SOCIETY
Russians Look Back on 2024: Inflation as Chronic Disease, End to War a Distant Dream
January 13, 2025
-
Denis Volkov
Director of the Levada Center (Moscow)
Sociologist Denis Volkov writes about Russian assessments of 2024, the fact that the number of people supporting peace talks with Ukraine has grown significantly, and the growing concern among Russians about a number of social issues.
According to the most general overall sentiments shared by two-thirds of Russians, the year 2024 turned out to be “average”—seen both in the level of responses from last year, as well as most of the measurements from the 2000s and 2010s.
Almost the same number considered it “successful”—slightly less than 2023 figures, which represented the peak over 25 years of measurements. Focus groups show that people primarily include their assessments of their own situation in their responses—"everyone is alive and well,” “we have a roof over our heads and food on our plates,” "we were able to take a vacation”—but also ideas about the situation within the country, for example: "the economic situation is difficult, but from the point of view of what was forecast for 2022, it’s fine” or "the year was not unsuccessful for us in terms of military achievements.”
Over the past five years, survey takers have had much more positive evaluations of their own lives than of the situation in the country over all. Thus, more than half (55%) say that the past year was “just like the one prior,” while another 35% say that it was more difficult. When speaking about the country, the ratio flips—the prevailing opinion is that the year was more difficult. For both questions, the ratio of answers resembles assessments given in December 2023. All this suggests that, despite all the twists and turns, people have more or less adapted to the situation and perceive the situation with a certain degree of detachment.
Almost the same number considered it “successful”—slightly less than 2023 figures, which represented the peak over 25 years of measurements. Focus groups show that people primarily include their assessments of their own situation in their responses—"everyone is alive and well,” “we have a roof over our heads and food on our plates,” "we were able to take a vacation”—but also ideas about the situation within the country, for example: "the economic situation is difficult, but from the point of view of what was forecast for 2022, it’s fine” or "the year was not unsuccessful for us in terms of military achievements.”
Over the past five years, survey takers have had much more positive evaluations of their own lives than of the situation in the country over all. Thus, more than half (55%) say that the past year was “just like the one prior,” while another 35% say that it was more difficult. When speaking about the country, the ratio flips—the prevailing opinion is that the year was more difficult. For both questions, the ratio of answers resembles assessments given in December 2023. All this suggests that, despite all the twists and turns, people have more or less adapted to the situation and perceive the situation with a certain degree of detachment.
The terrorist attack at the Crocus City Hall concert venue in Moscow killed over 130 people and injured hundreds. March 2024. Source: Wiki Commons
Main events of the year
Monthly surveys taken over the course of the year clearly demonstrate how eventful 2024 proved to be. These events evoked a greater emotional response and more people considered one or another event to be significant.
The total list of significant events that we compiled for survey takers to evaluate was almost twice as long as in 2023. Our focus group participants said the same thing themselves: “A very eventful year, and often you don’t know how to react to everything that’s going on,” “They moved into the Kursk Oblast, then they threatened us with a nuclear war, then the ‘Oreshnik’ appeared—you barely have time to breathe.”
Judging by the results of the final December survey, the most significant events of 2024 for Russians were the attack on the Kursk Oblast (mentioned by 35% of respondents), the Russian presidential elections and the terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall (31% each), as well as the use of the new Oreshnik missile (30%).
Among other significant events, people mentioned the US presidential elections, Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian regions, the general course of the “special operation,” and the BRICS summit in Kazan.
Monthly surveys taken over the course of the year clearly demonstrate how eventful 2024 proved to be. These events evoked a greater emotional response and more people considered one or another event to be significant.
The total list of significant events that we compiled for survey takers to evaluate was almost twice as long as in 2023. Our focus group participants said the same thing themselves: “A very eventful year, and often you don’t know how to react to everything that’s going on,” “They moved into the Kursk Oblast, then they threatened us with a nuclear war, then the ‘Oreshnik’ appeared—you barely have time to breathe.”
Judging by the results of the final December survey, the most significant events of 2024 for Russians were the attack on the Kursk Oblast (mentioned by 35% of respondents), the Russian presidential elections and the terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall (31% each), as well as the use of the new Oreshnik missile (30%).
Among other significant events, people mentioned the US presidential elections, Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian regions, the general course of the “special operation,” and the BRICS summit in Kazan.
