Politics
Will We be Able to End the War in Ukraine in 2025?
January 3, 2025
- Nikolay MitrokhinАcademic Researcher, Research Center for East European Studies at the University of Bremen (Germany)
Political scientist Nikolay Mitrokhin writes about how in 2024, Russia managed to turn the tide of war in the land theater in its favor and capture the largest amount of Ukrainian territory since 2022, and also considers possible scenarios for how events will unfold in the near future.
The original text in Russian was published in Republic. A slightly shortened version is republished here with their permission.
The main takeaway from the third year of war has been the acute realization by all participants and observers that Ukraine will not win. Contrary to statements given by the country’s political leadership, Ukraine will be unable to use military means to return its territory, not just to the January 1, 2014 borders (or to the 1991 borders), but even to the borders controlled by the Armed Forces of Ukraine on January 1, 2022.
Moreover, Donald Trump’s election as US president calls into question the very principle that western supporters of Kyiv declared and fiercely defended—that in any peace treaty, Ukraine’s position as the victim of aggression should be definitive.
It is becoming increasingly evident that an end to the war will only come after negotiations between Russia and the US (or the US and China, with the participation of Russia and the EU), and that Ukraine will have to accept the results. However, there is no certainty that the parties will be able to reach an agreement and that the war will end in 2025.
The main takeaway from the third year of war has been the acute realization by all participants and observers that Ukraine will not win. Contrary to statements given by the country’s political leadership, Ukraine will be unable to use military means to return its territory, not just to the January 1, 2014 borders (or to the 1991 borders), but even to the borders controlled by the Armed Forces of Ukraine on January 1, 2022.
Moreover, Donald Trump’s election as US president calls into question the very principle that western supporters of Kyiv declared and fiercely defended—that in any peace treaty, Ukraine’s position as the victim of aggression should be definitive.
It is becoming increasingly evident that an end to the war will only come after negotiations between Russia and the US (or the US and China, with the participation of Russia and the EU), and that Ukraine will have to accept the results. However, there is no certainty that the parties will be able to reach an agreement and that the war will end in 2025.
Map of Military Actions as of December 2024. Source: Wiki Commons
The world as a whole has adapted to the reality of a major war on the European continent, the first of its kind in almost 80 years. By the end of 2024, it had been relegated to second, then third and fourth place in world news, after the Hamas terrorist group’s attack on Gaza, Israel’s fight against it and Hezbollah, as well as Trump’s presidential campaign, the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the disintegration of the coalition in Germany, and so on.
The arrival of the heads of China and India, as well as the UN Secretary General, to the BRICS summit in Kazan in October showed that the West's intention to create an effective political and economic vacuum around Russia has failed. This is also evidenced by the increase in deliveries of Russian liquefied gas to European ports in the fall, and Russia’s acquisition of a new military ally, North Korea, which entered the war on Russia’s side in the fall.
The US, in the voice of the president elect, which has already sent more than $90 billion (slightly more than the EU) of support to Ukraine, promises to take decisive measures to stop the war, despite the declarations of the Ukrainian president about returning to the 1991 borders.
The situation could have been different if the Ukrainian Armed Forces had successfully advanced.
The arrival of the heads of China and India, as well as the UN Secretary General, to the BRICS summit in Kazan in October showed that the West's intention to create an effective political and economic vacuum around Russia has failed. This is also evidenced by the increase in deliveries of Russian liquefied gas to European ports in the fall, and Russia’s acquisition of a new military ally, North Korea, which entered the war on Russia’s side in the fall.
The US, in the voice of the president elect, which has already sent more than $90 billion (slightly more than the EU) of support to Ukraine, promises to take decisive measures to stop the war, despite the declarations of the Ukrainian president about returning to the 1991 borders.
The situation could have been different if the Ukrainian Armed Forces had successfully advanced.
“However, the last time Ukraine demonstrated clear progress in this direction was by liberating territory in November 2022.”
The prospects of Ukraine receiving support from the EU and its other Western allies, such as the UK and Canada, are also murky. They cannot and will not be able to produce enough armored vehicles, large air defense systems and aircraft in the coming years to compensate for the reduction (or termination) of aid from the US.
