Politics
Populist Governors Reappearing in Russia
March 18, 2025
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Nikolai Petrov
Senior Research Fellow, Head of the Laboratory for the Analysis of Transformational Processes, New Eurasian Strategies Center (NEST)
Political scientist Nikolai Petrov looks at the recent reappearance of populist governors in Russia, who had all but disappeared with the emergence of Sergei Kiriyenko as the Kremlin’s chief of domestic policy in 2016 and the transition to a “technocratic” model of governance.
Could three recently appointed Russian governors mark a new trend of populism at the regional level in Russia? They are: Georgy Filimonov of Vologda Region (44 years old; appointed in October 2023), Vyacheslav Fedorishchev of Samara Region, (35; May 2024) and Alexander Khinshtein of Kursk Region (50; December 2024).
The latter two got their posts amid bitter local conflicts. Fedorishchev’s predecessor had been elected only a few months earlier. As for Khinshtein, the Kremlin took the unprecedented step of removing a recently appointed governor from the local elite who had then been confirmed in an election. The reason was collective and increasingly organized protests of outraged people evacuated from the areas of Kursk Region occupied by the Ukrainian army. As a Duma deputy, Khinshtein, known as a demagogue, took on the issue of defrauded investors and depositors and is believed to be able to talk to Russians who feel wronged by the powers that be.
Filimonov’s appointment in Vologda Region is rumored to be attributable to the Kremlin’s intention to rein in oligarch Alexei Mordashov, who has supposedly shown insufficient zeal in supporting the special military operation, and to weaken the hold of Mordashov’s Severstal on the regional administration.
The latter two got their posts amid bitter local conflicts. Fedorishchev’s predecessor had been elected only a few months earlier. As for Khinshtein, the Kremlin took the unprecedented step of removing a recently appointed governor from the local elite who had then been confirmed in an election. The reason was collective and increasingly organized protests of outraged people evacuated from the areas of Kursk Region occupied by the Ukrainian army. As a Duma deputy, Khinshtein, known as a demagogue, took on the issue of defrauded investors and depositors and is believed to be able to talk to Russians who feel wronged by the powers that be.
Filimonov’s appointment in Vologda Region is rumored to be attributable to the Kremlin’s intention to rein in oligarch Alexei Mordashov, who has supposedly shown insufficient zeal in supporting the special military operation, and to weaken the hold of Mordashov’s Severstal on the regional administration.
“All three appointees are well-educated Muscovites who have made successful careers for themselves in the Putin regime.”
Only Filimonov, who spent his childhood in Cherepovets (Vologda Region), has any connection to the region he was appointed to lead.
Eight governors have been appointed recently, and the fact that three of them are populists may signal a new trend.
Not faceless bureaucrats
Khinshtein was a notorious investigative journalist who, at the dawn of his journalistic career, actively used siloviki connections. He has awards from all of Russia’s many security and law enforcement agencies (except the Investigative Committee, between whose chief, Alexander Bastrykin, and Khinshtein there is bad blood). As mentioned, Khinshtein served multiple terms as a Duma deputy from United Russia starting in 2003 (note that he was elected as a representative of territorial districts, not by party list). He has authored numerous books, including How Russia is Being Killed (2007), Tale of Lost Time: Why Brezhnev Could Not Be Putin (2011), End of Atlantis. Why Putin Will Never Turn into Gorbachev(2018).
The other two, though not such colorful figures, also differ strikingly from the usual Kiriyenko-style, gray “technocrats.”
Filimonov is the world champion in “musical forms” kickboxing (1999). In 2013, he defended his doctoral dissertation, which he wrote on soft power in US foreign policy, and speaks English, French and Spanish. He is a member of the nationalist Izborsky Club and is considered a follower of the philosopher Alexander Dugin and a friend of Putin’s daughter Katerina Tikhonova.
Fedorishchev, who managed to serve as an assistant and adviser to such esteemed liberal ministers as Vladimir Mau and Alexei Ulyukaev, defended his dissertation in 2013 as well, on public-private partnerships in the context of globalization. Starting in 2016, he worked under Putin’s former bodyguard Alexei Dyumin in Tula Region – first as his deputy and then “first deputy.”
