SOCIETY
The Use of Nuclear Weapons No Longer Seems Unthinkable in Russia
December 2, 2024
- Alexei LevinsonDirector of research at the Levada Center
Sociologist Alexei Levinson breaks down Levada Center research on what Russians think about the potential use of nuclear weapons by Russia and how public perceptions are changing amid the militarization of the country.
The original text in Russian was published in Gorby magazine and is being republished here with small changes and the author’s permission.
Levada Center has asked Russians about the possible use of nuclear weapons by the Russian leadership in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine – whether it will use them and whether that would be justified.
Still, a word of caution: it is not based on public opinion that the Russian authorities make decisions; there is no direct link between how the Russian population views the use of nuclear weapons and whether they will actually be used by the Kremlin.
2023: “Our side” will never use nuclear weapons
Research into public opinion on this issue is nevertheless valuable because these are, in essence, questions of life and death – people’s own and that of others. The surveys tell us what Russians think about their own country: can Russia, would Russia dare, does Russia have the right to commit the terrible act that has been committed only once before, by the US, which dropped atomic bombs on Japan in World War II?
In April 2023, the Levada Center asked: “is the Russian leadership ready to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine during the special military operation if it deems it necessary?”
Levada Center has asked Russians about the possible use of nuclear weapons by the Russian leadership in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine – whether it will use them and whether that would be justified.
Still, a word of caution: it is not based on public opinion that the Russian authorities make decisions; there is no direct link between how the Russian population views the use of nuclear weapons and whether they will actually be used by the Kremlin.
2023: “Our side” will never use nuclear weapons
Research into public opinion on this issue is nevertheless valuable because these are, in essence, questions of life and death – people’s own and that of others. The surveys tell us what Russians think about their own country: can Russia, would Russia dare, does Russia have the right to commit the terrible act that has been committed only once before, by the US, which dropped atomic bombs on Japan in World War II?
In April 2023, the Levada Center asked: “is the Russian leadership ready to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine during the special military operation if it deems it necessary?”
Hiroshima in the aftermath of the atomic bombing. August 1945. Source: Wiki Commons
There were twice as many “no” as “yes” responses, and three times as many “definitely no” as “definitely yes” responses. The view that “our side” would never do such a thing looks predominant. This seems self-evident: since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the idea that such a thing should never happen again had spread across Russian society as an undiscussed and seemingly uncontested norm.
Let’s recall the basic ideas about nuclear weapons, based on which people responded to our questions.
Building nuclear weapons took the greatest scientists, the luminaries of world science, who were engaged in fundamental research on the creation and structure of the universe and our world. And it was these scientists who first understood the immense power they were handing over to people with these weapons. They understood that their destructive power was far superior in scale and nature to the regular capabilities of armies, which were accustomed to conventional weapons. For military men, this was just another, albeit more effective, type of weapon.
Let’s recall the basic ideas about nuclear weapons, based on which people responded to our questions.
Building nuclear weapons took the greatest scientists, the luminaries of world science, who were engaged in fundamental research on the creation and structure of the universe and our world. And it was these scientists who first understood the immense power they were handing over to people with these weapons. They understood that their destructive power was far superior in scale and nature to the regular capabilities of armies, which were accustomed to conventional weapons. For military men, this was just another, albeit more effective, type of weapon.
“Yet the scientists who developed the nuclear bomb understood that they had created a weapon against which there is no and cannot be any defense. What it does not destroy immediately, it destroys gradually.”
They came up with the idea that no one state should have a monopoly on nuclear weapons in the modern world – it must be restrained by the possession of the same weapons by its enemy. At the same time,potential nuclear intimidation and threats would be conditioned by the understanding on both sides that these weapons must not be used, since their use against the enemy ultimately means mutual destruction.
“Nuclear deterrence theory” appeared. Indeed, any weapon functions as a threat; it does not have to kill and destroy to be effective. This – and only this – should be the fate of nuclear weapons, their creators believed.
This discourse proved compelling, and partly thanks to it, the Cold War never went “hot.”
