Politics
Unprecedented Losses Increasing the Chances of New Mobilization in Russia
March 12, 2025
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Sergei Shelin
Journalist, independent analyst
Journalist Sergei Shelin dissects the statistics on Russia’s losses in the war and concludes that Putin will soon need to choose between declaring another wave of mobilization or agreeing to a pause in the war.
The original text in Russian was published in the Moscow Times and is being republished here with the author’s permission.
A cemetery in Rostov with soldiers killed in Ukraine. "Construction of the Segment of Valor to be of high quality". Source: YouTube
Since the beginning of the war, Vladimir Putin has kept changing who is to bear the brunt of the Russian losses: first, it was regular army soldiers and Donbas separatist proxies; then, convicts and mobilized men; and now, mercenaries.
The more Russians dead, the less shocking each new update on causalities becomes. Lists of the dead (which are hardly exhaustive), published on the third anniversary of the war by Mediazona and the BBC Russian service, already run to 95,000 names.
The total number of casualties on the Russian side is estimated at 167,000-235,000 (according to military analysts cited by the BBC) and 165,000 (Mediazona and Meduza, based on probate registry data).
If we add the roughly 23,000 proxies killed from the parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions occupied by Russia from 2014 (as estimated by the BBC) and take into account those killed in January-February 2025, the total losses of the Russian side now number at least 200,000. This is the estimated upper bound of the Russian force that invaded Ukraine three years ago.
Rational insanity
In terms of losses, this war has already far surpassed all the Balkan wars in the 1990s, combined, which before the war in Ukraine marked the bloodiest in Europe since World War II. In those conflicts, 130,000-160,000 died on all sides, including civilians.
As for Ukrainian causalities, only the UALosses project keeps a verified, by-name list. Seventy thousand dead are listed, though the total number, including Ukrainian MIAs and POWs, is much higher, not to mention civilian deaths. Thus, this war has easily claimed a combined 300,000 lives already. This is the cost of the Putin regime’s insanity.
Meanwhile, the regime quite rationally organizes the supply of soldiers for its meat grinder. In the first months after the full-scale invasion, the war was fought by regular army forces and Donbas separatist formations formed through mass mobilization in the region. The estimated population of the entire Luhansk and Donetsk regions is only 3.5 million, with the 23,000 dead proxy soldiers being the price the Russian regime has forced these regions to pay for “liberation.”
If Russia had paid the same price proportionally, its losses would be a million dead now.
The more Russians dead, the less shocking each new update on causalities becomes. Lists of the dead (which are hardly exhaustive), published on the third anniversary of the war by Mediazona and the BBC Russian service, already run to 95,000 names.
The total number of casualties on the Russian side is estimated at 167,000-235,000 (according to military analysts cited by the BBC) and 165,000 (Mediazona and Meduza, based on probate registry data).
If we add the roughly 23,000 proxies killed from the parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions occupied by Russia from 2014 (as estimated by the BBC) and take into account those killed in January-February 2025, the total losses of the Russian side now number at least 200,000. This is the estimated upper bound of the Russian force that invaded Ukraine three years ago.
Rational insanity
In terms of losses, this war has already far surpassed all the Balkan wars in the 1990s, combined, which before the war in Ukraine marked the bloodiest in Europe since World War II. In those conflicts, 130,000-160,000 died on all sides, including civilians.
As for Ukrainian causalities, only the UALosses project keeps a verified, by-name list. Seventy thousand dead are listed, though the total number, including Ukrainian MIAs and POWs, is much higher, not to mention civilian deaths. Thus, this war has easily claimed a combined 300,000 lives already. This is the cost of the Putin regime’s insanity.
Meanwhile, the regime quite rationally organizes the supply of soldiers for its meat grinder. In the first months after the full-scale invasion, the war was fought by regular army forces and Donbas separatist formations formed through mass mobilization in the region. The estimated population of the entire Luhansk and Donetsk regions is only 3.5 million, with the 23,000 dead proxy soldiers being the price the Russian regime has forced these regions to pay for “liberation.”
If Russia had paid the same price proportionally, its losses would be a million dead now.
“Donbas has long been bled dry and unable to provide Putin with more soldiers. The Russian president came to this conclusion as early as autumn 2022. The only way to replenish the army quickly was mobilization.”
The call-up of 300,000 reservists at that time – proportionally 10-15 times smaller than the draft in the Donbas – caused an uproar among the public that the regime could not just disregard or ignore.