Filimonov is obviously a protégé of Kiriyenko, with whom Filimonov’s father, a coach, did combat sports. As for Fedorishchev, there is reason to believe that he is Rostec CEO Sergei Chemezov’s man. That is evidenced, in particular, by Fedorishchev’s chairmanship of the State Council industry commission and appointment to lead Samara Region, the votchina of Rostec.
Image-crafting
Khinshtein goes with a turtleneck jacket for meetings with the people and a full suit for meetings of the regional government – for the cameras. Meanwhile, other officials in these meetings are also in suits with white shirts but, unlike the governor, do not wear ties. Filimonov prefers mandarin-collar jackets (“some of my jackets resemble gymnasium uniforms, others tsarist army officer uniforms,” he explained in an interview), while his subordinates have identical sweatshirts with the inscription “Team Filimonov.”
Eight governors have been appointed recently, and the fact that three of them are populists may signal a new trend.
Not faceless bureaucrats
Khinshtein was a notorious investigative journalist who, at the dawn of his journalistic career, actively used siloviki connections. He has awards from all of Russia’s many security and law enforcement agencies (except the Investigative Committee, between whose chief, Alexander Bastrykin, and Khinshtein there is bad blood). As mentioned, Khinshtein served multiple terms as a Duma deputy from United Russia starting in 2003 (note that he was elected as a representative of territorial districts, not by party list). He has authored numerous books, including How Russia is Being Killed (2007), Tale of Lost Time: Why Brezhnev Could Not Be Putin (2011), End of Atlantis. Why Putin Will Never Turn into Gorbachev(2018).
The other two, though not such colorful figures, also differ strikingly from the usual Kiriyenko-style, gray “technocrats.”
Filimonov is the world champion in “musical forms” kickboxing (1999). In 2013, he defended his doctoral dissertation, which he wrote on soft power in US foreign policy, and speaks English, French and Spanish. He is a member of the nationalist Izborsky Club and is considered a follower of the philosopher Alexander Dugin and a friend of Putin’s daughter Katerina Tikhonova.
Fedorishchev, who managed to serve as an assistant and adviser to such esteemed liberal ministers as Vladimir Mau and Alexei Ulyukaev, defended his dissertation in 2013 as well, on public-private partnerships in the context of globalization. Starting in 2016, he worked under Putin’s former bodyguard Alexei Dyumin in Tula Region – first as his deputy and then “first deputy.”
Filimonov is obviously a protégé of Kiriyenko, with whom Filimonov’s father, a coach, did combat sports. As for Fedorishchev, there is reason to believe that he is Rostec CEO Sergei Chemezov’s man. That is evidenced, in particular, by Fedorishchev’s chairmanship of the State Council industry commission and appointment to lead Samara Region, the votchina of Rostec.
Image-crafting
Khinshtein goes with a turtleneck jacket for meetings with the people and a full suit for meetings of the regional government – for the cameras. Meanwhile, other officials in these meetings are also in suits with white shirts but, unlike the governor, do not wear ties. Filimonov prefers mandarin-collar jackets (“some of my jackets resemble gymnasium uniforms, others tsarist army officer uniforms,” he explained in an interview), while his subordinates have identical sweatshirts with the inscription “Team Filimonov.”
“Fedorishchev sports a military style: khaki jackets with stylized patches and ‘Governor’ and ‘Fedorishchev’ name tapes.”
All three governors are hyperactive on social media, without fail posting daily video updates. Khinshtein’s Telegram channel has over 250,000 subscribers and Fedorishchev’s over 100,000. To monitor public sentiment, all three rely on “regional management centers.” On Khinshtein’s orders, Kursk Region’s management center analyzes officials’ social media outreach with a monthly discussion of the online activity of regional government members and municipal heads.
In addition, each governor’s office reflect his idiosyncrasies.
In Filimonov’s reception area, there are five portraits and one bust of Stalin, while portraits of Lenin, the tsars and famous tsarist generals hang on the walls. His office features an icon and a large panel with the inscription: “Vologda Region is the soul of the Russian North, the stronghold [mesto sily] of the Russian world.” Filimonov described the style he chose for his office as “nonconformism… a tribute to the past… a reference to the 19th century, the Soviet Union at the dawn of the formation of a new state [gosudarstvennost’].”