“The tragedy at Crocus City Hall caused the greatest emotional response among our fellow citizens. More than half of those surveyed (56%) in March named this terrorist attack the central event of the month in an open-ended question without prompts.”
A distribution point for humanitarian aid for Kursk residents. August 2024. Source: Wiki Commons
People were shaken by the scale of the tragedy, in which at least 145 were killed. Empathy for the victims was enhanced by the fact that any ordinary person could easily imagine themselves in the victim’s place, as a visitor at a musical event in one of the largest concert halls in the country. This is not the case with most dramatic events: they seem as if they are happening on a screen somewhere far away, not to us.
Only the Ukrainian army’s attack on the Kursk Oblast caused a comparable surge of empathy, which resulted in fundraising for refugees. Inhabitants of neighboring villages found it easiest of all to imagine themselves in the place of Kursk Oblast residents. “They’ll reach us too,” “It may affect us too.” But the further from the scene of events, the greater the detachment: “The special operation is in its third year, and in Moscow, everything’s fine—well, one window in Moscow proper was knocked out by a drone.” For most, concern about the events in the Kursk Oblast was more likely associated with fears of a new wave of mobilization and the risk of being directly involved in the conflict.
But let us return to the conversation about the terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall.
Only the Ukrainian army’s attack on the Kursk Oblast caused a comparable surge of empathy, which resulted in fundraising for refugees. Inhabitants of neighboring villages found it easiest of all to imagine themselves in the place of Kursk Oblast residents. “They’ll reach us too,” “It may affect us too.” But the further from the scene of events, the greater the detachment: “The special operation is in its third year, and in Moscow, everything’s fine—well, one window in Moscow proper was knocked out by a drone.” For most, concern about the events in the Kursk Oblast was more likely associated with fears of a new wave of mobilization and the risk of being directly involved in the conflict.
But let us return to the conversation about the terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall.
“The fact that people from the former Central Asian Soviet republics were accused of carrying out the terrorist attack raised a wave of anti-migrant sentiment in society that has not subsided to this day.”
Against this backdrop, concerns about the influx of migrants have doubled compared to 2023. And the attack has also divided the year into before and after: everything that happened before seems much more distant.
Thus, the Russian presidential elections held on March 17 seemed much less significant by the end of the year than they did in February-March. The results of the elections were evident long before voting day. No one expected any surprises and there were none.
In today’s focus groups, the Russian elections were overshadowed by the later-occurring and more dynamic US election campaigns, marked by a failed assassination attempt, fierce competition between candidates, and intrigue that persisted until the very end.
Thus, the Russian presidential elections held on March 17 seemed much less significant by the end of the year than they did in February-March. The results of the elections were evident long before voting day. No one expected any surprises and there were none.
In today’s focus groups, the Russian elections were overshadowed by the later-occurring and more dynamic US election campaigns, marked by a failed assassination attempt, fierce competition between candidates, and intrigue that persisted until the very end.
Muscovites waiting to put their signatures down for Boris Nadezhdin as a presidential candidate. January 2024. Nadezhdin was eventually barred from running. Source: X
Interest in the US election cycle was higher in 2024 than it was four years ago, and sympathy for Donald Trump has grown. And all because a portion of the Russian population believes that his victory will bring an end to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict: “With Trump, we can reach an agreement.”
Much was said about the “special operation” during the Russian elections as well. Vladimir Putin regularly addressed this topic during the campaign, and voters' attention was drawn to candidates who advocated a speedy end to the conflict. First, there was Boris Nadezhdin (see Russia.Post about his campaign here), with people lined up outside of his campaign headquarters to add their signature to his nomination, then later, after the Central Election Commission refused to register Nadezhdin, Vyacheslav Davankov, a candidate from the New People party.
However, none of these politicians enjoyed much support—not because voters did not want peace, but rather because they did not see them as any real competition to the main candidate.
Similarly, the death of Alexei Navalny, which, according to respondents, was one of the most notable events in February (primarily, it was residents of large cities disappointed with the government who spoke about it, but not only them), seemed like a distant memory by the second half of the year: “As if it didn’t happen this year, as if many years had already passed.”
For the liberal wing of the Russian opposition, Navalny’s death was a disorganizing event. As focus group participants said, “the opposition fell apart,” “it used to have a single, unifying face,” and now it is unclear “who will lead the opposition instead of him.”
