Politics
‘Time of Heroes’ Program:
How the Kremlin is Going to
Re-Adapt War Veterans to Civilian Life
How the Kremlin is Going to
Re-Adapt War Veterans to Civilian Life
April 7, 2025
-
Ben Noble
Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme -
Nikolai Petrov
Consulting Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
Political scientists Ben Noble and Nikolai Petrov discuss the developments since the launch of ‘Time of Heroes’ program over one year ago. The Kremlin appears to take seriously the challenges posed by mass de-mobilization – of many thousands of tired, angry, weapons-trained, and possibly disturbed men returning to civilian life.
This conversation has originally been distributed as a bulletin from the Chatham House Russia and Eurasia Programme.
Have the goals of the programme changed since its launch?
The headline goal of the programme remains to form a new elite from those who have fought in the war against Ukraine. In February 2024, Vladimir Putin referred to ‘warriors’ as part of the ‘real elite’ of Russia.
Tellingly, Kiriyenko referred to veterans of the war on Ukraine as the ‘new Afgantsy’, referring to veterans from the Soviet Union’s war against Afghanistan, whose return resulted in a sharp rise in violent crime.
Have any of the graduates of the programme excelled in their appointments – or is there a sense that these appointments are largely symbolic, with technocrats doing the real work?
It is too early to talk about any successes of the three dozen newly appointed participants from the programme. But both the rush to appoint them and the nature of the posts they have received – such as advisory roles and posts relating to patriotic education – indicate that the Kremlin does not expect any real bureaucratic achievements from them.
Have the goals of the programme changed since its launch?
The headline goal of the programme remains to form a new elite from those who have fought in the war against Ukraine. In February 2024, Vladimir Putin referred to ‘warriors’ as part of the ‘real elite’ of Russia.
Tellingly, Kiriyenko referred to veterans of the war on Ukraine as the ‘new Afgantsy’, referring to veterans from the Soviet Union’s war against Afghanistan, whose return resulted in a sharp rise in violent crime.
Have any of the graduates of the programme excelled in their appointments – or is there a sense that these appointments are largely symbolic, with technocrats doing the real work?
It is too early to talk about any successes of the three dozen newly appointed participants from the programme. But both the rush to appoint them and the nature of the posts they have received – such as advisory roles and posts relating to patriotic education – indicate that the Kremlin does not expect any real bureaucratic achievements from them.
Yevgeny Pervyshov at a meeting of Time of Heroes program participants with Vladimir Putin in June 2024. In November 2024, Pervyshov was appointed governor of Tambov Region. Source: VK
The only exception, perhaps, is Yevgeny Pervyshov (see Russia.Post about him here) , who was appointed acting governor of the Tambov region in November 2024. He is, apparently, quite capable of handling this job. But that should come as no surprise: he has experience as mayor of Krasnodar, which is larger in population than the Tambov region.
Russian regions have created their own equivalents of the federal-level programme. Do you have a sense of whether some regions have been more successful than others?
On 14 December 2024, at the United Russia party congress, Putin said that the federal-level ‘Time of Heroes’ programme should be expanded, with the launch of regional programmes.
This would add to the programmes already started in the regions of Belgorod, Voronezh, Ryazan, Samara, Tula, in Stavropol Krai, and in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug.
The timing of Putin’s announcement may be linked with the American political calendar. With Donald Trump’s re-election, the Kremlin may well have thought that the prospect of an end to its war on Ukraine is more likely, with the need to prepare for returning troops – but that is only speculative.
What do these regional programmes involve? In the Saratov region, special assistants for patriotic work were introduced into the education system at the regional and district levels. And the head of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Aysen Nikolayev, instructed heads of districts to appoint war veterans as their deputies to advise on patriotic education.
In the Moscow region, the authorities have been offering war veterans training in four roles – civic activist, manager, profile specialist and entrepreneur – since the beginning of 2025. And the ‘Time of Heroes of St Petersburg’ programme is set to start imminently.
These regional programmes allow the authorities to take on and train many more veterans than the federal programme.
But it is important to remember that the prospective scale of participation in all of these programmes combined is much lower than the total number of those fighting in the war against Ukraine.
Beyond the ‘Time of Heroes’ programme and its regional equivalents, there are broader efforts to re-adapt veterans to civilian life. Since the beginning of 2025, for instance, a large-scale network of rehabilitation centres financed by the Social Fund of Russia has been operating across the country, providing medical rehabilitation.
