To these were added issues like restoring the Ukrainian economy and lifting sanctions against Russia.

For Ukrainians, it is the prospect of economic recovery that is critically important, while for Russians, it is hopes for the peacetime future once sanctions are lifted. This formulation allows both sides to believe that compromise is possible without humiliation.

Though Ukrainians consider sanctions to be a key part of Western support (“weapons, money, sanctions” are how Ukrainian respondents describe that support), awareness of the possibility of their being lifted is already present in the public discourse – this is in part due to Putin’s rhetoric and Trump’s stance. At the same time, though Russians tend to downplay the impact of sanctions, 65% of respondents in September 2024 hoped they would be canceled.

To make the scenarios more realistic, at this stage we did not suggest peace terms that are obviously unacceptable for one or the other side; instead, we compactly formulated starting positions that were to become the subject of negotiations.

Our Ukrainian colleagues from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) and we at ExtremeScan have found that respondents perceive the proposed scenarios as a package and that the parameters included in the scenarios influence each other.
“If the package includes the return of control of territories, then it becomes much more attractive (for Ukrainians),” KIIS concluded. “For example, if Russia retains control of all occupied territories, then 38% of Ukrainians are ready to accept such a package versus 51% who are categorically against it. If packages also include serious security guarantees and Ukraine’s membership in the EU, Ukrainians’ willingness to accept territorial losses will be significantly higher. Territorial losses are perceived by Ukrainians as meaningless without reliable security guarantees and the prospect of safe and prosperous development in the future.”

We constructed four scenarios for four random subsamples in both countries. They served as a lens through which we could observe how combinations of different ceasefire terms might affect their attractiveness to Russians and Ukrainians. Each respondent assessed only one scenario.

In the Ukrainian version, the formulation about control of territories was accompanied by the caveat: “though Ukraine does not officially recognize this.” For Ukrainians, this is a mandatory condition.

The territorial parameters varied from complete Russian control of occupied territories to the return of parts of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions.

Security is the most important parameter for each side. The war has severely traumatized Ukrainians and will affect generations to come, while it has become a major frustration for Russians.

The most acceptable scenario for both sides turned out to be the following:

• Russia retains control of occupied territories (Ukraine does not officially recognize this);
• Ukraine receives security guarantees from the West (a military contingent is deployed along the demarcation line);
• Ukraine receives funds for economic recovery;
• Sanctions are lifted from Russia in stages.

This scenario was supported by 60% in Russia versus 29% who were against it. In Ukraine, the corresponding figures were 62% and 34%.

The average “index” of readiness to accept the terms of a ceasefire across all four scenarios was 48% in Russia and 56% in Ukraine (note: this is after the Trump-Zelensky meeting in late February, whereas it was 63% before). Even after Zelensky’s public dressing-down in the Oval Office, Ukrainians’ willingness to compromise remained higher than Russians’.

Thus, we find his role to be ambivalent and unstable.

Who can stop the war? Putin. But does he want peace?

We asked about the power (or lack thereof) of the leaders of the key countries to resolve the conflict.
Putin was ranked first in Ukraine (67%) and in Russia – with nearly 100% (94%). This reflects the understanding among Russians (and Ukrainians) that it is he who started the war/“special military operation” and it is he who can stop it.

Rhetorically, Putin constantly declares his desire for peace, placing responsibility for sabotaging the peace process on Kyiv. The result: at end-February 2025, 80% of Russian respondents believed Putin is determined to conclude a peace and only 10% to keep fighting. This, however, looks like parroting of the official position.

Yet public demand to end the war is gradually rising, even if it is not voiced.
In early 2024 and that autumn, only a small part of the country hoped for a peace agreement initiated by Russia with mutual concessions from both sides (36% of those 68% Russians who would like to achieve this goal). It took Trump’s peace push and loud rhetoric about his readiness to end the conflict between Russia and Ukraine to solidify hopes for a quick end to the war.

However, an analysis of the information space – official statements, Telegram channels, Putin’s comments – shows that the Kremlin is not preparing public opinion for peace. Only 7% of official, Kremlin and military content in Russia at the beginning of 2025 expressed a neutral or positive attitude toward a potential ceasefire. In other words, 93% of content is either against peace talks or discredits them as a “tactical pause” that would only benefit Ukraine.

Propaganda shapes public opinion in Russia ahead of important decisions, and the lack of a signal that peace is imminent indicates that a ceasefire is not on the agenda currently. Can a peace be concluded if the leader of one of the warring sides does not want it?

Official communications make peace talks seem like a defeat, a surrender, a moment of weakness that will be exploited by the Ukrainians. The Kremlin is not setting the stage domestically for concessions, compromises or a new phase in the war.

Nevertheless, a significant portion of Russians would prefer territorial concessions by Russia versus continued military action and further mobilization. Only 25% believe the “special military operation” has benefited them personally and their families.

And while today some Russians support further conquests in Ukraine, if the negotiation process drags on and Trump’s mood changes, a swift reversal in public opinion in favor of compromise and readiness to make concessions is possible – contrary to the Kremlin’s wishes.

Can a comprise be found? Yes, and it is closer than you think.

Our research shows that despite ideological and cultural differences, it is possible to find a formula to achieve a peace that is acceptable to most Russians and Ukrainians. It would be neither vae victis nor pax victis, but a reasonable compromise.

For Ukrainians: security guarantees (real ones, not just on paper) are more important than NATO membership; territorial losses are possible if they are not made permanent – they would not be recognized, meaning they could be reversed in the future; regaining territories and receiving reparations should remain on the agenda, but there is an understanding that this is impractical in the early stages; the main thing is the survival of the state, reconstruction and a pathway to Europe.

For Russians: security and Ukraine’s renunciation of its NATO ambitions are more important than new territories; the “newly acquired” (Ukrainian) regions do not hold a special significance for Russians – they care more about achieving a symbolic victory and assuaging the perceived threat from the West (note: Crimea is a separate case).

Our research shows neither side sees a short-term ceasefire as progress. It is perceived rather as a maneuver, a trick, a temporary tactical pause. Both sides suspect each other of treachery. Still, no one verbally rejects the idea of a ceasefire.