SOciety
‘Our Country Does not Coincide with “Theirs,” Invented in the Kremlin’
September 28, 2024
- Andrei Kolesnikov
Columnist for Newtimes.ru and Novaya Gazeta (Moscow)
- Yevgeny Senshin
Journalist
In an interview, political scientist Andrei Kolesnikov discusses the atomizing and splintering of Russians with democratic views, “silent resistance” and “defense mechanisms” in Russia, and about the prospects for peace in Ukraine.
The original interview was published in Republic. A shortened version is being published here with the editors’ permission.
In your view, does politics still exist in Russia in the classical sense of the term? If not, how should we understand and describe the processes taking place in Russia around power?
It’s politics. And some kind of politics. Do not confuse democracy and politics, reasoning that where there are no normal elections and democratic institutions, there is no politics. The disaster we are living through is the result of a political decision.
The behavior of elites and the zigzags of public opinion are the consequences of political decisions and reactions to them. Broadcasting from abroad by exiled democratic media, as well as work inside Russia by journalists, civic activists, scientists, lawyers, human rights defenders, doctors, lecturers and teachers is politics. And this is how it is seen by the authorities, who label them “foreign agents” and “undesirable.”
In your view, does politics still exist in Russia in the classical sense of the term? If not, how should we understand and describe the processes taking place in Russia around power?
It’s politics. And some kind of politics. Do not confuse democracy and politics, reasoning that where there are no normal elections and democratic institutions, there is no politics. The disaster we are living through is the result of a political decision.
The behavior of elites and the zigzags of public opinion are the consequences of political decisions and reactions to them. Broadcasting from abroad by exiled democratic media, as well as work inside Russia by journalists, civic activists, scientists, lawyers, human rights defenders, doctors, lecturers and teachers is politics. And this is how it is seen by the authorities, who label them “foreign agents” and “undesirable.”
Lev Shlosberg, a Russian oppositional politician and human rights activist. Source: Wiki Commons
It has been more than three months since a serious reshuffle took place in the government. Putin removed his old friend Shoigu as defense minister, after which arrests of his deputies and other Ministry of Defense officials began. Could this be some sort of purge at the very top?
I do not think this is a purge (sanatsiya). Key representatives of the business elite interwoven into the state, along with members of Putin’s inner circle (and circles further away from the president), remain in their spots. For Shoigu, unlike his colleagues, this can be considered a soft landing. In other countries, a case of such total corruption would destroy the authority of both the entire government and the president himself. But in Russia, in the eyes of the population, Putin is cleaning up the highest echelons of power.
Whereas among the Kremlin elites, despite the arrests of high-ranking defense officials, everything is outwardly calm, among those who are considered members of the Russian opposition, passions are running high. I have in mind the recent investigation by Navalny associates (FBK) alleging assassination attempts on oppositionists by Leonid Nevzlin. In your view, what are the potential consequences for the opposition? Some commentators believe that the opposition for sure has no chance in Russia anymore.
What chance does the opposition have in Russia given the level of political repression in the country? What are we talking about? It is not the fault, but the misfortune of the opposition – its members, with rare exceptions, are in exile or in prison. I can name, for example, [St Petersburg Duma Deputy Boris] Vishnevsky (see his article in Russia.Post) and Lev Shlosberg from Yabloko, who are trying not to leave Russia. I am afraid that just for mentioning their names I will be pelted with rotten tomatoes.
I do not think this is a purge (sanatsiya). Key representatives of the business elite interwoven into the state, along with members of Putin’s inner circle (and circles further away from the president), remain in their spots. For Shoigu, unlike his colleagues, this can be considered a soft landing. In other countries, a case of such total corruption would destroy the authority of both the entire government and the president himself. But in Russia, in the eyes of the population, Putin is cleaning up the highest echelons of power.
Whereas among the Kremlin elites, despite the arrests of high-ranking defense officials, everything is outwardly calm, among those who are considered members of the Russian opposition, passions are running high. I have in mind the recent investigation by Navalny associates (FBK) alleging assassination attempts on oppositionists by Leonid Nevzlin. In your view, what are the potential consequences for the opposition? Some commentators believe that the opposition for sure has no chance in Russia anymore.
