SOCIETY
‘May We Write About This,
And If So, In What Vein?’
And If So, In What Vein?’
October 11, 2024
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Egor SeroletovEgor Seroletov is a pseudonym used by a senior editor at a regional branch of a national pro-government media outlet
Egor Seroletov, the pseudonym of an editor at a Russian propaganda outlet, describes how directives “from above” shape news coverage and how things have changed since the start of Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine.
The original text in Russian was published in Republic. A slightly shortened version is being published here with their permission.
On March 14, 2022, Channel One employee Marina Ovsyannikova burst into the frame during a live broadcast of the Vremya news program with an antiwar poster. Photo: Screenshot / Channel One
There were restrictions in the editorial policy of propaganda publications even before the invasion of Ukraine. Yet their contours were generally clear to most editors on the ground. For example, criticism was prohibited of United Russia or large companies that advertise with us. If you write about a disgraced official or MP, then you just do not indicate which party he belongs to.
Navalny’s time: How propaganda wrote about the 2021 protests
It’s hard to believe now, but in January 2021, we were allowed to write about the protests that were taking place across the country in support of Alexei Navalny (even after his death in a Yamal penal colony, Navalny is listed as an “extremist and terrorist” – Republic). Although following a number of guidelines that changed several times.
I remember that there was no decision on whether we could write [about them] until the very beginning of the protests. The bosses only vaguely said: “we will see how things go.” Apparently, at that time, the Presidential Administration found it difficult to predict how large-scale these events would be.
On the eve of the protests, many media outlets, including ours, published news about legal liability for participating in unauthorized protests. It was officially posted by government departments and state bodies. The name “Navalny” usually did not appear in these press releases.
When the internet started filling up with footage of crowds of people, it became simply impossible to ignore the protests all over the country, and the bosses finally gave the go-ahead: “we will write [about them], but without hype or sympathy for Navalny and his supporters. We write about the number of people participating in the protests only if this information is provided by the police or state bodies.”
Navalny’s time: How propaganda wrote about the 2021 protests
It’s hard to believe now, but in January 2021, we were allowed to write about the protests that were taking place across the country in support of Alexei Navalny (even after his death in a Yamal penal colony, Navalny is listed as an “extremist and terrorist” – Republic). Although following a number of guidelines that changed several times.
I remember that there was no decision on whether we could write [about them] until the very beginning of the protests. The bosses only vaguely said: “we will see how things go.” Apparently, at that time, the Presidential Administration found it difficult to predict how large-scale these events would be.
On the eve of the protests, many media outlets, including ours, published news about legal liability for participating in unauthorized protests. It was officially posted by government departments and state bodies. The name “Navalny” usually did not appear in these press releases.
When the internet started filling up with footage of crowds of people, it became simply impossible to ignore the protests all over the country, and the bosses finally gave the go-ahead: “we will write [about them], but without hype or sympathy for Navalny and his supporters. We write about the number of people participating in the protests only if this information is provided by the police or state bodies.”
“The topic of Alexei Navalny’s poisoning was to be avoided.”
Only the following wording was allowed: “before returning to Russia, where criminal cases have been opened against him, he was in Germany.” Naturally, it was forbidden to write about Navalny’s presidential ambitions and his anti-corruption activities.
True, as often happens at a major media outlet, some local editors had already published articles about the protests at their own risk, without waiting for approval from the network’s bosses. Why? Firstly, to get traffic, and secondly, out of professional pride (who wants to be the last to write an article on a topic that other media outlets had written up two hours earlier). But the majority in such situations still obediently wait for the green light.
In such situations, editors who try to coordinate every sneeze are especially annoying. They flood work chats, giving an update on every step and securing the bosses’ approval. Although many were writing about serious things. “Where we are a police van hit a woman during a protest; she was taken to the hospital. The correspondent at the scene is reporting that she broke her leg. May we put this on the site and publish photos?” asked one of the regional editors. The bosses responded negatively: “let’s avoid unpleasant details.”
In some regions, riot police started getting pelted with snowballs. Experienced editors also decided to consult with Moscow on this matter – [if they cover it] would this not be considered as a call to action? It took the bosses about half an hour to respond. The directive was something like this: there is no need to write separately about security forces getting pelted with snowballs, but if it was captured on photo or video, then you may publish it.
