SOCIETY
Russians Believe Their Leaders Should Negotiate from a Position of Strength
March 7, 2025
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Denis Volkov
Director of the Levada Center (Moscow)
Sociologist and Levada Center Director Denis Volkov argues that most Russians favor starting peace negotiations and have pinned their hopes on Trump. Yet alongside a gradual increase in support for peace, Russians’ readiness to give back Ukrainian territory as part of an agreement is simultaneously decreasing.
The original text in Russian was published in Forbes. We are republishing it here with their permission.
Russian society is increasingly infused with hope that the “special operation” in Ukraine could end this year. Such sentiment is evident in discussions we have had with Russians about their outlook for the future and their expectations of the duration of the conflict. They paid particular attention to the US presidential election, with all eyes on Donald Trump, who promised to end the Russia-Ukraine conflict within 24 hours of taking office.
Though there has been no “quick fix,” the US president’s shift in policy has encouraged more and more Russians to believe that a peaceful settlement between Russia and Ukraine is possible.
Russians want a détente
The sheer volume of coverage of Trump and his rhetoric in the Russian information space – dominated by official media – could give one the impression that Trump had “won” the Kremlin, not the White House. The news flow gives reason to assume that Russian elites sympathize with the newly elected president and do not rule out a deal with him, around which they are now laying the groundwork to ensure a positive public reaction.
Russian society is increasingly infused with hope that the “special operation” in Ukraine could end this year. Such sentiment is evident in discussions we have had with Russians about their outlook for the future and their expectations of the duration of the conflict. They paid particular attention to the US presidential election, with all eyes on Donald Trump, who promised to end the Russia-Ukraine conflict within 24 hours of taking office.
Though there has been no “quick fix,” the US president’s shift in policy has encouraged more and more Russians to believe that a peaceful settlement between Russia and Ukraine is possible.
Russians want a détente
The sheer volume of coverage of Trump and his rhetoric in the Russian information space – dominated by official media – could give one the impression that Trump had “won” the Kremlin, not the White House. The news flow gives reason to assume that Russian elites sympathize with the newly elected president and do not rule out a deal with him, around which they are now laying the groundwork to ensure a positive public reaction.
Russian and US delegations meeting in Riyadh. February 2025. Source: VK
One way or another, the fact is all conversations in Russia today revolve around ending the three-year-long conflict – against the backdrop of heightened interest in what is happening in Ukraine and Trump’s rhetoric.
In the second half of 2024, our focus group participants insisted that “Trump is a businessman” and “you can reach an agreement with him” – unlike Biden, who, due to his age, seemed to most Russians to be manipulated by anti-Russia US elites. The appearance of a lively, energetic president in the White House offered at least some hope for ending the conflict. As respondents said: “Trump promised to end the war, so we are looking forward to Trump.”
It is no surprise that the overwhelming majority of Russians (85%) positively assess the US-Russia talks that started in Riyadh and continued in Istanbul. Throughout the conflict, more than half of Russians voiced their support for improving relations with the US and the West.
In the second half of 2024, our focus group participants insisted that “Trump is a businessman” and “you can reach an agreement with him” – unlike Biden, who, due to his age, seemed to most Russians to be manipulated by anti-Russia US elites. The appearance of a lively, energetic president in the White House offered at least some hope for ending the conflict. As respondents said: “Trump promised to end the war, so we are looking forward to Trump.”
It is no surprise that the overwhelming majority of Russians (85%) positively assess the US-Russia talks that started in Riyadh and continued in Istanbul. Throughout the conflict, more than half of Russians voiced their support for improving relations with the US and the West.
“Despite the prevailing negative attitude toward the US and Europe in general, the majority wanted to ease international tensions, especially with rising talk of the possible use of nuclear weapons.”
That said, the prevailing idea was that Russia wanted to negotiate but the West did not. Now, Trump’s election has created the feeling that the West’s position may finally be changing.