What chance does the opposition have in Russia given the level of political repression in the country? What are we talking about? It is not the fault, but the misfortune of the opposition – its members, with rare exceptions, are in exile or in prison. I can name, for example, [St Petersburg Duma Deputy Boris] Vishnevsky (see his article in Russia.Post) and Lev Shlosberg from Yabloko, who are trying not to leave Russia. I am afraid that just for mentioning their names I will be pelted with rotten tomatoes.
“A fantastic split has emerged within the community of Russians who consume products of opposition groups and their leaders.”
It is not only the opposition that is split (it has always existed in this state), for example, the liberal party Union of Right Forces thought it extremely important to hurt Yabloko, and vice versa, even though they had a common enemy: the communists in the 1990s and later, in the early 2000s, United Russia. Russians with democratic views have been fragmented and atomized.
In general, these people have the same views and values. But you would not believe the hate on social media toward Vladimir Kara-Murza and Ilya Yashin when they, having found themselves in Germany after the prisoner swap, held a press conference and dared to say that not all Russians are freaks and Putin supporters, and that a ceasefire is a more important priority than continuing the war with the death of a huge number of people on both sides! Their heroism, it seems, means nothing to some.
We should not be disappointed in the opposition, but these people.
It is not the opposition that is resisting inside Russia, but civil society.
We were reminded of its existence when it went to collect signatures for Nadezhdin and lit candles after Navalny’s death. Lawyers, sociologists, journalists, doctors, teachers, artists and publishers who are still working in Russia – this is responsible civil society.
The blocked Novaya Gazeta works in Moscow; Irina Prokhorova and Elena Shubina publish excellent books in Moscow. And the lawyers who defend those persecuted for political reasons are mostly here, despite all the risks.
As in Soviet times, “to you and us” cheers the intelligentsia in their own kitchens – in St Petersburg, in Moscow, in other cities. All this, despite the differences in form, is civil resistance. Since Soviet times, we have known that nonparticipation in nastiness, “silent resistance,” is very important for the future of Russia.
In general, these people have the same views and values. But you would not believe the hate on social media toward Vladimir Kara-Murza and Ilya Yashin when they, having found themselves in Germany after the prisoner swap, held a press conference and dared to say that not all Russians are freaks and Putin supporters, and that a ceasefire is a more important priority than continuing the war with the death of a huge number of people on both sides! Their heroism, it seems, means nothing to some.
We should not be disappointed in the opposition, but these people.
It is not the opposition that is resisting inside Russia, but civil society.
We were reminded of its existence when it went to collect signatures for Nadezhdin and lit candles after Navalny’s death. Lawyers, sociologists, journalists, doctors, teachers, artists and publishers who are still working in Russia – this is responsible civil society.
The blocked Novaya Gazeta works in Moscow; Irina Prokhorova and Elena Shubina publish excellent books in Moscow. And the lawyers who defend those persecuted for political reasons are mostly here, despite all the risks.
As in Soviet times, “to you and us” cheers the intelligentsia in their own kitchens – in St Petersburg, in Moscow, in other cities. All this, despite the differences in form, is civil resistance. Since Soviet times, we have known that nonparticipation in nastiness, “silent resistance,” is very important for the future of Russia.
Vladimir Kara-Murza, Andrei Pivovarov and Ilya Yashin at a press conference after the US-Russia prisoner swap. Bonn, Germany. August 2, 2024. Source: Dzen
You mentioned the negative reaction to statements by Kara-Murza and Yashin, which was another example of how those who left continue to argue with those who remain in the country about who is morally superior. Have you seen such discussions?
I have already answered this question to some extent. Of course, I encounter these discussions, because “underground” discussion is extremely popular both here in Russia and abroad. Personally, I am in daily contact with both.
What I do not understand are the issues with Russians who stayed in the country.
I have already answered this question to some extent. Of course, I encounter these discussions, because “underground” discussion is extremely popular both here in Russia and abroad. Personally, I am in daily contact with both.
What I do not understand are the issues with Russians who stayed in the country.
