Politics
Three Years Since the Invasion: How the Russia-Ukraine Front Line Looks Today
February 24, 2025
- Nikolay MitrokhinАcademic Researcher, Research Center for East European Studies at the University of Bremen (Germany)
Political scientist Nikolay Mitrokhin argues that after three years of war with huge losses, neither Russia nor Ukraine has managed to achieve its stated goals.
The Russia-Ukraine war as of February 2025. Source: Wiki Commons
If we try to describe in one word the state of affairs on the front lines at the end of the third year of the war, it would be “exhaustion.” First of all, this is about soldiers, as Ukraine and Russia are scraping the barrel to replenish their armies.
Front-line fatigue
Neither side has enough men to realize its strategy. The situation is most acute for front-line infantry, whose ranks are being replenished by rear-based specialized units and increasingly expensive contract soldiers.
In Russia, the signing bonus for so-called kontraktniki has soared tenfold in the last year to reach the equivalent of $27,000. In Ukraine, a similar, one-off payment was introduced at the beginning of 2025 for volunteers aged 18-24, who are not subject to conscription. It is even higher than its Russian analogue, at $30,000, and comes with many additional benefits.
In winter 2024-25, the Russian side, which has suffered even higher human losses, has started sending wounded and not fully recovered soldiers directly from hospitals near the front line to assault Ukrainian positions. Social media is filled with footage taken by Ukrainian drones showing people hobbling toward front-line trenches and trying to fight off the buzzing death flying toward them with crutches.
Drones prove vital weapon
In this war, drones conduct reconnaissance, provide supplies to units on the front lines and, most importantly, are the preferred short-range strike weapons, destroying men and materiel.
Front-line fatigue
Neither side has enough men to realize its strategy. The situation is most acute for front-line infantry, whose ranks are being replenished by rear-based specialized units and increasingly expensive contract soldiers.
In Russia, the signing bonus for so-called kontraktniki has soared tenfold in the last year to reach the equivalent of $27,000. In Ukraine, a similar, one-off payment was introduced at the beginning of 2025 for volunteers aged 18-24, who are not subject to conscription. It is even higher than its Russian analogue, at $30,000, and comes with many additional benefits.
In winter 2024-25, the Russian side, which has suffered even higher human losses, has started sending wounded and not fully recovered soldiers directly from hospitals near the front line to assault Ukrainian positions. Social media is filled with footage taken by Ukrainian drones showing people hobbling toward front-line trenches and trying to fight off the buzzing death flying toward them with crutches.
Drones prove vital weapon
In this war, drones conduct reconnaissance, provide supplies to units on the front lines and, most importantly, are the preferred short-range strike weapons, destroying men and materiel.
“In terms of importance, drones have replaced artillery and, even more so, all types of infantry small arms and portable weapons.”
This video of a soldier on crutches was captured by Ukrainian drones and posted on Ukrainian social media. Source: Youtube
Amid the active use of drones, keeping equipment at or near the front line has become a problem for both sides. Attempts to address this vulnerability have proven unsuccessful despite the progress and proliferation of electronic warfare systems, which are now mounted on virtually all types of equipment and placed in most “strongpoints.”
The scale of equipment losses is such that within the last year, Russian soldiers have ditched armored vehicles for old Soviet cars with their roofs cut off and motorcycles, and sometimes even donkeys and camels. On the Ukrainian side, the situation is slightly better, but attempts to use equipment to break through Russian lines, even over short distances, have led to significant losses. This is a bigger issue for Ukraine since it has very little of its own equipment and Western supplies are relatively meager.
The scale of equipment losses is such that within the last year, Russian soldiers have ditched armored vehicles for old Soviet cars with their roofs cut off and motorcycles, and sometimes even donkeys and camels. On the Ukrainian side, the situation is slightly better, but attempts to use equipment to break through Russian lines, even over short distances, have led to significant losses. This is a bigger issue for Ukraine since it has very little of its own equipment and Western supplies are relatively meager.
A Ukrainian FPV fiber optic drone. Source: VK
Search for ‘wonder weapons’
Rapid technological changes have prompted both sides to look for “wonder weapons” that, without needing huge investments, could be used on a wide scale to change the game.
