Politics
Will Russia’s New Oreshnik Missile Change the Course of the War?
December 17, 2024
- Alexander GoltsJournalist
Journalist Alexander Golts explains what Russia’s new Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile is, what danger it poses to Europe and why the current moment resembles the US-Soviet arms race in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
On November 21, an event occurred that could significantly alter the military-strategic situation in Europe for the coming years. Workshops at the famous Yuzhmash plant (in Soviet times, the heavy SS-18 Satan missiles were produced there) in the city of Dnipro, Ukraine, were hit by a ballistic missile launched from Russia’s Kapustin Yar test site in Astrakhan Region.
Hours later, a jubilant Vladimir Putin made a televised address in which he announced that in response to attacks by Ukrainian troops with long-range missiles provided by the US and UK, “in field conditions, we also carried out tests of one of Russia’s latest medium-range missile systems – in this case, carrying a nonnuclear hypersonic ballistic missile that our engineers named ‘Oreshnik.’”
Over the next two weeks, the president several times – during a meeting with the developers of the wunderwaffe, during a summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, during a sit-down in Minsk with Alexander Lukashenko and even during a meeting the Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights – mentioned the Oreshnik, adding new details and considerations to his version of what is going on.
Like a nuclear bomb
Here is what Putin has told us about the Oreshnik. After Washington terminated the INF Treaty in 2019, Russian scientists developed a fundamentally new missile system called Oreshnik (the president’s words imply that the Kremlin had previously strictly observed the provisions prohibiting the development of such missiles and that the Oreshnik missile was developed in record time, which seems doubtful).
This weapon, Putin explained, is capable of striking any point on the European continent. There is no need to place any explosives on the multiple warheads (it soon became clear that Yuzhmash was hit with empty shells). After all, they fall at hypersonic speeds of about 3 kilometers per second, so, as Putin explained, the collision of several warheads with the ground does damage comparable to a nuclear explosion.
Hours later, a jubilant Vladimir Putin made a televised address in which he announced that in response to attacks by Ukrainian troops with long-range missiles provided by the US and UK, “in field conditions, we also carried out tests of one of Russia’s latest medium-range missile systems – in this case, carrying a nonnuclear hypersonic ballistic missile that our engineers named ‘Oreshnik.’”
Over the next two weeks, the president several times – during a meeting with the developers of the wunderwaffe, during a summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, during a sit-down in Minsk with Alexander Lukashenko and even during a meeting the Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights – mentioned the Oreshnik, adding new details and considerations to his version of what is going on.
Like a nuclear bomb
Here is what Putin has told us about the Oreshnik. After Washington terminated the INF Treaty in 2019, Russian scientists developed a fundamentally new missile system called Oreshnik (the president’s words imply that the Kremlin had previously strictly observed the provisions prohibiting the development of such missiles and that the Oreshnik missile was developed in record time, which seems doubtful).
This weapon, Putin explained, is capable of striking any point on the European continent. There is no need to place any explosives on the multiple warheads (it soon became clear that Yuzhmash was hit with empty shells). After all, they fall at hypersonic speeds of about 3 kilometers per second, so, as Putin explained, the collision of several warheads with the ground does damage comparable to a nuclear explosion.
The consequences of the Tunguska event that Vladimir Putin mentioned in connection with the Oreshnik missile. Trees were knocked down and burned over hundreds of square kilometers by the Tunguska asteroid impact in 1908. The original image was taken in 1929. Source: Wiki Commons
The Russian leader even mentioned the consequences of the Tunguska asteroid event. Since it is thought to be impossible to intercept the Oreshnik with missile defense systems, the Kremlin intends to warn of new attacks in advance so that civilians can leave. Moscow has pointedly said it will determine when and where the next strike will be carried out. After all, according to the changes that Putin demonstratively made to Russia’s “nuclear doctrine” – two days before the Oreshnik strike – the document in which the Russian president informs the West of his nuclear policy, the Kremlin can arbitrarily designate as its military adversary any nuclear power that supplies weapons to Ukraine.
The same old Rubezh
Putin’s statements about the Oreshnik, however, are only somewhat true.
The same old Rubezh
Putin’s statements about the Oreshnik, however, are only somewhat true.
“The tactical and technical characteristics of this new weapon, as Pentagon experts judged, were strikingly reminiscent of the well-known Rubezh (RS-26) intermediate-range ballistic missile, which had long been the subject of rather fierce disputes between Moscow and Washington.”
Tests of the Rubezh, which traces its lineage back to the Topol and Yars missiles that form the backbone of Russia’s nuclear arsenal, have been underway since 2011. The US suspected (now, we see, not without reason) that Putin sought to circumvent the then-operating INF Treaty with this missile.