“There are 30-40 million of us, people of democratic views, if we extrapolate onto the working population sociological data about those who do not support the Russian operation in Ukraine.”
Should we all leave?
Personally, I feel that I am needed here, which is why, when the Carnegie Foundation, where I worked for almost 10 years, was declared an “undesirable organization,” I decided to stay in Russia. This meant leaving a think tank that enjoys enormous respect in the world (which no longer has a branch in Russia, but still works in Lebanon and China). Many Russians who left think I am crazy...
Merab Mamardashvili noted [about Russia]: “here the essence of things is more visible.” Although he was saying that in the late Soviet era, which was much more “vegetarian” than the present.
[Socialite, journalist and one-time participant in oppositional politics] Ksenia Sobchak recently wrote: “whether you are for or against the special military operation, whether you condemn it or approve of it, whether you are in the opposition or pro-government, it does not matter: if you stay in Russia, you are FORCED to accept the rules of the game, otherwise you will find yourself… dangerously close to… a place called the Federal Penitentiary Service.” Do you think she is right about the “rules of the game” or is she whipping up fear so that those who remain will talk less?
It depends on what you mean by “rules of the game.” For example, at Novaya Gazeta the word “war” is replaced with three dots, so as not to put their own journalists in harm’s way. Yet the publication does not follow “their” rules of the game; it resists and helps its readers survive morally.
Sure, I cannot work with “undesirable” organizations. But in my pieces on the portal Newtimes.ru, where I have been writing a column for years, do I follow the “rules of the game?” I do not play with “them” in their games. I stay myself and act completely transparently and in line with the Constitution. As a qualified lawyer, I know perfectly well that it has been destroyed. But as a citizen, I have my own relationship with my Constitution; no one has canceled Chapter Two on the rights and freedoms of man and citizen.
In your view, does the opposition, or even just emigrants dissatisfied with the regime, have a chance to return to Russia and try to change things politically? Recently, some opposition-minded Russians have been saying things like “we understand we will never return to Russia.”
Personally, I feel that I am needed here, which is why, when the Carnegie Foundation, where I worked for almost 10 years, was declared an “undesirable organization,” I decided to stay in Russia. This meant leaving a think tank that enjoys enormous respect in the world (which no longer has a branch in Russia, but still works in Lebanon and China). Many Russians who left think I am crazy...
Merab Mamardashvili noted [about Russia]: “here the essence of things is more visible.” Although he was saying that in the late Soviet era, which was much more “vegetarian” than the present.
[Socialite, journalist and one-time participant in oppositional politics] Ksenia Sobchak recently wrote: “whether you are for or against the special military operation, whether you condemn it or approve of it, whether you are in the opposition or pro-government, it does not matter: if you stay in Russia, you are FORCED to accept the rules of the game, otherwise you will find yourself… dangerously close to… a place called the Federal Penitentiary Service.” Do you think she is right about the “rules of the game” or is she whipping up fear so that those who remain will talk less?
It depends on what you mean by “rules of the game.” For example, at Novaya Gazeta the word “war” is replaced with three dots, so as not to put their own journalists in harm’s way. Yet the publication does not follow “their” rules of the game; it resists and helps its readers survive morally.
Sure, I cannot work with “undesirable” organizations. But in my pieces on the portal Newtimes.ru, where I have been writing a column for years, do I follow the “rules of the game?” I do not play with “them” in their games. I stay myself and act completely transparently and in line with the Constitution. As a qualified lawyer, I know perfectly well that it has been destroyed. But as a citizen, I have my own relationship with my Constitution; no one has canceled Chapter Two on the rights and freedoms of man and citizen.
In your view, does the opposition, or even just emigrants dissatisfied with the regime, have a chance to return to Russia and try to change things politically? Recently, some opposition-minded Russians have been saying things like “we understand we will never return to Russia.”
“Many, like me, have not left because they understand that this could be forever. They want to be home.”
