alarmed not only Russian propagandists but also Western audiences (including the World Council of Churches), as well as Pope Francis, who, commenting on the law, called for “no Christian Church [to] be abolished directly or indirectly.”
There is no guarantee that the law will not become an excuse for dividing-up the property of a weakened Church (as happened during the redistribution of parishes in Western Ukraine in 1989-92 and in 2018-19).
“Will the implementation of the law and a potential ban on the UOC not end up hurting Ukraine’s reputation abroad and causing numerous lawsuits in international courts?”
Clergy and laymen bar a Ministry of Culture commission from entering the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra. April 2023. Source: VK
At the same time, were a banned UOC to be restored, it would come to be seen as “popular” (nardonaya) and a victim.
Three points of view on the new law
Ukrainian “turbo-patriots” (a term often used to describe those who advocate the “Ukrainization of Ukraine” and demand “patriotic behavior” from their fellow citizens) – represented in the Rada by the European Solidarity and Holos (“Voice”) factions in particular – believe that the UOC, which they say consists of “FSB agents in cowls,” “Moscow popes,” “Kremlin agents,” etc., should be destroyed and absorbed by the “true” Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU). President Zelensky basically endorsed this position, stating on August 24 that the influence of the “Moscow devils” had been broken.
The turbo-patriots see the new law as a major victory for Ukraine over Moscow and a step toward gaining national autonomy. Banning the UOC is supported by 64% of Ukrainians, according to a May poll by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS). Turbo-patriots also view UOC officials who violate the law as “currency” for prisoner swaps with Russia so that captured Ukrainian soldiers and those being persecuted by Moscow for their pro-Ukraine stance can come home.
This position has received support from many Ukrainian sympathizers around the world, and even Germany’s public broadcaster Deutsche Welle covered the new law in this spirit.
The second point of view is represented by the Kremlin and the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), who essentially agree with the Ukrainian turbo-patriots’ assessment that the UOC is a representative of the “Russian world” and an organic part of the ROC – an example of “Russian people” being persecuted by Ukrainian “Nazis” (this is consistently repeated in statements by the World Russian People’s Council, which is run by the Moscow Patriarchate and the Presidential Administration).
For the Kremlin and ROC, the new law is a convenient bit of anti-Ukraine propaganda that can be used inside and outside of Russia, while for residents of occupied Ukrainian territory, where Orthodoxy is represented almost exclusively by UOC parishes, it provides additional fodder for anti-Kyiv sentiment. This allows the ROC to quietly, without getting permission from the UOC, subordinate dioceses in areas controlled by Russian troops. It comes even though in 2014-22 the Crimean dioceses of the UOC, legally reregistered under Russian law, ecclesiastically remained in real subordination to Kyiv, which could appoint bishops there.
The third point of view is that of the UOC itself as an organization and legal entity, as well as some Ukrainian politicians who support it (there was even a split in Zelensky’s Servant of the People faction over the law) and many Ukraine experts. They see the UOC as a Ukrainian church in political terms: its clergy and laity are Ukrainian citizens, the overwhelming majority of whom are ethnic Ukrainians.
And since the clergy generally come from the country’s western regions, Ukrainian is their native language – unlike many of those who accuse them of being “Muscovites.”
Is the UOC really a ‘vassal of Moscow’?
In the first hours after the full-scale Russian invasion, the UOC leadership and Synod condemned the war and expressed support for the Ukrainian army.
Three points of view on the new law
Ukrainian “turbo-patriots” (a term often used to describe those who advocate the “Ukrainization of Ukraine” and demand “patriotic behavior” from their fellow citizens) – represented in the Rada by the European Solidarity and Holos (“Voice”) factions in particular – believe that the UOC, which they say consists of “FSB agents in cowls,” “Moscow popes,” “Kremlin agents,” etc., should be destroyed and absorbed by the “true” Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU). President Zelensky basically endorsed this position, stating on August 24 that the influence of the “Moscow devils” had been broken.