Something of the sort was seen last year in the Black Sea, when Ukrainian unmanned boats, after a series of successful attacks, forced the Russian Black Sea Fleet to leave its usual bases in Crimea and head east, effectively eliminating it as a threat. Then, on December 31, the Ukrainians, having equipped those boats with surface-to-air missiles, shot down two Russian helicopters, which marked the first-ever battle between floating robots and human-controlled aircraft and has created a serious threat to Russian military aviation in the western Black Sea.
This could turn the tables in the area, as Russian garrisons on the islands along the Crimean coast and Kherson Region are supplied primarily by air. Moreover, most airfields in Crimea are located near the coast, which makes the helicopters and naval aviation based there newly vulnerable during landing.
Russia’s “wonder weapon” has been so-called glide bombs, which over the past year have cleared the way for Russian ground troops, wreaking havoc on such major Ukrainian defensive points as Avdiivka, Krasnohorivka, Vuhledar, Velyka Novosilka, Kurakhove and Toretsk.
Rapid technological changes have prompted both sides to look for “wonder weapons” that, without needing huge investments, could be used on a wide scale to change the game.
Something of the sort was seen last year in the Black Sea, when Ukrainian unmanned boats, after a series of successful attacks, forced the Russian Black Sea Fleet to leave its usual bases in Crimea and head east, effectively eliminating it as a threat. Then, on December 31, the Ukrainians, having equipped those boats with surface-to-air missiles, shot down two Russian helicopters, which marked the first-ever battle between floating robots and human-controlled aircraft and has created a serious threat to Russian military aviation in the western Black Sea.
This could turn the tables in the area, as Russian garrisons on the islands along the Crimean coast and Kherson Region are supplied primarily by air. Moreover, most airfields in Crimea are located near the coast, which makes the helicopters and naval aviation based there newly vulnerable during landing.
Russia’s “wonder weapon” has been so-called glide bombs, which over the past year have cleared the way for Russian ground troops, wreaking havoc on such major Ukrainian defensive points as Avdiivka, Krasnohorivka, Vuhledar, Velyka Novosilka, Kurakhove and Toretsk.
“Another important innovation is fiber-optic drones, which managed to disrupt the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Region as initially planned.”
The Ukrainians, despite numerous attempts and prolonged battles, were unable to take the district centers of Glushkovo and Korenevo and thereby secure their northern and western flanks with positions along the easily defensible left bank of the wide Seim River. This failure allowed Russian troops to go on the offensive, attacking primarily from those areas, and take back more than half of the territory captured by the Ukrainian army in Kursk Region.
Yet “wonder weapons” need to be used as part of well-designed tactics and in combination with other types of weapons to produce multiplier effects.
Recent Ukrainian and Russian failures
The well-trained and equipped Ukrainian army brigades that invaded Kursk Region in August lost a lot of Western armored vehicles in the first few days, the result of unsuccessful attempts to break through in columns. Thus, the Ukrainians failed to secure a strong foothold in the region.
The Danish F-16s delivered to Ukraine in autumn 2024, on which great hopes were placed and which cost Kyiv’s sponsors enormous amounts of money, never made it to the front lines, after one of them was destroyed over central Ukraine in its very first air battle.
Ukraine has sharply increased production of heavy attack drones, which have been used against targets deep in the Russian rear; however, they have failed to create a fuel crisis in Russia or stop the flow of oil products through Russian ports in the Baltic and Black seas.
Russia, for its part, has managed to destroy half of Ukraine’s power capacity, though this has not cut off cities and heavy industry from electricity for long; Russia’s high-explosive glide bombs have neither reduced Russian losses of soldiers and equipment, nor translated into victory in at least a third of Russian offensives (especially in the northeastern part of Ukraine, including the Siverskyi, Kupiansk, Vovchansk and Kharkiv areas); and Russia’s fiber optic drones have yet to drive the Ukrainian army fully out of Kursk Region.
Yet “wonder weapons” need to be used as part of well-designed tactics and in combination with other types of weapons to produce multiplier effects.
Recent Ukrainian and Russian failures
The well-trained and equipped Ukrainian army brigades that invaded Kursk Region in August lost a lot of Western armored vehicles in the first few days, the result of unsuccessful attempts to break through in columns. Thus, the Ukrainians failed to secure a strong foothold in the region.
The Danish F-16s delivered to Ukraine in autumn 2024, on which great hopes were placed and which cost Kyiv’s sponsors enormous amounts of money, never made it to the front lines, after one of them was destroyed over central Ukraine in its very first air battle.