Ukrainian soldiers capture a Russian T-90M tank in Kursk Region. August 2024. Source: Wiki Commons
Home is not equal to the regime and the state, it is our country, which does not coincide with “their” country, invented in the Kremlin, at the FSB, on state television. When Putin leaves, a lot will change. The regime is extremely personalized. With Stalin gone, his comrades all sought liberalization, never mind how moderate. Just before Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, the entire country, including ordinary people, party functionaries and even some Politburo members, already passionately wanted change.
Sure, Putinism can outlive Putin; chaos is possible. The moderate scenario is different: gradual normalization (not democratization) of politics and public life under a technocratic boss (most likely from the old elite, not the counter-elite, like the conventional [Prime Minister Mikhail] Mishustin).
It has been more than a month since Kursk Region blew up as a factor in the conflict in Ukraine and as a story in Russian society. In your view, has it had any major impact? Or is everything “going according to plan,” as Putin says?
In the current, extraordinary circumstances, any shock is very quickly routinized, and growing anxiety subsides.
Sure, Putinism can outlive Putin; chaos is possible. The moderate scenario is different: gradual normalization (not democratization) of politics and public life under a technocratic boss (most likely from the old elite, not the counter-elite, like the conventional [Prime Minister Mikhail] Mishustin).
It has been more than a month since Kursk Region blew up as a factor in the conflict in Ukraine and as a story in Russian society. In your view, has it had any major impact? Or is everything “going according to plan,” as Putin says?
In the current, extraordinary circumstances, any shock is very quickly routinized, and growing anxiety subsides.
“A psychological defense mechanism is triggered where you distance yourself from bad news and the incomprehensible outside world.”
The grave of Alexei Navalny. Moscow, March 2024. Source: Wiki Commons
A significant part of the country is, as the patriarch of Russian sociological research Lev Gudkov defines it, stuck in the “fetal position,” which serves to protect oneself: I do not see anything, and I do not want to see anything, leave me alone.
There is still a view that these Russians who consciously stay in the fetal position and cherish learned indifference will wake up because long-range missiles are flying at them. That is not so: Stockholm syndrome will kick in with regard to Putin, and such events will only contribute to further consolidation around him, in the best case having no impact on the mass consciousness. Definitely not on those who loath to think independently and find arguments to justify themselves in the speeches of their bosses and political talk shows on state television.
In your view, is there something like a thaw or perestroika around the corner? Do you think an adequate reaction is indefinite political anabiosis or escapism, along with watching opposition channels on Telegram and YouTube (while it’s still possible)?
In all authoritarian regimes, people fall into anabiosis – that same “fetal position” as a defensive reaction. The most optimistic thing that awaits us is a transition not even to democracy at first, but at least to some kind of normality. There will be no thaw under Putin.
Let’s talk about world politics. In your view, after two and a half years of war, what does the West want with regard to the ongoing conflict? Does it want Ukraine to win? Or is it waiting for the war of attrition to bleed both countries dry?
The West wants peace. Ideally, this very generalized West would like to return at least to the beginning of February 2022, when it was possible to cooperate with Russia, at least economically. And I am sure that this is the desire of many Russians and certainly numerous elites.
But for now, such a scenario is an absolute utopia.
When it became clear that Putin’s regime could not be bent, the West began to see Russia as a toxic enclave, which the US and Europe will deal with at some point later, when the hot phase of confrontation ends and long negotiations begin, which will go on for years. Perhaps with a more unstable dividing line than the border between the two Koreas.
There is still a view that these Russians who consciously stay in the fetal position and cherish learned indifference will wake up because long-range missiles are flying at them. That is not so: Stockholm syndrome will kick in with regard to Putin, and such events will only contribute to further consolidation around him, in the best case having no impact on the mass consciousness. Definitely not on those who loath to think independently and find arguments to justify themselves in the speeches of their bosses and political talk shows on state television.
In your view, is there something like a thaw or perestroika around the corner? Do you think an adequate reaction is indefinite political anabiosis or escapism, along with watching opposition channels on Telegram and YouTube (while it’s still possible)?
In all authoritarian regimes, people fall into anabiosis – that same “fetal position” as a defensive reaction. The most optimistic thing that awaits us is a transition not even to democracy at first, but at least to some kind of normality. There will be no thaw under Putin.
