Society
What the Data Says about Claims of Kremlin Targeting Ethnic Minorities
May 23, 2025
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Sergey Chernyshov
Historian, researcher at Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Historian Sergey Chernyshov presents data showing that the Kremlin is not disproportionately persecuting ethnic minority activists at home or using non-Russian soldiers as cannon fodder in the war in Ukraine.
One rather often hears that the war in Ukraine is being waged thanks to cheap cannon fodder from Russia’s ethnic republics and that ethnic minorities and ethnic minority activists are being subjected to particularly brutal political persecution. Such statements have been made by the late Pope Francis and by leaders of the Russian opposition. Special conferences have been held on the "genocide of the nations of Russia" (here and here). Meanwhile, articles suggesting an extermination of non-Russian peoples can be found not only on sites devoted to decolonization issues but also in serious scientific journals.
Interviews with ethnic minority activists complement the global decolonial agenda, and the focus on ethnic persecution generates discussions about the supposedly inevitable disintegration of Russia into ethnic states.
But are these claims supported by the data?
The evolution of Russia’s ‘nationalities policy’
Before we analyze the numbers, let’s look at the peculiarities of the Russian state’s ethnic-administrative structure and the term “nations” in the current Russian reality.
The current nationalities policy is largely the result of the Soviet and then post-Soviet heritage. The first census conducted in the Russian Empire in 1897 did not contain a column for “nationality”; instead, one’s estate (sosloviye), religious affiliation and native language were indicated.
Many Soviet nationality-based subdivisions emerged in response to situational political objectives. For example, the first instance of national autonomy within the RSFSR – the Bashkir ASSR – came in 1918 during the Civil War as the Bolsheviks wanted activists of the Bashkir national movement to join their side.
In the 1920s, Soviet ethnographers, guided by Marxist ideology, took up the issue. The nation that was called Ostyaks in the Russian Empire was divided up into Khanty, Selkups and Kets, while the Sakha, Tungus, Samoyeds and Russians were combined to form a mixed group called “Dolgans,” with a separate Taymyr (Dolgano-Nenets) Autonomous Okrug.
Interviews with ethnic minority activists complement the global decolonial agenda, and the focus on ethnic persecution generates discussions about the supposedly inevitable disintegration of Russia into ethnic states.
But are these claims supported by the data?
The evolution of Russia’s ‘nationalities policy’
Before we analyze the numbers, let’s look at the peculiarities of the Russian state’s ethnic-administrative structure and the term “nations” in the current Russian reality.
The current nationalities policy is largely the result of the Soviet and then post-Soviet heritage. The first census conducted in the Russian Empire in 1897 did not contain a column for “nationality”; instead, one’s estate (sosloviye), religious affiliation and native language were indicated.
Many Soviet nationality-based subdivisions emerged in response to situational political objectives. For example, the first instance of national autonomy within the RSFSR – the Bashkir ASSR – came in 1918 during the Civil War as the Bolsheviks wanted activists of the Bashkir national movement to join their side.
In the 1920s, Soviet ethnographers, guided by Marxist ideology, took up the issue. The nation that was called Ostyaks in the Russian Empire was divided up into Khanty, Selkups and Kets, while the Sakha, Tungus, Samoyeds and Russians were combined to form a mixed group called “Dolgans,” with a separate Taymyr (Dolgano-Nenets) Autonomous Okrug.
Railway station in Birobidzhan, Jewish Autonomous Oblast. Source: Wiki Commons
There were other projects that have survived as atavisms. Take the Jewish Autonomous Region in the Russian Far East, established in 1934 by Stalin as a “homeland” for Soviet Jews, who were encouraged – but often forced – to relocate to the region. Today, just 1% of the region’s population is Jewish.
Only in certain ethnic republics in Russia does the non-Russian population (the “titular nation”) constitute a majority. For example, in Buryatia, where a video about “Buryats fighting for Putin” went viral in 2014-15, ethnic Russians make up 66% of the region’s population today. In other words, two of every three residents of Buryatia are Russian, not Buryat, and Buryat activists can necessarily represent only a minority of the region.
In 1999, Russia adopted a law on “indigenous small-numbered peoples,” which was motivated by good intentions. It introduced a number of benefits for these “peoples” – early retirement, additional social payments and even exemption from military service. As a result, for example, the tiny nation of Tubalars in the Altai Republic almost doubled from 2002 to 2020, from 1,500 to 3,600. What actually happened, however, as researchers have pointed out, is that Russians, Altaians and Tatars claimed to be Tubalars to get access to entitlements.
Only in certain ethnic republics in Russia does the non-Russian population (the “titular nation”) constitute a majority. For example, in Buryatia, where a video about “Buryats fighting for Putin” went viral in 2014-15, ethnic Russians make up 66% of the region’s population today. In other words, two of every three residents of Buryatia are Russian, not Buryat, and Buryat activists can necessarily represent only a minority of the region.