Fedorishchev is a numerology believer. When he moved into the regional administration building, he changed the numbering of the offices to make own No. 369. The office itself is a rather bureaucratic, post-Soviet one, with massive dark furniture and green leather, a portrait of Putin on the wall behind the governor’s desk, an icon by the door and a faded relief map of the region on the wall.
Khinshtein’s office is like Fedorishchev’s, but the icons are placed upright, not hung, and the walls are covered with letters of gratitude and certificates of merit from the heads of security services and other government agencies. Whereas Filimonov calls his region “the soul of the Russian North,” Khinshtein calls Kursk “the cradle of Orthodox traditions, the spiritual bulwark of our nation.”
In addition, each governor’s office reflect his idiosyncrasies.
In Filimonov’s reception area, there are five portraits and one bust of Stalin, while portraits of Lenin, the tsars and famous tsarist generals hang on the walls. His office features an icon and a large panel with the inscription: “Vologda Region is the soul of the Russian North, the stronghold [mesto sily] of the Russian world.” Filimonov described the style he chose for his office as “nonconformism… a tribute to the past… a reference to the 19th century, the Soviet Union at the dawn of the formation of a new state [gosudarstvennost’].”
Fedorishchev is a numerology believer. When he moved into the regional administration building, he changed the numbering of the offices to make own No. 369. The office itself is a rather bureaucratic, post-Soviet one, with massive dark furniture and green leather, a portrait of Putin on the wall behind the governor’s desk, an icon by the door and a faded relief map of the region on the wall.
Khinshtein’s office is like Fedorishchev’s, but the icons are placed upright, not hung, and the walls are covered with letters of gratitude and certificates of merit from the heads of security services and other government agencies. Whereas Filimonov calls his region “the soul of the Russian North,” Khinshtein calls Kursk “the cradle of Orthodox traditions, the spiritual bulwark of our nation.”
Acting Governor of Kursk Region Alexander Khinshtein meeting with groups of residents of regional districts bordering Ukraine. January 2025. Source: VK
Khinshtein as a model populist
Khinshtein came to Kursk Region without his team and started working with the government that his predecessor had not yet fully put together when he was replaced. At his first press conference as acting governor, Khinshtein said he would govern the region “by hand”: “that is not right, but it is the most effective.”
He suggested officials who had done wrong “repent” – following the Ukrainian foray into Kursk in August 2024, an investigation into embezzlement of funds earmarked for the construction of defenses against the leadership of Kursk Region Development Corporation is ongoing. Having taken a look around, Khinshtein fired several regional officials, including the head of the regional security committee, who had emerged as a focal point of discontent due to a slow evacuation after the Ukrainian incursion.
Lacking his own team, Khinshtein is trying to rely on local cadres and those handpicked by the Presidential Administration to help him. In January, Alexander Chepik, a graduate of Kiriyenko’s “school of governors” who had previously held high posts in the regional governments of Karelia and Buryatia, was made first deputy governor. In February, Vladimir Bazarov, another “universal manager,” was appointed deputy governor, having made stops before that in Yamalia, Sevastopol (deputy governor) and Belgorod Region (deputy governor for construction from 2020).
Khinshtein came to Kursk Region without his team and started working with the government that his predecessor had not yet fully put together when he was replaced. At his first press conference as acting governor, Khinshtein said he would govern the region “by hand”: “that is not right, but it is the most effective.”
He suggested officials who had done wrong “repent” – following the Ukrainian foray into Kursk in August 2024, an investigation into embezzlement of funds earmarked for the construction of defenses against the leadership of Kursk Region Development Corporation is ongoing. Having taken a look around, Khinshtein fired several regional officials, including the head of the regional security committee, who had emerged as a focal point of discontent due to a slow evacuation after the Ukrainian incursion.
Lacking his own team, Khinshtein is trying to rely on local cadres and those handpicked by the Presidential Administration to help him. In January, Alexander Chepik, a graduate of Kiriyenko’s “school of governors” who had previously held high posts in the regional governments of Karelia and Buryatia, was made first deputy governor. In February, Vladimir Bazarov, another “universal manager,” was appointed deputy governor, having made stops before that in Yamalia, Sevastopol (deputy governor) and Belgorod Region (deputy governor for construction from 2020).