The turbo-patriots see the new law as a major victory for Ukraine over Moscow and a step toward gaining national autonomy. Banning the UOC is supported by 64% of Ukrainians, according to a May poll by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS). Turbo-patriots also view UOC officials who violate the law as “currency” for prisoner swaps with Russia so that captured Ukrainian soldiers and those being persecuted by Moscow for their pro-Ukraine stance can come home.
This position has received support from many Ukrainian sympathizers around the world, and even Germany’s public broadcaster Deutsche Welle covered the new law in this spirit.
The second point of view is represented by the Kremlin and the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), who essentially agree with the Ukrainian turbo-patriots’ assessment that the UOC is a representative of the “Russian world” and an organic part of the ROC – an example of “Russian people” being persecuted by Ukrainian “Nazis” (this is consistently repeated in statements by the World Russian People’s Council, which is run by the Moscow Patriarchate and the Presidential Administration).
For the Kremlin and ROC, the new law is a convenient bit of anti-Ukraine propaganda that can be used inside and outside of Russia, while for residents of occupied Ukrainian territory, where Orthodoxy is represented almost exclusively by UOC parishes, it provides additional fodder for anti-Kyiv sentiment. This allows the ROC to quietly, without getting permission from the UOC, subordinate dioceses in areas controlled by Russian troops. It comes even though in 2014-22 the Crimean dioceses of the UOC, legally reregistered under Russian law, ecclesiastically remained in real subordination to Kyiv, which could appoint bishops there.
The third point of view is that of the UOC itself as an organization and legal entity, as well as some Ukrainian politicians who support it (there was even a split in Zelensky’s Servant of the People faction over the law) and many Ukraine experts. They see the UOC as a Ukrainian church in political terms: its clergy and laity are Ukrainian citizens, the overwhelming majority of whom are ethnic Ukrainians.
And since the clergy generally come from the country’s western regions, Ukrainian is their native language – unlike many of those who accuse them of being “Muscovites.”
Is the UOC really a ‘vassal of Moscow’?
In the first hours after the full-scale Russian invasion, the UOC leadership and Synod condemned the war and expressed support for the Ukrainian army.
“The UOC actively assists the Ukrainian army, refugees and residents of areas affected by the war. Its parishioners, along with some priests, monks and close relatives of the clergy, are fighting on the front lines.”
Metropolitan Onufriy, the primate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Source: Wiki Commons
During Russia’s aggression, the UOC has suffered significant losses: about a hundred churches have been destroyed, with priests and laity killed and many wounded.
In May 2022, the UOC declared its independence and autonomy from the ROC, adopting the corresponding amendments to its charter. Church representatives stopped participating in all joint church bodies and events of the ROC.
The allegation that the UOC is an FSB agent network remains unsubstantiated, even after at least 1,300 searches conducted by Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) in the winter of 2022/23 (see Russia.Post about it here).
Only about 40 “Orthodox” cases for alleged crimes against the state (spanning the six Criminal Code articles) have made it to Ukrainian courts, with close to 100 more cases being adjudicated out of court.
According to Dmytro Vovk, who heads the Center for the Rule of Law and Religion Studies at the National Law University in Kharkiv, three quarters of the cases are related to “inappropriate language,” which, though previously not a Criminal Code violation, is now being reinterpreted.
RBC Ukraine reports similar statistics: only 25 of the 100 cases filed against UOC clergy have resulted in convictions. Atypical in this regard was the case of Metropolitan Ionafan (Yeletskikh) – the only UOC hierarch convicted and swapped with Russia. He was found guilty of authoring and publishing an article criticizing the OCU on the diocesan website and sentenced to five years in prison.
For the entire war, only four or five UOC priests have agreed to a prisoner exchange with Russia after trial, according to various sources and confirmed by the news agency Ukrinform.