The Battlefield and Changing Russian Tactics
The situation in the three main theaters of war differs significantly. In 2024, Russia managed to turn the tide of war in the land theater in its favor and capture the largest amount of Ukrainian territory since 2022, mainly due to the territory in the southwest and west of the Donetsk Oblast.
Overall, the year 2024 on the battlefield was marked primarily by the creeping offensive launched by Russia in November 2023 with a systematic assault on Avdiivka, during which the Russian army developed new offensive tactics.
Before this, the Russian offensive was characterized by the active use of artillery, after which columns of armored vehicles approached the next village along rural roads mined by the Ukrainian military in order to capture it, which led to huge losses.
The Battlefield and Changing Russian Tactics
The situation in the three main theaters of war differs significantly. In 2024, Russia managed to turn the tide of war in the land theater in its favor and capture the largest amount of Ukrainian territory since 2022, mainly due to the territory in the southwest and west of the Donetsk Oblast.
Overall, the year 2024 on the battlefield was marked primarily by the creeping offensive launched by Russia in November 2023 with a systematic assault on Avdiivka, during which the Russian army developed new offensive tactics.
Before this, the Russian offensive was characterized by the active use of artillery, after which columns of armored vehicles approached the next village along rural roads mined by the Ukrainian military in order to capture it, which led to huge losses.
“In 2024, the Russian Armed Forces adopted new tactics, using small groups of infantrymen to attack suddenly, without preliminary shelling.”
The task of the assault units was to quickly pass through the area controlled by Ukrainian drone operators and reach the next belt of forest, where they would be more difficult to detect. After that, they would (or would not) find a stronghold or observation point of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and, if necessary, would clear it, directing artillery, drones or tanks to the area.
In the event that large strongholds or technical facilities were discovered, assault groups or recon drones transmitted their coordinates to combat aircraft, which dropped a guided (adjustable) aerial bomb (GAB) on the site from a distance of about 60–80 kilometers, which destroyed everything within a radius of 30–60 meters.
Another development was a change in offensive tactics, as advanced groups of the Russian army began to bypass fortified Ukrainian areas, especially in populated areas, using a “pincer” maneuver: starting small in number, and then growing stronger and fortifying forces.
At first, two soldiers would appear in the forest belts, then six, then 20, and they dispersed into small groups so that it would be ineffective to waste shells on them. Then some of them rode mopeds to the next forest belt, thus bypassing the large Ukrainian strongholds in the fields.
The Russian Armed Forces carried out attacks in different areas in intervals of one to two weeks, so the Ukrainian Armed Forces did not have time to concentrate reserves to eliminate each breach, of which there were about ten at a time along a specific front line.
In the event that large strongholds or technical facilities were discovered, assault groups or recon drones transmitted their coordinates to combat aircraft, which dropped a guided (adjustable) aerial bomb (GAB) on the site from a distance of about 60–80 kilometers, which destroyed everything within a radius of 30–60 meters.
Another development was a change in offensive tactics, as advanced groups of the Russian army began to bypass fortified Ukrainian areas, especially in populated areas, using a “pincer” maneuver: starting small in number, and then growing stronger and fortifying forces.
At first, two soldiers would appear in the forest belts, then six, then 20, and they dispersed into small groups so that it would be ineffective to waste shells on them. Then some of them rode mopeds to the next forest belt, thus bypassing the large Ukrainian strongholds in the fields.
The Russian Armed Forces carried out attacks in different areas in intervals of one to two weeks, so the Ukrainian Armed Forces did not have time to concentrate reserves to eliminate each breach, of which there were about ten at a time along a specific front line.
Russian military presence in Ukraine, spring of 2022. Photo: social media
On February 17, the city of Avdiivka (essentially a western suburb of Donetsk) was captured, and two months later an event occurred that determined the course of the entire 2024 campaign.
On April 17–18, the Russian army broke through the well-fortified defenses of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near the village of Ocheretino northwest of Avdiivka (the 155th Brigade defending it simply fled) and within a month defeated the Ukrainian Armed Forces units transferred to fortify this sector. After which, Russian troops began to advance relatively quickly from north to south, across and into the rear of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' defensive lines in the center and south of the western part of Donetsk Oblast.