“Khinshtein’s moves as governor are a model of populism. On a weekly basis, he holds government meetings, broadcast online, where he scolds underperforming bureaucrats, gives out orders and shares his thoughts on how to serve the people.”
Reports with photos and comments of his meetings in Moscow with high-ranking officials are posted online. In Minchenko Consulting’s latest index measuring the federal contacts among Russian governors, Khinshtein ranks first by a wide margin. Khishtein makes members of the regional government maintain their own social media accounts and take questions from Kursk residents online.
Khinshtein’s populist tactics also include unexpected visits to stores to check prices on food and to discontent residents of occupied areas where fighting is taking place. Khinshtein plays on anti-immigrant sentiments, as well. In January, he spoke out in support of banning migrants from holding certain jobs, such as drivers (including taxis) and couriers, explaining that “this is being done to support our citizens first.”
Khinshtein’s populist tactics also include unexpected visits to stores to check prices on food and to discontent residents of occupied areas where fighting is taking place. Khinshtein plays on anti-immigrant sentiments, as well. In January, he spoke out in support of banning migrants from holding certain jobs, such as drivers (including taxis) and couriers, explaining that “this is being done to support our citizens first.”
In December 2024, a monument to Stalin was erected in Vologda at the behest of the regional branch of the Communist Party and with support of the regional administration, headed by Governor Georgy Filimonov. Source: VK
Filimonov as a fighter against oligarchy
On top of the Stalins hanging in his reception area, Filimonov has already erected a monument to Stalin in the region’s capital and is planning to add one of Ivan the Terrible. Filimonov’s sympathies for tyrants are fused with an interest in paganism: he claims to have a sacred name that comes from the “Slavic pre-Christian tradition.” In addition, he gave his daughters the ancient Slavic names Veleslava and Ladoslava.
Upon arriving in Vologda Region, Filimonov immediately began to sack officials tied to Severstal, who made up the bulk of the regional government. Even though he did not have his own team, recent appointments were quickly reversed. Alexander Povetkin, a famous retired boxer who had been made deputy governor for youth policy, sports and patriotic education, resigned seven months after his appointment. Filimonov’s predecessor, Oleg Kuvshinnikov, whom Filimonovtapped to be the governor’s representative in the Federation Council, was recalled less than a year later. In just over a year, the region’s health minister was changed twice.
According to Filimonov, his approach to governing combines “principles of hierarchy, moderate rigidity and military discipline with agility, brainstorming, corporate practices and, most importantly, principles of the veche.”
One of his first initiatives after being elected (note: after being appointed, an acting governor needs to win an election, which is typically a formality) was to restrict alcohol sales: starting in March, Vologda Region residents can only buy alcohol for two hours a day on weekdays, from 12:00 to 14:00. This resulted in the widespread closure of stores whose business directly depended on alcohol sales. Another recent Filimonov initiative is to create a nonprofit “to form a system of moral and ideological guidelines for young people” – chillingly called Oprichniki.
On top of the Stalins hanging in his reception area, Filimonov has already erected a monument to Stalin in the region’s capital and is planning to add one of Ivan the Terrible. Filimonov’s sympathies for tyrants are fused with an interest in paganism: he claims to have a sacred name that comes from the “Slavic pre-Christian tradition.” In addition, he gave his daughters the ancient Slavic names Veleslava and Ladoslava.
Upon arriving in Vologda Region, Filimonov immediately began to sack officials tied to Severstal, who made up the bulk of the regional government. Even though he did not have his own team, recent appointments were quickly reversed. Alexander Povetkin, a famous retired boxer who had been made deputy governor for youth policy, sports and patriotic education, resigned seven months after his appointment. Filimonov’s predecessor, Oleg Kuvshinnikov, whom Filimonovtapped to be the governor’s representative in the Federation Council, was recalled less than a year later. In just over a year, the region’s health minister was changed twice.
