Politics
Russia’s ‘Historical Truth’ Campaign Hits Soviet Political Repressions
September 17, 2024
- Boris VishnevskyColumnist, St Petersburg city deputy
Columnist and politician Boris Vishnevsky details recent amendments made to Russia’s law on preserving the memory of victims of political repression, which now lacks information about the number of those victims and facts about the repression.
The original text in Russian was published in Russian in Novaya Gazeta. A slightly shortened version is being republished here with the editors’ permission.
A 300-meter-long monument with the names of 20,762 people shot at the Butovo Firing Range (now located within the city limits of Moscow) between August 8, 1937, and October 19, 1938. Erected in September 2017. Source: Wiki Commons
On June 20, the Russian government issued Order No. 1564-r, amending the State Policy Concept for Perpetuating the Memory of the Victims of Political Repression. The first version of the concept was approved by the Russian government on August 2015, the corresponding order, No. 1561-r, signed by then-Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev.
In the current version, the wording is so vague as to be unclear about who exactly carried out the repressions, who was responsible, what exactly the repressions entailed, whom and in what numbers they affected, and who was rehabilitated and how many rehabilitated persons there are.
Yet there was enough room for discussions of “national interests,” “strengthening traditional spiritual and moral values” and protecting society from “destructive information and psychological influence.”
And, of course, about the Baltic and Ukrainian Nazis, traitors to the Motherland and members of underground nationalist groups.
What has been removed from the preamble
The preamble of the document has been changed almost completely. Not only is the key statement gone that “Russia cannot fully become a state governed by the rule of law and take a leading role in the world community without perpetuating the memory of the many millions of its citizens who became victims of political repression.” Almost all the specifics have been removed.
Not a word is left about how representatives of religious confessions or remaining prerevolutionary elites were repressed.
In the current version, the wording is so vague as to be unclear about who exactly carried out the repressions, who was responsible, what exactly the repressions entailed, whom and in what numbers they affected, and who was rehabilitated and how many rehabilitated persons there are.
Yet there was enough room for discussions of “national interests,” “strengthening traditional spiritual and moral values” and protecting society from “destructive information and psychological influence.”
And, of course, about the Baltic and Ukrainian Nazis, traitors to the Motherland and members of underground nationalist groups.
What has been removed from the preamble
The preamble of the document has been changed almost completely. Not only is the key statement gone that “Russia cannot fully become a state governed by the rule of law and take a leading role in the world community without perpetuating the memory of the many millions of its citizens who became victims of political repression.” Almost all the specifics have been removed.
Not a word is left about how representatives of religious confessions or remaining prerevolutionary elites were repressed.
“There is no more mention of forced collectivization, the famine it caused or the mass repressions in which ‘millions of people lost their lives, became prisoners of the Gulag and were deprived of their property and subjected to deportation’.”
There is no reminder of how in the 1950s and 1960s, relatives of those executed were given death certificates with fictitious dates and causes of death. Later, when they began to receive documents that actually indicated the dates of execution, a line was put for the cause of death. Meanwhile, the places of mass executions and burials were not disclosed, and documents about them remained classified.
The section describing the rehabilitation process that resumed during the perestroika years (at that time, millions of repression victims remained unrehabilitated) has been completely removed from the concept. On the creation of a Politburo commission within the CPSU Central Committee to further examine case materials related to repressions; on the annulment by decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of all extrajudicial rulings of “troikas” and “special [NKVD] councils;” on the cancellation of all repressive acts to deport various nations populating Russia; on the decisions by which the repressions from the 1920s and into the 1950s were recognized illegal and the rights of all victims of political repressions were subject to rehabilitation; and, finally, on recognition of the fact of political repressions before Stalin and after him.
The section describing the rehabilitation process that resumed during the perestroika years (at that time, millions of repression victims remained unrehabilitated) has been completely removed from the concept. On the creation of a Politburo commission within the CPSU Central Committee to further examine case materials related to repressions; on the annulment by decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of all extrajudicial rulings of “troikas” and “special [NKVD] councils;” on the cancellation of all repressive acts to deport various nations populating Russia; on the decisions by which the repressions from the 1920s and into the 1950s were recognized illegal and the rights of all victims of political repressions were subject to rehabilitation; and, finally, on recognition of the fact of political repressions before Stalin and after him.
The Wall of Grief: a memorial to the victims of political persecution. President Putin attended the opening in October 2017. Source: Wiki Commons
When Russia became an independent state, a number of Supreme Soviet resolutions, laws, presidential decrees and government resolutions were adopted to qualify various facts surrounding the repressions and rehabilitate their victims.