Much was said about the “special operation” during the Russian elections as well. Vladimir Putin regularly addressed this topic during the campaign, and voters' attention was drawn to candidates who advocated a speedy end to the conflict. First, there was Boris Nadezhdin (see Russia.Post about his campaign here), with people lined up outside of his campaign headquarters to add their signature to his nomination, then later, after the Central Election Commission refused to register Nadezhdin, Vyacheslav Davankov, a candidate from the New People party.
However, none of these politicians enjoyed much support—not because voters did not want peace, but rather because they did not see them as any real competition to the main candidate.
Similarly, the death of Alexei Navalny, which, according to respondents, was one of the most notable events in February (primarily, it was residents of large cities disappointed with the government who spoke about it, but not only them), seemed like a distant memory by the second half of the year: “As if it didn’t happen this year, as if many years had already passed.”
For the liberal wing of the Russian opposition, Navalny’s death was a disorganizing event. As focus group participants said, “the opposition fell apart,” “it used to have a single, unifying face,” and now it is unclear “who will lead the opposition instead of him.”
“Our polls confirm that Russian liberals do not have a recognized leader today. Only 4% of Russians noted Navalny's death among the main events of the year.”
Inflation remains, as always, the major concern among Russian people. Source: Statista
Economic assessments
For not the first time, inflation and the general rise in living costs was one of the important topics of the year—among other events, it was noted by 21% of respondents. Among the most important social problems, inflation still ranks first.
While last year, eggs and bananas were symbols of price hikes, this year, the media wrote more about skyrocketing butter prices. It is important to note that despite all the concern about rising prices, the perception of the issue as acute has decreased in recent years as inflation is seen more as a chronic disease—one which the majority of the population can live with, at least partially, thanks to annual readjustments of pensions, benefits and salaries for public sector employees.
It is worth noting that in the latter half of the year, concern about most social problems, such as poverty, economic crisis, inaccessibility of health care, and stratification between the poor and the rich, grew slightly and synchronously. In essence, this is the flip side of successful adaptation to the realities of the new era. While, with the start of the “special operation,” consolidation around the government and concerns about the future pushed aside concerns about social problems, as the conflict becomes routine, familiar concerns are returning again.
Overall economic assessments remained quite moderate throughout the year, optimism prevailed only in relation to the future development of the economy. Assessments of personal situations are more modest—they still usually say that "the situation has not changed/will not change,” "everything has remained the same for me, it hasn’t changed.”
For not the first time, inflation and the general rise in living costs was one of the important topics of the year—among other events, it was noted by 21% of respondents. Among the most important social problems, inflation still ranks first.
While last year, eggs and bananas were symbols of price hikes, this year, the media wrote more about skyrocketing butter prices. It is important to note that despite all the concern about rising prices, the perception of the issue as acute has decreased in recent years as inflation is seen more as a chronic disease—one which the majority of the population can live with, at least partially, thanks to annual readjustments of pensions, benefits and salaries for public sector employees.
It is worth noting that in the latter half of the year, concern about most social problems, such as poverty, economic crisis, inaccessibility of health care, and stratification between the poor and the rich, grew slightly and synchronously. In essence, this is the flip side of successful adaptation to the realities of the new era. While, with the start of the “special operation,” consolidation around the government and concerns about the future pushed aside concerns about social problems, as the conflict becomes routine, familiar concerns are returning again.
Overall economic assessments remained quite moderate throughout the year, optimism prevailed only in relation to the future development of the economy. Assessments of personal situations are more modest—they still usually say that "the situation has not changed/will not change,” "everything has remained the same for me, it hasn’t changed.”
“However, the ratio of positive to negative assessments is better today than it has been over the past 16 years.”
This is the result of a fairly long-term increase in economic and consumer sentiment, observed at least since the end of the pandemic. Peak values for all indicators were recorded in March-April of this year—election season, during which time the authorities usually schedule additional bonuses and make promises.
Estimates of the economic situation then approached the maximum figures that had previously been observed only at the peak of the recovery growth of the 2000s, which was cut short by the 2008 global financial crisis.
