Society
It is Not the Response of the Survey-Taker that Matters, but the Action of the Citizen
January 6, 2025
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Sergei Shelin
Journalist, independent analyst
Journalist Sergei Shelin takes a critical look at the latest wave of debate about whether Russian public opinion polls can be trusted when it comes to support for the war. According to the author, both those who trust opinion poll results and those who don’t still find more in the responses given by ordinary people than the people themselves intended to convey.
The original text in Russian was published in The Moscow Times and is reprinted here with small changes with the author’s permission.
The latest storm of passions was triggered by a short report by Maria Snegovaya, in which she summarizes publicly available survey results and concludes that Russian support for the war is unsurprising given “years of state indoctrination, the legacy of Soviet beliefs, the lack of alternative narratives in the public sphere, and more pragmatic considerations such as adaptation and avoidance of cognitive dissonance.”
This innocuous observation, published in English, would certainly not have caused controversy. But Snegovaya also addressed her compatriots on social networks with an even more concise summary of her thoughts in Russian.
With the decisiveness of someone primarily familiar with Russian realities from academic monographs and seminars, the researcher pointed out that “the majority of respected sociologists and political scientists” trust Russian polls; that Russia’s modernization has not worked and that the middle class supports the war more than the poor; that a “generational continuum” has emerged, i.e., young people, like the elderly, are pro-war; that “the liberal pro-Western segment in the country is small (~7–10% of the population),” and that there is no point in even trying to dissuade Russians, since “they do not want to know what disturbs their inner comfort.”
Word and deed
This is where the commotion began. Indignant critics of Snegovaya insist that the surveys are bogus, and that Russians’ responses to pollsters reflect only their fear of their superiors. We can see how passions boiled over in these reviews, in which outraged responses range from “I saw the report and there are simply no good arguments in it” to personal attacks: “You, Maria, are not a researcher, but a propagandist of the worst kind.”
(Russia.Post has repeatedly addressed the issue of the reliability of survey data. For example, see this article)
It is curious that no one entered into a substantive dispute with the researcher regarding the interpretation of the surveys themselves, even though, for instance, the surveys do not record the aforementioned “generational continuum.”
In the most recent wave of research conducted by Russian Field in November, young respondents overwhelmingly (68% to 17%) supported a transition to peace talks, while older respondents were more militant and split in half (46% to 47%) on the issue of continuing the “special operation.” But these details are not what I am writing about today.
The main issue is that the debate itself has gone down the wrong path.
First of all, trust in the results of polls is linked to the belief in the obviously pro-war sentiments of the Russian public, which supposedly clearly follow from these polls. Although in reality, the polls show different things.
Secondly, in defining “support” or “opposition” for the war, both Snegovaya and her opponents consider not real actions, but merely statements made by respondents in interviews with pollsters.
The latest storm of passions was triggered by a short report by Maria Snegovaya, in which she summarizes publicly available survey results and concludes that Russian support for the war is unsurprising given “years of state indoctrination, the legacy of Soviet beliefs, the lack of alternative narratives in the public sphere, and more pragmatic considerations such as adaptation and avoidance of cognitive dissonance.”
This innocuous observation, published in English, would certainly not have caused controversy. But Snegovaya also addressed her compatriots on social networks with an even more concise summary of her thoughts in Russian.
With the decisiveness of someone primarily familiar with Russian realities from academic monographs and seminars, the researcher pointed out that “the majority of respected sociologists and political scientists” trust Russian polls; that Russia’s modernization has not worked and that the middle class supports the war more than the poor; that a “generational continuum” has emerged, i.e., young people, like the elderly, are pro-war; that “the liberal pro-Western segment in the country is small (~7–10% of the population),” and that there is no point in even trying to dissuade Russians, since “they do not want to know what disturbs their inner comfort.”
Word and deed
This is where the commotion began. Indignant critics of Snegovaya insist that the surveys are bogus, and that Russians’ responses to pollsters reflect only their fear of their superiors. We can see how passions boiled over in these reviews, in which outraged responses range from “I saw the report and there are simply no good arguments in it” to personal attacks: “You, Maria, are not a researcher, but a propagandist of the worst kind.”