It is necessary to stipulate that, despite all the desire for a détente and Russians’ sympathy for Trump, the ideal form of relations between Moscow and Washington is seen by the majority in Russia not as friendship – over the past 30 years, significant mistrust has accumulated in US-Russia relations, which is hard to overcome – but rather as noninterference in each other’s affairs.
People in focus groups repeatedly expressed the idea that it would be good if, after a deal is done, Trump would “go away” and “deal with his own problems” so the US would “stay out of our business” and “stop interfering in our affairs.” But first, there needs to be a deal.
The majority are in favor of negotiations
Overall, ending the Russia-Ukraine conflict and starting peace negotiations is currently supported by about 60% of Russians. We saw these numbers in surveys starting in summer 2024, but the Ukrainian army’s incursion into Kursk Region had the effect of decreasing support for peace negotiations for a time. Indeed, since February 2022, the proportion of those in favor of a peaceful resolution of the conflict almost never fell below half the population.
It is necessary to stipulate that, despite all the desire for a détente and Russians’ sympathy for Trump, the ideal form of relations between Moscow and Washington is seen by the majority in Russia not as friendship – over the past 30 years, significant mistrust has accumulated in US-Russia relations, which is hard to overcome – but rather as noninterference in each other’s affairs.
People in focus groups repeatedly expressed the idea that it would be good if, after a deal is done, Trump would “go away” and “deal with his own problems” so the US would “stay out of our business” and “stop interfering in our affairs.” But first, there needs to be a deal.
The majority are in favor of negotiations
Overall, ending the Russia-Ukraine conflict and starting peace negotiations is currently supported by about 60% of Russians. We saw these numbers in surveys starting in summer 2024, but the Ukrainian army’s incursion into Kursk Region had the effect of decreasing support for peace negotiations for a time. Indeed, since February 2022, the proportion of those in favor of a peaceful resolution of the conflict almost never fell below half the population.
"Should Russia improve relations with the US and other Western countries?" Definitely yes/Probably yes/Probably no/Definitely no/Hard to say. Source: Levada Center
Still, this should be understood as the most general desire to end the conflict and stop the bloodshed. The most frequently heard argument in favor of this – in focus groups and in responses to open questions – is that too many have already died on both sides. Behind this argument is a hidden anxiety among Russians that the longer the conflict goes on, the higher the chances of escalation. That, in turn, could mean a new mobilization, which most would very much like to avoid. Thus, the sooner that peace comes, the lower the risks for every Russian family.
The growth in support for peace negotiations is driven also by a shift in rhetoric by the Kremlin, which has been signaling Russia’s readiness for talks for the past few months. That has influenced public opinion, preparing it for a possible settlement.
It is wrong to juxtapose supporters of peace negotiations with supporters of the Kremlin, as some researchers and commentators do.
The growth in support for peace negotiations is driven also by a shift in rhetoric by the Kremlin, which has been signaling Russia’s readiness for talks for the past few months. That has influenced public opinion, preparing it for a possible settlement.
It is wrong to juxtapose supporters of peace negotiations with supporters of the Kremlin, as some researchers and commentators do.
“Surveys show that support for peace negotiations prevails even among regime loyalists, who, for all three years of the conflict, have made up a large part of the support for ending the ‘special operation.’”
Still, they believe that the country’s leadership should decide when and on what terms to conclude a peace agreement. Focus group participants say: “it would be good if the conflict ended sooner,” but “we are little people, let the big people decide,” and “Putin has all the information, he knows best.”
In the last couple of months, less than a third of Russians have been against peace negotiations and for fighting on, whereas throughout the conflict the average was about 40%. Their main argument is that “we should not stop halfway” and “we need to finish what we started” given that “so much has already been sacrificed.” Regime loyalists also predominate in this group. Those who criticized the Kremlin “from the right,” demanding more decisive action (Igor Strelkov embodied this opposition), were always marginal, barely accounting for 5-6% of the total population.
