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Russians and the
Ukrainian Incursion:
What Will the Confusion and Anger Translate Into?
Ukrainian Incursion:
What Will the Confusion and Anger Translate Into?
August 28, 2024
Sergei Shelin
Journalist, independent analyst
Analyzing the reaction of ordinary Russians to the loss of several districts in Kursk Region, journalist Sergei Shelin argues that the Ukrainian incursion has not had a significant impact on Russian attitudes toward the Putin regime or the war.
The original text in Russian was published in The Moscow Times is being republished here with the author’s permission.
“Could some local debacles (and Kursk remains one) have political ripple effects? As we see, no…” says sociologist Elena Koneva. “Regime change in a country whose population lives under the threat of repression can [only] be carried out, if not entirely by the military, then in serious cooperation with the military; I cannot imagine it any other way…” (see Koneva’s latest research published on Russia.Post here).
I agree that after the defeats in Kursk Region, even if ordinary Russians had felt intense anger toward the perpetrators of the war, along with the deepest disappointment in the regime, they still would not have taken to the streets to overthrow it. That is too dangerous. Had there had been a significant shift in public opinion, however, an environment more conducive to all sorts of elite jockeying would have emerged, even to a coup “in cooperation with the military.”
This idea can be taken in the other direction as well. If the incursion into undisputed Russian territory did not cause anger toward the regime but rather a patriotic upsurge, then it will be much easier for the authorities to carry out mass conscription of reservists and push through other measures requiring suffering and sacrifice from Russians.
Kursk overshadows everything
“Could some local debacles (and Kursk remains one) have political ripple effects? As we see, no…” says sociologist Elena Koneva. “Regime change in a country whose population lives under the threat of repression can [only] be carried out, if not entirely by the military, then in serious cooperation with the military; I cannot imagine it any other way…” (see Koneva’s latest research published on Russia.Post here).
I agree that after the defeats in Kursk Region, even if ordinary Russians had felt intense anger toward the perpetrators of the war, along with the deepest disappointment in the regime, they still would not have taken to the streets to overthrow it. That is too dangerous. Had there had been a significant shift in public opinion, however, an environment more conducive to all sorts of elite jockeying would have emerged, even to a coup “in cooperation with the military.”
This idea can be taken in the other direction as well. If the incursion into undisputed Russian territory did not cause anger toward the regime but rather a patriotic upsurge, then it will be much easier for the authorities to carry out mass conscription of reservists and push through other measures requiring suffering and sacrifice from Russians.
Kursk overshadows everything
“The authorities themselves seem to want to do without a national upsurge. Putin’s playbook does not entail whipping up intense and especially fiery emotions.”
The 80th Air Assault Brigade captured a T-90M Proryv tank in the Kursk region. August 18, 2024. Source: Wiki Commons
Putin is carrying on like normal, in public barely mentioning the events in Kursk Region, which likely humiliated him. Yet the Kursk fiasco has clearly shaken the country.
After the Ukrainian army crossed into Kursk Region, pollsters at the regime’s disposal hastily began to conduct surveys, though the results were for internal use only. The weekly surveys of the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), however, remain a useful exception.
According to FOM data, in the days when part of Kursk Region fell to Ukraine, Putin’s ratings (trust in him and job performance) saw only a slight blip and remained around the usual 80%. In this regard, it seems there is little that can shake Russians. Even in the autumn of 2022, when mobilization was announced and a panic ensued, Putin’s ratings barely budged, ticking down to 75%.
At the same time, the level of tension in the country has risen sharply. Before the Ukrainian incursion, two of every three respondents told FOM that their relatives, friends, colleagues and acquaintances were “calm” rather than “anxious.” Yet after the first setbacks in Kursk, already half of respondents reported a feeling of “anxiety” among the people around them.
During the two and a half years of the war, calm had generally prevailed. The exception was at the very beginning (February 2022), when a majority of the country (55%) said people around them were anxious, along with the first weeks of mobilization (October 2022 ), when the figure spiked to 70%, and after the first drone strikes on Moscow in May 2023 (53%).
The Kursk defeat overshadowed all other news. When FOM asked respondents of an open-ended survey to name the most important thing that happened during the week, 44% mentioned the incursion into Kursk Region or Ukrainian shelling, or both.
This is two thirds of the 64% who named at least one event in the past week. Usually, half of those surveyed fail to recall a single one, but that figure dropped to 36%, itself indicating widespread anxiety.
No need for defense mechanisms
These worries usually do not stem from personal experience of escaping occupied or threatened areas, or even personal acquaintance with refugees.