After the Soviet collapse
The political beliefs of the subsequent era, which began with the collapse of the USSR and the Socialist Camp, were also based on these ideas. Amid all the talk today about the West taking advantage of its weakened enemy and forcing things on us, recall that the West made huge efforts to ensure that the nuclear weapons of the USSR, which had been pointed at the West, did not scatter into the hands of the new and weak states (when the USSR disappeared, 3,200 strategic nuclear warheads remained in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus – RP) but, rather, remained with the strongest power, Russia.
All the measures of mutual control, which revealed military secrets that no spy could obtain, were meant to preserve the possibility of mutual destruction. The policies of both sides were guided by this self-evident idea of nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence.
“Nuclear deterrence theory” appeared. Indeed, any weapon functions as a threat; it does not have to kill and destroy to be effective. This – and only this – should be the fate of nuclear weapons, their creators believed.
This discourse proved compelling, and partly thanks to it, the Cold War never went “hot.”
After the Soviet collapse
The political beliefs of the subsequent era, which began with the collapse of the USSR and the Socialist Camp, were also based on these ideas. Amid all the talk today about the West taking advantage of its weakened enemy and forcing things on us, recall that the West made huge efforts to ensure that the nuclear weapons of the USSR, which had been pointed at the West, did not scatter into the hands of the new and weak states (when the USSR disappeared, 3,200 strategic nuclear warheads remained in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus – RP) but, rather, remained with the strongest power, Russia.
All the measures of mutual control, which revealed military secrets that no spy could obtain, were meant to preserve the possibility of mutual destruction. The policies of both sides were guided by this self-evident idea of nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence.
“In a very simple form, the idea that there would be no winners in a nuclear war and that if one started, the whole world would perish in a nuclear apocalypse, a nuclear winter, penetrated the mass consciousness of Soviet and post-Soviet people.”
such a war would be a nuclear one, and its end would be the end of the world. Thus, there can be no war. Nuclear weapons and armies must be maintained – for the sake of peace.
From these ideas it followed that Russia would never use its nuclear weapons. It could not and should not do so under any circumstances.
There was a parallel discourse about nuclear weapons: they were so incredibly destructive, and the consequences of their use were so terrible, that there could be no good reason to use them. And our potential adversaries agreed with this, too.
Evidence testifying to the horrific aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was commonplace in the USSR, serving as one of the key arguments for condemnation of the US, the USSR’s main adversary in the Cold War. A simple view took shape: this is how our enemy, the bearer of evil, acted, so we, who are on the side of good, cannot, should not and will not do the same. Thus, another facet of the mass attitude toward nuclear weapons emerged – that nuclear weapons will be used neither by our country nor anyone else.
All the ideas described above live in the mass consciousness of Russians and, as we can see in results of the 2023 Levada Center survey, are predominant.
From these ideas it followed that Russia would never use its nuclear weapons. It could not and should not do so under any circumstances.
There was a parallel discourse about nuclear weapons: they were so incredibly destructive, and the consequences of their use were so terrible, that there could be no good reason to use them. And our potential adversaries agreed with this, too.
Evidence testifying to the horrific aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was commonplace in the USSR, serving as one of the key arguments for condemnation of the US, the USSR’s main adversary in the Cold War. A simple view took shape: this is how our enemy, the bearer of evil, acted, so we, who are on the side of good, cannot, should not and will not do the same. Thus, another facet of the mass attitude toward nuclear weapons emerged – that nuclear weapons will be used neither by our country nor anyone else.
All the ideas described above live in the mass consciousness of Russians and, as we can see in results of the 2023 Levada Center survey, are predominant.
Soviet physicist and a Nobel Peace Prize laureate Andrei Sakharov. 1989. Source: Wiki Commons
The view of the army and security services
Yet alongside the scientists who created nuclear weapons, there was another group with different ideas about them – the strategists, tacticians and “practitioners” from the army and security services, to whom these weapons were entrusted.