Let’s talk about world politics. In your view, after two and a half years of war, what does the West want with regard to the ongoing conflict? Does it want Ukraine to win? Or is it waiting for the war of attrition to bleed both countries dry?
The West wants peace. Ideally, this very generalized West would like to return at least to the beginning of February 2022, when it was possible to cooperate with Russia, at least economically. And I am sure that this is the desire of many Russians and certainly numerous elites.
But for now, such a scenario is an absolute utopia.
When it became clear that Putin’s regime could not be bent, the West began to see Russia as a toxic enclave, which the US and Europe will deal with at some point later, when the hot phase of confrontation ends and long negotiations begin, which will go on for years. Perhaps with a more unstable dividing line than the border between the two Koreas.
“For now, to make political decisions, it is easier for the West to consider Russia completely toxic and to equate basically all Russians with Putinists, and the country with the regime.”
This thinking cannot be called strategic, but the situation is definitely extraordinary.
How do you assess the likelihood of peace being concluded in the near future, especially in light of the US presidential election?
That option was possible at the beginning of this disaster. Now neither leader is ready to make concessions. Still, readiness to make concessions is born from a hopeless situation and high-quality, skillful mediation. That is why many are now looking to India: Turkey is not doing so well, the Arab countries are not either; the Global South would like to stop this, but it is not going to put pressure on Putin, nor is China.
It is more or less obvious that, in the classic, twentieth-century sense, there will be no winners in this confrontation. A war of attrition continues and will continue. It cannot lead to anything other than the death and maiming of young men and a demographic crisis. Another two and a half years of the same military operations – forward through five kilometers of scorched earth, five kilometers back. Drones will fly at Russia, missiles at Ukraine.
A common argument: a ceasefire is unacceptable because it will give Putin a break. Yet Putin does not need a break! His economy is already semi-militarized. No ceasefire means higher military-industrial production, higher GDP (unhealthy growth, but growth) and higher wages. Sure, this leads to overheating, to inflation; sure, it will not be so easy for the Ministry of Finance to balance the budget; sure, the Central Bank is raising the key rate to the skies; but there is no collapse or famine.
But Ukraine needs a break, at least because, as Ukrainian Energy Minister German Galushchenko said, the country could be “plunged into darkness.” Concessions on both sides are inevitable. To begin discussing their scale, there must be a ceasefire.
Or at least give it some thought, instead of attacking Lev Shlosberg and Grigory Yavlinsky for trying to talk about it. Social media is full of furious criticism of both.
At stake is not land or “saving face,” but human lives.
How do you assess the likelihood of peace being concluded in the near future, especially in light of the US presidential election?
That option was possible at the beginning of this disaster. Now neither leader is ready to make concessions. Still, readiness to make concessions is born from a hopeless situation and high-quality, skillful mediation. That is why many are now looking to India: Turkey is not doing so well, the Arab countries are not either; the Global South would like to stop this, but it is not going to put pressure on Putin, nor is China.
It is more or less obvious that, in the classic, twentieth-century sense, there will be no winners in this confrontation. A war of attrition continues and will continue. It cannot lead to anything other than the death and maiming of young men and a demographic crisis. Another two and a half years of the same military operations – forward through five kilometers of scorched earth, five kilometers back. Drones will fly at Russia, missiles at Ukraine.
A common argument: a ceasefire is unacceptable because it will give Putin a break. Yet Putin does not need a break! His economy is already semi-militarized. No ceasefire means higher military-industrial production, higher GDP (unhealthy growth, but growth) and higher wages. Sure, this leads to overheating, to inflation; sure, it will not be so easy for the Ministry of Finance to balance the budget; sure, the Central Bank is raising the key rate to the skies; but there is no collapse or famine.
But Ukraine needs a break, at least because, as Ukrainian Energy Minister German Galushchenko said, the country could be “plunged into darkness.” Concessions on both sides are inevitable. To begin discussing their scale, there must be a ceasefire.
Or at least give it some thought, instead of attacking Lev Shlosberg and Grigory Yavlinsky for trying to talk about it. Social media is full of furious criticism of both.
At stake is not land or “saving face,” but human lives.
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