Even after combining the approximately 120,000-180,000 Kursk Region who have already fled and a similar number of refugees from neighboring Belgorod Region over the past two years, this mass of displaced people (i.e. approximately 300,000 people) is a fraction of the 10 million Ukrainians who have had to leave their country or been forced to settle elsewhere in Ukraine.
After the Ukrainian army crossed into Kursk Region, pollsters at the regime’s disposal hastily began to conduct surveys, though the results were for internal use only. The weekly surveys of the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), however, remain a useful exception.
According to FOM data, in the days when part of Kursk Region fell to Ukraine, Putin’s ratings (trust in him and job performance) saw only a slight blip and remained around the usual 80%. In this regard, it seems there is little that can shake Russians. Even in the autumn of 2022, when mobilization was announced and a panic ensued, Putin’s ratings barely budged, ticking down to 75%.
At the same time, the level of tension in the country has risen sharply. Before the Ukrainian incursion, two of every three respondents told FOM that their relatives, friends, colleagues and acquaintances were “calm” rather than “anxious.” Yet after the first setbacks in Kursk, already half of respondents reported a feeling of “anxiety” among the people around them.
During the two and a half years of the war, calm had generally prevailed. The exception was at the very beginning (February 2022), when a majority of the country (55%) said people around them were anxious, along with the first weeks of mobilization (October 2022 ), when the figure spiked to 70%, and after the first drone strikes on Moscow in May 2023 (53%).
The Kursk defeat overshadowed all other news. When FOM asked respondents of an open-ended survey to name the most important thing that happened during the week, 44% mentioned the incursion into Kursk Region or Ukrainian shelling, or both.
This is two thirds of the 64% who named at least one event in the past week. Usually, half of those surveyed fail to recall a single one, but that figure dropped to 36%, itself indicating widespread anxiety.
No need for defense mechanisms
These worries usually do not stem from personal experience of escaping occupied or threatened areas, or even personal acquaintance with refugees.
Even after combining the approximately 120,000-180,000 Kursk Region who have already fled and a similar number of refugees from neighboring Belgorod Region over the past two years, this mass of displaced people (i.e. approximately 300,000 people) is a fraction of the 10 million Ukrainians who have had to leave their country or been forced to settle elsewhere in Ukraine.
“For most Russians, the scourge of war is still a complete abstraction,”
like it was during the Afghan-Soviet War in the 1980s. As then, the ordinary Russian now believes that such things and such government decisions have nothing to do with him, even if he disapproves of sending troops to Ukraine.
Emigrant intellectuals often offer complex theories to explain this – about defense mechanisms the average man supposedly uses to protect himself from pangs of conscience. Yet the average man has no need for defense mechanisms.
Russians likely do not see the sense in criticizing the war from a moral standpoint. After all, the war was organized by the authorities, who are responsible and should have full responsibility for such issues. Ordinary people have nothing to do with it. Around this war they can condemn practical things, like an incorrect assessment of the balance of forces on the part of decisionmakers, as well as the personal difficulties or troubles created for themselves by the war.
He only loves his siloviki
The stability of Putin’s ratings suggests that this model has worked quite well during the Kursk fiasco. At least so far. There was no reaction even to Putin’s seemingly insulting decision to give RUB 10,000 to every refugee who can prove that he is from an evacuated area of Kursk Region. That amount is 97.5% less than the federal bonus that Putin just doubled for anyone who signs a contract to serve in the army and 99.5% less than the total amount of regional and federal payments received by a new recruit, which is quickly becoming the norm. The regime does not hide the fact that it is on the side of its siloviki – not those whom its siloviki fail to protect.
But maybe the government does not have to pander to the average man, who, having learned about the Ukrainian incursion, still felt a surge of patriotism?
If so, this would be reflected not in Putin’s ratings but in support for a new wave of mobilization and related measures – for starters, a huge influx of contract soldiers and purchases of war bonds.
Emigrant intellectuals often offer complex theories to explain this – about defense mechanisms the average man supposedly uses to protect himself from pangs of conscience. Yet the average man has no need for defense mechanisms.
Russians likely do not see the sense in criticizing the war from a moral standpoint. After all, the war was organized by the authorities, who are responsible and should have full responsibility for such issues. Ordinary people have nothing to do with it. Around this war they can condemn practical things, like an incorrect assessment of the balance of forces on the part of decisionmakers, as well as the personal difficulties or troubles created for themselves by the war.
