SOCIETY
Most Young People in Russia Are Apolitical and Loyal to the Regime
April 9, 2025
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Denis Volkov
Director of the Levada Center (Moscow)
Levada Center Director Denis Volkov argues why we should not exaggerate the factor of age in shaping attitudes toward power and politics in Russia. Though young Russians get their information differently, this does not necessarily translate into different views compared to older generations.
The original piece in Russian was published in Gorby and is being republished here with the author’s permission.
Political research on youth is often a response to specific events in which young people play a prominent role, such as the protests in Russia in 2017 and 2021. Such research is inevitably driven either by hopes for political change or fears that young people will be at the forefront of political unrest.
As a rule, these hopes turn out to be unfounded, and the fears exaggerated. This happens because the focus on youth distorts the scale of the processes being considered (they are given excessive importance).
This distortion can be avoided by studying the moods of young people as part of broader monitoring of public opinion.
Using data from long-term Levada Center surveys, below we will consider how the political sympathies of Russian youth have changed over the past quarter century – more specifically, what young Russians think about the country’s political leadership, as well as at what points and why their views changed.
We will not rely on generational theory, which divides society into groups based on their age and past experiences. Instead, we will look at youth as an organic part of Russian society. As such, young people are subject to overarching social, political and economic processes, though due to their specific characteristics, they may react to these processes somewhat differently than people of other ages.
We will consider the opinions of the youngest Russians regularly polled – those aged 18 to 24.
Before considering their political preferences and attitudes toward the regime, let’s look at some characteristics of young people everywhere.
Universal characteristics
One of these characteristics is the so-called “digital gap,” which is reflected in young people’s proficiency in using mobile devices, the internet and social media compared to older people.
For young people, these are natural things that they have learned early on. Meanwhile, older people generally find it hard to master something new. Thus, the digital gap affects Russia as much as any other country.
In Levada Center surveys, this gap is clearly visible in questions about where respondents get news about what is happening in the country and the world. For example, in January Russians under 25 were much less likely to get news from television than their compatriots aged 55 and older (35% versus 83%), with the opposite true for social media (62% versus 25%) and Telegram channels (56% versus 14%).
Similarly, while 89% of young Russians visit social media daily, only 31% of older Russians do so (about half of them do not use social media at all).
Though older Russians have long been on the internet, most have been able to master only the most basic things, like making calls via messengers and watching videos. Unlike young people, they struggle with navigating the array of online resources. That said, assessing the quality of information on the internet can be difficult for the youngest generation as well, since they have little experience in critically perceiving reality.
Political research on youth is often a response to specific events in which young people play a prominent role, such as the protests in Russia in 2017 and 2021. Such research is inevitably driven either by hopes for political change or fears that young people will be at the forefront of political unrest.
As a rule, these hopes turn out to be unfounded, and the fears exaggerated. This happens because the focus on youth distorts the scale of the processes being considered (they are given excessive importance).
This distortion can be avoided by studying the moods of young people as part of broader monitoring of public opinion.
Using data from long-term Levada Center surveys, below we will consider how the political sympathies of Russian youth have changed over the past quarter century – more specifically, what young Russians think about the country’s political leadership, as well as at what points and why their views changed.
We will not rely on generational theory, which divides society into groups based on their age and past experiences. Instead, we will look at youth as an organic part of Russian society. As such, young people are subject to overarching social, political and economic processes, though due to their specific characteristics, they may react to these processes somewhat differently than people of other ages.
We will consider the opinions of the youngest Russians regularly polled – those aged 18 to 24.
Before considering their political preferences and attitudes toward the regime, let’s look at some characteristics of young people everywhere.
Universal characteristics
One of these characteristics is the so-called “digital gap,” which is reflected in young people’s proficiency in using mobile devices, the internet and social media compared to older people.
For young people, these are natural things that they have learned early on. Meanwhile, older people generally find it hard to master something new. Thus, the digital gap affects Russia as much as any other country.
In Levada Center surveys, this gap is clearly visible in questions about where respondents get news about what is happening in the country and the world. For example, in January Russians under 25 were much less likely to get news from television than their compatriots aged 55 and older (35% versus 83%), with the opposite true for social media (62% versus 25%) and Telegram channels (56% versus 14%).
Similarly, while 89% of young Russians visit social media daily, only 31% of older Russians do so (about half of them do not use social media at all).
Though older Russians have long been on the internet, most have been able to master only the most basic things, like making calls via messengers and watching videos. Unlike young people, they struggle with navigating the array of online resources. That said, assessing the quality of information on the internet can be difficult for the youngest generation as well, since they have little experience in critically perceiving reality.
“Weak interest in politics, history and current events is another universal characteristic of young people. Russia is no exception in this regard.”