Over the next few months, this led to the destruction of the entire Ukrainian defense system in a vast area at the junction of the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia Fronts.
The dangerous breach could have been cut off by attacking from Kramatorsk. However, the Ukrainian Armed forces used five well-trained reserve brigades, armed with Western equipment, to break through into the Kursk Oblast, which yielded no results from a military perspective other than the capture of several hundred valuable prisoners.
On April 17–18, the Russian army broke through the well-fortified defenses of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near the village of Ocheretino northwest of Avdiivka (the 155th Brigade defending it simply fled) and within a month defeated the Ukrainian Armed Forces units transferred to fortify this sector. After which, Russian troops began to advance relatively quickly from north to south, across and into the rear of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' defensive lines in the center and south of the western part of Donetsk Oblast.
Over the next few months, this led to the destruction of the entire Ukrainian defense system in a vast area at the junction of the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia Fronts.
The dangerous breach could have been cut off by attacking from Kramatorsk. However, the Ukrainian Armed forces used five well-trained reserve brigades, armed with Western equipment, to break through into the Kursk Oblast, which yielded no results from a military perspective other than the capture of several hundred valuable prisoners.
“In a strategic sense, the advance into the Kursk Oblast was unsuccessful; many resources were spent, but the Ukrainian Armed Forces were unable to gain a foothold and stabilize their defenses.”
In 2025, Ukraine faces the threat of losing a third of the Zaporizhzhia Front, Russian military attacks on a relatively large city like Pokrovsk, and the Russian army advancing into the territory of the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.
War in the Air
The exchange of air strikes has made the skies the second most important battlefield in 2024. In this battle between Russia and Ukraine, there is relative parity, with Russia dominating slightly.
In increasing the production of attack drones and missiles, both sides are causing significant damage to one another, primarily in the energy sector. Since late summer, Russian missiles and drones have been actively attacking the Ukrainian energy system, which managed to recover in the first half of the year. Large cities such as Kharkiv, Odessa, Zaporizhzhia and Kryvyi Rih have found themselves in a particularly difficult situation.
Only by the end of the year, when Western countries transferred about a dozen additional defense systems to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, was it possible to provide relative protection against missiles to at least Kyiv, Odessa, Lviv and Dnipro.
There have also been some unpleasant changes for Ukraine in regard to attack drones. Russia has tripled their production and have begun mass use of new fake drones that overload the Ukrainian Armed Forces' air defense system.
Another development was the use of the latest Russian ballistic system, “Oreshnik,” against Ukraine (for demonstration purposes, without a warhead) (see Russia.Post article about it here).
Ukraine responded to this by sharply increasing the production of heavy attack drones, the capabilities of which are actively improving, as they can now fly over a distance of more than 1,600 kilometers, covering almost the entire European part of Russia, although they still do not reach the large industrial centers in the Urals.
These drones are effectively used to strike airfields, fuel and ammunition storage facilities, and oil refineries, but they cannot destroy heavy-duty concrete or brick structures.
War in the Air
The exchange of air strikes has made the skies the second most important battlefield in 2024. In this battle between Russia and Ukraine, there is relative parity, with Russia dominating slightly.
In increasing the production of attack drones and missiles, both sides are causing significant damage to one another, primarily in the energy sector. Since late summer, Russian missiles and drones have been actively attacking the Ukrainian energy system, which managed to recover in the first half of the year. Large cities such as Kharkiv, Odessa, Zaporizhzhia and Kryvyi Rih have found themselves in a particularly difficult situation.
Only by the end of the year, when Western countries transferred about a dozen additional defense systems to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, was it possible to provide relative protection against missiles to at least Kyiv, Odessa, Lviv and Dnipro.
There have also been some unpleasant changes for Ukraine in regard to attack drones. Russia has tripled their production and have begun mass use of new fake drones that overload the Ukrainian Armed Forces' air defense system.