On the Novocherkassk massacre in 1962; on the restoration of the rights of former POWs and repatriated civilians during the Great Patriotic War; on the rehabilitation of repressed clergy and believers; on the rehabilitation of peasants who participated in uprisings in 1918-22; on the establishment of memorial complexes at the burial sites of Soviet and Polish victims of repression at Katyn (Smolensk Region) and Mednoye (Tver Region).
None of this is in the concept anymore, as if it never happened.
There are none of the figures that were there before: that in 1991–2014, 3,510,818 people were rehabilitated, with 264,085 people (children of repressed persons) recognized as having been a victim of political repression and rehabilitated.
Finally, the statement that “in the time since 1953, the rehabilitation process in Russia has not been completed” has been removed from the concept.
The same goes for this: “the exact number of repressed persons remains unknown, a national monument to the victims of political repression has not been established and the necessary work to identify the burial sites of victims of repression yet to be carried out.”
On the Novocherkassk massacre in 1962; on the restoration of the rights of former POWs and repatriated civilians during the Great Patriotic War; on the rehabilitation of repressed clergy and believers; on the rehabilitation of peasants who participated in uprisings in 1918-22; on the establishment of memorial complexes at the burial sites of Soviet and Polish victims of repression at Katyn (Smolensk Region) and Mednoye (Tver Region).
None of this is in the concept anymore, as if it never happened.
There are none of the figures that were there before: that in 1991–2014, 3,510,818 people were rehabilitated, with 264,085 people (children of repressed persons) recognized as having been a victim of political repression and rehabilitated.
Finally, the statement that “in the time since 1953, the rehabilitation process in Russia has not been completed” has been removed from the concept.
The same goes for this: “the exact number of repressed persons remains unknown, a national monument to the victims of political repression has not been established and the necessary work to identify the burial sites of victims of repression yet to be carried out.”
“The words that ‘continuing attempts to justify repressions by citing the particularity of the times or denying them as a fact of our history are unacceptable’ are gone.”
What is in the new preamble?
The new preamble is a list of the “national interests of Russia” taking into account “long-term trends in the evolving situation in Russia and the world.”
Many interests are listed, from “preserving the nation of Russia” and “protecting the constitutional order, sovereignty, independence, state and territorial integrity of Russia” to “developing a safe information space,” “protecting Russian society from destructive information and psychological influence” and “strengthening traditional Russian spiritual and moral values.”
What this has to do with perpetuating the memory of victims of political repression is a mystery. Among the listed “national interests of Russia” there is no condemnation of previous political repressions or statement about the inadmissibility of new political repressions.
The new text of the preamble, to fit into the current ideological framework, states that the amnesty of Soviet citizens who collaborated with occupying forces in 1941–45, as decreed by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on September 17, 1955, “subsequently, among other things, led to the rehabilitation, according to formal criteria, and whitewashing of Nazi collaborators and traitors to the Motherland who served in the Baltic, Ukrainian and other death squads formed on a national basis, as well as members of underground nationalist and criminal [banditskiye] groups.”
The 1955 decree states that “guided by the principle of humanism, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet considers it possible to apply an amnesty to Soviet citizens who, during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45, through cowardice or lack of awareness, became involved in collaboration with the occupiers.”
The decree freed those who had been convicted under the relevant [criminal code] articles for 10 years of prison or less. Those who had been convicted for more than 10 years had their sentences halved. It was specifically underscored that the amnesty would not apply to “death squad members convicted of murder and torture of Soviet citizens.”
Also freed were those who were abroad but during the war had served in the German army or police, the gendarmerie or propaganda, and even those who held leadership positions in them – if they had “atoned for their guilt through subsequent patriotic work for the benefit of the Motherland or confessed.”
Importantly, the decree was about amnesty, i.e., an act of humanism and forgiveness, not “whitewashing” or “rehabilitation.”
In addition, the new version of the preamble mentions the 2020 constitutional amendment that “Russia ensures the protection of historical truth,” and states that in accordance with that principle, the process of rehabilitating repressed persons will be pursued.
Changes to other sections of the concept
On the need for an “objective analysis of both the achievements of the Soviet period and its tragic chapters, including mass political repressions,” “the Russian state” has replaced “the Soviet period.”
The new preamble is a list of the “national interests of Russia” taking into account “long-term trends in the evolving situation in Russia and the world.”
Many interests are listed, from “preserving the nation of Russia” and “protecting the constitutional order, sovereignty, independence, state and territorial integrity of Russia” to “developing a safe information space,” “protecting Russian society from destructive information and psychological influence” and “strengthening traditional Russian spiritual and moral values.”
What this has to do with perpetuating the memory of victims of political repression is a mystery. Among the listed “national interests of Russia” there is no condemnation of previous political repressions or statement about the inadmissibility of new political repressions.