The main claims put forward by the State Service for Ethnopolicy and Freedom of Conscience (DESS) after its “examination” into alleged UOC ties with the Moscow Patriarchate, the results of which were released at the end of 2023, boiled down to the UOC’s membership in the ROC, as well as a discussion of the degree of the UOC’s formal involvement in Russian affairs (based on the wording of ROC charter documents). At the same time, most of the report’s authors have long and openly advocated the destruction of the UOC. Thomas Bremer, a recognized German expert on Eastern European Orthodoxy, concludes that the examination has “significant flaws and shortcomings in both the methodological and the factual respects.”
Doubts about Orthodox church “reunification” in Ukraine
The state’s legalistic approach to the status of the UOC means that it needs proof that the church poses a threat to Ukraine’s security, yet convincing evidence has yet to be presented. Even one of the authors of the examination into the UOC, Lyudmila Filippovich, a professor at the Institute of Philosophy of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, who is a key figure in Ukraine in the administration of religious studies as a science and known as a lobbyist for the interests of the OCU, came out against the law, as the second version of the bill was considerably more radical. Its consequences, in her view, are unpredictable.
Meanwhile, the authorities have persistently called on and practically forced parishes, dioceses and the entire church to become part of the OCU. Do those who call the UOC “FSB agents in cowls” really expect them to abandon their supposed espionage activities and pro-Russia convictions as soon as the church affiliation in their documents changes?
If the main goal of the campaign is to ensure the “unity of Ukrainian Orthodoxy,” it is unlikely that the inclusion of the UOC, with many thousands of parishes, with its entire hierarchy and diocesan structures, in the OCU will help. Within the OCU itself, there are already de facto three autonomous churches – the former UOC-Kyiv Patriarchate, part of the former Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and former UOC parishes – subordinate to a single bishop in Kyiv. Where is the “unity” here?
In May 2022, the UOC declared its independence and autonomy from the ROC, adopting the corresponding amendments to its charter. Church representatives stopped participating in all joint church bodies and events of the ROC.
The allegation that the UOC is an FSB agent network remains unsubstantiated, even after at least 1,300 searches conducted by Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) in the winter of 2022/23 (see Russia.Post about it here).
Only about 40 “Orthodox” cases for alleged crimes against the state (spanning the six Criminal Code articles) have made it to Ukrainian courts, with close to 100 more cases being adjudicated out of court.
According to Dmytro Vovk, who heads the Center for the Rule of Law and Religion Studies at the National Law University in Kharkiv, three quarters of the cases are related to “inappropriate language,” which, though previously not a Criminal Code violation, is now being reinterpreted.
RBC Ukraine reports similar statistics: only 25 of the 100 cases filed against UOC clergy have resulted in convictions. Atypical in this regard was the case of Metropolitan Ionafan (Yeletskikh) – the only UOC hierarch convicted and swapped with Russia. He was found guilty of authoring and publishing an article criticizing the OCU on the diocesan website and sentenced to five years in prison.
For the entire war, only four or five UOC priests have agreed to a prisoner exchange with Russia after trial, according to various sources and confirmed by the news agency Ukrinform.
The main claims put forward by the State Service for Ethnopolicy and Freedom of Conscience (DESS) after its “examination” into alleged UOC ties with the Moscow Patriarchate, the results of which were released at the end of 2023, boiled down to the UOC’s membership in the ROC, as well as a discussion of the degree of the UOC’s formal involvement in Russian affairs (based on the wording of ROC charter documents). At the same time, most of the report’s authors have long and openly advocated the destruction of the UOC. Thomas Bremer, a recognized German expert on Eastern European Orthodoxy, concludes that the examination has “significant flaws and shortcomings in both the methodological and the factual respects.”
Doubts about Orthodox church “reunification” in Ukraine
The state’s legalistic approach to the status of the UOC means that it needs proof that the church poses a threat to Ukraine’s security, yet convincing evidence has yet to be presented. Even one of the authors of the examination into the UOC, Lyudmila Filippovich, a professor at the Institute of Philosophy of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, who is a key figure in Ukraine in the administration of religious studies as a science and known as a lobbyist for the interests of the OCU, came out against the law, as the second version of the bill was considerably more radical. Its consequences, in her view, are unpredictable.