Another development was the use of the latest Russian ballistic system, “Oreshnik,” against Ukraine (for demonstration purposes, without a warhead) (see Russia.Post article about it here).
Ukraine responded to this by sharply increasing the production of heavy attack drones, the capabilities of which are actively improving, as they can now fly over a distance of more than 1,600 kilometers, covering almost the entire European part of Russia, although they still do not reach the large industrial centers in the Urals.
These drones are effectively used to strike airfields, fuel and ammunition storage facilities, and oil refineries, but they cannot destroy heavy-duty concrete or brick structures.
Ukrainians Using US-Provided Long-Range Weapons. April 2022. Photo: Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Telegram channel
This is likely why, in 2024, Ukrainian drones focused on systematic attacks on Russian oil refineries and oil product storage systems, as well as on identified large ammunition depots. The Ukrainian Armed Forces managed to reduce the output of oil products in the Russian Federation by about 15%. This led to huge financial losses for producers, but did not deplete the supply of the Russian military groups.
Drone strikes and Western missile strikes on components of the Russian missile defense system and on the warehouses of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Russian army seem to be much more effective. However, despite the impressive size of the explosions, there is no talk yet of any reduction in the supply of ammunition to the Russian army.
Drone strikes and Western missile strikes on components of the Russian missile defense system and on the warehouses of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Russian army seem to be much more effective. However, despite the impressive size of the explosions, there is no talk yet of any reduction in the supply of ammunition to the Russian army.
“Any hopes the Ukrainian political leadership had for the power and range of Western missiles or the effectiveness of the F-16 fighters they received were not justified.”
This equipment did not change the situation either at the front or in the rear in Russia (except for in Crimea).
Ukraine's Victory at Sea
In the Black Sea, Ukraine has defeated Russia by a “crushing margin.” Attacking with unmanned naval boats (UNBs) and striking with Western missiles, Kyiv has forced Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and FSB ships to abandon the entire western and central Black Sea this year, and to move almost entirely away from their usual harbors in Crimea toward Novorossiysk and Abkhazia.
As a result, Ukraine was able to finally un-blockade its exports through ports in the Odessa Oblast, which is extremely important for its economy.
The Situation in the Back Lines
The central issue for both sides in 2024 has become mobilization and other ways of replenishing units operating on the line of combat.
After several unsuccessful offensives in 2022–2023 and the Kursk Operation in 2024, the Ukrainian Armed Forces faced an acute shortage of motivated fighters, a mobilization crisis, and outright desertion, which, according to official data alone, affected a seventh of the army.
Those forcibly mobilized from the streets fled training centers. There were no anti-retreat forces or any serious accountability for flat-out refusal to serve in Ukraine.
Ukraine's Victory at Sea
In the Black Sea, Ukraine has defeated Russia by a “crushing margin.” Attacking with unmanned naval boats (UNBs) and striking with Western missiles, Kyiv has forced Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and FSB ships to abandon the entire western and central Black Sea this year, and to move almost entirely away from their usual harbors in Crimea toward Novorossiysk and Abkhazia.
As a result, Ukraine was able to finally un-blockade its exports through ports in the Odessa Oblast, which is extremely important for its economy.
The Situation in the Back Lines
The central issue for both sides in 2024 has become mobilization and other ways of replenishing units operating on the line of combat.
After several unsuccessful offensives in 2022–2023 and the Kursk Operation in 2024, the Ukrainian Armed Forces faced an acute shortage of motivated fighters, a mobilization crisis, and outright desertion, which, according to official data alone, affected a seventh of the army.
Those forcibly mobilized from the streets fled training centers. There were no anti-retreat forces or any serious accountability for flat-out refusal to serve in Ukraine.
“And the level of corruption in the agencies in charge of mobilization and medical examination was so high that neither the army nor the political leadership of Ukraine are capable of effectively managing the situation.”
On the Russian side, the problem is less acute, but contract mobilization (which accounts for 440,000 people per year, according to Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev) is not enough to put existing plans to expand the army into action.