Similar trends are observed, for example, in the US, as evidenced by surveys from the Pew Research Center and other pollsters. Interest in these areas awakens when people are around 30-35 years old, as people begin to live an independent life and are faced with the need to get a better handle on what is happening around them and to make their own choices.
Nevertheless, no more than a third of the entire population of a country is actively and consistently interested in knowing more about the world around them – this is true both in Russia and in the US – so we should not exaggerate the increase in knowledge that comes with age.
Let’s compare the engagement of younger and older Russians with politics. Whereas among people over 55 years old, more than half of those surveyed regularly vote in elections for various levels of government, among people aged 18-24, it is only about a quarter.
Nevertheless, no more than a third of the entire population of a country is actively and consistently interested in knowing more about the world around them – this is true both in Russia and in the US – so we should not exaggerate the increase in knowledge that comes with age.
Let’s compare the engagement of younger and older Russians with politics. Whereas among people over 55 years old, more than half of those surveyed regularly vote in elections for various levels of government, among people aged 18-24, it is only about a quarter.
A protest against Alexei Navalny's arrest. St Petersburg, January 2021. Source: Wiki Commons
Note that even when Russian youth’s political activity peaked in recent years – as mentioned above, in 2017 and 2021 – only a small proportion of urban youth were involved in the protests. The majority of young people remained apolitical and generally loyal to the regime.
In addition, only about 35% of Russians under the age of 25 say they are “more or less closely” following the special military operation in Ukraine (this includes 7% of the whole sample who say they follow it “very closely”), whereas among Russians over 55 the figure is as high as 71% (including 32% who pay close attention).
From loyalty to protest...
Throughout the 2000s and up until early 2018 (but especially until early 2012), the youngest age group was the most positive about the regime. During this period, their responses were, on average, 10-15 percentage points higher than those of older respondents. This is understandable: young Russians were generally more satisfied with their lives, felt supported by their families and reported healthier moods generally. In addition, they did not see any serious alternatives to the regime.
As the government’s authority declined – after the 2008 financial crisis and the resulting deterioration in the quality of life, Vladimir Putin’s overall approval rating gradually fell from 87-88% in 2008 to 61-62% in 2013 – support for Putin and the government among young people also declined. Nevertheless, it was among young Russians where the highest support for the country’s leadership remained all those years. Dissatisfaction with the regime was concentrated in older age groups, which translated into votes for left-wing opposition parties, primarily the KPRF.
In addition, only about 35% of Russians under the age of 25 say they are “more or less closely” following the special military operation in Ukraine (this includes 7% of the whole sample who say they follow it “very closely”), whereas among Russians over 55 the figure is as high as 71% (including 32% who pay close attention).
From loyalty to protest...
Throughout the 2000s and up until early 2018 (but especially until early 2012), the youngest age group was the most positive about the regime. During this period, their responses were, on average, 10-15 percentage points higher than those of older respondents. This is understandable: young Russians were generally more satisfied with their lives, felt supported by their families and reported healthier moods generally. In addition, they did not see any serious alternatives to the regime.
As the government’s authority declined – after the 2008 financial crisis and the resulting deterioration in the quality of life, Vladimir Putin’s overall approval rating gradually fell from 87-88% in 2008 to 61-62% in 2013 – support for Putin and the government among young people also declined. Nevertheless, it was among young Russians where the highest support for the country’s leadership remained all those years. Dissatisfaction with the regime was concentrated in older age groups, which translated into votes for left-wing opposition parties, primarily the KPRF.
“After the incorporation of Crimea into Russia, support for the regime jumped across all age groups.”
The situation gradually began to change as economic conditions worsened overall and life satisfaction dipped amid the economic crisis of late 2014-early 2015, caused in no small part by the first packages of Western sanctions.
With a lag of 1-2 years, the popularity of government officials also took a dive. The trigger, however, was the announcement in mid-2018 of plans to raise the retirement age. As before, the attitude of young people toward the authorities worsened in parallel with that of other age groups (at that time, the youngest focus group participants voiced concerns not so much about themselves as about their parents).
Interestingly, it was then that opposition sentiments spread fast among Russian youth. This is attributable to a combination of several circumstances.
With a lag of 1-2 years, the popularity of government officials also took a dive. The trigger, however, was the announcement in mid-2018 of plans to raise the retirement age. As before, the attitude of young people toward the authorities worsened in parallel with that of other age groups (at that time, the youngest focus group participants voiced concerns not so much about themselves as about their parents).
Interestingly, it was then that opposition sentiments spread fast among Russian youth. This is attributable to a combination of several circumstances.