The new text of the preamble, to fit into the current ideological framework, states that the amnesty of Soviet citizens who collaborated with occupying forces in 1941–45, as decreed by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on September 17, 1955, “subsequently, among other things, led to the rehabilitation, according to formal criteria, and whitewashing of Nazi collaborators and traitors to the Motherland who served in the Baltic, Ukrainian and other death squads formed on a national basis, as well as members of underground nationalist and criminal [banditskiye] groups.”
The 1955 decree states that “guided by the principle of humanism, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet considers it possible to apply an amnesty to Soviet citizens who, during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45, through cowardice or lack of awareness, became involved in collaboration with the occupiers.”
The decree freed those who had been convicted under the relevant [criminal code] articles for 10 years of prison or less. Those who had been convicted for more than 10 years had their sentences halved. It was specifically underscored that the amnesty would not apply to “death squad members convicted of murder and torture of Soviet citizens.”
Also freed were those who were abroad but during the war had served in the German army or police, the gendarmerie or propaganda, and even those who held leadership positions in them – if they had “atoned for their guilt through subsequent patriotic work for the benefit of the Motherland or confessed.”
Importantly, the decree was about amnesty, i.e., an act of humanism and forgiveness, not “whitewashing” or “rehabilitation.”
In addition, the new version of the preamble mentions the 2020 constitutional amendment that “Russia ensures the protection of historical truth,” and states that in accordance with that principle, the process of rehabilitating repressed persons will be pursued.
Changes to other sections of the concept
On the need for an “objective analysis of both the achievements of the Soviet period and its tragic chapters, including mass political repressions,” “the Russian state” has replaced “the Soviet period.”
“The word ‘mass’ in ‘mass political repressions’ has disappeared as well – it is now nowhere to be found in the concept.”
The Mask of Sorrow: a memorial in Magadan dedicated to the memory of the victims of political repression. Opened in June 1996. Source: Wiki Commons
Firstly, what do the achievements of the preceding period of the “Russian state” have to do with political repressions in the Soviet era? And secondly, getting rid of the qualification “mass” in “mass repressions” (and, as mentioned above, getting rid of information on the number of those repressed and rehabilitated) is a deliberate attempt to avoid indicating the scale of political repression, which the authorities take pains not to bring up.
The same goal is served by getting rid of the part of the concept about measures planned for memorialization, which in the 2015 text was defined as “the establishment and development of memorial sites in places of mass burial of victims of political repressions that perpetuate [their] memory.”
At the same time, a clause has been added to “verify the validity of decisions of judicial and nonjudicial bodies, as well as the cancellation of decisions made on rehabilitation in relation to persons specified in Article 4 of the law On the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression.
The article states that ineligible for rehabilitation are persons “in whose cases there is sufficient evidence” to support accusations of committing a number of serious crimes: treason (espionage or disclosure of military or state secrets); going over to the enemy’s side; espionage, terrorist acts, sabotage; war crimes; crimes against peace, against humanity and against justice; and a number of others.
Such persons had not previously been recognized as having the right to rehabilitation (this has been the law since 1991). What will the “verification” provided for in the new text mean? Will today’s prosecutors and investigators begin to reconsider circumstances and facts about days long past (and concerning persons who are almost certainly long gone)?
Judging by what we have seen in recent years, there is no reason to trust their objectivity and impartiality.
The same goal is served by getting rid of the part of the concept about measures planned for memorialization, which in the 2015 text was defined as “the establishment and development of memorial sites in places of mass burial of victims of political repressions that perpetuate [their] memory.”
At the same time, a clause has been added to “verify the validity of decisions of judicial and nonjudicial bodies, as well as the cancellation of decisions made on rehabilitation in relation to persons specified in Article 4 of the law On the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression.
The article states that ineligible for rehabilitation are persons “in whose cases there is sufficient evidence” to support accusations of committing a number of serious crimes: treason (espionage or disclosure of military or state secrets); going over to the enemy’s side; espionage, terrorist acts, sabotage; war crimes; crimes against peace, against humanity and against justice; and a number of others.
Such persons had not previously been recognized as having the right to rehabilitation (this has been the law since 1991). What will the “verification” provided for in the new text mean? Will today’s prosecutors and investigators begin to reconsider circumstances and facts about days long past (and concerning persons who are almost certainly long gone)?
Judging by what we have seen in recent years, there is no reason to trust their objectivity and impartiality.
“There are quite a few reasons, meanwhile, to believe that the motivation for a possible revision of decisions about rehabilitations will be political.”
This revision would affect not so much those who were actually rehabilitated unlawfully, but rather those who need to be declared guilty again to fit today’s political situation. This means people with Ukrainian, Baltic and other currently “hostile” surnames.
Finally, in the section on the concept’s implementation, the previously stated intention to “establish a single memorial network to perpetuate the memory of victims of political repression” is no longer there.