As a result, all manner of “clients” of the penitentiary system joined the ranks of the assault groups, starting with defendants, then later specialists in certain technical areas in locations near the front lines, and were replaced by servicemen of specialized rear army units from the depths of Russia (for example, repairmen from the Pacific Fleet), as well as recruited servicemen from North Korea. True, there are so few of the latter on the front line that they have not yet had an effect, although, apparently, they have suffered serious losses during their ten days of deployment.
As a result, all manner of “clients” of the penitentiary system joined the ranks of the assault groups, starting with defendants, then later specialists in certain technical areas in locations near the front lines, and were replaced by servicemen of specialized rear army units from the depths of Russia (for example, repairmen from the Pacific Fleet), as well as recruited servicemen from North Korea. True, there are so few of the latter on the front line that they have not yet had an effect, although, apparently, they have suffered serious losses during their ten days of deployment.
Valery Gerasimov, Vladimir Putin and Sergei Shoigu during military exercises. September 2022. Photo: Kremlin Pool / Global Look Press
Another major problem at the beginning of the year was the shortage of large-caliber artillery shells. However, both sides were able to resolve this issue throughout the year. Russia received ammunition from North Korea, Ukraine from the West. However, the issue of the armored vehicle shortage could not be solved, and in fact, this led to a change in tactics, as well as to an increase in the use of First Person View (FPV) drones as the main weapon for engaging the enemy at distances of more than a kilometer.
According to various estimates, Russia has a reserve of armored vehicles suitable for restoration at factories that will last them at least another year. It will not be enough for major military advances (when, two times a month, these military columns appear, the Ukrainian Armed Forces can burn 20 vehicles per battle), but it will be enough to support the infantry units currently advancing.
According to various estimates, Russia has a reserve of armored vehicles suitable for restoration at factories that will last them at least another year. It will not be enough for major military advances (when, two times a month, these military columns appear, the Ukrainian Armed Forces can burn 20 vehicles per battle), but it will be enough to support the infantry units currently advancing.
“For the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the quality of military command at all levels has become a major problem in the rear. The number of complaints about this increased many fold by the end of the year.”
Criticism is aimed not so much at the fundamental nature of the decisions being made(like the Kursk offensive or the desire to hold on to the last villages in Donbass that have already been blown to smithereens by artillery), but the system of decision-making at the middle and lower levels.
Among the things being criticized are the frequent rotations of brigades, when new ones are in no hurry to take the advanced positions of the old ones, and the Russians actively take advantage of this; the level of coordination of brigades in specific areas; relationships within the brigades between the command and ordinary soldiers, which are rapidly deteriorating, and there is not much remaining of the comradery that existed at the beginning of the war in many units.
On the other hand, we can see the successful continuation of work by Ukrainian sabotage groups, not only in the occupied territories, but also inside Russia, including the assassination of the head of a Russian army branch and some other significant figures (here and here).
Predictions
There are four possible scenarios we can discuss: optimistic, pessimistic, dire and catastrophic.
The best (optimistic) option for Ukraine, according to not only external observers but also many people inside the country, is an immediate suspension of hostilities along the current border demarcation lines and a freezing of the conflict without recognizing the occupied territories as Russian.
Supporters of this option are ready to pay for it by giving up NATO membership prospects for an indefinite period. Here, hope is pinned on direct negotiations between Trump and Putin. It is also possible that Russia will experience a painful blow from a Ukrainian localized offensive operation along one or another weakened section of the front line or state border.
The pessimistic scenario for Ukraine involves much more significant concessions as a result of negotiations, including the possibility of a complete or partial loss of territories in which Russia has staked claim: the not yet occupied parts of the Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk and Kherson Oblasts, as well as concessions to Russia concerning Ukrainian domestic policy.
The dire scenario assumes the failure or prolongation of negotiations between Trump and Putin with the continuation of full-scale military actions, in which the Russian Federation will have better human resources (possibly adding another 300-400 thousand people to the army through additional mobilization) and equipment.
In this case, the Russian Armed Forces will more or less quickly advance to the Dnipro River and by the end of 2025 will storm regional centers such as Zaporizhia and Dnipro, or at least, the left banks. In this scenario, the conditions for ending the war for Ukraine will be tougher. But the US may give Ukraine more weapons if it believes that responsibility for continuing the war lies with Putin.