Alexei Navalny at a protest. Moscow, March 2017. Source: Wiki Commons
Precisely at this time – in 2017-19 – the popularity of internet platforms such as YouTube and Instagram exploded in Russia. Thanks to these new communication technologies, independent journalists such as Yuri Dud and Alexei Pivovarov, as well as young opposition politicians, primarily the late Alexei Navalny but also many others, managed to expand their audience significantly (Navalny had begun to master the internet to promote his political ideas in the late 2000s, but he became an online icon only a decade later).
In addition, by the late 2010s, amid stiffening economic headwinds, a significant part of Russian society had grown more receptive to criticism of the regime.
The main audience for opposition politicians online was Russian youth – to a large extent because young people were much more internet-savvy than older generations.
It is thus no surprise that the calls of Navalny and his supporters to protest in 2017 and 2021 were answered primarily by urban Russian youth. The height of opposition sentiments among youth lasted from late 2020 to mid-2021. In a May 2020 survey, as many as 40% of young people expressed their readiness to take part in protest actions (versus 28% among the entire population). This period coincided with the peak of Navalny’s fame and popularity, the release of his documentary about "Putin’s palace" and protests in support of Navalny after his arrest in Moscow in early 2021. Other prominent figures emerged, as well: for instance, Nikolai Bondarenko, a young KPRF deputy from Saratov, and Ekaterina Shulman, a political scientist particularly popular with the younger generation.
In addition, by the late 2010s, amid stiffening economic headwinds, a significant part of Russian society had grown more receptive to criticism of the regime.
The main audience for opposition politicians online was Russian youth – to a large extent because young people were much more internet-savvy than older generations.
It is thus no surprise that the calls of Navalny and his supporters to protest in 2017 and 2021 were answered primarily by urban Russian youth. The height of opposition sentiments among youth lasted from late 2020 to mid-2021. In a May 2020 survey, as many as 40% of young people expressed their readiness to take part in protest actions (versus 28% among the entire population). This period coincided with the peak of Navalny’s fame and popularity, the release of his documentary about "Putin’s palace" and protests in support of Navalny after his arrest in Moscow in early 2021. Other prominent figures emerged, as well: for instance, Nikolai Bondarenko, a young KPRF deputy from Saratov, and Ekaterina Shulman, a political scientist particularly popular with the younger generation.
“The growth of opposition sentiments among young people in 2018-21 came alongside a rise in support for the regime among the oldest Russians, who have ever since been its base.”
During these years, with many young people protesting, the gap in approval ratings of the government between young and old Russians reached a record 23 percentage points.
In focus groups at that time, young people said the suppression of the protests served as confirmation for them that the authorities “think only of themselves,” “do not let new people into power” and consider them “second-rate.” Many older Russians, on the contrary, approved of the actions of the siloviki or saw nothing wrong with them, considering the protests an act of disobedience and a “provocation.”
In focus groups at that time, young people said the suppression of the protests served as confirmation for them that the authorities “think only of themselves,” “do not let new people into power” and consider them “second-rate.” Many older Russians, on the contrary, approved of the actions of the siloviki or saw nothing wrong with them, considering the protests an act of disobedience and a “provocation.”
Russian men flee Ukraine War mobilization. The queue to the checkpoint "Upper Lars" on the Russian-Georgian border. Archives. September 2022.
A significant number of older Russians felt rejection, discomfort, irritation and fear, which fueled their desire to push back hard on the youth protests – otherwise, they argued, “we will lose our young people.” Here they were echoed by high-ranking officials, who made similar statements.
… and back to loyalty
The solution to the problem of young people’s weak loyalty began to emerge in early 2022, delivering visible results a year later. The current Russia-Ukraine conflict triggered a wave of patriotic consolidation in Russian society, also known as the “rally ‘round the flag” effect, boosting support for the Russian leadership across all segments of Russian society, including among young people.
Opposition politicians lost popularity as new heroes organically appeared, like Yevgeny Prigozhin and voenkory (military bloggers). In addition, the suppression of protests, prosecution of Navalny and his supporters, and emigration of some anti-regime Russians reduced the attractiveness of opposition activity. Nevertheless, in early 2022 young people still demonstrated weaker loyalty to the regime than other age groups.
A significant test came with the partial mobilization in autumn 2022. Unexpectedly, young people reacted more acutely than other age groups, with the gap in government approval ratings reaching 15 percentage points at end-September 2022.
However, as the threat of mobilization seemed to pass, the mood of young people quickly improved (as it did across other age groups).
… and back to loyalty
The solution to the problem of young people’s weak loyalty began to emerge in early 2022, delivering visible results a year later. The current Russia-Ukraine conflict triggered a wave of patriotic consolidation in Russian society, also known as the “rally ‘round the flag” effect, boosting support for the Russian leadership across all segments of Russian society, including among young people.