(Russia.Post has repeatedly addressed the issue of the reliability of survey data. For example, see this article)
It is curious that no one entered into a substantive dispute with the researcher regarding the interpretation of the surveys themselves, even though, for instance, the surveys do not record the aforementioned “generational continuum.”
In the most recent wave of research conducted by Russian Field in November, young respondents overwhelmingly (68% to 17%) supported a transition to peace talks, while older respondents were more militant and split in half (46% to 47%) on the issue of continuing the “special operation.” But these details are not what I am writing about today.
The main issue is that the debate itself has gone down the wrong path.
First of all, trust in the results of polls is linked to the belief in the obviously pro-war sentiments of the Russian public, which supposedly clearly follow from these polls. Although in reality, the polls show different things.
Secondly, in defining “support” or “opposition” for the war, both Snegovaya and her opponents consider not real actions, but merely statements made by respondents in interviews with pollsters.
“But even the most militant or anti-war phrase rarely converts into a militant or anti-war act.”
Why this discussion misses the point
I think that anyone who wants to make progress in understanding the Russian mindset should move away from this dispute and proceed from the following considerations:
First, the main polling agencies, even those loyal to the state, such as the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM), do not directly falsify their product. Their reports deserve to be taken seriously.
Secondly, it is important to remember that Russian responses to direct and quite possibly frightening questions, such as directly asking about their faith in Putin or his activities, are the most banal and least relevant.
The Levada Center, the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) and VCIOM all have similar estimations of Putin’s approval rating (from 79–87%). They have changed little over the three years of the war. There is no catch here.
I think that anyone who wants to make progress in understanding the Russian mindset should move away from this dispute and proceed from the following considerations:
First, the main polling agencies, even those loyal to the state, such as the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM), do not directly falsify their product. Their reports deserve to be taken seriously.
Secondly, it is important to remember that Russian responses to direct and quite possibly frightening questions, such as directly asking about their faith in Putin or his activities, are the most banal and least relevant.
The Levada Center, the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) and VCIOM all have similar estimations of Putin’s approval rating (from 79–87%). They have changed little over the three years of the war. There is no catch here.
The former Defense Minister, Sergei Shoigu (right) , was the second most popular political figure after Putin before the war. However, his popularity declined rapidly following the onset of the “special military operation.” Source: Wiki Commons
Professional polling services know who they are dealing with. They have more sophisticated methods up their sleeves. For example, VCIOM also asks the public an "open question" (without prompting names), asking them to independently recall government officials they trust or, on the contrary, distrust.
When determined this way, the level of trust in Putin falls to 37% (with 5% recalling that they do not trust him). This is higher than before the war, although not by much.
But if we take former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, who was second only to Putin in popularity before the war, we see this popularity quickly deflated with the start of the “special operation.” It was he, and not Putin, who began to be seen as the main culprit in the failure to achieve victory.
Shoigu’s fall was evident in the responses to these “open questions” for at least a year before he was fired. And now the former popular minister has been almost forgotten, and if he is remembered, it is with hostility. Only 2% of those who responded to the open question with no prompts named him as a person they trusted, and 7% named him as one they did not trust.
When determined this way, the level of trust in Putin falls to 37% (with 5% recalling that they do not trust him). This is higher than before the war, although not by much.
But if we take former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, who was second only to Putin in popularity before the war, we see this popularity quickly deflated with the start of the “special operation.” It was he, and not Putin, who began to be seen as the main culprit in the failure to achieve victory.
Shoigu’s fall was evident in the responses to these “open questions” for at least a year before he was fired. And now the former popular minister has been almost forgotten, and if he is remembered, it is with hostility. Only 2% of those who responded to the open question with no prompts named him as a person they trusted, and 7% named him as one they did not trust.