After reaching a peak in mid-spring, economic assessments began to decline. Apparently, the overall increase in the cost of living and the reduction of some social programs after the elections, such as preferential mortgages, had an effect. Closer to autumn, for the first time in several years, there was a notable decrease in the proportion of people talking about the advisability of making large purchases; this may be the first signs that the Central Bank’s efforts to cool demand have begun to bear fruit.
Most indicators continued to decline until mid-autumn, when an uncertain sort of stabilization set it. But it is too early to talk about a formed trend; further observations are required.
Visually, the dynamics of economic assessments throughout 2024 can be imagined as a bubble that inflated by March-April, but by the end, had already collapsed—according to most indicators, today we have returned to the levels seen at the end of 2023. And it is not yet obvious in which direction the situation will develop next year.
Growing weariness over the conflict in Ukraine
Three quarters of Russians look to 2025 with hope—the same figures that we observed last December. From surveys of colleagues and focus group discussions, we know that these hopes are primarily linked to a ceasefire in Ukraine. As respondents say: “You always make the best wishes before the New Year,” “The most important thing is for the war to end and for you to be smart enough not to press the red button,” and “Hope dies last.”
Estimates of the economic situation then approached the maximum figures that had previously been observed only at the peak of the recovery growth of the 2000s, which was cut short by the 2008 global financial crisis.
After reaching a peak in mid-spring, economic assessments began to decline. Apparently, the overall increase in the cost of living and the reduction of some social programs after the elections, such as preferential mortgages, had an effect. Closer to autumn, for the first time in several years, there was a notable decrease in the proportion of people talking about the advisability of making large purchases; this may be the first signs that the Central Bank’s efforts to cool demand have begun to bear fruit.
Most indicators continued to decline until mid-autumn, when an uncertain sort of stabilization set it. But it is too early to talk about a formed trend; further observations are required.
Visually, the dynamics of economic assessments throughout 2024 can be imagined as a bubble that inflated by March-April, but by the end, had already collapsed—according to most indicators, today we have returned to the levels seen at the end of 2023. And it is not yet obvious in which direction the situation will develop next year.
Growing weariness over the conflict in Ukraine
Three quarters of Russians look to 2025 with hope—the same figures that we observed last December. From surveys of colleagues and focus group discussions, we know that these hopes are primarily linked to a ceasefire in Ukraine. As respondents say: “You always make the best wishes before the New Year,” “The most important thing is for the war to end and for you to be smart enough not to press the red button,” and “Hope dies last.”
“In 2024, the overall desire to see peace negotiations reached its highest level for the entire duration of the “special operation”—57-58%, while the proportion of people who supported continuing military hostilities fell to a minimum of 35-36%.”
The desire to end the conflict is evident in many of our studies—in sympathies for Trump, in interest in Nadezhdin and Davankov, in the questions that Russians would like to ask the president, most of which can be briefly formulated as follows: “When will this end?”; “When will there be peace?”
Interestingly, the past year saw a turning point in people’s perceptions of the duration of the Ukrainian conflict: in July, for the first time, the number of respondents who say that military action will continue for more than a year has noticeably fell to 32%, compared to 45% in January 2024. By November, the share of those who believe that the most difficult parts of the "special operation" are still to come decreased to 38% from 52% in April 2023.
Such sentiments reflect tension and a gradually growing weariness with the conflict. However, it should be noted that the majority of Russians do not want peace at any price and are not ready to make concessions to Ukraine. The majority still leaves the decision on when and how to begin negotiations to the authorities.
Overall, almost two-thirds of respondents again expect 2025 to be tense, both politically and economically. At the same time, the same number believe that for the average person the year will be more or less calm—life has already taught us to adapt to difficulties.
Interestingly, the past year saw a turning point in people’s perceptions of the duration of the Ukrainian conflict: in July, for the first time, the number of respondents who say that military action will continue for more than a year has noticeably fell to 32%, compared to 45% in January 2024. By November, the share of those who believe that the most difficult parts of the "special operation" are still to come decreased to 38% from 52% in April 2023.
Such sentiments reflect tension and a gradually growing weariness with the conflict. However, it should be noted that the majority of Russians do not want peace at any price and are not ready to make concessions to Ukraine. The majority still leaves the decision on when and how to begin negotiations to the authorities.
Overall, almost two-thirds of respondents again expect 2025 to be tense, both politically and economically. At the same time, the same number believe that for the average person the year will be more or less calm—life has already taught us to adapt to difficulties.
Share this article
Read More