The difference in their approaches is well illustrated by a story told by Andrei Sakharov: at a Kremlin reception to mark the successful testing of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, Sakharov raised a toast to the weapon never needing to be used, to which the response, as he paraphrased in his memoirs, was, “we – the inventors, scientists, engineers and workers – created a terrifying weapon, the most terrifying in the history of humankind. But we would have no say whatsoever over its use. That decision would be made by them – those at the pinnacle of power, of the Party and military hierarchy.”
The history of weapons development is the ebb and flow between means of destruction and means of defense. Thus, the absolute power of nuclear weapons began to be refuted; there are ways, it was said, to counteract and defend against it – in short, it is possible to survive a nuclear war; a nuclear war can be won. The idea that there would be no winners in such a war can be thrown out. There will be, and it should be us. For military men, such an ideology is natural.
The current militarization of the country means the spread of such discourse to social groups beyond the military.
The turning point was when this militarization penetrated the political sphere. Politicians appeared who were either truly convinced that in a global thermonuclear war, Russia would defeat its enemies and dominate the entire world, or who thought they could fix their urgent political problems by controlling their audience through such a belief.
The idea of abandoning the view of nuclear war as the end of human existence is also tempting for those who are fighting for public attention for other purposes, be they ideological or commercial. Post apocalyptic visions have penetrated popular culture.
Blurring the perception of nuclear weapons
In today's public consciousness, the perception of nuclear weapons as something unimaginably terrible persists, but the idea of their use is no longer unthinkable.
In this regard, note that more than half of our respondents chose qualified responses with the word “probably.” The unshakable idea of the complete impossibility of using nuclear weapons, especially by “our side,” stayed most intact among respondents 55 years of age and older (34%). Almost as many seniors, however, answered “probably not” about the potential for Russia to use nuclear weapons.
Indeed, the younger Russians are, the less often they responded “definitely not.”
Yet alongside the scientists who created nuclear weapons, there was another group with different ideas about them – the strategists, tacticians and “practitioners” from the army and security services, to whom these weapons were entrusted.
The difference in their approaches is well illustrated by a story told by Andrei Sakharov: at a Kremlin reception to mark the successful testing of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, Sakharov raised a toast to the weapon never needing to be used, to which the response, as he paraphrased in his memoirs, was, “we – the inventors, scientists, engineers and workers – created a terrifying weapon, the most terrifying in the history of humankind. But we would have no say whatsoever over its use. That decision would be made by them – those at the pinnacle of power, of the Party and military hierarchy.”
The history of weapons development is the ebb and flow between means of destruction and means of defense. Thus, the absolute power of nuclear weapons began to be refuted; there are ways, it was said, to counteract and defend against it – in short, it is possible to survive a nuclear war; a nuclear war can be won. The idea that there would be no winners in such a war can be thrown out. There will be, and it should be us. For military men, such an ideology is natural.
The current militarization of the country means the spread of such discourse to social groups beyond the military.
The turning point was when this militarization penetrated the political sphere. Politicians appeared who were either truly convinced that in a global thermonuclear war, Russia would defeat its enemies and dominate the entire world, or who thought they could fix their urgent political problems by controlling their audience through such a belief.
The idea of abandoning the view of nuclear war as the end of human existence is also tempting for those who are fighting for public attention for other purposes, be they ideological or commercial. Post apocalyptic visions have penetrated popular culture.
Blurring the perception of nuclear weapons
In today's public consciousness, the perception of nuclear weapons as something unimaginably terrible persists, but the idea of their use is no longer unthinkable.
In this regard, note that more than half of our respondents chose qualified responses with the word “probably.” The unshakable idea of the complete impossibility of using nuclear weapons, especially by “our side,” stayed most intact among respondents 55 years of age and older (34%). Almost as many seniors, however, answered “probably not” about the potential for Russia to use nuclear weapons.
Indeed, the younger Russians are, the less often they responded “definitely not.”
“Among older youth, a third gave a not very confident ‘no’ about using nuclear weapons, and only a quarter a firm ‘no’.”