The treaty prohibited the development and production of missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. The US believed that Moscow was testing the Rubezh at precisely this range. Moscow, however, argued that it was building and testing a new ICBM (which was permitted by another treaty, START), pointing out that Rubezh had flown 5,800 kilometers.
The disputes lasted for several years, with the White House changing hands in the meantime. For Trump, arms control was not as much a priority as it was for his predecessor. At some point, the Kremlin decided not to give the US president any reason to break the INF Treaty, which was important for Russia. Then in 2018, the Rubezh project mysteriously, without explanation, disappeared from the armament program.
Yet this did not save the treaty. Just the next year, the White House terminated it without much sparring. The main reason was not Rubezh, but another missile, the 9M729 cruise missile, already put into service in Russia. According to experts, several missiles might have remained in warehouses from the Rubezh program, a practice carried over from the Soviet military-industrial complex. There is nothing surprising in this. More than 40 years ago, during the INF Treaty negotiations, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev shocked his American colleagues when he said that he did not know exactly how many intermediate-range missiles the USSR had. The chief of the general staff knew only how many missiles the armed forces had, but, as it turned out, the manufacturers had an equal number of missiles.
‘Oreshnik,’ Prompt Global Strike and the Tunguska asteroid
The idea of a strategic missile strike on any point on the globe with conventional rather than nuclear weapons or, as Putin put it, “the practical absence of the need to use nuclear weapons,” was borrowed by Moscow from Washington. In the US, this concept appeared in the early 2000s and was called Prompt Global Strike (PGS).
Yet it is unlikely that the new missile will give Putin a major advantage in the military conflict with Ukraine.
The idea of putting a conventional warhead on a nuclear weapon arose in the US as strategic weapons were reduced and given the fact that Russia had significantly fewer ICBMs. At that time, with the threat of a nuclear confrontation downgraded, the Pentagon looked to have too many strategic weapons carriers. Instead of destroying them, the decision was made to make the missiles nonnuclear.
There seems to be a problem with this for the Oreshnik, however. The warheads get their enormous speed from gravity, as their separation occurs in an atmosphere-free space, several hundred kilometers above the Earth’s surface.
One of the biggest challenges is the passage of the warhead through the dense layers of the atmosphere, when it becomes literally a “clump” of plasma. There is very complex technology to protect nuclear warheads from this, including maneuvering equipment and special materials. However, conventional warheads are designed completely differently.
The treaty prohibited the development and production of missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. The US believed that Moscow was testing the Rubezh at precisely this range. Moscow, however, argued that it was building and testing a new ICBM (which was permitted by another treaty, START), pointing out that Rubezh had flown 5,800 kilometers.
The disputes lasted for several years, with the White House changing hands in the meantime. For Trump, arms control was not as much a priority as it was for his predecessor. At some point, the Kremlin decided not to give the US president any reason to break the INF Treaty, which was important for Russia. Then in 2018, the Rubezh project mysteriously, without explanation, disappeared from the armament program.
Yet this did not save the treaty. Just the next year, the White House terminated it without much sparring. The main reason was not Rubezh, but another missile, the 9M729 cruise missile, already put into service in Russia. According to experts, several missiles might have remained in warehouses from the Rubezh program, a practice carried over from the Soviet military-industrial complex. There is nothing surprising in this. More than 40 years ago, during the INF Treaty negotiations, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev shocked his American colleagues when he said that he did not know exactly how many intermediate-range missiles the USSR had. The chief of the general staff knew only how many missiles the armed forces had, but, as it turned out, the manufacturers had an equal number of missiles.
‘Oreshnik,’ Prompt Global Strike and the Tunguska asteroid
The idea of a strategic missile strike on any point on the globe with conventional rather than nuclear weapons or, as Putin put it, “the practical absence of the need to use nuclear weapons,” was borrowed by Moscow from Washington. In the US, this concept appeared in the early 2000s and was called Prompt Global Strike (PGS).
Yet it is unlikely that the new missile will give Putin a major advantage in the military conflict with Ukraine.
The idea of putting a conventional warhead on a nuclear weapon arose in the US as strategic weapons were reduced and given the fact that Russia had significantly fewer ICBMs. At that time, with the threat of a nuclear confrontation downgraded, the Pentagon looked to have too many strategic weapons carriers. Instead of destroying them, the decision was made to make the missiles nonnuclear.
There seems to be a problem with this for the Oreshnik, however. The warheads get their enormous speed from gravity, as their separation occurs in an atmosphere-free space, several hundred kilometers above the Earth’s surface.
One of the biggest challenges is the passage of the warhead through the dense layers of the atmosphere, when it becomes literally a “clump” of plasma. There is very complex technology to protect nuclear warheads from this, including maneuvering equipment and special materials. However, conventional warheads are designed completely differently.
