In the immediate aftermath of Wagner’s mutiny in June 2023 and even more so after Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death two months later in August, plenty of speculation was offered concerning the fate of the group. Wagner’s role in Ukraine effectively ended with the mutiny, but its large-scale operations in Syria, Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR), alongside several smaller-scale ones, mostly in other African countries, had come to represent one of the most visible faces of Russian foreign policy.

Russian government efforts to replace Wagner Group, drive by the 2023 mutiny, had mixed results. In Syria and Libya, they were successful, not least because the conflicts affecting these countries were frozen or had greatly diminished in intensity by then. The Russian government also managed to get a new contract in Burkina Faso, without involving Wagner Group but relying on Russian PMC Redut instead. During 2024, efforts to launch a new brand in the PMC business, the Africa Corps, had limited success and in practice it was either Redut or Wagner that managed the bulk of operations in Africa and Middle East.

In Mali, the only country where Wagner was seriously engaged in active conflict as of mid-2023, the transition did not succeed, not least because the Malian junta insisted to keep Wagner for the core mercenary business of actively fighting on its behalf. In the CAR, President Touadéra too insisted to keep Wagner, this time to secure his regime. The Russian government, in the end, had to accept a compromise and include Wagner Group in its revised contracts with Mali and CAR. In the CAR, Wagner’s business interests were affected only in limited measure, while in Syria, the other main focus of Wagner-related business schemes, the business was quickly taken over by the Russian authorities.

The key lesson here is that while there were aspects of Wagner’s multi-spectrum activities that the MoD PMC department and partners such as Redut were able to take over, such as support roles and training contracting, Wagner proved irreplaceable as far as engaging in combat was concerned. In addition, some African regimes showed a clear preference for trusting regime security to Wagner, even if in general having the Russian government involved in the contracts was seen as a safer approach. Overall, the compromises worked out appeared quite satisfactory for African clients.

Although in the end a compromise was worked out and Wagner-Russian MoD relations seemed to be improving considerably during 2024, Pavel Prigozhin, who took over from his father, also sought to establish the Wagner business on more independent footing. He and his marketing team sought to find clients without the support of the Russian authorities, marking a break with previous practice. Sources reported multiple contacts and negotiations with a variety of clients, although as of summer 2024 no new contract had been signed. Under his management, Wagner Group also sought to take steps towards building its own air wing, without which it would not be able to carry out combat operations independently. For a period at least, Wagner group also sought to directly compete with the Russian government in seeking contracts, for example trying to partner with Chinese companies, but without success. In the meanwhile, those within the Russian apparatus who saw Prigozhin’s ruthless and rapacious business approach seemed to be gaining ground in advocating a more developmental approach.


The paper by Antonio Giustozzi and David Lewis examines the shifts in Russian policy in Syria, Mali and the CAR, based on a series of interviews with Wagner personnel and other informed interlocutors. In total, for this report authors utilized 22 interviews with current and former Wagner Group staff, Russian diplomats and military officers, Syrian, Malian and Central African government officials, military officers, businessmen and local community elders, as well as experts and analysts working on Wagner Group in various European and North American countries. Some interviewees spoke in their official capacity or as external observers, but the majority of the sources spoke off the record.

The paper opens the Russia Program’s Academic Policy Paper Series, a collection of policy reports produced by scholars using rigorous academic methodologies. The series aims to present cutting-edge, policy-relevant research in a form that is both accessible and impactful for a broad audience.