Meanwhile, the authorities have persistently called on and practically forced parishes, dioceses and the entire church to become part of the OCU. Do those who call the UOC “FSB agents in cowls” really expect them to abandon their supposed espionage activities and pro-Russia convictions as soon as the church affiliation in their documents changes?
If the main goal of the campaign is to ensure the “unity of Ukrainian Orthodoxy,” it is unlikely that the inclusion of the UOC, with many thousands of parishes, with its entire hierarchy and diocesan structures, in the OCU will help. Within the OCU itself, there are already de facto three autonomous churches – the former UOC-Kyiv Patriarchate, part of the former Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and former UOC parishes – subordinate to a single bishop in Kyiv. Where is the “unity” here?
“If the task is to create a unified church, why is the state violating the Constitution and international treaties and declarations on freedom of conscience signed and protected by the legal mechanisms of the EU, where the country wants to go?”
An OCU procession on the Day of the Baptism of Kyivan Rus. July 2019. Source: Wiki Commons
For more than two years, ensuring “spiritual security” was not the top issue, so why right now? Perhaps it would have been better to wait until the end of the war to formalize the “divorce” of the UOC with the ROC?
What does the call for a “unified national church” mean in a multi-confessional country where, besides the three major (and several small) Eastern Rite Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches, there are also officially registered Roman Catholic and numerous large Protestant churches? Why is a secular president so concerned about the interests of one of the Orthodox churches?
Should we expect the central government in Ukraine to fulfill its obligations as a guarantor of the constitutional rights of citizens, in particular, to equally punish not only UOC officials but all disseminators of hate speech and false information in the religious sphere? Should we expect the authorities to cancel unlawful decisions to close religious communities and seize UOC churches, with law enforcement agencies carrying out court decisions to return property to the UOC? For example, the UOC has been stripped of almost all the buildings housing its churches and monasteries in Galicia, all churches in Khmelnytskyi and some around Irpin (a suburb of Kyiv).
Where do the legitimate defense needs of a fighting country end and tyranny dictated by internal political and religious competition begin? The state of war gives those in power ample opportunities to redistribute resources to help themselves (but not necessarily the country).
The Ecumenical Patriarch steps in
The OCU is clearly considered “authentic” by the authorities and turbo-patriots, since its churches contain a lot of patriotic and nationalistic symbols, such as flags of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) flying above OCU churches and portraits of the uncanonized “Heavenly Hundred” against a background of symbols of the radical right-wing Svoboda party hanging on the walls of OCU cathedrals.
Nevertheless, the OCU has serious problems in carrying out its main, spiritual mission – as it is understood by believers and not by those politicians and journalists for whom political goals are much more important. This shifting of priorities weighs on church attendance even in regions where the OCU is politically strong and influential.
On August 25, for example, a thirty-thousand-strong procession of UOC supporters finished at Pochayiv Lavra, located in Ternopil Region, having marched from Kamianets-Podilskyi in Khmelnytsky Region, one of two regions outside of western Ukraine where the UOC is under particular pressure.
The procession itself is a tradition, having been held for 200 years apart from the decades of communist rule. Back in 2022, however, it was met with protests from supporters of the OCU and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church who lived in villages along the route. Because of this, the procession splintered, with pilgrims being chased away by opponents and government officials.
The next year, the procession was banned by the Ternopil Region Defense Council “to avoid provocations.” Police in neighboring regions blocked buses with pilgrims who were trying to get to the starting point, though at least a couple thousand people managed to get there.
This year, despite the same ban, pilgrims walked under the protection of the National Guard. The OCU, meanwhile, cannot carry out anything on such a scale in that part of the country. It does not have the believers for this, while those that it does have lack the spiritual enthusiasm that would drive them to walk for 10 days on foot along rural roads under the scorching sun.