According to Filimonov, his approach to governing combines “principles of hierarchy, moderate rigidity and military discipline with agility, brainstorming, corporate practices and, most importantly, principles of the veche.”
One of his first initiatives after being elected (note: after being appointed, an acting governor needs to win an election, which is typically a formality) was to restrict alcohol sales: starting in March, Vologda Region residents can only buy alcohol for two hours a day on weekdays, from 12:00 to 14:00. This resulted in the widespread closure of stores whose business directly depended on alcohol sales. Another recent Filimonov initiative is to create a nonprofit “to form a system of moral and ideological guidelines for young people” – chillingly called Oprichniki.
“Filimonov’s war with oligarch Alexei Mordashov, the owner of the key economic entity in the region, Severstal, is being waged on two fronts: through personnel changes and environmental protection actions.”
Mordashov has responded by attempting to paralyze the local government in Cherepovets, where Severstal is located, with nine of the 26 city council members linked to the company resigning.
Before that, instead of investing in the second stage of a factory for deep wood processing in Vologda, Mordashov’s wood-processing holding, Sveza, bought up four large companies producing paper for cigarette filters, cardboard packaging and special-purpose paper – in the city of Pskov and in Leningrad Region. It seems Sveza is about to pull out of Vologda Region.
Filimonov’s purge of regional elites made itself felt in election results: in the presidential election in March, Vologda was one of only four regions where Putin’s support was under 80%. Filimonov himself notched the second-worst performance among all two dozen governors up for election in autumn 2024, receiving 62% overall and 55% in Cherepovets.
Before that, instead of investing in the second stage of a factory for deep wood processing in Vologda, Mordashov’s wood-processing holding, Sveza, bought up four large companies producing paper for cigarette filters, cardboard packaging and special-purpose paper – in the city of Pskov and in Leningrad Region. It seems Sveza is about to pull out of Vologda Region.
Filimonov’s purge of regional elites made itself felt in election results: in the presidential election in March, Vologda was one of only four regions where Putin’s support was under 80%. Filimonov himself notched the second-worst performance among all two dozen governors up for election in autumn 2024, receiving 62% overall and 55% in Cherepovets.
Samara Region Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev. February 2025. Source: VK
Fedorishchev as a Dyumin’s client
Fedorishchev is also battling powerful people in his region. One of them is businessman Vladimir Avetisyan (until recently thought to actually call the shots in Samara), together with entities of Volgopromgaz controlled by him. On New Year’s Eve, Fedorishchev announced that the regional government was initiating the renationalization of gas distribution assets, which would go back to regional and municipal control, that had previously been sold to Avetisyan. The governor also publicly proclaimed the need to launch criminal cases against Avetisyan-owned Samaragaz and Middle Volga Gas Company (SVGK).
Like Filimonov, Fedorishchev started by personnel purges. Though he was less radical, he went after both the team of the previous governor and businesspeople linked to him.
Meanwhile, Fedorishchev, though no match for Khinshtein in terms of aggressive self-promotion, is keen to keep up his image. This includes daily videos, usually from the car – either covering his plans or recapping his day – and stories on his Telegram about special military operation heroes. Fedorishchev was among the first governors to launch a regional veterans pathway program, called School for Heroes, based on the presidential Time for Heroes program. In addition, on Face to Face (Ochnaya Stavka) on the TV channel Gubernia, Fedorishchev challenges well-known people in the region to a public debate – from the aforementioned oligarch Avetisyan to ex-governor Konstantin Titov.
Fedorishchev is also battling powerful people in his region. One of them is businessman Vladimir Avetisyan (until recently thought to actually call the shots in Samara), together with entities of Volgopromgaz controlled by him. On New Year’s Eve, Fedorishchev announced that the regional government was initiating the renationalization of gas distribution assets, which would go back to regional and municipal control, that had previously been sold to Avetisyan. The governor also publicly proclaimed the need to launch criminal cases against Avetisyan-owned Samaragaz and Middle Volga Gas Company (SVGK).
Like Filimonov, Fedorishchev started by personnel purges. Though he was less radical, he went after both the team of the previous governor and businesspeople linked to him.