That day, questions about how to cover this or that event related to the protests were coming in from all corners of the country. Our bosses tried to answer most of them promptly. It took from five minutes to half an hour. Meanwhile, the security forces acted more and more harshly, actively using batons, not in the least worried about the presence of journalists there.
True, as often happens at a major media outlet, some local editors had already published articles about the protests at their own risk, without waiting for approval from the network’s bosses. Why? Firstly, to get traffic, and secondly, out of professional pride (who wants to be the last to write an article on a topic that other media outlets had written up two hours earlier). But the majority in such situations still obediently wait for the green light.
In such situations, editors who try to coordinate every sneeze are especially annoying. They flood work chats, giving an update on every step and securing the bosses’ approval. Although many were writing about serious things. “Where we are a police van hit a woman during a protest; she was taken to the hospital. The correspondent at the scene is reporting that she broke her leg. May we put this on the site and publish photos?” asked one of the regional editors. The bosses responded negatively: “let’s avoid unpleasant details.”
In some regions, riot police started getting pelted with snowballs. Experienced editors also decided to consult with Moscow on this matter – [if they cover it] would this not be considered as a call to action? It took the bosses about half an hour to respond. The directive was something like this: there is no need to write separately about security forces getting pelted with snowballs, but if it was captured on photo or video, then you may publish it.
That day, questions about how to cover this or that event related to the protests were coming in from all corners of the country. Our bosses tried to answer most of them promptly. It took from five minutes to half an hour. Meanwhile, the security forces acted more and more harshly, actively using batons, not in the least worried about the presence of journalists there.
“All of a sudden, a new directive came from the bosses: ‘you may publish everything that your correspondents have personally witnessed’.”
This photo of security forces in Yekaterinburg against the backdrop of a “Belarusian products” store went viral. Photo: Social media
This caused real delight. The photographers who had been in the thick of things were especially happy. That day, photo banks were filled with thousands of pictures from a variety of angles of security forces striking protestors with their batons. But personally, I remember the photo of the OMON in Yekaterinburg the most: a squad of “cosmonauts” are standing there against the backdrop of a sign saying “Belarusian products.” It looked like mockery of the regime.
Why were we allowed to write about the harsh actions of the security forces and even publish this footage? Theories appeared immediately, and later I confirmed them in a conversation with someone in the know. At some point, the authorities realized that the protests in support of Navalny were getting too large, and cases of clashes with Rosgvardiya were no longer isolated. The Presidential Administration realized that now was the time to scare people, to show that the security forces were ready to take the harshest measures.
The invasion of Ukraine: Short-lived uncertainty
The invasion of Ukraine seems to have come as a surprise to everyone. Before the start of the special military operation, we broadcast the same narratives that were voiced on television. For example, we criticized the US intelligence about the buildup of Russian forces on the border [with Ukraine]. All sorts of experts and analysts insisted that Russia did not need this invasion and ridiculed the concerns of other countries.
Meanwhile, voenkory (“war bloggers”) were broadcasting something a little different. Judging by what I heard, their rhetoric, which has already become the norm, was more virulent at that time. They were shouting that the Kyiv regime was building up its forces in the Donbas and were calling on the Russian army to take decisive action. This meant the occupation of new Ukrainian territory. It seems that at that moment the press began to return to the topic of the [Ukrainian] blockade of Crimea, which seemed to have been forgotten over the previous eight years [since the end of the Donbas war].
But in the Presidential Administration, I think, they understood that the nation was not yet ready to accept the new line about the need for a war. At that time, it seemed too radical.
When the Russian army took action, our network’s bosses did not panic – obviously, they had been warned about the impending invasion. But the middle managers were clearly not ready for such a turn of events. Some allowed themselves pacifist and humanistic rhetoric. Jumping ahead, many of these employees quit later, or moved to other departments where they could write up topics unrelated to politics.
Why were we allowed to write about the harsh actions of the security forces and even publish this footage? Theories appeared immediately, and later I confirmed them in a conversation with someone in the know. At some point, the authorities realized that the protests in support of Navalny were getting too large, and cases of clashes with Rosgvardiya were no longer isolated. The Presidential Administration realized that now was the time to scare people, to show that the security forces were ready to take the harshest measures.
