On the one hand, he looks "ideological,” promoting values like “patriotism,” "traditionalism" and anti-Westernism. On the other hand, he is presented as effective, an experienced and competent manager. Herein lies the weak spot of Putin's image. Until now, most of the political attacks on him were ideological, accusing him of violating human rights, the principles of democracy and so on. He fended them off relatively easily using the ideas of "patriotism" and "traditional values.”

Falling living standards make the regime vulnerable

However, the visionary playbook works poorly against attacks from the other side, those that call into question his effectiveness. There it begins to look like "hot air," "empty chatter." You can be whatever "patriot" you like, but if you turn out to be a bad crisis manager and do a poor job of managing the system, then you are of little use to the Fatherland. Putin hasn’t been systematically and consistently attacked from the standpoint of effectiveness, and this was a big mistake of his opponents. If someone were now trying to seriously and professionally undermine Putin’s image, then this is where he would focus his efforts. He would launch, so to speak, a “second front.”

The fact is that the Russian regime will have a hard time proving its effectiveness while living standards are falling. The only thing that such an opponent must do is not to allow Putin to shift the responsibility onto the "traditional" domestic scapegoats – sloppiness, red tape, bureaucratism and so on. Thus, criticism should be focused on the personal decisions of the leader.

The war is already starting to disappear from the front pages and soon will fade into the background. Issues like the economy, domestic policy, living standards and social problems will again come to the fore. This will be a moment of weakness for Putin – in such situations his ratings start to decline even without any focused external influence. If organized, such influence could significantly speed up the process. If a political actor was actually carrying out a major targeted campaign against Putin, then he would create a pool of experts who, having given up fighting a war with the regime on the “ideological” front, would take up public analysis and criticism of the economic policy pursued by the government from a non-ideological standpoint.

They would repeat that "the slogans are correct, but the execution is awful." If someone purposefully took this line, then at some point all state propaganda would begin to work against the regime: "All talk, no action." To centralize the flow of information, this hypothetical actor could even unite experts into some kind of “expert shadow government,” which would come out and say: “In the context of unprecedented sanctions, which threaten a sharp drop in living standards and the implosion of the state’s social infrastructure, we consider it necessary to offer Russian society alternative options for saving the domestic economy. We see that the government – whether out of incompetence or driven by the selfish motives of influential oligarch groups – doesn’t always make optimal decisions. We will develop our own course of action and offer it to Russians.”

If the electorate constantly hears that there are people offering alternative solutions and developing alternative trajectories, then this argument will disappear by itself. Moreover, it is “non-ideological” critics who, for objective reasons, will be the most acceptable candidates to take power after the fall of the regime. They would look like compromise figures capable of keeping the radical opposition from a full-fledged revolution. The most important thing is for the "non-ideological" critics to eventually shift to presenting an alternative image of the country's future, developing a strategy for future reforms, holding discussions, conferences and round tables, organizing votes on various options, etc.

I’ve already written that such work is critical to undermine the social base of the regime. Currently, it is precisely the lack of a clear outlook, along with the fear that “it might get worse,” that keeps the majority loyal. As soon as people believe that there is a future and it has been clearly outlined, they will refuse to support the regime. The Kremlin loves to accuse its political opponents of being "agents of the State Department” – yet judging by how Putin is criticized, the State Department seems far removed. Rather the resistance that we see is organized by many unconnected points, each of which acts how it wants, while a united front, controlled from one command post, can’t exist in nature. If it did, then it would certainly organize the resistance I’ve described.