He only loves his siloviki
The stability of Putin’s ratings suggests that this model has worked quite well during the Kursk fiasco. At least so far. There was no reaction even to Putin’s seemingly insulting decision to give RUB 10,000 to every refugee who can prove that he is from an evacuated area of Kursk Region. That amount is 97.5% less than the federal bonus that Putin just doubled for anyone who signs a contract to serve in the army and 99.5% less than the total amount of regional and federal payments received by a new recruit, which is quickly becoming the norm. The regime does not hide the fact that it is on the side of its siloviki – not those whom its siloviki fail to protect.
But maybe the government does not have to pander to the average man, who, having learned about the Ukrainian incursion, still felt a surge of patriotism?
If so, this would be reflected not in Putin’s ratings but in support for a new wave of mobilization and related measures – for starters, a huge influx of contract soldiers and purchases of war bonds.
“Right now there are compelling reasons for mobilization, yet if the authorities are preparing a draft, they have not advertised such plans, probably fearing another panic.”
A serviceman of the Russian army against the background of the destroyed Cougar H and Kozak-7 MRAPs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kursk region. August, 2024. Source: Wiki Commons
As for contract soldiers, the sharp increase in bonuses for signing up merely speaks of their growing shortage.
Putin’s remark a few days after the incursion that “[there has been] an increase in recent days in the number of men wishing to join our boys, the fighters who have heroically taken up arms to defend Russia” – assuming it is true – is only about mercenaries who had not signed up before, until then having waited for payments to rise further. There is nothing like a patriotic upsurge in sight. At least for now.
Time to panic?
As far as the true feelings of the masses are concerned, I again agree with Koneva about “the lack of a critical attitude toward the authorities and sympathy even for the residents of the neighboring region.” The Russian people, of course, will obey almost any tightening of the screws. But in their personal life, they look set to change their behavior in line with their rising anxiety.
This may be reflected in stocking up (in case of an emergency), as well as a slower or zero growth of bank deposits. Since the start of the war, deposits have grown and grown, essentially becoming war bonds for the government.
Rising consumer spending and falling deposits, should these processes gain steam, would accelerate inflation and shake the relative financial stability that Putin’s technocrats have so far maintained. Within a few weeks we will see whether these processes have started or not. But the first signs that the public is wary have already emerged.
Supported by the seasonal decline in food prices, consumer inflation was basically flat in early August. Against this rather comforting backdrop, however, Russians suddenly raised both their inflation expectations and estimates of current inflation: according to the latest Central Bank data, for August 1-13 (Ukrainian troops crossed the border on August 6), one-year inflation expectations rose from 12.4% to 12.9% and current inflation estimates from 14.2% to 15.0%.
Contrary to what people see and hear around them, they are now expecting inflation to accelerate. Moreover, this shift in sentiment was due to growing pessimism on the part of well-off Russians, who have savings, i.e. the abovementioned war bonds.
The average Russian’s reaction to the Ukrainian incursion – at least for now – is more one of anxious evasion than righteous patriotic outrage.
Putin’s remark a few days after the incursion that “[there has been] an increase in recent days in the number of men wishing to join our boys, the fighters who have heroically taken up arms to defend Russia” – assuming it is true – is only about mercenaries who had not signed up before, until then having waited for payments to rise further. There is nothing like a patriotic upsurge in sight. At least for now.
Time to panic?
As far as the true feelings of the masses are concerned, I again agree with Koneva about “the lack of a critical attitude toward the authorities and sympathy even for the residents of the neighboring region.” The Russian people, of course, will obey almost any tightening of the screws. But in their personal life, they look set to change their behavior in line with their rising anxiety.
This may be reflected in stocking up (in case of an emergency), as well as a slower or zero growth of bank deposits. Since the start of the war, deposits have grown and grown, essentially becoming war bonds for the government.
Rising consumer spending and falling deposits, should these processes gain steam, would accelerate inflation and shake the relative financial stability that Putin’s technocrats have so far maintained. Within a few weeks we will see whether these processes have started or not. But the first signs that the public is wary have already emerged.
Supported by the seasonal decline in food prices, consumer inflation was basically flat in early August. Against this rather comforting backdrop, however, Russians suddenly raised both their inflation expectations and estimates of current inflation: according to the latest Central Bank data, for August 1-13 (Ukrainian troops crossed the border on August 6), one-year inflation expectations rose from 12.4% to 12.9% and current inflation estimates from 14.2% to 15.0%.
Contrary to what people see and hear around them, they are now expecting inflation to accelerate. Moreover, this shift in sentiment was due to growing pessimism on the part of well-off Russians, who have savings, i.e. the abovementioned war bonds.
The average Russian’s reaction to the Ukrainian incursion – at least for now – is more one of anxious evasion than righteous patriotic outrage.
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