United Russia wants to get many war veterans elected into office in the 2026 State Duma elections. How successful are they likely to be?
Neither the war on Ukraine itself nor its ‘heroes’ are popular in Russian society. That explains past electoral disappointments for veterans, which we have discussed before. And that might make people question the wisdom of trying to get them elected in the future.
Russian regions have created their own equivalents of the federal-level programme. Do you have a sense of whether some regions have been more successful than others?
On 14 December 2024, at the United Russia party congress, Putin said that the federal-level ‘Time of Heroes’ programme should be expanded, with the launch of regional programmes.
This would add to the programmes already started in the regions of Belgorod, Voronezh, Ryazan, Samara, Tula, in Stavropol Krai, and in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug.
The timing of Putin’s announcement may be linked with the American political calendar. With Donald Trump’s re-election, the Kremlin may well have thought that the prospect of an end to its war on Ukraine is more likely, with the need to prepare for returning troops – but that is only speculative.
What do these regional programmes involve? In the Saratov region, special assistants for patriotic work were introduced into the education system at the regional and district levels. And the head of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Aysen Nikolayev, instructed heads of districts to appoint war veterans as their deputies to advise on patriotic education.
In the Moscow region, the authorities have been offering war veterans training in four roles – civic activist, manager, profile specialist and entrepreneur – since the beginning of 2025. And the ‘Time of Heroes of St Petersburg’ programme is set to start imminently.
These regional programmes allow the authorities to take on and train many more veterans than the federal programme.
But it is important to remember that the prospective scale of participation in all of these programmes combined is much lower than the total number of those fighting in the war against Ukraine.
Beyond the ‘Time of Heroes’ programme and its regional equivalents, there are broader efforts to re-adapt veterans to civilian life. Since the beginning of 2025, for instance, a large-scale network of rehabilitation centres financed by the Social Fund of Russia has been operating across the country, providing medical rehabilitation.
United Russia wants to get many war veterans elected into office in the 2026 State Duma elections. How successful are they likely to be?
Neither the war on Ukraine itself nor its ‘heroes’ are popular in Russian society. That explains past electoral disappointments for veterans, which we have discussed before. And that might make people question the wisdom of trying to get them elected in the future.
“But Sergey Kiriyenko has a plan. He has, in effect, created a ‘school of legislators’ – competent officials who participate nominally in the war to gain veteran status and who will stand in the 2026 elections.”
Vasily Starkov, a former minister of transport of Sverdlovsk Region. Photo: Social media
Kiriyenko oversees a unit of the armed forces that contains drone operators; these military operatives are stationed well behind the front line, so they face minimal risk; but, by ‘serving’ in the war, they have shown their loyalty and patriotism.
The Kremlin is hoping that this cadre of semi-elites strikes the right balance between veteran credentials and technocratic abilities.
What does all of this tell us about the Kremlin’s thinking and planning regarding its war against Ukraine?
The Kremlin takes seriously the challenges posed by mass de-mobilization – of many thousands of tired, angry, weapons-trained, and possibly disturbed men returning to civilian life.
There are already cases of military personnel returning and immediately committing violent crimes. The scale of this threat is not currently large, but it would likely spike with a cessation of hostilities and the return of veterans.
The federal-level ‘Time of Heroes’ programme and its regional equivalents are one component of the Kremlin’s planning for de-mobilization, along with broader adaptation and rehabilitation programmes.
But the scale of the task is enormous. And it suggests the Kremlin will not allow a large wave of veterans to return to civilian life in Russia any time soon.
The Kremlin is hoping that this cadre of semi-elites strikes the right balance between veteran credentials and technocratic abilities.
What does all of this tell us about the Kremlin’s thinking and planning regarding its war against Ukraine?
The Kremlin takes seriously the challenges posed by mass de-mobilization – of many thousands of tired, angry, weapons-trained, and possibly disturbed men returning to civilian life.
There are already cases of military personnel returning and immediately committing violent crimes. The scale of this threat is not currently large, but it would likely spike with a cessation of hostilities and the return of veterans.
The federal-level ‘Time of Heroes’ programme and its regional equivalents are one component of the Kremlin’s planning for de-mobilization, along with broader adaptation and rehabilitation programmes.
But the scale of the task is enormous. And it suggests the Kremlin will not allow a large wave of veterans to return to civilian life in Russia any time soon.
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