Because of the sanctions, the following figures resigned from their positions: Alekperov (Lukoil), Andrei Guryev (PhosAgro), Yevtushenkov (Sistema), Dmitri Konov (SIBUR), Dmitri Mazepin (Uralkali), Andrei Melnichenko (SUEK and EuroChem), Vadim Moshkovich (Rusagro), Vladimir Rashevsky (SUEK) and others.
Alekperov was replaced as president of Lukoil by Vadim Vorobyov, a former associate
of Sergei Kiriyenko, the deputy head of the Presidential Administration. In exchange for supporting the “special operation” in Ukraine and transferring his core energy assets for management by a state corporation, Alekperov was allowed to continue providing strategic direction for Lukoil and received a promise
that Rosneft would halt attempts to take over the company for two years.
State oligarchs represent a hybrid of bureaucrats with backgrounds in business and private-sector oligarchs. On the one hand, they are better protected from the vicissitudes of the market, but on the other, they could lose almost everything they have by one stroke of Putin’s pen, should he decide to dismiss them.
With the outbreak of the war, the Kremlin demanded that they, like their private-sector peers, publicly and unequivocally declare their full loyalty and present an optimistic view of the future. Starting in March, the public was shown a parade of oligarchs giving lengthy interviews to the main news channels: Potanin (March 12), Shuvalov (March 18), Kostin (March 25), Lisin (April 5) and Deripaska (April 15).
The culmination of this oath of allegiance to the Kremlin was the St Petersburg Forum in June, where heavyweight state oligarchs, including Gref, Miller, Sechin and Chemezov, outnumbered their private-sector peers and gave lengthy statements.Security bureaucrats
On the one hand, wartime is their time, but on the other, they act on command, are used instrumentally and aren’t executing this instrumental role of theirs very well. For the most part, the security bureaucrats aren’t in the public eye, and though every now and then information surfaces about dismissals and even arrests of high-ranking military and FSB officers (including a number of army generals
who failed with their assignments, as well as head
of the FSB Fifth Directorate Colonel General Sergei Beseda and National Guard Deputy Director Lieutenant General Roman Gavrilov, who oversaw its own security service and special forces), it’s still difficult to verify. What is for sure is that since the leadership at the Prosecutor General and the National Guard/Internal Troops was replaced, large-scale purges have been carried out at both institutions; at end-2021, Putin replaced his advisor Anatoly Seryshev for security personnel.
Unlike the oligarchs, all security officials are Putin’s people – in fact, it’s the second “generation” (second rotation). Among them are “old” officials who were appointed during the transition to the tandem (when Dmitri Medvedev was president and Putin prime minister) and Putin’s return to the Kremlin, along with “new” officials appointed during Putin’s last two presidential terms.Old:
Alexander Bastrykin (Investigative Committee; appointed in 2007), Nikolai Patrushev, (Security Council; 2008), Alexander Bortnikov (FSB; 2008), Vladimir Kolokoltsev (Internal Affairs Ministry; 2012), Sergei Shoigu (Defense Ministry; 2012) and Valery Gerasimov (General Staff; 2012). New
: Viktor Zolotov (National Guard; 2016), Dmitri Kochnev (FSO; 2016), Alexei Rubezhnoy (Presidential Security Service; 2016), Igor Krasnov (Prosecutor General; 2020), Sergei Korolev (FSB; 2021), Dmitri Mironov (Presidential Administration; 2021), Alexander Kurenkov (Emergency Situations Ministry; 2022),
Among the security officials now promoting themselves against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, it is necessary to note Ramzan Kadyrov, the leader of Chechnya and at the same time head of his own security forces.