Ukraine has sharply increased production of heavy attack drones, which have been used against targets deep in the Russian rear; however, they have failed to create a fuel crisis in Russia or stop the flow of oil products through Russian ports in the Baltic and Black seas.
Russia, for its part, has managed to destroy half of Ukraine’s power capacity, though this has not cut off cities and heavy industry from electricity for long; Russia’s high-explosive glide bombs have neither reduced Russian losses of soldiers and equipment, nor translated into victory in at least a third of Russian offensives (especially in the northeastern part of Ukraine, including the Siverskyi, Kupiansk, Vovchansk and Kharkiv areas); and Russia’s fiber optic drones have yet to drive the Ukrainian army fully out of Kursk Region.
“The main weakness of both armies remains the quality of operational planning – often because of obvious political pressure on commanders.”
A house in Nikopol, a city in the south of Ukraine, on the right bank of the Dnieper River, after Russian shelling. September 2024. Source: Wiki Commons
Prowar critics (for example, here and here) say that the Russian army has exhausted itself conquering numerous cities and towns in the Donbas and northern Kharkiv region without delivering a strategic blow to the enemy. The Ukrainian army, in turn, has opted to commit significant reserves to Kursk Region this year instead of plugging holes in the defense of the Donbas and Kharkiv Region.
The Ukrainians have thus given up almost the entire southern part of Donetsk Region, as well as a dozen villages that had been liberated on the Zaporizhzhia front back in 2023. Recently, Russian troops managed to capture areas around the tactically important town of Velyka Novosilka that had gone over to the Ukrainians during the Ukrainian army’s widely advertised but generally calamitous 2023 summer offensive; the Russians built on these gains by taking Velyka Novosilka itself, which had held out for three years.
Both armies, like both countries and their economies, are in need of a stop in the fighting and a period to recover. That said, Ukraine is in the weaker position. The Russian army continues to advance, though in the first two months of 2025 the pace of the advance – if we look at the amount of Ukrainian territory captured – has at least halved versus November 2024.
What goals have not achieved
The reasons for what is shaping up to be a Ukrainian defeat in the war, besides the oft-heard arguments about insufficient Western support and a lack of Ukrainians willing to fight in the east, have been debated in the Ukrainian press.
The Ukrainians have thus given up almost the entire southern part of Donetsk Region, as well as a dozen villages that had been liberated on the Zaporizhzhia front back in 2023. Recently, Russian troops managed to capture areas around the tactically important town of Velyka Novosilka that had gone over to the Ukrainians during the Ukrainian army’s widely advertised but generally calamitous 2023 summer offensive; the Russians built on these gains by taking Velyka Novosilka itself, which had held out for three years.
Both armies, like both countries and their economies, are in need of a stop in the fighting and a period to recover. That said, Ukraine is in the weaker position. The Russian army continues to advance, though in the first two months of 2025 the pace of the advance – if we look at the amount of Ukrainian territory captured – has at least halved versus November 2024.
What goals have not achieved
The reasons for what is shaping up to be a Ukrainian defeat in the war, besides the oft-heard arguments about insufficient Western support and a lack of Ukrainians willing to fight in the east, have been debated in the Ukrainian press.
Trump and Zelensky have sparred amid US moves to negotiate with the Kremlin. February 2025. Source: VK
It is said that corruption has done much to erode the country’s mobilization capacity and limited supplies going to the front. Poor planning at all levels of the military is another common allegation. Finally, critics say that the country’s leadership, banking on generous support from the West, has paid woefully inadequate attention to building up Ukraine’s defense industry. According to President Zelensky, only recently has the country reached the30% mark in terms of producing the weapons it needs, with the rest supplied by the West. The situation was even more lopsided before.
Russia, in contrast, has ramped up its defense industry, while over the past year supplies of ammunition (primarily artillery shells) and drones from Iran and North Korea have increased. The latter nation, named a “strategic ally” by the Kremlin, has chipped in a small number of soldiers, who, however, have not made a dent in the war.
After three years of fighting with huge losses, neither side has achieved its stated goals.
Russia, as the aggressor, has been unable to establish control over Ukraine or to push the supposed military threat away from the Russian border. In Kharkiv Region, where, as Putin claimed on February 21, 2022, “reconnaissance radars… will allow NATO to tightly control Russia’s airspace up to the Urals” and “NATO tactical aviation… including precision weapon carriers… capable of striking at our territory to the depth of the Volgograd-Kazan-Samara-Astrakhan line” might be based, Ukrainian troops and potentially (secretly) their Western allies look set to remain. Putin described the threat from potential deployment of US missiles in Ukraine as a “knife to the throat” of Russia. In addition, the “demilitarization” and “denazification” of Ukraine, which were initially declared as goals of the “special military operation,” will likely need to be shelved.
