politics
‘We Always Have a Better Relationship if Each Side Understands What the Other Side is Actually Saying’
March 17, 2025
- Thomas GrahamDistinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, special assistant to the president George W. Bush and senior director for Russia on the National Security Council staff from 2004 to 2007
In an interview with RBC, Russia expert Thomas Graham talks about terms for potential ceasefire in Ukraine, including where the ceasefire line may be drawn, and gives his thoughts on the state of US-Russia relations and the limits of NATO expansion.
The interview was originally published in Russian on rbc.ru. We republish the English version here with Thomas Graham’s and RBC’s permissions.
Steven Witkoff, in addition to his Middle East portfolio as the United States Special Envoy to the Middle East, also became President Trump's de facto envoy to President Putin. Source: Wiki Commons
— On March 13, Steve Witkoff was in Moscow. This is his second visit in a month. On the same day, it emerged that he is no longer the main negotiator with Moscow. How do you assess the effectiveness of the contacts and the overall dynamics of US-Russia relations?
— Well, I think in general the relationship is moving in a much better direction than it was six weeks or two months ago. We have opened up a dialogue. We've had very serious discussions about Ukraine and the settlement of the other conflicts surrounding Ukraine at this point. Steve Witkoff has been in Moscow twice. He's probably not the main negotiator because it turns out that the main negotiators are President Trump and President Putin. But he is certainly an intermediary that is capable of carrying messages between the two presidents and I think that's the role that he's playing at this point.
The two presidents are scheduled to speak or at least they indicated desire to speak personally. I imagine that will happen in the not too distant future, and that will give us a much better sense of what trajectory we're really on and what the possibilities are in the next several weeks. But I think we're going to find that there is a desire in both capitals to put this relationship on a safer, more constructive rails and to find a way in which we can bring the conflict in Ukraine to a satisfactory end for Russia, for the United States and for the Ukrainians as well.
— How do you assess the new Trump team? How well does the White House currently understand Russia and the way its leadership thinks?
— Well, it's a new team. I think it's no secret that it's not a team that comes to office with a great deal of expertise on Russia, Ukraine or Europe for that matter. But the president does take a different view about world order, about how we should be conducting our relations with Russia and that's positive.
— Well, I think in general the relationship is moving in a much better direction than it was six weeks or two months ago. We have opened up a dialogue. We've had very serious discussions about Ukraine and the settlement of the other conflicts surrounding Ukraine at this point. Steve Witkoff has been in Moscow twice. He's probably not the main negotiator because it turns out that the main negotiators are President Trump and President Putin. But he is certainly an intermediary that is capable of carrying messages between the two presidents and I think that's the role that he's playing at this point.
The two presidents are scheduled to speak or at least they indicated desire to speak personally. I imagine that will happen in the not too distant future, and that will give us a much better sense of what trajectory we're really on and what the possibilities are in the next several weeks. But I think we're going to find that there is a desire in both capitals to put this relationship on a safer, more constructive rails and to find a way in which we can bring the conflict in Ukraine to a satisfactory end for Russia, for the United States and for the Ukrainians as well.
— How do you assess the new Trump team? How well does the White House currently understand Russia and the way its leadership thinks?
— Well, it's a new team. I think it's no secret that it's not a team that comes to office with a great deal of expertise on Russia, Ukraine or Europe for that matter. But the president does take a different view about world order, about how we should be conducting our relations with Russia and that's positive.
“Quite frankly, personally I would like to see a greater level of expertise inside the administration on Russia, because that's important for the negotiation.”
It's important that the administration understand clearly what the Russian position is, that they react to that and not to what they imagine the Russian position to be. I know there's some concern about it in Moscow as well.
We always have a better relationship and we conduct negotiations much more effectively if each side understands what the other side is actually saying, what the motivations are, what interests lie behind it, where the red lines are and so forth. So the Trump administration, I believe, is going to have to work very very quickly to bring itself, as we say, up to speed on issues like this if we're going to have an effective negotiation going forward. And I think that is something that should be welcomed in Moscow if that indeed happens.