The invasion of Ukraine: Short-lived uncertainty
The invasion of Ukraine seems to have come as a surprise to everyone. Before the start of the special military operation, we broadcast the same narratives that were voiced on television. For example, we criticized the US intelligence about the buildup of Russian forces on the border [with Ukraine]. All sorts of experts and analysts insisted that Russia did not need this invasion and ridiculed the concerns of other countries.
Meanwhile, voenkory (“war bloggers”) were broadcasting something a little different. Judging by what I heard, their rhetoric, which has already become the norm, was more virulent at that time. They were shouting that the Kyiv regime was building up its forces in the Donbas and were calling on the Russian army to take decisive action. This meant the occupation of new Ukrainian territory. It seems that at that moment the press began to return to the topic of the [Ukrainian] blockade of Crimea, which seemed to have been forgotten over the previous eight years [since the end of the Donbas war].
But in the Presidential Administration, I think, they understood that the nation was not yet ready to accept the new line about the need for a war. At that time, it seemed too radical.
When the Russian army took action, our network’s bosses did not panic – obviously, they had been warned about the impending invasion. But the middle managers were clearly not ready for such a turn of events. Some allowed themselves pacifist and humanistic rhetoric. Jumping ahead, many of these employees quit later, or moved to other departments where they could write up topics unrelated to politics.
The North Crimean Canal. On February 24, 2022, during Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Russian troops completely captured the canal; from late April 2022, water has been supplied for irrigation of Crimean agriculture. Source: Wiki Commons
On February 24 [2022] itself, editors did not receive any clear instructions. I assume that they did not exist at that time. I remember that on the first day of the war, the network’s bosses were focused on the topic of reopening the North Crimean Canal.
On February 24, the head of the Republic of Crimea, Sergei Aksyonov, communicated that work had begun to clear the canal to receive water. Soon he announced that the blockade of the peninsula was essentially over. The topic of restoring agriculture in Crimea became more important than ever. Naturally, the media endlessly reported on the “inhumane actions of the Kyiv regime, which had blockaded Crimea.”
The absence of instructions did not last long. Literally the next day, editors were given the task of looking for heroes of the special military operation from their regions and talking about the importance of the operation. I know for certain that in many regions, the press services of [regional] governments recommended that loyal editorial boards contact certain political analysts. In particular, they could explain what the terms “demilitarization” and “denazification,” still little understood by “deep Russia,” meant. Naturally, the political analysts gave assurances that Russia had been forced to start the special operation. The insidious West did this, and Ukraine was just a pawn in its game.
Later, the rhetoric changed a little. As the Russian army failed in various aspects, Ukraine began to be perceived in the press as a more independent player. Such a lapdog cannot give such an impressive rebuff to the second army in the world... But in the spring of 2022, this was still a long way off.
But finding special military operation soldiers in the regions turned out to be not so easy. Firstly, after their personal data began to leak onto the internet, many began to be afraid to admit that they were fighting in the war. Secondly, the Russian army is a very sluggish structure. And any comments from the military were preceded by a lengthy approval process. Therefore, in most cases, journalists had to take comments from volunteers.
All over the country people held solitary pickets against the war. We were not prohibited from writing about them.
On February 24, the head of the Republic of Crimea, Sergei Aksyonov, communicated that work had begun to clear the canal to receive water. Soon he announced that the blockade of the peninsula was essentially over. The topic of restoring agriculture in Crimea became more important than ever. Naturally, the media endlessly reported on the “inhumane actions of the Kyiv regime, which had blockaded Crimea.”
The absence of instructions did not last long. Literally the next day, editors were given the task of looking for heroes of the special military operation from their regions and talking about the importance of the operation. I know for certain that in many regions, the press services of [regional] governments recommended that loyal editorial boards contact certain political analysts. In particular, they could explain what the terms “demilitarization” and “denazification,” still little understood by “deep Russia,” meant. Naturally, the political analysts gave assurances that Russia had been forced to start the special operation. The insidious West did this, and Ukraine was just a pawn in its game.