What mood, in your opinion, predominates today among your relatives, friends, colleagues, and acquaintances – calm or anxious? Green: Calm; Red: Anxious;
Gray: Unsure
Data in % of all respondents
Survey by the Public Opinion Foundation, December 20–22, 2024.
Gray: Unsure
Data in % of all respondents
Survey by the Public Opinion Foundation, December 20–22, 2024.
Both FOM and Levada have their own useful non-leading questions. For example, FOM’s signature weekly question about whether the "mood of those around you" is "calm" or "anxious" clearly revealed the outbursts of mass panic in the fall of 2022 during the mobilization and in the spring of this year due to the Crocus City terrorist attack.
It is important not to forget that surveys are a limited-action tool and can only give so much. For example, polls clearly reveal the aforementioned desire of young people for the “special operation” to end as soon as possible, but does not explain what exactly lies behind this desire.
It is important not to forget that surveys are a limited-action tool and can only give so much. For example, polls clearly reveal the aforementioned desire of young people for the “special operation” to end as soon as possible, but does not explain what exactly lies behind this desire.
“Pacifism can come not only from moral, but also from selfish considerations. After all, the youth are the ones threatened by mobilization, not pensioners.”
To gain a more complete understanding, we need higher-level research.
One example is this study of perceptions of the war in three regions, conducted by the Public Sociology Lab using the participant observation method. It revealed, for example, a gap between the authorities’ obsession with conquest and the more relaxed nationalism of ordinary loyalists. (see Russia.Post on some of the results of this study here).
Finally, another important consideration is that in a regime like the Russian one, what matters is not what a subject says in their own kitchen or during an interview with a survey taker, but rather the actions they take. Are they obedient to their superiors? If so, the assessments and positions they express privately are regarded as harmless chit-chat, including by themselves.
Nevermind your conscience
Supporting the war involves actively helping the regime in its military campaign, not chatting about geopolitics over beers.
Snegovaya and her supporters do not have a feel for this difference. That is why they “support for the war” to be not actions taken, but words, and moreover, words that appear in the least reliable sections of the available surveys.
The reality of wartime Russia does not look much like either picture painted by opposing sides in this debate.
One example is this study of perceptions of the war in three regions, conducted by the Public Sociology Lab using the participant observation method. It revealed, for example, a gap between the authorities’ obsession with conquest and the more relaxed nationalism of ordinary loyalists. (see Russia.Post on some of the results of this study here).
Finally, another important consideration is that in a regime like the Russian one, what matters is not what a subject says in their own kitchen or during an interview with a survey taker, but rather the actions they take. Are they obedient to their superiors? If so, the assessments and positions they express privately are regarded as harmless chit-chat, including by themselves.
Nevermind your conscience
Supporting the war involves actively helping the regime in its military campaign, not chatting about geopolitics over beers.
Snegovaya and her supporters do not have a feel for this difference. That is why they “support for the war” to be not actions taken, but words, and moreover, words that appear in the least reliable sections of the available surveys.
The reality of wartime Russia does not look much like either picture painted by opposing sides in this debate.
“There is neither a blind fusion of the public with the authorities, nor a mass rejection of the war.”
Despite the shortage of soldiers, Putin is afraid to call another draft. There is every reason to believe that the Kremlin will resort to this measure only as a last resort. Mobilization will not cause a popular uprising, but it will certainly create panic, one fraught with chaos.
The supply of volunteer contract soldiers is also not that large. Therefore, the authorities will have to either achieve conditions for a truce that Putin finds acceptable, or tighten the regime and sharply increase the army’s numbers. This is precisely the fork in the road the country will face over the course of the next several months.
Only one poll, which I will not link to, erroneously claims that Russians are allegedly agreeing to serve their country. Those who conducted it made a typical mistake: they mistook people’s idle chit-chat for an intention to actually fight.
In reality, the “lower classes” are already tired of the war. The percentage of those who prefer peace talks has grown from 35 to 53% over the three years of the invasion. The state is stronger than the people and, if it wants, will continue its “special operation,” despite the attitude of its citizens. But the atmosphere is changing, and in this case the regime will have to find new moves to overcome the people’s weariness.