— At the negotiations in Jeddah, the US obtained Ukraine's agreement for a 30-day full ceasefire as a way to start peace talks. The positive effect of the ceasefire in terms of creating conditions for negotiations is clear, but what dangers and risks might there be in a ceasefire? Could the US and Ukraine take advantage of the pause to rejuvenate and reequip Ukrainian army units for further fighting, given that Washington has already resumed military aid?
First of all, we need to remember that a ceasefire hasn't been agreed to at this point. And we don't know exactly what was agreed to by the Americans and the Ukrainians in Jeddah. We know that there was some agreement on a 30-day ceasefire, but what conditions were attached to that by the Ukrainians is not clear at this point.
As we know, President Putin said that they agree with the proposition, but the certain nuances have to be worked out. And I'm sure that Steve Witkoff and President Putin discussed in some detail what conditions would be attached to a ceasefire, how it would be implemented and so forth and that is a matter that the two presidents are going to discuss in the not too distant future.
Now, it's probably not strange that both sides had some of the same fears when it comes to the ceasefire. You just indicated what the Russian concerns are — that during a cease-fire the Ukrainians will use that as a time to recuperate, to rebuild their armed forces and to launch a more furious attack against Russia at the end of 30 days. Well, I'm not surprised the same is the concern in Kiev and they have said this publicly from time to time — that during a ceasefire Russia will have a chance to recuperate, that it will further rebuild some of its fighting forces and then it will renew the assault with even greater energy at the end of the ceasefire.
So one of the challenges of a ceasefire agreement is to give it an impulse towards not a simple 30-day ceasefire, but a more permanent ceasefire. But that requires, I believe, an agreement to work on a range of issues that surround the conflict. Some of those President Putin has mentioned — what the Russian side calls the root causes of the conflict. The Ukrainians are also deeply concerned about security guarantees.
These issues have to be on the table in a negotiation to prepare for the ceasefire, so each side has some confidence that the 30-day ceasefire will be actually part of a larger process that will lead to negotiations towards a permanent settlement of the conflict.
— Russia seemingly has its doubts about the expediency of a ceasefire, given its dominance on the battlefield. Can the US somehow persuade Russia to agree to a halt in hostilities?
The short answer to that question is yes. We need to think about that in the broader context. People are obviously focused on the Ukraine conflict at this point.
We always have a better relationship and we conduct negotiations much more effectively if each side understands what the other side is actually saying, what the motivations are, what interests lie behind it, where the red lines are and so forth. So the Trump administration, I believe, is going to have to work very very quickly to bring itself, as we say, up to speed on issues like this if we're going to have an effective negotiation going forward. And I think that is something that should be welcomed in Moscow if that indeed happens.
— At the negotiations in Jeddah, the US obtained Ukraine's agreement for a 30-day full ceasefire as a way to start peace talks. The positive effect of the ceasefire in terms of creating conditions for negotiations is clear, but what dangers and risks might there be in a ceasefire? Could the US and Ukraine take advantage of the pause to rejuvenate and reequip Ukrainian army units for further fighting, given that Washington has already resumed military aid?
First of all, we need to remember that a ceasefire hasn't been agreed to at this point. And we don't know exactly what was agreed to by the Americans and the Ukrainians in Jeddah. We know that there was some agreement on a 30-day ceasefire, but what conditions were attached to that by the Ukrainians is not clear at this point.
As we know, President Putin said that they agree with the proposition, but the certain nuances have to be worked out. And I'm sure that Steve Witkoff and President Putin discussed in some detail what conditions would be attached to a ceasefire, how it would be implemented and so forth and that is a matter that the two presidents are going to discuss in the not too distant future.