In 1999, Russia adopted a law on “indigenous small-numbered peoples,” which was motivated by good intentions. It introduced a number of benefits for these “peoples” – early retirement, additional social payments and even exemption from military service. As a result, for example, the tiny nation of Tubalars in the Altai Republic almost doubled from 2002 to 2020, from 1,500 to 3,600. What actually happened, however, as researchers have pointed out, is that Russians, Altaians and Tatars claimed to be Tubalars to get access to entitlements.
“In short, not every resident of Buryatia is a Buryat, not every person registered as a Tubalar is a real Tubalar, and in the Jewish Autonomous Region there are practically no Jews.”
Ethnic political persecution: Myth or reality?
In Russia today, one can rather easily check whether some social group (based on ethnicity, religion, gender, etc.) is relatively more persecuted.
Political persecution in Russia is largely formalized in extrajudicial lists, e.g., “undesirable organizations” (designated by the Prosecutor General), “foreign agents” (Ministry of Justice) and “terrorists and extremists” (Rosfinmonitoring). These lists are publicly available, and they can be used to determine the relative level of political persecution against ethnic minorities and ethnic minority activists.
For example, the list of “undesirable organizations” currently consists of 221 groups, including Greenpeace, Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) and others. Yet there are just 11 that can be considered promoting the interests of a national minority in Russia, like the Free Buryatia Foundation and the Ingush Independence Committee.
The same is true for the “foreign agents ” list. As of early May, there are 983 people and organizations on it, the most well-known being FBK and Memorial, among others. At most about 50 ethnic minority activists and their organizations are “foreign agents” – a figure you reach only if you include all the journalists of regional RFE/RL projects (i.e., Idel.Realities, Azatliq Radiosi, Kavkaz.Realities) and numerous representatives of “governments in exile,” who actually represent only themselves and several dozen other activists. In other words, among “foreign agents,” ethnic minority activists are also a small percentage.
Finally, the list of “terrorists and extremists,” maintained by Rosfinmonitoring and seemingly created specifically to combat opposition to the existence of a unified Russian state, currently has 813 entries, but again ethnic minority activists and their organizations do not account for the majority.
Even if we include the likes of the Kostroma Republic Movement, Yelets Autonomous Republic and Independent Kuban People's Republic (i.e., groups that represent regions but not ethnic minorities), the total number is 200 (out of 813). For comparison, there are more than 400 regional and other Jehovah’s Witnesses groups designated as "terrorists and extremists.”
In Russia today, one can rather easily check whether some social group (based on ethnicity, religion, gender, etc.) is relatively more persecuted.
Political persecution in Russia is largely formalized in extrajudicial lists, e.g., “undesirable organizations” (designated by the Prosecutor General), “foreign agents” (Ministry of Justice) and “terrorists and extremists” (Rosfinmonitoring). These lists are publicly available, and they can be used to determine the relative level of political persecution against ethnic minorities and ethnic minority activists.
For example, the list of “undesirable organizations” currently consists of 221 groups, including Greenpeace, Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) and others. Yet there are just 11 that can be considered promoting the interests of a national minority in Russia, like the Free Buryatia Foundation and the Ingush Independence Committee.
The same is true for the “foreign agents ” list. As of early May, there are 983 people and organizations on it, the most well-known being FBK and Memorial, among others. At most about 50 ethnic minority activists and their organizations are “foreign agents” – a figure you reach only if you include all the journalists of regional RFE/RL projects (i.e., Idel.Realities, Azatliq Radiosi, Kavkaz.Realities) and numerous representatives of “governments in exile,” who actually represent only themselves and several dozen other activists. In other words, among “foreign agents,” ethnic minority activists are also a small percentage.
Finally, the list of “terrorists and extremists,” maintained by Rosfinmonitoring and seemingly created specifically to combat opposition to the existence of a unified Russian state, currently has 813 entries, but again ethnic minority activists and their organizations do not account for the majority.
Even if we include the likes of the Kostroma Republic Movement, Yelets Autonomous Republic and Independent Kuban People's Republic (i.e., groups that represent regions but not ethnic minorities), the total number is 200 (out of 813). For comparison, there are more than 400 regional and other Jehovah’s Witnesses groups designated as "terrorists and extremists.”
Women in Makhachkala (Dagestan) protesting Putin’s partial mobilization order. September 2022. Source: YouTube
Are ethnic minorities disproportionately being sacrificed in Ukraine?
Another widespread idea is that the Russian army fighting in Ukraine is made up primarily of non-Russians. This spawns claims by ethnic minority activists that the Russia-Ukraine war is, for example, a “genocide of the Bashkir people” and a “trashing of the non-Russian world of Russia.”
Back in October 2022, Alexei Bessudnov, of the University of Exeter, analyzed open data on Russian army losses and refuted this. Based on his model, he argued that in Russia’s ethnic republics the proportion of killed soldiers (relative to the overall population) is, of course, significantly higher than in Moscow, but this can be chalked up to regional economic inequality, not discrimination.