“And there is reason to believe that Russian missile designers have yet to create a conventional munition that could penetrate the dense layers of the atmosphere. That is why Oreshnik hit Yuzhmash with just blanks.”
The Iskander-M, a Russian mobile short-range ballistic missile system practicing for the Victory Day parade on Red Square. April 2015. Source: Wiki Commons
In fairness, most PGS projects entailed a kinetic strike, where damage is caused by the enormous force of the collision. In this case, the warhead does not have to carry any explosives at all. But US strategists limited operations to the destruction of certain important individual objects, like the headquarters of terrorist organizations or bases where weapons of mass destruction are made.
Unlike Putin, the US military has never said that the effect of such weapons could be comparable to that of a nuclear explosion. The kinetic impact of the Tunguska asteroid was indeed like a nuclear explosion – however, this was because the mass of the asteroid weighed about a million tons, while the weight of the warhead on the Rubezh and, as can be assumed, the Oreshnik is about 800 kilograms.
Technological problems
Thus, to cause the same damage as the Tunguska asteroid, Russia would have to strike one place with more than a thousand warheads at the same time, which is almost impossible. Modern nuclear weapons have a yield of about 150 kilotons, i.e. their explosion is equivalent to the explosion of 150,000 tons of TNT. So even if Russian engineers manage to create a conventional munition for the Oreshnik, the damage would still be comparable to that caused by a conventional aerial bomb, dozens of which fall on Ukraine every day.
Claims by the Russian authorities that serial production of the Oreshnik is about to commence have also raised doubts.
All Russian solid-fuel missiles, from the strategic Yars and Bulava to the tactical Iskander, are made at the Votkinsk plant in Izhevsk.
Even though the plant has undergone a major renovation that cost RUB 11 billion, the Russian army still has a serious shortage of Iskander missiles, which have to be specially stockpiled to carry out a mass attack on targets in Ukraine.
Thus, the start of production of the Oreshnik, with its unclear military potential, could take up a lot of capacity at the plant.
Unlike Putin, the US military has never said that the effect of such weapons could be comparable to that of a nuclear explosion. The kinetic impact of the Tunguska asteroid was indeed like a nuclear explosion – however, this was because the mass of the asteroid weighed about a million tons, while the weight of the warhead on the Rubezh and, as can be assumed, the Oreshnik is about 800 kilograms.
Technological problems
Thus, to cause the same damage as the Tunguska asteroid, Russia would have to strike one place with more than a thousand warheads at the same time, which is almost impossible. Modern nuclear weapons have a yield of about 150 kilotons, i.e. their explosion is equivalent to the explosion of 150,000 tons of TNT. So even if Russian engineers manage to create a conventional munition for the Oreshnik, the damage would still be comparable to that caused by a conventional aerial bomb, dozens of which fall on Ukraine every day.
Claims by the Russian authorities that serial production of the Oreshnik is about to commence have also raised doubts.
All Russian solid-fuel missiles, from the strategic Yars and Bulava to the tactical Iskander, are made at the Votkinsk plant in Izhevsk.
Even though the plant has undergone a major renovation that cost RUB 11 billion, the Russian army still has a serious shortage of Iskander missiles, which have to be specially stockpiled to carry out a mass attack on targets in Ukraine.
Thus, the start of production of the Oreshnik, with its unclear military potential, could take up a lot of capacity at the plant.
“No matter what, all the Putin regime will have at its disposal over the next two years is a few experimental missiles left over from the last decade.”
Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev signing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in December 1987. It required the Soviet Union and the US to eliminate their ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Source: Wiki Commons
Likely, the decision to strike Ukraine with the Oreshnik was calculated to have a psychological, intimidating effect, first and foremost, on Western states. In that regard, the attack failed to achieve the desired result.
Not only did representatives of these states directly state that Russia’s use of the Oreshnik would not affect their plans to support Ukraine; even after the attack on Yuzhmash, the Ukrainian armed forces have continued to use long-range missiles against Russia. This explains why Vladimir Putin talks so much about the Oreshnik’s destructive potential.
Likely wanting to create even more fear, Moscow involved Minsk in the campaign: Alexander Lukashenko is asking for the wunderwaffe to be deployed in Belarus, and Putin is promising to grant his request and saying that the targets for the missiles, which will be manned by the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, will be determined by the political and military leadership of Belarus. One can only imagine what kind of confusion this could lead to, were someone seriously to implement such a policy.
The threat to Europe
Nevertheless, Russia’s acquisition of a combat-ready intermediate-range missile represents a significant change in the strategic situation in Europe and the world. The Oreshnik can strike anywhere in the Old World.