The situation is made more acute by what UOC sources claim is growing disappointment on the part of the Ecumenical Patriarchate over his 2019 decision to grant the OCU “canonical autocephaly.” (The decision on autocephaly does not confer the rights of a truly autonomous church – in particular, the OCU cannot choose its own patriarch or open parishes abroad.)
What does the call for a “unified national church” mean in a multi-confessional country where, besides the three major (and several small) Eastern Rite Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches, there are also officially registered Roman Catholic and numerous large Protestant churches? Why is a secular president so concerned about the interests of one of the Orthodox churches?
Should we expect the central government in Ukraine to fulfill its obligations as a guarantor of the constitutional rights of citizens, in particular, to equally punish not only UOC officials but all disseminators of hate speech and false information in the religious sphere? Should we expect the authorities to cancel unlawful decisions to close religious communities and seize UOC churches, with law enforcement agencies carrying out court decisions to return property to the UOC? For example, the UOC has been stripped of almost all the buildings housing its churches and monasteries in Galicia, all churches in Khmelnytskyi and some around Irpin (a suburb of Kyiv).
Where do the legitimate defense needs of a fighting country end and tyranny dictated by internal political and religious competition begin? The state of war gives those in power ample opportunities to redistribute resources to help themselves (but not necessarily the country).
The Ecumenical Patriarch steps in
The OCU is clearly considered “authentic” by the authorities and turbo-patriots, since its churches contain a lot of patriotic and nationalistic symbols, such as flags of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) flying above OCU churches and portraits of the uncanonized “Heavenly Hundred” against a background of symbols of the radical right-wing Svoboda party hanging on the walls of OCU cathedrals.
Nevertheless, the OCU has serious problems in carrying out its main, spiritual mission – as it is understood by believers and not by those politicians and journalists for whom political goals are much more important. This shifting of priorities weighs on church attendance even in regions where the OCU is politically strong and influential.
On August 25, for example, a thirty-thousand-strong procession of UOC supporters finished at Pochayiv Lavra, located in Ternopil Region, having marched from Kamianets-Podilskyi in Khmelnytsky Region, one of two regions outside of western Ukraine where the UOC is under particular pressure.
The procession itself is a tradition, having been held for 200 years apart from the decades of communist rule. Back in 2022, however, it was met with protests from supporters of the OCU and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church who lived in villages along the route. Because of this, the procession splintered, with pilgrims being chased away by opponents and government officials.
The next year, the procession was banned by the Ternopil Region Defense Council “to avoid provocations.” Police in neighboring regions blocked buses with pilgrims who were trying to get to the starting point, though at least a couple thousand people managed to get there.
This year, despite the same ban, pilgrims walked under the protection of the National Guard. The OCU, meanwhile, cannot carry out anything on such a scale in that part of the country. It does not have the believers for this, while those that it does have lack the spiritual enthusiasm that would drive them to walk for 10 days on foot along rural roads under the scorching sun.
The situation is made more acute by what UOC sources claim is growing disappointment on the part of the Ecumenical Patriarchate over his 2019 decision to grant the OCU “canonical autocephaly.” (The decision on autocephaly does not confer the rights of a truly autonomous church – in particular, the OCU cannot choose its own patriarch or open parishes abroad.)
“Initially, both the future leaders of the OCU and then-President Poroshenko promised Patriarch Bartholomew that the OCU would help unite Ukrainian Orthodoxy and eliminate conflicts. Yet things are moving in the opposite direction.”
The signing of the Agreement on Cooperation and Interaction between Ukraine and the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. Istanbul, November 3, 2018. Source: Wiki Commons
Currently, the OCU wholly includes neither the former Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) nor the other ostensible driver of unification, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC, many of whose communities retain autonomy), and definitely not the UOC, whence two bishops (out of 80) and no more than 200 parishes (out of 10,000) have actually joined the OCU.