Now, it's probably not strange that both sides had some of the same fears when it comes to the ceasefire. You just indicated what the Russian concerns are — that during a cease-fire the Ukrainians will use that as a time to recuperate, to rebuild their armed forces and to launch a more furious attack against Russia at the end of 30 days. Well, I'm not surprised the same is the concern in Kiev and they have said this publicly from time to time — that during a ceasefire Russia will have a chance to recuperate, that it will further rebuild some of its fighting forces and then it will renew the assault with even greater energy at the end of the ceasefire.
So one of the challenges of a ceasefire agreement is to give it an impulse towards not a simple 30-day ceasefire, but a more permanent ceasefire. But that requires, I believe, an agreement to work on a range of issues that surround the conflict. Some of those President Putin has mentioned — what the Russian side calls the root causes of the conflict. The Ukrainians are also deeply concerned about security guarantees.
These issues have to be on the table in a negotiation to prepare for the ceasefire, so each side has some confidence that the 30-day ceasefire will be actually part of a larger process that will lead to negotiations towards a permanent settlement of the conflict.
— Russia seemingly has its doubts about the expediency of a ceasefire, given its dominance on the battlefield. Can the US somehow persuade Russia to agree to a halt in hostilities?
The short answer to that question is yes. We need to think about that in the broader context. People are obviously focused on the Ukraine conflict at this point.
“But we need to remember that what both Presidents have talked about is a much broader relationship between the United States and Russia, a real thawing after three and a half or more years of a deep freeze in US-Russian relations.”
In the initial phone call the Presidents talked about — yes — the Ukraine conflict, but they also talked about the Middle East, strategic stability, energy security. And you can think about the range of issues that are important to both countries that require, I think, active and subsequent discussion. The Arctic, for example, would be another area, the renewal of US-Russian business contacts would be another.
And so if there's one thing that I believe it's that the Kremlin — as it thinks about this Ukraine crisis and the ceasefire — does not want to adopt a position that precludes further developments in the broader US-Russian relationship.
So if those are issues on the table, I do believe it's quite possible that President Trump will make clear that Russia will need to take some concessions towards the ceasefire, towards peace. And that will be a condition for continuing to broaden the relationship between the two countries, which is clearly in the long-term strategic interests of both Russia and the United States.
And so if there's one thing that I believe it's that the Kremlin — as it thinks about this Ukraine crisis and the ceasefire — does not want to adopt a position that precludes further developments in the broader US-Russian relationship.
So if those are issues on the table, I do believe it's quite possible that President Trump will make clear that Russia will need to take some concessions towards the ceasefire, towards peace. And that will be a condition for continuing to broaden the relationship between the two countries, which is clearly in the long-term strategic interests of both Russia and the United States.
Russian invasion of Ukraine – ongoing military conflict in Eastern Europe since 2022. Source: Wiki Commons
— Moscow is also concerned about what will happen to the Ukrainian soldiers still in Kursk Region. Meanwhile, there have been reports of Russian troops entering Dnipro and Sumy regions. If the sides agree to a ceasefire and start full negotiations, how realistic will it be to achieve a shift in the contact line through diplomacy? Is it possible [for the sides] to agree on a withdrawal of troops?
That's obviously the idea. One of the issues that would have to be decided before a ceasefire could go into places is where the actual line of the ceasefire is going to be and whether the two sides along with the United States will agree on a line that will require one or the other country to withdraw forces from certain territory or not. So that's a question for the negotiation before a ceasefire is put into place.
I am quite confident that the Ukrainian position would be that the line should go through territory in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporozhye and Kherson at this point (In September 2022, the authorities of the DPR, LPR, and the Russian-controlled territories of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions held referendums on joining Russia. — RBC) and not include other areas or regions of Ukraine. The Russian position clearly is going to be that Kursk is not going to be part of the ceasefire and the Ukrainian forces will have to withdraw entirely from the Kursk region.
— If this line of ceasefire is negotiated, how stable and sustainable can it be? Do you expect some sort of movement there as well, as they negotiate?