Next, it was convicts’ turn to fight in Ukraine. Finally, the Kremlin – instead of launching a second wave of mobilization, which had been expected in spring 2023 – started systematically recruiting mercenary “volunteers.”
Pipeline of soldiers fixed – for a while
Explaining the Russian masses’ tolerance for causalities, the BBC argues that half of the dead were social outsiders “who basically did not take part in public life.” In addition: “of every 10 killed on the Russian side, three are convicts and another two are residents of the self-proclaimed DNR and LNR.”
Next, it was convicts’ turn to fight in Ukraine. Finally, the Kremlin – instead of launching a second wave of mobilization, which had been expected in spring 2023 – started systematically recruiting mercenary “volunteers.”
Pipeline of soldiers fixed – for a while
Explaining the Russian masses’ tolerance for causalities, the BBC argues that half of the dead were social outsiders “who basically did not take part in public life.” In addition: “of every 10 killed on the Russian side, three are convicts and another two are residents of the self-proclaimed DNR and LNR.”
Yevgeny Prigozhin reports on the capture of Bakhmut. May 20, 2023. Source: VK
This is only partly true. Donetsk and Luhansk region residents, to judge by the estimates provided, are not 20% of the dead, but rather 10-15%. As for convicts, it certainly cannot be said they “basically did not take part in public life” back in the Russian provinces – they fit in just as well as those who are not doing time currently. Meanwhile, their share of the losses is not 30%, but at most 25%.
More importantly, by mid- or late-2023 the regime had almost exhausted the supply of convicts and switched to “volunteers.” The switch was all the easier because the men came from the same social circles as the convicts.
More importantly, by mid- or late-2023 the regime had almost exhausted the supply of convicts and switched to “volunteers.” The switch was all the easier because the men came from the same social circles as the convicts.
“They have a fatalistic attitude toward the death of men like themselves, not because of their ‘outsider’ status, as the BBC thinks, but because of their general worldview.”
It is these mercenaries who have borne the brunt of the war over the last year and a half and died more than anyone else. Today, they are already the biggest group among Russian causalities since the start of the war, at about 30% of the total. If approximately 700,000 kontraktniki have signed up since 2022, every tenth has been killed. Most of them laid down their lives in the bloody offensives of the last year. The conveyor belt delivering human material to the front line has been humming.
The army has managed to overcome a dearth of officers, who cannot be quickly replaced. Whereas at the beginning of the invasion, they made up as much as 10% of casualties, now, writes Mediazona, “their share has decreased to 2-3%... due to the changing nature of military operations and the active recruitment of volunteer privates, who are much more likely to die than their superiors.”
Yet this “quick and easy” way of replenishing the armed forces is reaching its end. To judge by the systematic hikes in contract signing bonuses in late 2024, the number of men willing to risk their lives, even for huge sums of money, has begun to decline. The Ukrainian invasion of Russia’s Kursk Region in August 2024 did not cause a patriotic surge in Russia, as some had expected, and the supply of recruits is drying up.
In addition, local budgets, it turns out, are not limitless. At end-February, the Samara Region governor reduced the signing bonus from RUB 3.6 million – the highest in the country, set in January – to RUB 2.1 million.
Blood tax imposed unevenly
With almost no convicts left and mercenaries and money lacking, a second wave of mobilization – a brutal but proven measure – is returning to the agenda. Almost 11,000 dead mobilized soldiers have been identified by name. In reality, it may be double that, which would be a tenth of all those killed on the Russian side and a fifteenth of the 300,000 plus who were called up in autumn 2022.
Across the country, the blood tax is imposed in an uneven but politically understandable way. The two “capitals” of Russia – Moscow and St Petersburg – have suffered the least. Native Muscovite “volunteers” are hard to find; forcibly mobilized Muscovites harder; and fallen mobilized Muscovites harder still.
The army has managed to overcome a dearth of officers, who cannot be quickly replaced. Whereas at the beginning of the invasion, they made up as much as 10% of casualties, now, writes Mediazona, “their share has decreased to 2-3%... due to the changing nature of military operations and the active recruitment of volunteer privates, who are much more likely to die than their superiors.”
Yet this “quick and easy” way of replenishing the armed forces is reaching its end. To judge by the systematic hikes in contract signing bonuses in late 2024, the number of men willing to risk their lives, even for huge sums of money, has begun to decline. The Ukrainian invasion of Russia’s Kursk Region in August 2024 did not cause a patriotic surge in Russia, as some had expected, and the supply of recruits is drying up.
