Society
Even If Loyalty Is Just a Mask, Vast Majority of Russians Never Take This Mask Off
April 8, 2025
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Sergei Shelin
Journalist, independent analyst and author of Russia After Putin and Trump
(Freedom Letters, 2025)
Journalist Sergei Shelin analyzes recent surveys conducted by state pollsters that show Russians are happy with their lives and consider Russia a free country. Meanwhile, every fourth respondent said they would inform on those who criticized the war in Ukraine.
The original article in Russian was published in the Moscow Times and is being republished here with small changes and with the author’s permission.
The upbeat mood of Russians in recent weeks and months – quite favorable from the Kremlin’s perspective – can easily be explained by habitual conformism. This argument would be compelling if Russians, in some other situations, expressed their “true views.” But since there is virtually no evidence of this in the public space, let’s assume that in interviews with the state-controlled pollster FOM and the state-owned VTsIOM, Russians express an entirely organic loyalty to the government.
It’s the ‘soul,’ not propaganda
The most indicative sign of our times is the readiness of fellow citizens to inform on each other, measured and published by FOM. But before moving on to the survey results, let’s first sketch a portrait of an average Russian based on his/her own responses to questions about himself/herself.
He/she is, in general, a happy person. The FOM “happiness index” is now 7.3 out of 10.0 points, having fluctuated around this mark throughout the three years of war. On the eve of the invasion of Ukraine, it was a more modest 6.8 points.
A breakdown of the reasons why respondents are happy is not provided. Yet some reasons can be guessed.
This spring, most Russians are optimistic about their financial situation. Twenty-nine percent expect it to improve in the coming year, while only 12% fear a deterioration. Young people are even more cheerful. Among those under 30, the share of those expecting an improvement is 55%.
Overall, the “special military operation” has seemed to boost perceived well-being: before the war, the share of Russians who assessed their financial situation as bad was 21%, whereas now the figure has dropped to just 16%.
There is more to this than just propaganda and the public’s desire to demonstrate loyalty.
The upbeat mood of Russians in recent weeks and months – quite favorable from the Kremlin’s perspective – can easily be explained by habitual conformism. This argument would be compelling if Russians, in some other situations, expressed their “true views.” But since there is virtually no evidence of this in the public space, let’s assume that in interviews with the state-controlled pollster FOM and the state-owned VTsIOM, Russians express an entirely organic loyalty to the government.
It’s the ‘soul,’ not propaganda
The most indicative sign of our times is the readiness of fellow citizens to inform on each other, measured and published by FOM. But before moving on to the survey results, let’s first sketch a portrait of an average Russian based on his/her own responses to questions about himself/herself.
He/she is, in general, a happy person. The FOM “happiness index” is now 7.3 out of 10.0 points, having fluctuated around this mark throughout the three years of war. On the eve of the invasion of Ukraine, it was a more modest 6.8 points.
A breakdown of the reasons why respondents are happy is not provided. Yet some reasons can be guessed.
This spring, most Russians are optimistic about their financial situation. Twenty-nine percent expect it to improve in the coming year, while only 12% fear a deterioration. Young people are even more cheerful. Among those under 30, the share of those expecting an improvement is 55%.
Overall, the “special military operation” has seemed to boost perceived well-being: before the war, the share of Russians who assessed their financial situation as bad was 21%, whereas now the figure has dropped to just 16%.
There is more to this than just propaganda and the public’s desire to demonstrate loyalty.
“Workers, especially the young and energetic, now feel much more confident in the labor market than they did several years ago. Employers, keen to attract scarce personnel, have ramped up the number of financial enticements.”
The Mood of Those Around Me
What is the predominant mood, in your view, among your family members, friends, coworkers and acquaintances – relaxed or anxious? (FOM survey, March 28-30)
Green = Relaxed
Orange = Anxious
Gray = Hard to say
What is the predominant mood, in your view, among your family members, friends, coworkers and acquaintances – relaxed or anxious? (FOM survey, March 28-30)
Green = Relaxed
Orange = Anxious
Gray = Hard to say
The fact that there is a war going on is something that most Russians try not to notice in their daily lives. This is why 57% of respondents, according to the most recent weekly FOM surveys, report a “relaxed” mood among their family, friends and acquaintances, and coworkers, versus only 37% who said they sensed “anxiety.” Such a ratio was considered good even in peacetime.
As they look around, Russians find that things are OK: 87% of those polled by VTsIOM are satisfied with their locality. Among Muscovites and Petersburgers, the figure is a whopping 94%, while in smaller big cities it is only slightly lower. “The largest megalopolises [have] services and comfort, but Russians value the ‘soul’ of smaller big cities,” VTsIOM explains.
