Even though their options were limited, Russians still made choices about where to resettle. Many chose Turkey over other accessible destinations because of previous tourist trips, which provided a sense of familiarity in an otherwise uncertain transition.

This familiarity was reinforced by existing Russian-speaking communities and services, particularly in parts of Istanbul, Antalya and Alanya. For example, Antalya has Russian-language schools and kindergartens, while Russian-speaking staff are unexpectedly common in many pharmacies. Arriving Russians also perceived high levels of development and quality of life in Turkey, appreciating its infrastructure, service sector and medical care.

Throughout 2022, Russians mentioned Turkey’s relative affordability, a reality that has since changed due to an economic downturn, inflation and sky-rocketing housing costs (the latter partially blamed on the arrival of Russians, at least in Istanbul, Antalya and Alanya).

Compared with other destinations that welcomed a large number of Russians, such as Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Serbia, Turkey stood out for its lack of history as a former Soviet republic and its membership in NATO. The country has long played a careful balancing game between West and East, between its membership in Western political, economic and military institutions and Eastern strategic partnerships, particularly under the leadership of President Erdoğan.

Throughout the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, Turkey has provided military and diplomatic support to Ukraine and recognized its territorial sovereignty while simultaneously relying on Russian oil and gas to meet its energy demands and without joining its Western allies in imposing sanctions on Russia.

Who are the Russians in Turkey?

The Russians who came to Turkey often match the general profile of those who chose to leave Russia since February 2022. Most are younger than 50, come from the country’s major urban areas, are educated and well-traveled and, at least in Russia, were part of the middle class, which had significantly expanded since the 2000s. Their reasons for leaving Russia were a mix of opposition to the government, uncertainty about Russia’s stability, fear of being cut off from the world and military mobilization.

Higher-profile political activists, journalists, artists and intellectuals are more likely to have sought exile in the EU or North America, although many transited through Turkey initially. Many Russians we spoke with in Turkey could visit Russia without fear of repercussions. Additionally, wealthier Russians who left since February 2022 did not come to Turkey, with Dubai seemingly a top destination for many.

While many Russians held built up sufficient economic and social capital back home, those unable to work remotely or transfer their skills and networks to Turkey experienced a drop in economic status in their new home. Turkey has comparatively lower salaries than those in Russian urban centers, plus many jobs require fluency in Turkish. It is also notoriously difficult to obtain a work permit, with many migrants and refugees from different countries working informally. Of the over 4 million migrants and refugees in Turkey, recent data from Turkey’s Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services indicates that only around 240,000 held work permits in 2023. Around 18,000 were Russian nationals, the figure having nearly tripled from around 6,200 at the end of 2021, prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Some Russian arrivals opened businesses in Turkey, including brick-and-mortar establishments such as cafes, restaurants and hair and nail salons. These mainly cater to fellow Russians and members of the Russian-speaking community. More informal businesses are advertised through social media, such as the delivery of homemade dishes that are popular across many countries of the former Soviet Union.

Those with financial means have sought out Turkey’s citizenship-by-investment program, under which a purchase of property worth at least $400,000 can get one a Turkish passport. The Turkish statistics agency reports that Russians are consistently among the top foreign buyers of real estate in the country.

Residence permits: The main hurdle to staying in turkey


Establishing the exact number of Russians who have settled in Turkey since early 2022 is difficult. The government agency overseeing immigration, the Presidency of Migration Management, publishes monthly and yearly statistics on residence permits by nationality. By comparing data from before and after February 2022, we see that 80,000-90,000 Russian nationals received first-time residence permits throughout 2022. Since early 2023, however, the number of Russian nationals with residence permits has steadily declined, from a peak of around 150,000 at the end of 2022 to around 90,000 in September 2024. For comparison, at the end of 2021, around 66,000 Russians held Turkish residence permits.

Residence permit refusals have affected not only Russian nationals but much of the foreign population in Turkey. Publicly available data from the Turkish Presidency of Migration Management indicates a 21% decrease in the number of foreigners with a residence permit from the end of 2022 until September 2024. Russians have told me that the refusal of a residence permit, or the expectation of such a refusal, and the accompanying insecurity were the primary reason why they were leaving Turkey, mostly for onward migration.