But Putin may get his way on special rights for Russian speakers in Ukraine and for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. To be specific, he may de facto force Ukraine to comply with the provisions of European legislation on the rights of linguistic and religious minorities – no matter how paradoxical an appeal to international norms coming from the Kremlin may look.The new US administration may demand the same from Kyiv. Vice President JD Vance, in an interview last spring, alleged that Ukraine “is doing some pretty bad stuff,” citing “news reports of priests being investigated, church assets being seized and priests being arrested.”
What goals have been achieved
Moscow has managed to accomplish some tactical objectives: driving the Ukrainian army out of Luhansk Region and pushing it away from the city of Donetsk; taking control of territory with large deposits of coal, lithium and salt in central and southern Donetsk Region; and creating a land bridge to Crimea and seizing swaths of fertile land in southeast Ukraine.
Ukraine has thus far managed to defend its independence and maintained unity in the fight against an enemy at least three times stronger.
Russia, in contrast, has ramped up its defense industry, while over the past year supplies of ammunition (primarily artillery shells) and drones from Iran and North Korea have increased. The latter nation, named a “strategic ally” by the Kremlin, has chipped in a small number of soldiers, who, however, have not made a dent in the war.
After three years of fighting with huge losses, neither side has achieved its stated goals.
Russia, as the aggressor, has been unable to establish control over Ukraine or to push the supposed military threat away from the Russian border. In Kharkiv Region, where, as Putin claimed on February 21, 2022, “reconnaissance radars… will allow NATO to tightly control Russia’s airspace up to the Urals” and “NATO tactical aviation… including precision weapon carriers… capable of striking at our territory to the depth of the Volgograd-Kazan-Samara-Astrakhan line” might be based, Ukrainian troops and potentially (secretly) their Western allies look set to remain. Putin described the threat from potential deployment of US missiles in Ukraine as a “knife to the throat” of Russia. In addition, the “demilitarization” and “denazification” of Ukraine, which were initially declared as goals of the “special military operation,” will likely need to be shelved.
But Putin may get his way on special rights for Russian speakers in Ukraine and for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. To be specific, he may de facto force Ukraine to comply with the provisions of European legislation on the rights of linguistic and religious minorities – no matter how paradoxical an appeal to international norms coming from the Kremlin may look.The new US administration may demand the same from Kyiv. Vice President JD Vance, in an interview last spring, alleged that Ukraine “is doing some pretty bad stuff,” citing “news reports of priests being investigated, church assets being seized and priests being arrested.”
What goals have been achieved
Moscow has managed to accomplish some tactical objectives: driving the Ukrainian army out of Luhansk Region and pushing it away from the city of Donetsk; taking control of territory with large deposits of coal, lithium and salt in central and southern Donetsk Region; and creating a land bridge to Crimea and seizing swaths of fertile land in southeast Ukraine.
Ukraine has thus far managed to defend its independence and maintained unity in the fight against an enemy at least three times stronger.
“Ukraine’s territorial losses after three years of war are much smaller than what could have been expected before the conflict began.”
During future peace negotiations, Ukraine may manage to effect the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Kharkiv Region in exchange for the parts of Kursk Region it occupies and to regain control over the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in exchange for joint reconstruction of the Kakhovka Dam and the resumption of water supplies to Crimea via the North Crimea Canal (see also here).
There is no longer any talk of returning to the borders of 1991. In the future, when the war is over, the memory of these losses and the war in general will incubate a Ukrainian national idea.
It remains to be seen whether the talks that started in February will lead to the development and implementation of a plan to end the war. There is a realistic chance that the fighting will stop by the year-end, but at this point it is backed up by nothing more than hopes and statedintentions.
There is no longer any talk of returning to the borders of 1991. In the future, when the war is over, the memory of these losses and the war in general will incubate a Ukrainian national idea.
It remains to be seen whether the talks that started in February will lead to the development and implementation of a plan to end the war. There is a realistic chance that the fighting will stop by the year-end, but at this point it is backed up by nothing more than hopes and statedintentions.
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