The OCU faces internal challenges as well, like forming an effective hierarchy and episcopate. Suffice it to say that the former head of the UOC-KP, the core of the reformed OCU, officially left the OCU, restored the UOC-KP with a couple of fellow bishops and managed to ordain a dozen more. While the OCU still considers him its retired bishop, it remains unclear what to do with his bishops (they were formally elevated to the rank of bishop and have the canonical right to ordain others).
Such internal conflicts are one of the reasons why the majority of the world’s Orthodox churches (eight out of 14) have yet to recognize the OCU.
The head of the UOC, Metropolitan Onufriy, will play a critical role in where things go from here. In what is a rare situation for Orthodox churches, Onufriy has absolute religious authority within the UOC and at the same time is a respected national church leader in the eyes of foreign churches. This has not been affected by his obvious religious conservatism or corresponding ideological differences with many colleagues from the world of European Orthodoxy.
While President Zelensky was signing the law banning the UOC, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, along with a whole team of bishops and priests of Ukrainian origin from the Ecumenical Patriarchate, arrived in Kyiv for consultations. They met not only with the OCU and Greek Catholics but also the leadership of the UOC. The latter meeting caused a sensation, as the UOC had broken off relations with Constantinople back in 2018, when Patriarch Bartholomew’s envoys arrived to prepare for a unification council. It recently came out that Metropolitan Onufriy had reached out to resume contacts at the beginning of this summer.
Serhiy Bortnik, a prominent theologian and UOC diplomat, has suggested that this could mark the beginning of a process whereby the UOC is given the status of an exarchate under the Ecumenical Patriarch.
Theoretically, some other unification process is possible whereby the UOC, which has about triple the number of parishes and at least three times as many actual parishioners as the OCU has, would continue to predominate in Ukrainian Orthodoxy – provided that the current OCU or its separate parts receive a semi-autonomous status in a formally united church. In any case, Moscow will no longer have a say in Ukrainian church matters (though theoretically it could give the UOC autocephaly).
The OCU faces internal challenges as well, like forming an effective hierarchy and episcopate. Suffice it to say that the former head of the UOC-KP, the core of the reformed OCU, officially left the OCU, restored the UOC-KP with a couple of fellow bishops and managed to ordain a dozen more. While the OCU still considers him its retired bishop, it remains unclear what to do with his bishops (they were formally elevated to the rank of bishop and have the canonical right to ordain others).
Such internal conflicts are one of the reasons why the majority of the world’s Orthodox churches (eight out of 14) have yet to recognize the OCU.
The head of the UOC, Metropolitan Onufriy, will play a critical role in where things go from here. In what is a rare situation for Orthodox churches, Onufriy has absolute religious authority within the UOC and at the same time is a respected national church leader in the eyes of foreign churches. This has not been affected by his obvious religious conservatism or corresponding ideological differences with many colleagues from the world of European Orthodoxy.
While President Zelensky was signing the law banning the UOC, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, along with a whole team of bishops and priests of Ukrainian origin from the Ecumenical Patriarchate, arrived in Kyiv for consultations. They met not only with the OCU and Greek Catholics but also the leadership of the UOC. The latter meeting caused a sensation, as the UOC had broken off relations with Constantinople back in 2018, when Patriarch Bartholomew’s envoys arrived to prepare for a unification council. It recently came out that Metropolitan Onufriy had reached out to resume contacts at the beginning of this summer.
Serhiy Bortnik, a prominent theologian and UOC diplomat, has suggested that this could mark the beginning of a process whereby the UOC is given the status of an exarchate under the Ecumenical Patriarch.
Theoretically, some other unification process is possible whereby the UOC, which has about triple the number of parishes and at least three times as many actual parishioners as the OCU has, would continue to predominate in Ukrainian Orthodoxy – provided that the current OCU or its separate parts receive a semi-autonomous status in a formally united church. In any case, Moscow will no longer have a say in Ukrainian church matters (though theoretically it could give the UOC autocephaly).
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