The OTR-21 Tochka tactical ballistic missile (NATO reporting name: SS-21 Scarab) on display during practice for a military parade in Ekaterinburg. 2009. Source: Wiki Commons
In this age group, where almost everyone was born and grew up under the same president, not everyone is sure that he will never press the “red button.” Eleven percent, on the contrary, are firmly convinced that he might press it, and another 24% are inclined to think that he might. We can put it like this: overall, two thirds of Russians believe or want to believe that Putin will not take this fatal step, but almost a third have stopped thinking that it is impossible.
In last year’s April survey, respondents were also asked whether “Russia’s use of nuclear weapons in the current conflict in Ukraine could be justified.”
It is important to understand what is behind the word “justified.” For instance, the question could be perceived as: is the use of nuclear weapons justified in response to a nuclear strike by the enemy? But then we should expect the absolute majority of the country to answer in the affirmative. After all, our common morality is based on the Old Testament’s “an eye for an eye.”
It is also impossible to rule out the possibility that our side, considering that the enemy is about to launch a nuclear attack, would initiate a preemptive strike. This is roughly how the start of the special military operation in February 2022 was explained by the Kremlin.
The public was largely satisfied with that explanation. Because, with a little stretch, it is almost the same as retaliation, just in advance. So in the case of nuclear weapons, one would have to expect general agreement that their use would be seen as legitimate.
Is this not what Russia’s military doctrine states? The Russian president has already referred to it more than once. And he is the one who has the right to decide on the use of nuclear weapons. While Paragraph 20 declares that “the primary objective of the Russian Federation is the prevention of nuclear and other kinds of military conflicts,” Paragraph 27 stakes a reservation: “the Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction against it or its allies…” This is what we mentioned above. But then it goes on: “… as well as in the case of aggression against the Russian Federation using conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state is threatened.”
The taboo against using nuclear weapons is eroding
A significant part of the Russian public is most likely not familiar with the abovementioned military doctrine and knows little about the arms in question. Information about them is classified, yet even if it were not, only military specialists would have a full understanding of these weapons. In the public consciousness, there is only an image. Our research examines what this image is now.
The wording of the question, again, does not specify what “justified” means. We can assume a rational justification looks like this: action A is more reasonable than action B. Meanwhile, a practical, operational or situational justification might look like this: in a certain context, option A is more advantageous than option B. That said, we think that when it comes to nuclear weapons, such a justification is not the main one for most people.
The discussions among ordinary people about Hiroshima and Nagasaki focus not on the military or political rationale of this act but rather on the moral side, arriving at a position of moral condemnation of the US. So we shall assume that the majority of our respondents have in mind moral justification.
Thus, we can state that half of Russians are sure that there are no moral grounds or justification for using nuclear weapons in the Ukraine conflict and there cannot be. Still, note that from April 2023 to June 2024, when the second survey was taken, the size of this majority shrank from 56% to 52%, while the size of the minority saying that a nuclear strike by Russia could be justified grew from 29% to 34%.
In last year’s April survey, respondents were also asked whether “Russia’s use of nuclear weapons in the current conflict in Ukraine could be justified.”
It is important to understand what is behind the word “justified.” For instance, the question could be perceived as: is the use of nuclear weapons justified in response to a nuclear strike by the enemy? But then we should expect the absolute majority of the country to answer in the affirmative. After all, our common morality is based on the Old Testament’s “an eye for an eye.”
It is also impossible to rule out the possibility that our side, considering that the enemy is about to launch a nuclear attack, would initiate a preemptive strike. This is roughly how the start of the special military operation in February 2022 was explained by the Kremlin.
The public was largely satisfied with that explanation. Because, with a little stretch, it is almost the same as retaliation, just in advance. So in the case of nuclear weapons, one would have to expect general agreement that their use would be seen as legitimate.