Turkish immigration authorities rarely elucidate their policy. My conclusion, based on research and discussions with these officials, is that Turkey’s approach to immigration is reactive and rapidly evolving. For example, throughout 2022, there was little indication of newly arrived Russian nationals being refused first-time residence permits. The ease of obtaining one-year residency – mostly by presenting a one-year rental contract – was another reason that many Russians chose Turkey for initial resettlement. Beginning in the first half of 2023, Russian communities were flooded with word-of-mouth information on the high rate of refusals for first-time residence permit seekers, as well as rejected renewals – a reality reflected in the abovementioned statistics.

Turkey’s increasingly unwelcoming immigration climate

Turkey was historically a country with out-migration abroad, such as the exodus of Turkish labor migrants to Germany in the 1960s and 1970s. Since the 1990s, however, as the country developed and its economy improved, it has steadily become an attractive destination for migrants. Because of its borders with Europe and an unstable Middle East, particularly Syria and Iraq, refugees and asylum seekers began to come to Turkey, either for safety or to transit to Europe. A turning point came in 2011, when over 3.5 million Syrian refugees arrived after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. Today, around 3.0 million Syrians have temporary protected status in the country, while around 220,000 asylum-seekers from other countries are under international protection, mainly from Afghanistan and Iraq, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

In Turkish society and politics, there is significant resistance against Turkey becoming a country for immigration and of greater diversity. Syrian and Afghan refugees are the main targets of anti-immigrant political rhetoric and public sentiment. In particular, there is a political demand to deport Syrian refugees across much of the public, the Erdoğan administration and most of the political opposition. Amid the current economic downturn and high inflation, the anti-refugee sentiment has sporadically erupted into popular violence, such as in July of this year, when anti-Syrian riots broke out in multiple provinces. At least one Syrian was killed, a teenage boy, while cars, businesses and homes of Syrians were set on fire or damaged.

The Turkish immigration authorities have shifted gears since the appointment of Ali Yerlikaya as the interior minister in July 2023. The rise in residence permit refusals was already mentioned, although the Turkish government has never officially announced such a policy goal. Another immigration policy change has been “mobile immigration points,” set up across the country in areas with a high presence of immigrants to carry out checks on their status and reduce irregular migration.

Russians experienced this new policy firsthand in Antalya, where checks were set up at the entrance of a shopping mall in a neighborhood where many Russians resided. In Alanya, checks were conducted near cafes frequented by Russians. However, unlike labor migrants and refugees without legal residency – who were usually detained and deported – most Russians caught without residence permits were merely told to depart Turkey.

Unlike other immigrant communities, particularly refugees from Syria and Afghanistan, Russians do not face tangible public discrimination, nor are they directly addressed in political rhetoric. At the societal level, many Turks have a favorable attitude toward Russians and express mixed views on Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine.

What’s next for the Russians in Turkey?

In my interviews and informal conversations, many Russians indicated that, despite their wish to remain in Turkey longer, they were forced to consider onward migration because they were refused a residence permit or anticipated a refusal. Although no one we spoke with mentioned explicit discrimination, many expressed discomfort with the growing “anti-foreigner environment.” Turkey’s economic downturn and high inflation have also made some Russians consider relocating.

Russians continue to choose among limited options. Many of my interviewees shared that they would like to move to the EU or North America, but most doubted their ability to obtain a visa or legal residency. Few wished to return to Russia in the short term. Instead, they considered other destinations like Serbia, Georgia and Armenia or further away, such as Asian destinations like Thailand and Indonesia (particularly Bali). Overall, uncertainty is a common experience for Russians who came to Turkey, and onward migration is likely for many.

The trajectory of the new Russian diaspora remains to be seen and will be better understood in the coming years. The last year and a half indicate that Turkey may not be a long-term home for recent Russian emigrants, an outcome driven by Turkey’s immigration climate and policies. Rather, for this new diaspora, Turkey may serve as a place for temporary resettlement and transit, just as it did after the 1917 revolution and the exodus of White Russians.