— There are two issues here. One is what the character of the front lines will be while the negotiations are underway to agree on the ceasefire. And then — what will be the character of the ceasefire line once it's agreed to. It's not unusual for fighting to continue while the various sides are negotiating, and I would imagine that would be the case here as well. Each side wants to see whether it can better its position on the battlefield, particularly when we're talking about drawing that line as they agree on the final ceasefire line.
Once the ceasefire line is agreed, then the question becomes how you can monitor and verify. I think the way forward is to put together a trilateral US-Russian-Ukrainian military commission that would be responsible for monitoring the ceasefire. It would use what we call national technical means to do that.
It's fairly easy to monitor aerial strikes, it's very easy to monitor events that occur at sea. It's more complicated to monitor and verify things that occur on land, in part because the two armies are in very close proximity to one another.
But there needs to be a military commission where potential violations of the ceasefire can be raised and adjudicated, and people can decide then who is responsible or, more importantly, what needs to be done to ensure that such incidents don't occur in the future, so the ceasefire and the negotiations be kept on track.
— On the issue of personnel to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire “on the ground,” is there a need for armed peacekeepers as opposed to observers?
We're not talking about armed peacekeepers. Remember, there are two militaries on the ground already and they're both armed. It's the Russian military and the Ukrainian military. That is not what we're talking about, we're talking about simply using national technical means — it means satellite, it means drones — to ensure that the terms of ceasefire are being honored.
Now presumably — and this is something that will be discussed during the ceasefire negotiation — there will be political will in Moscow and Kiev to maintain that ceasefire.
I think the Ukrainians will have an interest in doing that - in part, because up to this point they have actually been losing ground on the battlefield.
That's obviously the idea. One of the issues that would have to be decided before a ceasefire could go into places is where the actual line of the ceasefire is going to be and whether the two sides along with the United States will agree on a line that will require one or the other country to withdraw forces from certain territory or not. So that's a question for the negotiation before a ceasefire is put into place.
I am quite confident that the Ukrainian position would be that the line should go through territory in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporozhye and Kherson at this point (In September 2022, the authorities of the DPR, LPR, and the Russian-controlled territories of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions held referendums on joining Russia. — RBC) and not include other areas or regions of Ukraine. The Russian position clearly is going to be that Kursk is not going to be part of the ceasefire and the Ukrainian forces will have to withdraw entirely from the Kursk region.
— If this line of ceasefire is negotiated, how stable and sustainable can it be? Do you expect some sort of movement there as well, as they negotiate?
— There are two issues here. One is what the character of the front lines will be while the negotiations are underway to agree on the ceasefire. And then — what will be the character of the ceasefire line once it's agreed to. It's not unusual for fighting to continue while the various sides are negotiating, and I would imagine that would be the case here as well. Each side wants to see whether it can better its position on the battlefield, particularly when we're talking about drawing that line as they agree on the final ceasefire line.
Once the ceasefire line is agreed, then the question becomes how you can monitor and verify. I think the way forward is to put together a trilateral US-Russian-Ukrainian military commission that would be responsible for monitoring the ceasefire. It would use what we call national technical means to do that.
It's fairly easy to monitor aerial strikes, it's very easy to monitor events that occur at sea. It's more complicated to monitor and verify things that occur on land, in part because the two armies are in very close proximity to one another.
But there needs to be a military commission where potential violations of the ceasefire can be raised and adjudicated, and people can decide then who is responsible or, more importantly, what needs to be done to ensure that such incidents don't occur in the future, so the ceasefire and the negotiations be kept on track.
— On the issue of personnel to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire “on the ground,” is there a need for armed peacekeepers as opposed to observers?
We're not talking about armed peacekeepers. Remember, there are two militaries on the ground already and they're both armed. It's the Russian military and the Ukrainian military. That is not what we're talking about, we're talking about simply using national technical means — it means satellite, it means drones — to ensure that the terms of ceasefire are being honored.
Now presumably — and this is something that will be discussed during the ceasefire negotiation — there will be political will in Moscow and Kiev to maintain that ceasefire.