The supply of volunteer contract soldiers is also not that large. Therefore, the authorities will have to either achieve conditions for a truce that Putin finds acceptable, or tighten the regime and sharply increase the army’s numbers. This is precisely the fork in the road the country will face over the course of the next several months.
Only one poll, which I will not link to, erroneously claims that Russians are allegedly agreeing to serve their country. Those who conducted it made a typical mistake: they mistook people’s idle chit-chat for an intention to actually fight.
In reality, the “lower classes” are already tired of the war. The percentage of those who prefer peace talks has grown from 35 to 53% over the three years of the invasion. The state is stronger than the people and, if it wants, will continue its “special operation,” despite the attitude of its citizens. But the atmosphere is changing, and in this case the regime will have to find new moves to overcome the people’s weariness.
"Are you looking at the coming year with hope (blue), uncertainty (green), or anxiety (red)?"
Gray - unsure. Survey by the Levada Center. December 2024
Gray - unsure. Survey by the Levada Center. December 2024
Does it follow that the Russian people are peace-loving and suffer from a guilty conscience because their government continues a bloody war against its closest neighbor? No, it does not.
"There is no need to try to make people feel guilty and repent. It is clear that people are not close to all this. The need to criticize the war and Russian domestic policy is quite strong among people. When people in Russia criticize the war, they criticize it as harmful to Russia first and foremost, and not to Ukraine." This is one of the conclusions drawn from the aforementioned Public Sociology Lab study.
Putin is not so unconditionally valued by his people and does not particularly fit into the popular idea of an ideal Stalin-type ruler.
For example, assessments made by sociologists in the midst of the presidential elections in March 2024 give reasons to doubt the Russian president's widespread popularity. According to public opinion researchers, Putin’s triumphant victory was greatly exaggerated.
It is possible to assume that the general public would have reacted calmly to the overthrow and subsequent exposure of Putin if something similar had happened on the initiative of representatives of the highest elite.
"There is no need to try to make people feel guilty and repent. It is clear that people are not close to all this. The need to criticize the war and Russian domestic policy is quite strong among people. When people in Russia criticize the war, they criticize it as harmful to Russia first and foremost, and not to Ukraine." This is one of the conclusions drawn from the aforementioned Public Sociology Lab study.
Putin is not so unconditionally valued by his people and does not particularly fit into the popular idea of an ideal Stalin-type ruler.
For example, assessments made by sociologists in the midst of the presidential elections in March 2024 give reasons to doubt the Russian president's widespread popularity. According to public opinion researchers, Putin’s triumphant victory was greatly exaggerated.
It is possible to assume that the general public would have reacted calmly to the overthrow and subsequent exposure of Putin if something similar had happened on the initiative of representatives of the highest elite.
“The Russian people support the state and statehood in word and deed, but not this leader or this war.”
This conclusion will not satisfy either side of the online dispute with which we began this text--neither the critics nor supporters.
Russians on the whole are entirely ready to make peace with Ukraine, especially along the current front lines. And until the next war they will remain peace-loving and even ready for another reconciliation with the West. It is as easy as quitting smoking again.
And most likely they will readily accept some kind of general anti-corruption campaign, either targeted or, perhaps, non-targeted reprisals against the bureaucratic class. And any other of the traditional procedures that are taking place under the guise of the revival and modernization of Russia.
But they are not ready to manage their own country and be responsible for its actions.
Russians on the whole are entirely ready to make peace with Ukraine, especially along the current front lines. And until the next war they will remain peace-loving and even ready for another reconciliation with the West. It is as easy as quitting smoking again.
And most likely they will readily accept some kind of general anti-corruption campaign, either targeted or, perhaps, non-targeted reprisals against the bureaucratic class. And any other of the traditional procedures that are taking place under the guise of the revival and modernization of Russia.
But they are not ready to manage their own country and be responsible for its actions.
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