Later, the rhetoric changed a little. As the Russian army failed in various aspects, Ukraine began to be perceived in the press as a more independent player. Such a lapdog cannot give such an impressive rebuff to the second army in the world... But in the spring of 2022, this was still a long way off.
But finding special military operation soldiers in the regions turned out to be not so easy. Firstly, after their personal data began to leak onto the internet, many began to be afraid to admit that they were fighting in the war. Secondly, the Russian army is a very sluggish structure. And any comments from the military were preceded by a lengthy approval process. Therefore, in most cases, journalists had to take comments from volunteers.
All over the country people held solitary pickets against the war. We were not prohibited from writing about them.
“The directive was this: do not show sympathy for them and give the official view of these actions – mention that cases had been filed against people for ‘discrediting’ the Russian army.”
Nevertheless, in some places, such publications were banned – most likely, because certain higher-ups were playing it safe again.
There were no clear guidelines on many topics. This led to terrible confusion. This is another problem that occurs in large organizations. Every worker has 10 bosses, yet when a decision needs to be made quickly, none of them wants to take responsibility.
Write about losses, but do not give numbers
The position of our bosses on the topic of Russian losses in the special military operation changed several times. Initially, we were allowed to write only what the Russian Defense Ministry provided. And it, as is well known, generally prefers not to give information on the number of those killed on our side. But soon after the war began, numerous news items about casualties began to appear on the websites of news agencies.
Then, the network’s editors were given a different directive: write about the fallen “in a heroic vein.” Of course, we have to rely exclusively on official sources: the government, heads of local administrations and MPs. If the dead performed some kind of feat or was notable for something in his prewar life, we contact his relatives and tell readers about it.
There were no clear guidelines on many topics. This led to terrible confusion. This is another problem that occurs in large organizations. Every worker has 10 bosses, yet when a decision needs to be made quickly, none of them wants to take responsibility.
Write about losses, but do not give numbers
The position of our bosses on the topic of Russian losses in the special military operation changed several times. Initially, we were allowed to write only what the Russian Defense Ministry provided. And it, as is well known, generally prefers not to give information on the number of those killed on our side. But soon after the war began, numerous news items about casualties began to appear on the websites of news agencies.
Then, the network’s editors were given a different directive: write about the fallen “in a heroic vein.” Of course, we have to rely exclusively on official sources: the government, heads of local administrations and MPs. If the dead performed some kind of feat or was notable for something in his prewar life, we contact his relatives and tell readers about it.
A cemetery with Russian soldiers. Photo: Social media.
At the same time, it is forbidden to focus on Russian losses. That is, headlines like “three natives of (some Russian city) killed in the special military operation” are prohibited. There is an even stricter prohibition on indicating the number of dead and the time period when they died. For example, “this week, eight natives of Krasnodar died in the special military operation.”
Initially, we were not supposed to bring up the lack of ammunition, food, medicine, etc. In the first months of the special military operation, this was considered fake news. And even then, the problem was not so acute.
But over time, we began to actively cover this as well. Moreover, at some point, mayors, governors, MPs and officials of all stripes began to compete over who could help the war effort the most. All over the country, people began to mass-produce trench candles, sew camouflage nets and so on. We also cover all this, of course, in a purely positive light.
PMCs and the recruitment of convicts
From the moment Yevgeny Prigozhin began his “tour” across prisons, news aggregators began to publish headlines along the lines of “Novosibirsk murderer dies in special operation.”
Questions started pouring in from all over the country to the bosses. May we write about this, and if so, in what vein? The directive was: “you may write about the fact that some criminal known in your region died in the special military operation, but you may not write about how he got out of jail. People know anyway.”
Initially, we were not supposed to bring up the lack of ammunition, food, medicine, etc. In the first months of the special military operation, this was considered fake news. And even then, the problem was not so acute.
But over time, we began to actively cover this as well. Moreover, at some point, mayors, governors, MPs and officials of all stripes began to compete over who could help the war effort the most. All over the country, people began to mass-produce trench candles, sew camouflage nets and so on. We also cover all this, of course, in a purely positive light.
PMCs and the recruitment of convicts
From the moment Yevgeny Prigozhin began his “tour” across prisons, news aggregators began to publish headlines along the lines of “Novosibirsk murderer dies in special operation.”