Another widespread idea is that the Russian army fighting in Ukraine is made up primarily of non-Russians. This spawns claims by ethnic minority activists that the Russia-Ukraine war is, for example, a “genocide of the Bashkir people” and a “trashing of the non-Russian world of Russia.”
Back in October 2022, Alexei Bessudnov, of the University of Exeter, analyzed open data on Russian army losses and refuted this. Based on his model, he argued that in Russia’s ethnic republics the proportion of killed soldiers (relative to the overall population) is, of course, significantly higher than in Moscow, but this can be chalked up to regional economic inequality, not discrimination.
“Simply put, it is not non-Russians who are disproportionately dying in Ukraine, but rather disadvantaged individuals – both Russians and non-Russians.”
Chechen forces alongside Russian Army forces and separatist militias in Donbas, June, 2022. Source: Wiki Commons
This is the case in many other conflicts across the world.
Illustrative in this regard is a comparison of losses by regions according to wealth – the five richest versus the five poorest. Note that Moscow is not the richest region of the country, based on formal indicators such as GRP per capita and average per capita income. The richest are small and truly ethnic regions that have abundant natural resources.
Taking data on wealth from Rosstat and estimates on those killed in Ukraine from Mediazona, we get the following picture:
Ranking first in terms of formal wealth (GDP per capita) is the small Nenets Autonomous Okrug, where a Lukoil oil terminal is located. According to Mediazona, 70 residents of the region have died in the war in Ukraine, or 1.66 per 1,000 residents. Ranking second is the neighboring Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, which sits atop the West Siberian petroleum basin. It had 497 deaths in Ukraine, or 0.96 per 1,000 residents. To the south of Yamalia is the third-ranking region in terms of wealth, the “non-Russian” Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug. There casualties amounted to 0.61 per 1,000 residents. But the nonethnic Sakhalin, the fourth-wealthiest region, saw 936 residents killed in the war, or 2.05 per 1,000.
In the ethnic republics of the North Caucasus (home to the poorest Russian regions), casualties are significantly lower. For example, in Kabardino-Balkaria (81st in terms of GRP per capita), they are at 0.30 per 1,000 residents, and in Chechnya 0.22 per 1,000 residents. As follows from these numbers, there is no correlation between the wealth of a region and the proportion of its population killed in the war in Ukraine. Moreover, the data shows that the ethnic status of a region (“Russian” or “non-Russian”) is not a determining factor for the proportion of casualties. The figure for Sakhalin Region is 10 times that for Chechnya.
The following table brings these points out.
Illustrative in this regard is a comparison of losses by regions according to wealth – the five richest versus the five poorest. Note that Moscow is not the richest region of the country, based on formal indicators such as GRP per capita and average per capita income. The richest are small and truly ethnic regions that have abundant natural resources.
Taking data on wealth from Rosstat and estimates on those killed in Ukraine from Mediazona, we get the following picture:
Ranking first in terms of formal wealth (GDP per capita) is the small Nenets Autonomous Okrug, where a Lukoil oil terminal is located. According to Mediazona, 70 residents of the region have died in the war in Ukraine, or 1.66 per 1,000 residents. Ranking second is the neighboring Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, which sits atop the West Siberian petroleum basin. It had 497 deaths in Ukraine, or 0.96 per 1,000 residents. To the south of Yamalia is the third-ranking region in terms of wealth, the “non-Russian” Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug. There casualties amounted to 0.61 per 1,000 residents. But the nonethnic Sakhalin, the fourth-wealthiest region, saw 936 residents killed in the war, or 2.05 per 1,000.
In the ethnic republics of the North Caucasus (home to the poorest Russian regions), casualties are significantly lower. For example, in Kabardino-Balkaria (81st in terms of GRP per capita), they are at 0.30 per 1,000 residents, and in Chechnya 0.22 per 1,000 residents. As follows from these numbers, there is no correlation between the wealth of a region and the proportion of its population killed in the war in Ukraine. Moreover, the data shows that the ethnic status of a region (“Russian” or “non-Russian”) is not a determining factor for the proportion of casualties. The figure for Sakhalin Region is 10 times that for Chechnya.
The following table brings these points out.
Thus, it is not ethnicity that determines casualties among the residents of one region or another; rather it is likely the activeness and lobbying of regional elites, as well as the competing interests of local and national business, among other factors. This is a better explanation of why poor Chechnya has had relatively few of its residents killed in Ukraine but equally poor Buryatia has one of the highest casualty rates.
Overall, there is little evidence that suggests Russia is using primarily non-Russian soldiers as cannon fodder in Ukraine. Meanwhile, persecution of ethnic minority activists and their movements constitute only a small share of all political repression in Russia, so state violence can hardly be said to be guided primarily by ethnicity.
Overall, there is little evidence that suggests Russia is using primarily non-Russian soldiers as cannon fodder in Ukraine. Meanwhile, persecution of ethnic minority activists and their movements constitute only a small share of all political repression in Russia, so state violence can hardly be said to be guided primarily by ethnicity.
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