I think the Ukrainians will have an interest in doing that - in part, because up to this point they have actually been losing ground on the battlefield.
“I think the Russian side will have an interest in maintaining this ceasefire in part because they have an interest in developing a broader relationship with the United States.”
And the United States will have an interest in ensuring that the ceasefire is honored in part because President Trump has said he wants to move this towards an ultimate resolution. And ceasing the fighting has been a top priority of President Trump since he was inaugurated way back in January.
— So you do not expect there to be some sort of peacekeeping mission on the ground, along the lines of past OSCE missions?
— Well, certainly not for an interim 30-day ceasefire. Quite frankly, if you think about this over the long term, there will not be an OSCE monitoring mission on the ground in Ukraine. I think this will work much better if it is actually kept to the Ukrainians, the Russians and the Americans. And as I said if there's political will in both capitals, the ceasefire will be honored.
I think both countries will have an abiding interest in maintaining that ceasefire: the Ukrainians — for the reasons that I've already all laid down: they have been losing ground, they do need to recuperate from what has been a very devastating and ruinous conflict. I think the same is true for the Russian side, but you also have to add that maintaining that ceasefire will be important to the further development of US-Russian relations. And I think the Kremlin and the White House have a long-term strategic interest in building an enduring and more constructive relationship between our two countries.
— What are the possible options for Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions? Both are essentially divided between Russia and Ukraine, and from the standpoint of the Russian and Ukrainian constitutions, a part of each region is temporarily occupied by the enemy. What difficulties does this create in terms of a possible peace treaty?
— Well, the way these things are normally handled is that each side recognizes the de facto control that the other side exercises over that territory, but does not recognize that de jure — that means that they don't recognize that formally or legally, and they maintain their own claims to that territory.
What you would like then to see in a permanent agreement is that both sides agree that they will not seek to regain the territory that they believe is theirs through military means, that it will be diplomatic means by and large. This is the way the issue of the divided Germany was handled during the Cold War. Now I would imagine something along the same lines is what will result from a resolution of the current Ukraine conflict.
— So you do not expect there to be some sort of peacekeeping mission on the ground, along the lines of past OSCE missions?
— Well, certainly not for an interim 30-day ceasefire. Quite frankly, if you think about this over the long term, there will not be an OSCE monitoring mission on the ground in Ukraine. I think this will work much better if it is actually kept to the Ukrainians, the Russians and the Americans. And as I said if there's political will in both capitals, the ceasefire will be honored.
I think both countries will have an abiding interest in maintaining that ceasefire: the Ukrainians — for the reasons that I've already all laid down: they have been losing ground, they do need to recuperate from what has been a very devastating and ruinous conflict. I think the same is true for the Russian side, but you also have to add that maintaining that ceasefire will be important to the further development of US-Russian relations. And I think the Kremlin and the White House have a long-term strategic interest in building an enduring and more constructive relationship between our two countries.
— What are the possible options for Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions? Both are essentially divided between Russia and Ukraine, and from the standpoint of the Russian and Ukrainian constitutions, a part of each region is temporarily occupied by the enemy. What difficulties does this create in terms of a possible peace treaty?
— Well, the way these things are normally handled is that each side recognizes the de facto control that the other side exercises over that territory, but does not recognize that de jure — that means that they don't recognize that formally or legally, and they maintain their own claims to that territory.
What you would like then to see in a permanent agreement is that both sides agree that they will not seek to regain the territory that they believe is theirs through military means, that it will be diplomatic means by and large. This is the way the issue of the divided Germany was handled during the Cold War. Now I would imagine something along the same lines is what will result from a resolution of the current Ukraine conflict.
US and Russian delegates meet in Riyadh on 18 Feb 2025 to discuss bilateral relations and and the prospects of ending the war in Ukraine. Source: Wiki Commons
— Ukraine insists on receiving security guarantees similar to Article 5 of the UN Charter, i.e., that the guarantor is obligated to engage in a direct armed conflict with Russia. In your view, is this feasible? Will the US, European countries or other states agree to such a measure, given that Russia is a nuclear power?