Are the state pollsters lying? Not very much, I submit. There are few people trying to emigrate currently. Even the flows of people leaving places where Russians usually want to leave – for example, Primorye (going west) – are not very large.
A land of equality and freedom
The regime’s ideological projects, such as “traditional values,” are verbally supported by the overwhelming majority of Russians (85% versus 9%) – even accounting for feigned support, a majority clearly does not reject them.
The persecution of queer persons, for example, is almost accepted as a norm. Seven in eight Russians see it as a self-evident part of “traditional values.”
Meanwhile, women hardly notice the patriarchal rhetoric and practices of the regime. The majority of those surveyed (64%) claim to have “equal opportunities to realize their rights,” and 8% say they have even more opportunities than men. Only 23% of women surveyed believe Russian men are more privileged.
In general, Russians’ ideas about their country differ greatly from how it is seen from the outside. For example, 73% of respondents (versus 17%) consider Russia a free country. Yet this is not because alternative sources of information are unavailable. Half of Russians get their news from the internet, not from state-run television.
Accessing banned and independent resources is not particularly difficult: 25% of respondents use VPNs and another 25% read news on Telegram. That the most popular online resources among Russians are all state-run is the result of their free choice.
Nevertheless, Putin is not as beloved as it may seem. When asked directly, naturally 80% of respondents assure pollsters that they fully approve of his performance as president. But just ask them to list the names of politicians who inspire confidence, and only 37.5% (this spring) mention Putin. In terms of the nation’s affection for its leader, there have definitely been better times.
Four million denunciations
Scholars have argued about the driving force behind the Stalinist terror: was it mass, grassroots denunciations or the cold-blooded repression machine directed by the leader? This is a rather artificial juxtaposition. All those involved in the terror – officials, paid informers who were manipulated by them, and the masses of snitches and opportunists – did not act in isolation.
They breathed the same air and egged on each other. The willingness of many ordinary people to accept the terror and try to use it to their personal advantage played a huge, incendiary role.
Thus, the FOM poll on the readiness of Russians to denounce others explains a lot about life in Russia not only today but perhaps also tomorrow. Respondents were presented with eight “situations” and asked to say whether they would report them “to the police or other state authorities.”
Of these “situations,” two are particularly interesting: “insulting statements about the country’s leadership” and “negative comments about the actions of the Russian army in Ukraine.”
Let’s start with the former. Only 14% of Russians – one in seven – said they would flag negativity about the country’s leaders. Five times more people (69%) said they would not do so. The remaining 16% said they did not know. Let’s be kind and assume this is a cautious way of saying they would not inform on others in this situation.
Armchair imperialists
Does this mean one can criticize Putin in front of strangers without fear of being denounced? To some extent, yes, but with some caveats.
As they look around, Russians find that things are OK: 87% of those polled by VTsIOM are satisfied with their locality. Among Muscovites and Petersburgers, the figure is a whopping 94%, while in smaller big cities it is only slightly lower. “The largest megalopolises [have] services and comfort, but Russians value the ‘soul’ of smaller big cities,” VTsIOM explains.
Are the state pollsters lying? Not very much, I submit. There are few people trying to emigrate currently. Even the flows of people leaving places where Russians usually want to leave – for example, Primorye (going west) – are not very large.
A land of equality and freedom
The regime’s ideological projects, such as “traditional values,” are verbally supported by the overwhelming majority of Russians (85% versus 9%) – even accounting for feigned support, a majority clearly does not reject them.
The persecution of queer persons, for example, is almost accepted as a norm. Seven in eight Russians see it as a self-evident part of “traditional values.”
Meanwhile, women hardly notice the patriarchal rhetoric and practices of the regime. The majority of those surveyed (64%) claim to have “equal opportunities to realize their rights,” and 8% say they have even more opportunities than men. Only 23% of women surveyed believe Russian men are more privileged.
In general, Russians’ ideas about their country differ greatly from how it is seen from the outside. For example, 73% of respondents (versus 17%) consider Russia a free country. Yet this is not because alternative sources of information are unavailable. Half of Russians get their news from the internet, not from state-run television.
Accessing banned and independent resources is not particularly difficult: 25% of respondents use VPNs and another 25% read news on Telegram. That the most popular online resources among Russians are all state-run is the result of their free choice.
Nevertheless, Putin is not as beloved as it may seem. When asked directly, naturally 80% of respondents assure pollsters that they fully approve of his performance as president. But just ask them to list the names of politicians who inspire confidence, and only 37.5% (this spring) mention Putin. In terms of the nation’s affection for its leader, there have definitely been better times.