Interestingly, some Russian liberals have also found themselves in the camp of opponents of a peaceful resolution of the conflict, as they demand a full Ukrainian victory instead. This stance is most prominently represented by the organizers of opposition rallies in Berlin and is shared by 5-6% of Russians.
This far-right/liberal overlap should not be surprising. It came to the fore during the Prigozhin rebellion in 2023, when one side supported it because of sympathy for Prigozhin himself and the other because of ill will toward the current regime. Be that as it may, both of these positions remain marginal.
Peace negotiations, but with whom?
Let us return to the desire for peace negotiations prevailing in Russian society. The majority of Russians (70%) believe they should be conducted first and foremost with the US.
We have noted before that most Russians perceive the current conflict as a confrontation between Russia and the US-led West in which Ukraine is merely a proxy. This view was entrenched in Russian society even before February 24, 2022, during the period of rising tensions in late 2021.
In the last couple of months, less than a third of Russians have been against peace negotiations and for fighting on, whereas throughout the conflict the average was about 40%. Their main argument is that “we should not stop halfway” and “we need to finish what we started” given that “so much has already been sacrificed.” Regime loyalists also predominate in this group. Those who criticized the Kremlin “from the right,” demanding more decisive action (Igor Strelkov embodied this opposition), were always marginal, barely accounting for 5-6% of the total population.
Interestingly, some Russian liberals have also found themselves in the camp of opponents of a peaceful resolution of the conflict, as they demand a full Ukrainian victory instead. This stance is most prominently represented by the organizers of opposition rallies in Berlin and is shared by 5-6% of Russians.
This far-right/liberal overlap should not be surprising. It came to the fore during the Prigozhin rebellion in 2023, when one side supported it because of sympathy for Prigozhin himself and the other because of ill will toward the current regime. Be that as it may, both of these positions remain marginal.
Peace negotiations, but with whom?
Let us return to the desire for peace negotiations prevailing in Russian society. The majority of Russians (70%) believe they should be conducted first and foremost with the US.
We have noted before that most Russians perceive the current conflict as a confrontation between Russia and the US-led West in which Ukraine is merely a proxy. This view was entrenched in Russian society even before February 24, 2022, during the period of rising tensions in late 2021.
“Only half of Russians polled believe it makes sense to negotiate with Ukraine, and only a quarter think Europe should have a seat at the table.”
Though Ukraine is seen as being controlled by the West, there is an understanding that signing a peace agreement cannot be done without its participation; at the same time, there is a persistent feeling that Kyiv does not want to negotiate and thus it is pointless to talk to Bankova today.
The perception of Europe’s role has changed gradually throughout the conflict. At the very beginning, EU countries were perceived as being completely dependent on the US, acting on its instructions. Yetover the past year and a half, the proportion of the Russian public believing that European leaders, such as French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, have their own position on the Ukraine conflict – one that is even tougher on Russia than the US line – has gradually grown.
The US-Russia talks and the public split between the US and Europe on how to end the conflict have cemented this view. In fact, Russians’ have a more positive attitude toward the US than toward the EU for the first time ever, at 30% versus 21% as of February 2025. It will be interesting to see how sustainable this turns out be.
Negotiating from a position of strength
Though support for a peaceful settlement prevails in Russia society, the majority are not in favor of peace at any price. Thus, alongside the gradual increase in support for peace negotiations, readiness to give back Ukrainian territory as part of an agreement is simultaneously decreasing.
This is likely attributable to the belief, voiced by three quarters of respondents, that Russia is winning on the battlefield today. About the same number – 72% – say that the conflict is going well for Russia, though the occupation of part of Kursk Region and regular attacks by Ukrainian drones cause some concern. That is the highest figure since spring 2022, before the retreat of the Russian army from the city of Kherson and Kharkiv Region. People reason that with Russia gradually gaining the upper hand on the ground, Russian leaders can and should negotiate from a position of strength.