The catastrophic scenario is a partial collapse of the front due to the reduction of Ukrainian advance units (possibly due to another unsuccessful localized offensive operation by the Ukrainian army), the rapid advance of Russian units to the left bank of the Dnipro, and not only on the current Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk Fronts, but also on the territory of Kharkiv and even, perhaps, the Sumy and Poltava Oblasts.
In such conditions, one can expect that Ukrainian citizens will realize the catastrophic position that the army and the country is in, and in light of this, we may see a “reassembly” of the Ukrainian Armed Forces under the leadership of either the current or the next president.
In addition to replenishing the front lines with those who do not want to fight as long as the war is still far away, it will also be necessary to organize the country's defenses in new conditions (and with new tactics, and possibly a new structure of the army) and under new political and military leadership.
In this case, it is quite possible that Zelenskyy will resign, either voluntarily or forcibly (possibly as a result of elections), and that either Valeriy Zaluzhny, who, according to polls, is currently the most popular potential leader, or some other potential leader will come to power.
Among the things being criticized are the frequent rotations of brigades, when new ones are in no hurry to take the advanced positions of the old ones, and the Russians actively take advantage of this; the level of coordination of brigades in specific areas; relationships within the brigades between the command and ordinary soldiers, which are rapidly deteriorating, and there is not much remaining of the comradery that existed at the beginning of the war in many units.
On the other hand, we can see the successful continuation of work by Ukrainian sabotage groups, not only in the occupied territories, but also inside Russia, including the assassination of the head of a Russian army branch and some other significant figures (here and here).
Predictions
There are four possible scenarios we can discuss: optimistic, pessimistic, dire and catastrophic.
The best (optimistic) option for Ukraine, according to not only external observers but also many people inside the country, is an immediate suspension of hostilities along the current border demarcation lines and a freezing of the conflict without recognizing the occupied territories as Russian.
Supporters of this option are ready to pay for it by giving up NATO membership prospects for an indefinite period. Here, hope is pinned on direct negotiations between Trump and Putin. It is also possible that Russia will experience a painful blow from a Ukrainian localized offensive operation along one or another weakened section of the front line or state border.
The pessimistic scenario for Ukraine involves much more significant concessions as a result of negotiations, including the possibility of a complete or partial loss of territories in which Russia has staked claim: the not yet occupied parts of the Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk and Kherson Oblasts, as well as concessions to Russia concerning Ukrainian domestic policy.
The dire scenario assumes the failure or prolongation of negotiations between Trump and Putin with the continuation of full-scale military actions, in which the Russian Federation will have better human resources (possibly adding another 300-400 thousand people to the army through additional mobilization) and equipment.
In this case, the Russian Armed Forces will more or less quickly advance to the Dnipro River and by the end of 2025 will storm regional centers such as Zaporizhia and Dnipro, or at least, the left banks. In this scenario, the conditions for ending the war for Ukraine will be tougher. But the US may give Ukraine more weapons if it believes that responsibility for continuing the war lies with Putin.
The catastrophic scenario is a partial collapse of the front due to the reduction of Ukrainian advance units (possibly due to another unsuccessful localized offensive operation by the Ukrainian army), the rapid advance of Russian units to the left bank of the Dnipro, and not only on the current Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk Fronts, but also on the territory of Kharkiv and even, perhaps, the Sumy and Poltava Oblasts.
In such conditions, one can expect that Ukrainian citizens will realize the catastrophic position that the army and the country is in, and in light of this, we may see a “reassembly” of the Ukrainian Armed Forces under the leadership of either the current or the next president.
In addition to replenishing the front lines with those who do not want to fight as long as the war is still far away, it will also be necessary to organize the country's defenses in new conditions (and with new tactics, and possibly a new structure of the army) and under new political and military leadership.
In this case, it is quite possible that Zelenskyy will resign, either voluntarily or forcibly (possibly as a result of elections), and that either Valeriy Zaluzhny, who, according to polls, is currently the most popular potential leader, or some other potential leader will come to power.
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