Well, I believe countries in Europe by and large are not prepared to give guarantees on the order of Article 5.
But you know, the President of the United States has already made clear that Ukraine's NATO membership is off the table. Now, whether he believes that's off the table forever or for an extended period is something that has to be clarified in the days and weeks ahead.
I would imagine the types of security guarantees that Ukraine can reasonably expect to get are along the lines of what Western countries have provided up to this point. That is, in the case of aggression against Ukraine, the United States and European countries are prepared to provide military equipment and financial assistance. But fighting on the ground will be done almost primarily, if not solely by the Ukrainians themselves.
I also believe that as part of the settlement, Ukrainians will be looking for not on guarantees, but ties with Western countries that will include investment in the development of the Ukrainian defense industrial sector, security and military cooperation. That will enable Ukraine to raise and maintain a military force that is quite capable in particular in territorial defense and that in itself will be a significant element of deterrence.
Well, I believe countries in Europe by and large are not prepared to give guarantees on the order of Article 5.
But you know, the President of the United States has already made clear that Ukraine's NATO membership is off the table. Now, whether he believes that's off the table forever or for an extended period is something that has to be clarified in the days and weeks ahead.
I would imagine the types of security guarantees that Ukraine can reasonably expect to get are along the lines of what Western countries have provided up to this point. That is, in the case of aggression against Ukraine, the United States and European countries are prepared to provide military equipment and financial assistance. But fighting on the ground will be done almost primarily, if not solely by the Ukrainians themselves.
I also believe that as part of the settlement, Ukrainians will be looking for not on guarantees, but ties with Western countries that will include investment in the development of the Ukrainian defense industrial sector, security and military cooperation. That will enable Ukraine to raise and maintain a military force that is quite capable in particular in territorial defense and that in itself will be a significant element of deterrence.
“But I don't think you're going to find any Western country that is prepared to give Ukraine an Article 5 type of guarantee, certainly not in the near term.”
— Is it possible to outline guarantees based on an updated Budapest Memorandum?
— I don't think it's going to be a Budapest type of memorandum. There are a number of what are called bilateral security agreements that have already been signed between Kiev and a number of Western countries, including the United States and major Europe countries. My guess is that these will be reconfigured in some way and related to one another, that would provide a broader security guarantee. These would have to be properly resourced over the next decade and that is where this will end up at the end of the day. So short of NATO membership, but a type of security arrangement that should give Ukraine confidence that it will not be alone if it is the object of aggression by any country.
— I don't think it's going to be a Budapest type of memorandum. There are a number of what are called bilateral security agreements that have already been signed between Kiev and a number of Western countries, including the United States and major Europe countries. My guess is that these will be reconfigured in some way and related to one another, that would provide a broader security guarantee. These would have to be properly resourced over the next decade and that is where this will end up at the end of the day. So short of NATO membership, but a type of security arrangement that should give Ukraine confidence that it will not be alone if it is the object of aggression by any country.
Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin during the Helsinki summit (2018). Source: Wiki Commons
— How important is the role of expert discussions in the current peace process – so-called track-two diplomacy? Such discussions were held during the Istanbul talks, and there were reports of recent meetings in Geneva.
— Track twos can be helpful if they are endorsed by the capitals. That is, if Moscow, Washington and Kiev would like non-governmental experts to get together and try to think through a specific problem for them, to try to be innovative, to provide solutions that might elude people operating in a formal capacity, they can be quite useful.
If it's simply expert discussion that's not connected to anything, well, it has a value in maintaining ties between the expert community, but it has very little bearing on the actual course of development between the countries at the state level.
So I am not opposed to Russian experts talking to American experts, talking to Ukrainian experts. I think that is important. But we shouldn't exaggerate the value of these. Unless they are connected to the decision-making bodies in the appropriate capitals, their impact or influence is quite limited.
— Do you personally prepare materials for the Trump administration as an outside expert?
