POLITICS
‘Mutual Responsibility and Codevelopment’: How the Valdai Club Sees Future Relations Between Russia and Its Neighbors
April 24, 2026
Russia’s leading foreign policy think tank has recently issued a report on Russia in the post-Soviet space. Overall, it calls for Moscow to recognize objective processes playing out in former Soviet republics and adapt its policy to retain influence. At the same time, Russia’s neighbors ought to recognize that they are “geopolitically connected” to Russia and share “mutual responsibility.”
Russia’s Valdai Club think tank (note: it is under sanctions for disseminating disinformation and propaganda) recently released a report titled “Russia and Its Neighbors: Mutual Responsibility and Codevelopment.” It analyzes the drivers behind Russia’s evolving relationships with former Soviet republics, as well as the mechanisms for Moscow to preserve influence across the post-Soviet space.
The author of the report, Timofei Bordachev, program director of the Valdai Club, is one of the most prominent figures in Russia’s international affairs expert community. He comes from the circle around Sergei Karaganov, arguably the foreign policy expert most respected by the Kremlin and personally by Vladimir Putin, who seeks to formulate a comprehensive ideology for Russia, one encompassing both foreign and domestic affairs. Bordachev is a generation younger than Karaganov, with whom he is a colleague not only at the Valdai Club but also at the Higher School of Economics. The ideas of Bordachev and Karaganov represent a continuation and eclectic synthesis of strands of Russian conservative thought, religious philosophy and Eurasianism. In terms of international relations, this translates into a form of realism where state behavior is seen as determined largely by civilizational identity.
Bordachev argues, in the recent report, that the old model of interaction between Russia and the post-Soviet space, which had been based in part on the Soviet legacy, is no longer viable. Power is increasingly shifting to people without experience of being part of a single state; old models of interaction are becoming obsolete. Post-Soviet states are developing along two divergent paths: on the one hand, the Baltic states, Ukraine and Moldova have aligned with the West and the US, effectively outsourcing political rule to “external forces”; on the other hand, Central Asia and the South Caucasus have emerged as regions where Russia still maintains a presence.
The report describes the war in Ukraine as an important – but not the only – factor shaping the evolution of relations between Russia and post-Soviet countries. Another factor is competition from other actors, such as Turkey and China. Against this backdrop, the Kremlin can no longer remain “at the head of the table” and ought to recognize the autonomy of its neighbors, with its policy adapting to this new reality. By “adapting” Bordachev means tempering ambitions at dominance and shifting to a more selective system to preserve Russian influence.
The author of the report, Timofei Bordachev, program director of the Valdai Club, is one of the most prominent figures in Russia’s international affairs expert community. He comes from the circle around Sergei Karaganov, arguably the foreign policy expert most respected by the Kremlin and personally by Vladimir Putin, who seeks to formulate a comprehensive ideology for Russia, one encompassing both foreign and domestic affairs. Bordachev is a generation younger than Karaganov, with whom he is a colleague not only at the Valdai Club but also at the Higher School of Economics. The ideas of Bordachev and Karaganov represent a continuation and eclectic synthesis of strands of Russian conservative thought, religious philosophy and Eurasianism. In terms of international relations, this translates into a form of realism where state behavior is seen as determined largely by civilizational identity.
Bordachev argues, in the recent report, that the old model of interaction between Russia and the post-Soviet space, which had been based in part on the Soviet legacy, is no longer viable. Power is increasingly shifting to people without experience of being part of a single state; old models of interaction are becoming obsolete. Post-Soviet states are developing along two divergent paths: on the one hand, the Baltic states, Ukraine and Moldova have aligned with the West and the US, effectively outsourcing political rule to “external forces”; on the other hand, Central Asia and the South Caucasus have emerged as regions where Russia still maintains a presence.
The report describes the war in Ukraine as an important – but not the only – factor shaping the evolution of relations between Russia and post-Soviet countries. Another factor is competition from other actors, such as Turkey and China. Against this backdrop, the Kremlin can no longer remain “at the head of the table” and ought to recognize the autonomy of its neighbors, with its policy adapting to this new reality. By “adapting” Bordachev means tempering ambitions at dominance and shifting to a more selective system to preserve Russian influence.