Questions started pouring in from all over the country to the bosses. May we write about this, and if so, in what vein? The directive was: “you may write about the fact that some criminal known in your region died in the special military operation, but you may not write about how he got out of jail. People know anyway.”
“We generally tried not to cover the topic of recruiting convicts or the activities of the Wagner Group.”
Incidentally, this prohibition did not apply to voenkory. In general, they exist in some separate reality and are allowed much more. But when the Defense Ministry began recruiting convicts, it ceased to be taboo.
We, like other pro-government media, had a long-standing prohibition on publishing articles about crimes committed by special military operation veterans. Although over time it has become less strict. Sometimes, editors nevertheless publish such articles if all their competitors are writing about it.
“Let’s not do it; let’s play it safe” – these are the phrases heard from supervisors in most cases. Sometimes, subordinates are simply too lazy to raise a question with their superiors. Sometimes, they are afraid of getting a slap on the wrist themselves. If a senior boss is in a bad mood, he may say: “why are you even asking me that? Do you not understand that we do not write about such things?” Meanwhile, people are regularly scolded at planning meetings for failing to cover a topic – after all, our competitors (naturally, propagandists) wrote about it.
As I have already mentioned, some topics that were off limits at the beginning of the special military operation later ceased to be taboo. For example, we covered the Bakhmut “meat grinder” in some detail. And we even mentioned the fact that our troops were suffering losses (naturally, without specifying the exact number of dead and without panic).
But “officially” the bosses have not lifted the prohibitions on certain topics. Editors often have to act relying solely on their experience and intuition. Moreover, this is the situation at all major online media – I know, because I talk with colleagues from other publications.
‘I am part of the propaganda machine’
There was, is and will be propaganda in the Russian media. With the beginning of the special operation, it has intensified manyfold. I have been working for a major propaganda media outlet, with branches in many large cities, for over seven years. I understand perfectly well that I am part of the propaganda machine. Do I have a guilty conscience about this? Not really. Why? Firstly, despite all the prohibitions and restrictions, I still try to give an objective assessment of events – as much as our publication’s policy allows. Secondly, I understand that, by and large, there is no alternative. I am not yet ready to leave the country or work for a media outlet considered a “foreign agent” [by the Russian government]. And thirdly and, in my opinion, most importantly: if I go, another person will take my place. Will he or she be guided by the same principles as me?
We, like other pro-government media, had a long-standing prohibition on publishing articles about crimes committed by special military operation veterans. Although over time it has become less strict. Sometimes, editors nevertheless publish such articles if all their competitors are writing about it.
“Let’s not do it; let’s play it safe” – these are the phrases heard from supervisors in most cases. Sometimes, subordinates are simply too lazy to raise a question with their superiors. Sometimes, they are afraid of getting a slap on the wrist themselves. If a senior boss is in a bad mood, he may say: “why are you even asking me that? Do you not understand that we do not write about such things?” Meanwhile, people are regularly scolded at planning meetings for failing to cover a topic – after all, our competitors (naturally, propagandists) wrote about it.
As I have already mentioned, some topics that were off limits at the beginning of the special military operation later ceased to be taboo. For example, we covered the Bakhmut “meat grinder” in some detail. And we even mentioned the fact that our troops were suffering losses (naturally, without specifying the exact number of dead and without panic).
But “officially” the bosses have not lifted the prohibitions on certain topics. Editors often have to act relying solely on their experience and intuition. Moreover, this is the situation at all major online media – I know, because I talk with colleagues from other publications.
‘I am part of the propaganda machine’
There was, is and will be propaganda in the Russian media. With the beginning of the special operation, it has intensified manyfold. I have been working for a major propaganda media outlet, with branches in many large cities, for over seven years. I understand perfectly well that I am part of the propaganda machine. Do I have a guilty conscience about this? Not really. Why? Firstly, despite all the prohibitions and restrictions, I still try to give an objective assessment of events – as much as our publication’s policy allows. Secondly, I understand that, by and large, there is no alternative. I am not yet ready to leave the country or work for a media outlet considered a “foreign agent” [by the Russian government]. And thirdly and, in my opinion, most importantly: if I go, another person will take my place. Will he or she be guided by the same principles as me?
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