Politics
Changes in Ukraine’s Religious Landscape Triggered by New Law
August 26, 2024
- Cyril HovorunDirector of the Huffington Ecumenical Institute at Loyola Marymount University (Los Angeles, California)
Theologian Cyril Hovorun discusses the implications of a new Ukrainian law banning Russia-linked Orthodox Church in Ukraine and mentions other attempts to bring the two Orthodox churches in Ukraine closer to each other.
When viewed in the context of the rapid social, political and religious developments taking place in Ukraine, the new Ukrainian law “On the Defense of Constitutional Order in the Sphere of Activities of Religious Organizations” indeed looks less untimely, biased and damaging than it seems at first glance. Though problematic in some respects, it has the potential to bring about positive changes in the religious landscape in Ukraine.
The law, passed by a majority in the Ukrainian parliament on August 21 and signed by President Zelensky on Ukraine’s Independence Day, August 24, was pushed by the opposition European Solidarity party in a populist move to challenge Zelensky’s Servant of the People party.
Zelensky and his ruling party, instead of acting to contain this populism, yielded to it and proposed its own, watered-down, though still-populist, piece of legislation. As with any populist measure, this law satisfies popular emotions but fails to address the issue it promises to solve strategically.
If this law was the only attempt to limit Kremlin interference in Ukraine through the Church, then it might only worsen such meddling.
The law, passed by a majority in the Ukrainian parliament on August 21 and signed by President Zelensky on Ukraine’s Independence Day, August 24, was pushed by the opposition European Solidarity party in a populist move to challenge Zelensky’s Servant of the People party.
Zelensky and his ruling party, instead of acting to contain this populism, yielded to it and proposed its own, watered-down, though still-populist, piece of legislation. As with any populist measure, this law satisfies popular emotions but fails to address the issue it promises to solve strategically.
If this law was the only attempt to limit Kremlin interference in Ukraine through the Church, then it might only worsen such meddling.
Metropolitan Onufriy, the primate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Right after Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, he called on Putin to “immediately stop the fratricidal war,” citing the “sin of Cain, who out of envy killed his own brother.” Source: Wiki Commons
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), though no longer subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate, is still connected to it. The Kremlin, meanwhile, is interested not in preserving the UOC as an institution, but in sowing chaos and violence between the Ukrainian churches, state and society. The new law may lead to more chaos.
At the same time, there are some less visible but healthier policies being discussed and cautiously implemented in Ukraine. An indication of this is intensified communication between President Zelensky’s office and the Ecumenical Patriarchate. They seem to be cooperating to address the chaotic and tense status quo in relations between the two Orthodox churches in Ukraine: the independent Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) and the UOC, which maintains a certain special relationship with Moscow.
Yet this cooperation does not seek to favor the former over the latter; instead, it promotes rapprochement between the two.
At the same time, there are some less visible but healthier policies being discussed and cautiously implemented in Ukraine. An indication of this is intensified communication between President Zelensky’s office and the Ecumenical Patriarchate. They seem to be cooperating to address the chaotic and tense status quo in relations between the two Orthodox churches in Ukraine: the independent Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) and the UOC, which maintains a certain special relationship with Moscow.
Yet this cooperation does not seek to favor the former over the latter; instead, it promotes rapprochement between the two.
“Neither of the churches’ leaderships genuinely wants rapprochement, and only outside forces can make it happen.”
The tandem of the president’s office and the Ecumenical Patriarchate seems to have the will and authority to do so.
Although President Zelensky and many Ukrainian policymakers want the adopted law to be water under the bridge, it may turn out to be a “stick” forcing the UOC (ex-Moscow Patriarchate) out of its comfort zone, whereby the UOC could reap the benefits from the perception of being persecuted without really being persecuted. This position allowed the UOC to take no further actions after it had cut some ties to Moscow while declaring its complete independence from the Russian church. Despite the UOC’s attempts to sell the credibility of the declaration, Ukrainian society did not fall for such wishful thinking.
The UOC still seems to be in denial about the reality of the war and the weaponization of the Church by the Kremlin, though this could be the usual inertia of church thinking. The new law might bring the UOC to its senses. We will see whether the UOC starts adjusting to the state of war in Ukraine and the country’s effort to survive the existential threat posed by Russia’s invasion.
Although President Zelensky and many Ukrainian policymakers want the adopted law to be water under the bridge, it may turn out to be a “stick” forcing the UOC (ex-Moscow Patriarchate) out of its comfort zone, whereby the UOC could reap the benefits from the perception of being persecuted without really being persecuted. This position allowed the UOC to take no further actions after it had cut some ties to Moscow while declaring its complete independence from the Russian church. Despite the UOC’s attempts to sell the credibility of the declaration, Ukrainian society did not fall for such wishful thinking.
The UOC still seems to be in denial about the reality of the war and the weaponization of the Church by the Kremlin, though this could be the usual inertia of church thinking. The new law might bring the UOC to its senses. We will see whether the UOC starts adjusting to the state of war in Ukraine and the country’s effort to survive the existential threat posed by Russia’s invasion.
“Besides the stick, the Ukrainian state, in alliance with the Ecumenical Patriarchate, wants to offer the UOC a carrot – a road map for the church to get out of the limbo it has got itself in.”
There are some tiny hints that the UOC’s leadership is considering such a way out.
What is a carrot for the UOC is a stick for its counterpart, the OCU, however. The latter has cunningly resisted all attempts to involve the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the peacemaking process between the Orthodox jurisdictions in Ukraine.
This stick forces the OCU out of its comfort zone, as well. The OCU hoped that the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Ukrainian state would act in its exclusive interests on this issue. But the new law will fall short of the OCU’s expectations, likely without triggering a massive exodus of UOC communities to the OCU. The new law also gives the Ukrainian state leverage to gently press the latter to be more cooperative on interchurch reconciliation.
Both Ukrainian churches will have to overcome some of their vested interests and move closer to each other. This would serve the common good of the Ukrainian people and deliver a blow to President Putin. Both the Ukrainian state and the Ecumenical Patriarchate increasingly recognize the need for such rapprochement and are demonstrating a willingness to facilitate it. UOC-OCU rapprochement is the big picture of the religious landscape in Ukraine; the new law, even if not the most helpful part of this picture, has a place in it.
What is a carrot for the UOC is a stick for its counterpart, the OCU, however. The latter has cunningly resisted all attempts to involve the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the peacemaking process between the Orthodox jurisdictions in Ukraine.
This stick forces the OCU out of its comfort zone, as well. The OCU hoped that the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Ukrainian state would act in its exclusive interests on this issue. But the new law will fall short of the OCU’s expectations, likely without triggering a massive exodus of UOC communities to the OCU. The new law also gives the Ukrainian state leverage to gently press the latter to be more cooperative on interchurch reconciliation.
Both Ukrainian churches will have to overcome some of their vested interests and move closer to each other. This would serve the common good of the Ukrainian people and deliver a blow to President Putin. Both the Ukrainian state and the Ecumenical Patriarchate increasingly recognize the need for such rapprochement and are demonstrating a willingness to facilitate it. UOC-OCU rapprochement is the big picture of the religious landscape in Ukraine; the new law, even if not the most helpful part of this picture, has a place in it.
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