Though the number of people willing to make concessions to Ukraine for the sake of concluding a peace agreement has increased slightly over the past six months – from 20% to 30% – in many ways these are just words: on the main issues, Russian public opinion is becoming increasingly intractable.
For example, the number of Russians who are ready to accept Ukrainian membership in NATO or the return to Ukraine of the DNR and LNR or Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions has systematically declined. Today, 70% to 80% – depending on the question – consider such terms of a potential agreement as unacceptable for Russia.
In addition, if we set aside the swap of POWs, which is supported by both sides (92% of respondents in Russia), the terms that are most popular in Russia are unlikely to find understanding in Ukraine.
The perception of Europe’s role has changed gradually throughout the conflict. At the very beginning, EU countries were perceived as being completely dependent on the US, acting on its instructions. Yetover the past year and a half, the proportion of the Russian public believing that European leaders, such as French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, have their own position on the Ukraine conflict – one that is even tougher on Russia than the US line – has gradually grown.
The US-Russia talks and the public split between the US and Europe on how to end the conflict have cemented this view. In fact, Russians’ have a more positive attitude toward the US than toward the EU for the first time ever, at 30% versus 21% as of February 2025. It will be interesting to see how sustainable this turns out be.
Negotiating from a position of strength
Though support for a peaceful settlement prevails in Russia society, the majority are not in favor of peace at any price. Thus, alongside the gradual increase in support for peace negotiations, readiness to give back Ukrainian territory as part of an agreement is simultaneously decreasing.
This is likely attributable to the belief, voiced by three quarters of respondents, that Russia is winning on the battlefield today. About the same number – 72% – say that the conflict is going well for Russia, though the occupation of part of Kursk Region and regular attacks by Ukrainian drones cause some concern. That is the highest figure since spring 2022, before the retreat of the Russian army from the city of Kherson and Kharkiv Region. People reason that with Russia gradually gaining the upper hand on the ground, Russian leaders can and should negotiate from a position of strength.
Though the number of people willing to make concessions to Ukraine for the sake of concluding a peace agreement has increased slightly over the past six months – from 20% to 30% – in many ways these are just words: on the main issues, Russian public opinion is becoming increasingly intractable.
For example, the number of Russians who are ready to accept Ukrainian membership in NATO or the return to Ukraine of the DNR and LNR or Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions has systematically declined. Today, 70% to 80% – depending on the question – consider such terms of a potential agreement as unacceptable for Russia.
In addition, if we set aside the swap of POWs, which is supported by both sides (92% of respondents in Russia), the terms that are most popular in Russia are unlikely to find understanding in Ukraine.
“For example, the overwhelming majority of the population – more than 80% – would like guarantees for the rights of the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine and the status of the Russian Orthodox Church there.”
Recall it is protection of Russian speakers that our respondents have seen as the main goal of the “special operation” over the past three years.
Moreover, about 70% of Russians would generally like to see a Russia-friendly government established in Kyiv, a policy of geopolitical neutrality pursued by the Ukrainian government and Western sanctions against Russia lifted. On the latter point, an even larger share of the country (77% in February 2025) thinks Russia should act without worrying about sanctions: “if they are lifted, good; if they are not, that’s fine too.”
Such sentiment is in line with the Kremlin’s rhetoric, but it is entirely incongruous with the stated position of the Ukrainian leadership. And if there are no grounds for compromise between the warring sides, people will have to keep waiting for the long-awaited end to the bloodshed.
Moreover, about 70% of Russians would generally like to see a Russia-friendly government established in Kyiv, a policy of geopolitical neutrality pursued by the Ukrainian government and Western sanctions against Russia lifted. On the latter point, an even larger share of the country (77% in February 2025) thinks Russia should act without worrying about sanctions: “if they are lifted, good; if they are not, that’s fine too.”
Such sentiment is in line with the Kremlin’s rhetoric, but it is entirely incongruous with the stated position of the Ukrainian leadership. And if there are no grounds for compromise between the warring sides, people will have to keep waiting for the long-awaited end to the bloodshed.
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