Vladimir Putin at the Valdai's meeting
Kremlin.ru
Kremlin.ru
One component of this is the concept of “mutual responsibility.” From the Valdai Club’s perspective, relations between Russia and post-Soviet states have been largely one sided, with Russia providing security guarantees, energy resources and financial support. Going forward, Russia no longer intends to act as a benefactor without insisting on conditions and now expects greater loyalty from former Soviet republics. Moscow recognizes their sovereignty, Bordachev writes, but this recognition is qualified by the fact that all of them are “geopolitically connected” to Russia. In other words, neighbors may pursue independent foreign policies – it is just that these must not run counter to Moscow’s interests.
According to Bordachev, the primary channel of influence is shifting to economics. At the center of the Kremlin’s strategy are trade, transport corridors, energy and migrant labor. When countries in the region are integrated economically with Russia, political distancing becomes more costly. In the report, attention is also given to integration projects such as the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which external actors are allegedly attempting to undermine and weaken. Bordachev questions their effectiveness but acknowledges that their importance lies less in producing concrete outcomes than in serving as instruments through which Russia can institutionalize its presence in the post-Soviet space.
The report highlights Central Asia and the South Caucasus as priorities for the Kremlin. The reason is simple: Russia still retains room for maneuver and engagement there. The report devotes little attention to countries “seeking to transfer their sovereignty to the West,” like Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, or Moldova and Ukraine, though in relation to the latter two Bordachev says “not everything is lost yet.” By that he means the Ukraine question will be resolved by the ongoing war and potential peace negotiations, while in Moldova there is hope for “neutralist forces,” which, in Bordachev’s assessment, enjoy significant public support there (see here and here about Kremlin operations in Moldova since Maia Sandu came to power in 2019).
According to Bordachev, the primary channel of influence is shifting to economics. At the center of the Kremlin’s strategy are trade, transport corridors, energy and migrant labor. When countries in the region are integrated economically with Russia, political distancing becomes more costly. In the report, attention is also given to integration projects such as the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which external actors are allegedly attempting to undermine and weaken. Bordachev questions their effectiveness but acknowledges that their importance lies less in producing concrete outcomes than in serving as instruments through which Russia can institutionalize its presence in the post-Soviet space.
The report highlights Central Asia and the South Caucasus as priorities for the Kremlin. The reason is simple: Russia still retains room for maneuver and engagement there. The report devotes little attention to countries “seeking to transfer their sovereignty to the West,” like Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, or Moldova and Ukraine, though in relation to the latter two Bordachev says “not everything is lost yet.” By that he means the Ukraine question will be resolved by the ongoing war and potential peace negotiations, while in Moldova there is hope for “neutralist forces,” which, in Bordachev’s assessment, enjoy significant public support there (see here and here about Kremlin operations in Moldova since Maia Sandu came to power in 2019).
A meeting of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly Council in St. Petersburg in 2018.
Russian Federation Council.
Russian Federation Council.
In the South Caucasus, Russia’s position, though weakened, remains resilient, the report notes. It took a hit following the defeat of Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh and with the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in which Russia has virtually no role. A “Georgian scenario” is seen as likely in Moscow-Yerevan relations, meaning a downgrading of military-political ties combined with substantial preserved economic influence for Moscow.
In Central Asia, Russia is still viewed as the region’s primary military and economic pole. The Valdai report notes that Moscow retains significant economic levers in relation to Astana, including control over the main export route for Kazakhstani oil via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium and a notable presence in Kazakhstan’s uranium sector through Rosatom subsidiaries.
The report stresses that Russia can no longer rely solely on a shared past to anchor relations with neighboring countries, as that runs counter to objective processes, such as nation-building in former Soviet republics and their integration into the global system. Moscow needs to adapt to this reality – that its neighbors will inevitably diversify their political and economic ties – or else, as the report cautions, “the costs of hard confrontation can nullify the results of any policy of adaptation.”
In Central Asia, Russia is still viewed as the region’s primary military and economic pole. The Valdai report notes that Moscow retains significant economic levers in relation to Astana, including control over the main export route for Kazakhstani oil via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium and a notable presence in Kazakhstan’s uranium sector through Rosatom subsidiaries.
The report stresses that Russia can no longer rely solely on a shared past to anchor relations with neighboring countries, as that runs counter to objective processes, such as nation-building in former Soviet republics and their integration into the global system. Moscow needs to adapt to this reality – that its neighbors will inevitably diversify their political and economic ties – or else, as the report cautions, “the costs of hard confrontation can nullify the results of any policy of adaptation.”
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