Four million denunciations
Scholars have argued about the driving force behind the Stalinist terror: was it mass, grassroots denunciations or the cold-blooded repression machine directed by the leader? This is a rather artificial juxtaposition. All those involved in the terror – officials, paid informers who were manipulated by them, and the masses of snitches and opportunists – did not act in isolation.
They breathed the same air and egged on each other. The willingness of many ordinary people to accept the terror and try to use it to their personal advantage played a huge, incendiary role.
Thus, the FOM poll on the readiness of Russians to denounce others explains a lot about life in Russia not only today but perhaps also tomorrow. Respondents were presented with eight “situations” and asked to say whether they would report them “to the police or other state authorities.”
Of these “situations,” two are particularly interesting: “insulting statements about the country’s leadership” and “negative comments about the actions of the Russian army in Ukraine.”
Let’s start with the former. Only 14% of Russians – one in seven – said they would flag negativity about the country’s leaders. Five times more people (69%) said they would not do so. The remaining 16% said they did not know. Let’s be kind and assume this is a cautious way of saying they would not inform on others in this situation.
Armchair imperialists
Does this mean one can criticize Putin in front of strangers without fear of being denounced? To some extent, yes, but with some caveats.
“For example, do not criticize the president in front of young people. Because as many as 24% of young men and young women surveyed said they would snitch. And those with a higher education were no exception (23%).”
Though this is not a majority, the figures are shocking.
Of course, you can always assume some respondents are so intimidated that they are willing to lie about being snitches just to say the “right thing” to the interviewers. But this would be an erroneous conclusion. Because those who “will speak negatively about the actions of the Russian army in Ukraine” find far less sympathy among Russians: 24% of the entire sample said they would inform on them, versus 56% who said they would not and 20% who said it was hard to say what they would do – here again, the share of young people who said they would snitch (26%) is above average.
Young people, recall, are generally more satisfied with life in Russia today. Should we take seriously the fact that a significant percentage of them promise in interviews with pollsters to snitch on skeptics of that life? It hardly seems like playacting.
We do not know who today really writes denunciations and how much they do. But an important sign of the reality today is that a regime favorite, the professional informer Ekaterina Mizulina, head of the “Safe Internet League,” tours universities and is popular with student audiences.
A second conclusion based on the survey data: fear of the powers that be is not the main reason for Russians’ willingness to snitch. From the regime’s point of view, “insulting statements” about Putin are certainly no less dangerous than “negative comments” about the Russian army. And Russians know this. Yet they are less willing to defend Putin from “enemies” through denunciations than snitch on anyone who is against the war.
This not only shows that Russians’ attachment to the state and its conquests is stronger than their respect for the leader; it also indicates that being a snitch is convenient. Without sacrificing anything for the empire, they get to be imperialists. How can one not stand up from a safe place for the most sacred thing – the army?
For every two Russians who definitely would not denounce others, there is already one who definitely would. At least this is what people told pollsters in spring 2025. Russians’ love of worldly goods, money and other attributes of “happiness” has naturally translated into a willingness to inform on their neighbors in the hope of safeguarding that “happiness.”
Of course, you can always assume some respondents are so intimidated that they are willing to lie about being snitches just to say the “right thing” to the interviewers. But this would be an erroneous conclusion. Because those who “will speak negatively about the actions of the Russian army in Ukraine” find far less sympathy among Russians: 24% of the entire sample said they would inform on them, versus 56% who said they would not and 20% who said it was hard to say what they would do – here again, the share of young people who said they would snitch (26%) is above average.
Young people, recall, are generally more satisfied with life in Russia today. Should we take seriously the fact that a significant percentage of them promise in interviews with pollsters to snitch on skeptics of that life? It hardly seems like playacting.
We do not know who today really writes denunciations and how much they do. But an important sign of the reality today is that a regime favorite, the professional informer Ekaterina Mizulina, head of the “Safe Internet League,” tours universities and is popular with student audiences.
A second conclusion based on the survey data: fear of the powers that be is not the main reason for Russians’ willingness to snitch. From the regime’s point of view, “insulting statements” about Putin are certainly no less dangerous than “negative comments” about the Russian army. And Russians know this. Yet they are less willing to defend Putin from “enemies” through denunciations than snitch on anyone who is against the war.
This not only shows that Russians’ attachment to the state and its conquests is stronger than their respect for the leader; it also indicates that being a snitch is convenient. Without sacrificing anything for the empire, they get to be imperialists. How can one not stand up from a safe place for the most sacred thing – the army?
For every two Russians who definitely would not denounce others, there is already one who definitely would. At least this is what people told pollsters in spring 2025. Russians’ love of worldly goods, money and other attributes of “happiness” has naturally translated into a willingness to inform on their neighbors in the hope of safeguarding that “happiness.”
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