Is this not what Russia’s military doctrine states? The Russian president has already referred to it more than once. And he is the one who has the right to decide on the use of nuclear weapons. While Paragraph 20 declares that “the primary objective of the Russian Federation is the prevention of nuclear and other kinds of military conflicts,” Paragraph 27 stakes a reservation: “the Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction against it or its allies…” This is what we mentioned above. But then it goes on: “… as well as in the case of aggression against the Russian Federation using conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state is threatened.”
The taboo against using nuclear weapons is eroding
A significant part of the Russian public is most likely not familiar with the abovementioned military doctrine and knows little about the arms in question. Information about them is classified, yet even if it were not, only military specialists would have a full understanding of these weapons. In the public consciousness, there is only an image. Our research examines what this image is now.
The wording of the question, again, does not specify what “justified” means. We can assume a rational justification looks like this: action A is more reasonable than action B. Meanwhile, a practical, operational or situational justification might look like this: in a certain context, option A is more advantageous than option B. That said, we think that when it comes to nuclear weapons, such a justification is not the main one for most people.
The discussions among ordinary people about Hiroshima and Nagasaki focus not on the military or political rationale of this act but rather on the moral side, arriving at a position of moral condemnation of the US. So we shall assume that the majority of our respondents have in mind moral justification.
Thus, we can state that half of Russians are sure that there are no moral grounds or justification for using nuclear weapons in the Ukraine conflict and there cannot be. Still, note that from April 2023 to June 2024, when the second survey was taken, the size of this majority shrank from 56% to 52%, while the size of the minority saying that a nuclear strike by Russia could be justified grew from 29% to 34%.
“Among the older generation, the decline is even more pronounced: the share of those who firmly say that there is no moral justification for Russia’s use of nuclear weapons has decreased from 38% to 28%.”
Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev signing the SALT II Treaty in Vienna. June 18, 1979. Source: Wiki Commons
This means that though the old norm is still predominant, it is beginning to be eroded rapidly. What is driving this erosion? Our data allows us to identify those respondents who finger television as their most trusted source of information.
Such respondents have made up 44% of the entire sample in the last few years. A comparison of their responses from last year and this year shows that the erosion of the old norm, along with the shift to a new one (“justified”), has happened much faster than in the country as a whole. For the latter, roughly speaking, the ratio of “justified” to “not justified” responses went from 3 to 6 last year to 3 to 5 this year, while among those who particularly trust television for news it eroded from 3 to 5 to almost 3 to 3. Still, everyone who watches Russian television today knows whose views are being broadcast.
Another example of its effect: in June, 87% of the population approved of the president’s job performance, while it was 96% among those who say television is their most trusted source of information.
What was called the “threat of a nuclear conflict” in the 2023 survey worried 80-90% of the country, meaning that virtually no one rules out this threat. At the same time, the escalation of the special military operation in Ukraine into a conflict between Russia and NATO was considered likely last year by twice as many Russians as those who did not foresee that happening. In other words, Russians believe that the current situation, where NATO’s participation is only indirect, could – possibly as a result of a Russian nuclear strike – escalate into a direct conflict, i.e., nuclear war.
Such respondents have made up 44% of the entire sample in the last few years. A comparison of their responses from last year and this year shows that the erosion of the old norm, along with the shift to a new one (“justified”), has happened much faster than in the country as a whole. For the latter, roughly speaking, the ratio of “justified” to “not justified” responses went from 3 to 6 last year to 3 to 5 this year, while among those who particularly trust television for news it eroded from 3 to 5 to almost 3 to 3. Still, everyone who watches Russian television today knows whose views are being broadcast.
Another example of its effect: in June, 87% of the population approved of the president’s job performance, while it was 96% among those who say television is their most trusted source of information.
What was called the “threat of a nuclear conflict” in the 2023 survey worried 80-90% of the country, meaning that virtually no one rules out this threat. At the same time, the escalation of the special military operation in Ukraine into a conflict between Russia and NATO was considered likely last year by twice as many Russians as those who did not foresee that happening. In other words, Russians believe that the current situation, where NATO’s participation is only indirect, could – possibly as a result of a Russian nuclear strike – escalate into a direct conflict, i.e., nuclear war.
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