Meanwhile, the effectiveness of the concept will not be evaluated, as before, based on growth in the “number of memorial objects (permanent exhibitions, works of monumental art, etc.) [to] perpetuate the memory of victims of political repression; the number of exhibitions created on the topic of perpetuating [their] memory.” This sends a clear signal that new memorials to the victims are not needed.
The trend running through all the above mentioned changes is obvious and includes the rewriting of history textbooks in recent years, where the past is described in such a way as to justify the present.
This means not calling political repressions “mass” and speaking less about the crimes of the Soviet totalitarian regime but more about “Nazis,” “death squads,” “traitors,” and “accomplices,” about “national interests,” “spiritual and moral values,” “protection from destructive influence,” “security of the information space,” and so forth.
Finally, in the section on the concept’s implementation, the previously stated intention to “establish a single memorial network to perpetuate the memory of victims of political repression” is no longer there.
Meanwhile, the effectiveness of the concept will not be evaluated, as before, based on growth in the “number of memorial objects (permanent exhibitions, works of monumental art, etc.) [to] perpetuate the memory of victims of political repression; the number of exhibitions created on the topic of perpetuating [their] memory.” This sends a clear signal that new memorials to the victims are not needed.
The trend running through all the above mentioned changes is obvious and includes the rewriting of history textbooks in recent years, where the past is described in such a way as to justify the present.
This means not calling political repressions “mass” and speaking less about the crimes of the Soviet totalitarian regime but more about “Nazis,” “death squads,” “traitors,” and “accomplices,” about “national interests,” “spiritual and moral values,” “protection from destructive influence,” “security of the information space,” and so forth.
Homemade plaques with the names of those shot on the site of a modern building in Moscow. They are replacements put up by unknown persons after vandals destroyed official ones. Source: Last Address Telegram channel
Concept had long been under attack
This is reflected in the installation (although not on government initiative) of monuments to Stalin, the key figure behind the political repressions from the 1920s and into the 1950s.
It is evident from the attacks on monuments to victims of repression – in Perm Region and Yakutsk, Solovki and Vladimir, Tomsk and Irkutsk regions, Buryatia and Sverdlovsk Region, St Petersburg and Komi. In recent years, most often the targets have been monuments to repressed Soviet citizens of Polish, Lithuanian or Finnish descent, whose countries have recently been labeled “unfriendly.”
It is seen in the constant provocations at the memorial complex in Sandarmokh in Karelia against those who come to honor the memory of repressed persons.
It is reflected in the numerous cases of plaques put up by the Last Address project being targeted. In some cases, they are torn down (or damaged) by unknown vandals; in others, they are removed based on denunciations by people who see something wrong with them.
In St Petersburg, out of 441 Last Address plaques put up in recent years, 101 are gone.
In the text of the amended concept, it is basically impossible to understand what repressions are being discussed.
There is no mention of who carried them out and when. There is no mention of who the target was. There is no mention of what these repressions entailed. There is no mention of who is responsible for the repressions. There is no mention of how many people fell victim to the repressions and how many were later rehabilitated. There is no mention that it is inadmissible to defend repressions by citing “the particularity of the times” or to deny them altogether.
The general message is: there were some repressions, but rehabilitated victims are now being looked at in accordance with the principle of “historical truth.” Which, incidentally, often changes in Russia due to changes of regime or political course.
This is reflected in the installation (although not on government initiative) of monuments to Stalin, the key figure behind the political repressions from the 1920s and into the 1950s.
It is evident from the attacks on monuments to victims of repression – in Perm Region and Yakutsk, Solovki and Vladimir, Tomsk and Irkutsk regions, Buryatia and Sverdlovsk Region, St Petersburg and Komi. In recent years, most often the targets have been monuments to repressed Soviet citizens of Polish, Lithuanian or Finnish descent, whose countries have recently been labeled “unfriendly.”
It is seen in the constant provocations at the memorial complex in Sandarmokh in Karelia against those who come to honor the memory of repressed persons.
It is reflected in the numerous cases of plaques put up by the Last Address project being targeted. In some cases, they are torn down (or damaged) by unknown vandals; in others, they are removed based on denunciations by people who see something wrong with them.
In St Petersburg, out of 441 Last Address plaques put up in recent years, 101 are gone.
In the text of the amended concept, it is basically impossible to understand what repressions are being discussed.
There is no mention of who carried them out and when. There is no mention of who the target was. There is no mention of what these repressions entailed. There is no mention of who is responsible for the repressions. There is no mention of how many people fell victim to the repressions and how many were later rehabilitated. There is no mention that it is inadmissible to defend repressions by citing “the particularity of the times” or to deny them altogether.
The general message is: there were some repressions, but rehabilitated victims are now being looked at in accordance with the principle of “historical truth.” Which, incidentally, often changes in Russia due to changes of regime or political course.
Share this article
Read More