In addition, Putin is most likely not lying when he says that this missile is practically impossible to intercept. Again, due to the enormous speed of the warheads. Theoretically, the Oreshnik is capable of being intercepted by the US SM-3 surface-to-air missile of various modifications within the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System, which is deployed at two bases in Europe – one in Poland and the other in Romania. However, it remains to be seen whether these ballistic missile interceptors can really reach speeds sufficient to destroy the Oreshnik. Even if we assume that the speed is sufficient to make the interception, the range of the Oreshnik is significantly greater than that of the SM-3, which makes interception dubious.
This does not mean, however, that the Kremlin can threaten European NATO countries with impunity. What the appearance of the Oreshnik does is return the world to the strategic situation of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Back then, seeking to gain military superiority, the Soviet Union deployed several hundred RSD-10 Pioneer intermediate-range ballistic missiles.
The Pioneer, like the Oreshnik, could reach almost any point in Europe in a few minutes. And there were no means to intercept it. In response, NATO decided to deploy American Tomahawk and Pershing-2 missiles on the continent. Quite quickly, the Kremlin realized that the Americans, whom for the Soviet General Staff was the “main enemy,” could now hit Moscow and Leningrad, but the Soviet Pioneers could not reach Washington. The strategic advantage suddenly shifted to the US. As a result, the INF Treaty was signed, with the USSR having to destroy twice as many missiles as the US.
Now, that situation is repeating itself. Because Russia already has the 9M729 medium-range cruise missile, the US and Germany agreed to begin deploying “Tomahawk cruise missiles and developmental hypersonic weapons that have a longer range than current capabilities in Europe” on German territory in 2026. True, the sides stipulated that, firstly, these weapons would be nonnuclear and that, secondly, the deployments would initially be “episodic” (i.e., they would take place during exercises). However, it is rather likely that Putin’s threats will force NATO countries to abandon their caution.
The Kremlin’s acquisition of the Oreshnik is unlikely to give it any long-term military advantage, but it will make the current world even more dangerous and unstable.
Not only did representatives of these states directly state that Russia’s use of the Oreshnik would not affect their plans to support Ukraine; even after the attack on Yuzhmash, the Ukrainian armed forces have continued to use long-range missiles against Russia. This explains why Vladimir Putin talks so much about the Oreshnik’s destructive potential.
Likely wanting to create even more fear, Moscow involved Minsk in the campaign: Alexander Lukashenko is asking for the wunderwaffe to be deployed in Belarus, and Putin is promising to grant his request and saying that the targets for the missiles, which will be manned by the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, will be determined by the political and military leadership of Belarus. One can only imagine what kind of confusion this could lead to, were someone seriously to implement such a policy.
The threat to Europe
Nevertheless, Russia’s acquisition of a combat-ready intermediate-range missile represents a significant change in the strategic situation in Europe and the world. The Oreshnik can strike anywhere in the Old World.
In addition, Putin is most likely not lying when he says that this missile is practically impossible to intercept. Again, due to the enormous speed of the warheads. Theoretically, the Oreshnik is capable of being intercepted by the US SM-3 surface-to-air missile of various modifications within the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System, which is deployed at two bases in Europe – one in Poland and the other in Romania. However, it remains to be seen whether these ballistic missile interceptors can really reach speeds sufficient to destroy the Oreshnik. Even if we assume that the speed is sufficient to make the interception, the range of the Oreshnik is significantly greater than that of the SM-3, which makes interception dubious.
This does not mean, however, that the Kremlin can threaten European NATO countries with impunity. What the appearance of the Oreshnik does is return the world to the strategic situation of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Back then, seeking to gain military superiority, the Soviet Union deployed several hundred RSD-10 Pioneer intermediate-range ballistic missiles.
The Pioneer, like the Oreshnik, could reach almost any point in Europe in a few minutes. And there were no means to intercept it. In response, NATO decided to deploy American Tomahawk and Pershing-2 missiles on the continent. Quite quickly, the Kremlin realized that the Americans, whom for the Soviet General Staff was the “main enemy,” could now hit Moscow and Leningrad, but the Soviet Pioneers could not reach Washington. The strategic advantage suddenly shifted to the US. As a result, the INF Treaty was signed, with the USSR having to destroy twice as many missiles as the US.
Now, that situation is repeating itself. Because Russia already has the 9M729 medium-range cruise missile, the US and Germany agreed to begin deploying “Tomahawk cruise missiles and developmental hypersonic weapons that have a longer range than current capabilities in Europe” on German territory in 2026. True, the sides stipulated that, firstly, these weapons would be nonnuclear and that, secondly, the deployments would initially be “episodic” (i.e., they would take place during exercises). However, it is rather likely that Putin’s threats will force NATO countries to abandon their caution.
The Kremlin’s acquisition of the Oreshnik is unlikely to give it any long-term military advantage, but it will make the current world even more dangerous and unstable.
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