Opposition politicians lost popularity as new heroes organically appeared, like Yevgeny Prigozhin and voenkory (military bloggers). In addition, the suppression of protests, prosecution of Navalny and his supporters, and emigration of some anti-regime Russians reduced the attractiveness of opposition activity. Nevertheless, in early 2022 young people still demonstrated weaker loyalty to the regime than other age groups.
A significant test came with the partial mobilization in autumn 2022. Unexpectedly, young people reacted more acutely than other age groups, with the gap in government approval ratings reaching 15 percentage points at end-September 2022.
However, as the threat of mobilization seemed to pass, the mood of young people quickly improved (as it did across other age groups).
“By the beginning of 2023 and up to the present day, Russian youth again have the most positive views of the president and the government.”
Putin at a rally marking the 10-year anniversary of Crimea's "incorporation" into Russia. Red Square, March 2024. Source: Wiki Commons
That said, their support is less sure than that of their older compatriots. For example, there are almost equal numbers of young people who say they “definitely support” and “rather support” the president (42% versus 45% in January 2025), whereas Russians over 55 are firmer in their support (53% versus 37%).
In addition, the strong backing for the regime among Russian youth is accompanied by weaker support for the Russian army. This would seem to be a contradiction. The reality, however, is that the dovishness of young Russians is rather amorphous. In most cases, it does not mean sympathy for Ukraine or the West and takes the form of general slogans. Young focus group participants say, for example, they are “for peace around the world” and “against any military conflict” (an unbending, consistent dovish position is more characteristic of adults with liberal, opposition views).
The prevailing attitude of Russian youth to events in Ukraine seems to be attributable to a general lack of interest and attention – as we mentioned above, this is a universal characteristic. Because they are less interested, they are less immersed in the dominant information space – and thus less susceptibility to official propaganda.
In other words, on the issue of Ukraine, young people are not in opposition to the dominant discourse (or the political regime) – they rather lack a clear position. They are less supportive of the Russian army not because they sympathize with the other side in the current conflict, but because they have not staked out a conscious position.
Older generations report greater interest in what is happening in Ukraine and generally follow the news more closely, which accordingly makes them more susceptible to official propaganda.
Concluding remarks
When public opinion on the actions of the Russia’s leadership begins to change, this is also seen among young people, whose views in this regard move in line with broad sentiments.
The information consumption habits of young people – weak interest in political events and inattention to news, as well as a preference for the internet over television as a source of information – distinguish them from older people (not only in Russia).
As a result, Russian youth are less susceptible to official narratives and thus may not fully subscribe to the dominant ideas about what is happening in the country and the world. This, however, usually does not translate into opposition to the regime.
As people age, their interest in politics usually increases. This likely entails being drawn into existing information networks in society and internalizing the dominant ideas and opinions. Thus, the views of today’s young people are likely to slowly converge with those of the majority of the country.
In addition, the strong backing for the regime among Russian youth is accompanied by weaker support for the Russian army. This would seem to be a contradiction. The reality, however, is that the dovishness of young Russians is rather amorphous. In most cases, it does not mean sympathy for Ukraine or the West and takes the form of general slogans. Young focus group participants say, for example, they are “for peace around the world” and “against any military conflict” (an unbending, consistent dovish position is more characteristic of adults with liberal, opposition views).
The prevailing attitude of Russian youth to events in Ukraine seems to be attributable to a general lack of interest and attention – as we mentioned above, this is a universal characteristic. Because they are less interested, they are less immersed in the dominant information space – and thus less susceptibility to official propaganda.
In other words, on the issue of Ukraine, young people are not in opposition to the dominant discourse (or the political regime) – they rather lack a clear position. They are less supportive of the Russian army not because they sympathize with the other side in the current conflict, but because they have not staked out a conscious position.
Older generations report greater interest in what is happening in Ukraine and generally follow the news more closely, which accordingly makes them more susceptible to official propaganda.
Concluding remarks
When public opinion on the actions of the Russia’s leadership begins to change, this is also seen among young people, whose views in this regard move in line with broad sentiments.
The information consumption habits of young people – weak interest in political events and inattention to news, as well as a preference for the internet over television as a source of information – distinguish them from older people (not only in Russia).
As a result, Russian youth are less susceptible to official narratives and thus may not fully subscribe to the dominant ideas about what is happening in the country and the world. This, however, usually does not translate into opposition to the regime.
As people age, their interest in politics usually increases. This likely entails being drawn into existing information networks in society and internalizing the dominant ideas and opinions. Thus, the views of today’s young people are likely to slowly converge with those of the majority of the country.
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