— I've been engaged in track twos. I have over the years maintained contacts with the people in government, since I've left government in 2007. I am more than happy to exchange my views if people think that it's positive, but I am playing no direct role in the negotiations that are underway at this point.
There are track two processes underway. There are also fairly good ties between the two governments at this point. I think both sides — that is, the United States and Russia, the White House and the Kremlin — are satisfied with the way things are being conducted at this point. It makes no sense for other parties to try to engage or interfere or get in the way.
— Track twos can be helpful if they are endorsed by the capitals. That is, if Moscow, Washington and Kiev would like non-governmental experts to get together and try to think through a specific problem for them, to try to be innovative, to provide solutions that might elude people operating in a formal capacity, they can be quite useful.
If it's simply expert discussion that's not connected to anything, well, it has a value in maintaining ties between the expert community, but it has very little bearing on the actual course of development between the countries at the state level.
So I am not opposed to Russian experts talking to American experts, talking to Ukrainian experts. I think that is important. But we shouldn't exaggerate the value of these. Unless they are connected to the decision-making bodies in the appropriate capitals, their impact or influence is quite limited.
— Do you personally prepare materials for the Trump administration as an outside expert?
— I've been engaged in track twos. I have over the years maintained contacts with the people in government, since I've left government in 2007. I am more than happy to exchange my views if people think that it's positive, but I am playing no direct role in the negotiations that are underway at this point.
There are track two processes underway. There are also fairly good ties between the two governments at this point. I think both sides — that is, the United States and Russia, the White House and the Kremlin — are satisfied with the way things are being conducted at this point. It makes no sense for other parties to try to engage or interfere or get in the way.
“It's a time when people should allow the two governments to function as smoothly as possible to maintain the contacts.”
If things begin to bog down and there is a request from the Kremlin or the White House for new ideas, then that's the moment for experts to engage.
But the important thing always in things like this, when experts are thinking about forming track twos, is not to get in the way of the progress that the governments are making on their own. The governments themselves will make it clear to the expert community when they think the time is appropriate for their assistance.
— Russia is concerned about the legitimacy of the Ukrainian leader who will sign a peace treaty. What solutions are possible in this regard? Under what conditions is Zelensky’s signature possible on a future peace treaty? Will the decision to sign it require special legislation from the Rada?
— Zelensky remains the legitimate President of Ukraine under the laws and constitution of Ukraine at this point, which takes into account the possibility of martial law and so forth. So he has all of the authority he needs under Ukrainian law to sign a peace treaty or a settlement to this conflict.
I realize that there are concerns inside Russia. They’ve been raised publicly. A way of resolving this may be to create the conditions, in which elections could, in fact, be conducted inside Ukraine in accordance with the Ukrainian constitution and Ukrainian law, but that would take an agreement ultimately to a ceasefire that extends beyond one month to three or four months, which would allow Ukraine to lift martial law, have the three months it needs to conduct a proper presidential election. Then a new leader would be chosen according to the Constitution and will enjoy democratic legitimacy.
Who that individual could be is an open question. Zelensky could be reelected in those circumstances, or another individual could take this place. But that is one way of resolving the concerns on the Russian side, and from my standpoint, this would also be positive for the development of Ukraine as a more democratic society.
But that has to be worked out, I would argue, as part of the negotiation over the initial ceasefire and potentially a longer ceasefire. So when you head to the actual settlement documents, whenever that would be — and that is not going to be in the next month and not in the next two or three months — there would be no questions raised in Moscow about the legitimacy of the Ukrainian leader, who is signing those documents.
But the important thing always in things like this, when experts are thinking about forming track twos, is not to get in the way of the progress that the governments are making on their own. The governments themselves will make it clear to the expert community when they think the time is appropriate for their assistance.
— Russia is concerned about the legitimacy of the Ukrainian leader who will sign a peace treaty. What solutions are possible in this regard? Under what conditions is Zelensky’s signature possible on a future peace treaty? Will the decision to sign it require special legislation from the Rada?