Meanwhile, Fedorishchev, though no match for Khinshtein in terms of aggressive self-promotion, is keen to keep up his image. This includes daily videos, usually from the car – either covering his plans or recapping his day – and stories on his Telegram about special military operation heroes. Fedorishchev was among the first governors to launch a regional veterans pathway program, called School for Heroes, based on the presidential Time for Heroes program. In addition, on Face to Face (Ochnaya Stavka) on the TV channel Gubernia, Fedorishchev challenges well-known people in the region to a public debate – from the aforementioned oligarch Avetisyan to ex-governor Konstantin Titov.
“The thirty-five-year-old governor tries to connect with young people and posts his own rap online.”
On his orders, a Telegram chatbot was launched to gather suggestions for helping young people and improving the quality of life in Samara Region.
Fedorishchev’s main asset is the support of Dyumin. Fedorishchev told RBC TV that, upon being appointed governor, he called Dyumin: “he is my commander. I reported as per protocol. He, of course, congratulated me, but immediately gave me instructions and tips and drew my attention to some details.” Today, Fedorishchev ranks, according to Minchenko Consulting, as one of the most well-connected governors in Russia.
In autumn 2024, Fedorishchev attracted national attention by alleging corruption in the Russian soccer league.
In a normally functioning country, a governor may not be too noticeable. But to remain in the spotlight, Fedorishchev prefers to create and lead “headquarters” – for example, a headquarters for capital construction, which meets on a weekly basis, and a headquarters for coordination of the military-industrial complex.
Conclusions
The technocratized governance system built in recent years can fail in crisis situations, and the established system of remote monitoring of public sentiment through “regional management centers” does not solve the problem. The Kremlin needs a real dialogue with the population. A new type of governor – populist but controlled from above – is one way to build channels and formats for such a dialogue.
The populism of Filimonov, Fedorishchev and Khinshtein is of a different sort. Whereas the legitimacy of an ordinary populist politician is based on the support of the masses against the elites, their populism works through the support of the Kremlin. The populists of the 1990s scored political points by attacking Moscow, the “Center,” for failing to provide for regions; today’s populists target business – both federal (as in Vologda) and regional (as in Samara).
It is not so important for what purposes the Kremlin encourages or at least does not suppress the populism of its appointees; more important is the very fact that agency is being given back to everyday Russians, whose support populist governors are out to gain. Whereas currently the people are assigned the passive role of spectators, watching what is happening in their country through a television screen, this may soon be replaced by forms of more serious participation. In any case, this means less distance between the people and power.
Fedorishchev’s main asset is the support of Dyumin. Fedorishchev told RBC TV that, upon being appointed governor, he called Dyumin: “he is my commander. I reported as per protocol. He, of course, congratulated me, but immediately gave me instructions and tips and drew my attention to some details.” Today, Fedorishchev ranks, according to Minchenko Consulting, as one of the most well-connected governors in Russia.
In autumn 2024, Fedorishchev attracted national attention by alleging corruption in the Russian soccer league.
In a normally functioning country, a governor may not be too noticeable. But to remain in the spotlight, Fedorishchev prefers to create and lead “headquarters” – for example, a headquarters for capital construction, which meets on a weekly basis, and a headquarters for coordination of the military-industrial complex.
Conclusions
The technocratized governance system built in recent years can fail in crisis situations, and the established system of remote monitoring of public sentiment through “regional management centers” does not solve the problem. The Kremlin needs a real dialogue with the population. A new type of governor – populist but controlled from above – is one way to build channels and formats for such a dialogue.
The populism of Filimonov, Fedorishchev and Khinshtein is of a different sort. Whereas the legitimacy of an ordinary populist politician is based on the support of the masses against the elites, their populism works through the support of the Kremlin. The populists of the 1990s scored political points by attacking Moscow, the “Center,” for failing to provide for regions; today’s populists target business – both federal (as in Vologda) and regional (as in Samara).
It is not so important for what purposes the Kremlin encourages or at least does not suppress the populism of its appointees; more important is the very fact that agency is being given back to everyday Russians, whose support populist governors are out to gain. Whereas currently the people are assigned the passive role of spectators, watching what is happening in their country through a television screen, this may soon be replaced by forms of more serious participation. In any case, this means less distance between the people and power.
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