In addition, local budgets, it turns out, are not limitless. At end-February, the Samara Region governor reduced the signing bonus from RUB 3.6 million – the highest in the country, set in January – to RUB 2.1 million.
Blood tax imposed unevenly
With almost no convicts left and mercenaries and money lacking, a second wave of mobilization – a brutal but proven measure – is returning to the agenda. Almost 11,000 dead mobilized soldiers have been identified by name. In reality, it may be double that, which would be a tenth of all those killed on the Russian side and a fifteenth of the 300,000 plus who were called up in autumn 2022.
Across the country, the blood tax is imposed in an uneven but politically understandable way. The two “capitals” of Russia – Moscow and St Petersburg – have suffered the least. Native Muscovite “volunteers” are hard to find; forcibly mobilized Muscovites harder; and fallen mobilized Muscovites harder still.
“There have been 156 recorded deaths among mobilized Muscovites and 114 among mobilized Petersburgers. Meanwhile, 601 and 544 mobilized men from Bashkortostan and Tatarstan have died, respectively.”
The population of those regions, taken together, is much smaller than that of Moscow, while each region is considerably smaller than the city of St Petersburg population-wise. There are also many dead among men mobilized from other Volga regions, like Samara and Volgograd.
The regions of Crimea (64) and Sevastopol (18), seized in 2014, have lost relatively few mobilized men. The reason being that nothing like the mass mobilization and culling that was organized in the more recently annexed lands of the Donbas was seen in the less recently annexed lands of the Crimean Peninsula.
If we compare the first wave of Russian mobilization with the draft in the US during the Vietnam War, with the US population at that time being 1.4 times the Russian population today, eight times more Americans were drafted (more than 2 million), of whom every fortieth fell (over 50,000). Far fewer Russians were mobilized in 2022, but their probability of dying was much higher. If a second wave of mobilization takes place, the statistics hardly look set to improve.
It's a safe assumption that a second wave will not hit the pampered and regime-loyal capitals very hard. Nor will it hit the destitute provinces, which supply the bulk of the kontraktniki. Thus, the main burden will fall on moderately prosperous industrial regions, both Russian and non-Russian in terms of ethnic makeup. Broad and compulsory conscription will mean, for them, fundamentally deeper involvement in the war than before.
The likelihood of panic in response to Kremlin initiatives is always higher than the likelihood of organized protest against them. Yet the regime has not been dragging its feet on mobilization for more than two years for nothing. Antiwar unrest cannot be completely excluded. The subjects are tired of the “special military operation,” and they, albeit timidly, hope that Russia will bring it to a quick, victorious end and not keep throwing fuel on the fire. The price of the second wave will be higher than the first.
In any case, the acute lack of men for the front line is forcing Putin to choose: take a risk and carry out another mobilization or agree to pause the war.
The regions of Crimea (64) and Sevastopol (18), seized in 2014, have lost relatively few mobilized men. The reason being that nothing like the mass mobilization and culling that was organized in the more recently annexed lands of the Donbas was seen in the less recently annexed lands of the Crimean Peninsula.
If we compare the first wave of Russian mobilization with the draft in the US during the Vietnam War, with the US population at that time being 1.4 times the Russian population today, eight times more Americans were drafted (more than 2 million), of whom every fortieth fell (over 50,000). Far fewer Russians were mobilized in 2022, but their probability of dying was much higher. If a second wave of mobilization takes place, the statistics hardly look set to improve.
It's a safe assumption that a second wave will not hit the pampered and regime-loyal capitals very hard. Nor will it hit the destitute provinces, which supply the bulk of the kontraktniki. Thus, the main burden will fall on moderately prosperous industrial regions, both Russian and non-Russian in terms of ethnic makeup. Broad and compulsory conscription will mean, for them, fundamentally deeper involvement in the war than before.
The likelihood of panic in response to Kremlin initiatives is always higher than the likelihood of organized protest against them. Yet the regime has not been dragging its feet on mobilization for more than two years for nothing. Antiwar unrest cannot be completely excluded. The subjects are tired of the “special military operation,” and they, albeit timidly, hope that Russia will bring it to a quick, victorious end and not keep throwing fuel on the fire. The price of the second wave will be higher than the first.
In any case, the acute lack of men for the front line is forcing Putin to choose: take a risk and carry out another mobilization or agree to pause the war.
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