— Zelensky remains the legitimate President of Ukraine under the laws and constitution of Ukraine at this point, which takes into account the possibility of martial law and so forth. So he has all of the authority he needs under Ukrainian law to sign a peace treaty or a settlement to this conflict.
I realize that there are concerns inside Russia. They’ve been raised publicly. A way of resolving this may be to create the conditions, in which elections could, in fact, be conducted inside Ukraine in accordance with the Ukrainian constitution and Ukrainian law, but that would take an agreement ultimately to a ceasefire that extends beyond one month to three or four months, which would allow Ukraine to lift martial law, have the three months it needs to conduct a proper presidential election. Then a new leader would be chosen according to the Constitution and will enjoy democratic legitimacy.
Who that individual could be is an open question. Zelensky could be reelected in those circumstances, or another individual could take this place. But that is one way of resolving the concerns on the Russian side, and from my standpoint, this would also be positive for the development of Ukraine as a more democratic society.
But that has to be worked out, I would argue, as part of the negotiation over the initial ceasefire and potentially a longer ceasefire. So when you head to the actual settlement documents, whenever that would be — and that is not going to be in the next month and not in the next two or three months — there would be no questions raised in Moscow about the legitimacy of the Ukrainian leader, who is signing those documents.
President Trump and Vice President JD Vance clash with President Zelenskyy during meeting in Oval Office on Feb. 28, 2025. Source: Wiki Commons
— Are we really witnessing the “final act” of Zelensky’s time in power, as the FT writes?
It's always premature to discuss those things. Elections in Ukraine have been contested, they've led to surprises. It's hard to predict. Zelensky has been a popular leader and he has led Ukraine during a very difficult period. How the electorate is going to react is something we won't know until election day. As I've said, he remains the legitimate leader of Ukraine. And he will remain a legitimate leader of Ukraine until an election takes place that will either re-legitimize him or select someone else in his place.
— Could the next president be a person from outside the political establishment, given the warand fatigue of Ukrainian society?
— You can't rule that out. The pattern in much of the West over the past several years has been the emergence of forces that are outside the mainstream and elected because of dissatisfaction with the governing elites.
To a certain extent, that's what's happened in the United States with the election of President Trump by rejection of mainstream thinking about American politics. You can never rule that out. That's what makes democracy democracy — the uncertainty of how an election will actually take place and what the results will be.
— Russia insists that a settlement should eliminate the “root causes” of the crisis, including NATO expansion. Moscow says Trump agrees with this, but he will only be in the Oval Office for four years. Is there a long-term solution to this issue that is not subject to who controls the White House?
Well, I think there are a couple of things that one can say in this regard. First, there will be less of an interest in further NATO expansion as a consequence not only of the resolution of the Ukraine conflict, but also of the broader discussion about European unity.
It's always premature to discuss those things. Elections in Ukraine have been contested, they've led to surprises. It's hard to predict. Zelensky has been a popular leader and he has led Ukraine during a very difficult period. How the electorate is going to react is something we won't know until election day. As I've said, he remains the legitimate leader of Ukraine. And he will remain a legitimate leader of Ukraine until an election takes place that will either re-legitimize him or select someone else in his place.
— Could the next president be a person from outside the political establishment, given the warand fatigue of Ukrainian society?
— You can't rule that out. The pattern in much of the West over the past several years has been the emergence of forces that are outside the mainstream and elected because of dissatisfaction with the governing elites.
To a certain extent, that's what's happened in the United States with the election of President Trump by rejection of mainstream thinking about American politics. You can never rule that out. That's what makes democracy democracy — the uncertainty of how an election will actually take place and what the results will be.
— Russia insists that a settlement should eliminate the “root causes” of the crisis, including NATO expansion. Moscow says Trump agrees with this, but he will only be in the Oval Office for four years. Is there a long-term solution to this issue that is not subject to who controls the White House?
Well, I think there are a couple of things that one can say in this regard. First, there will be less of an interest in further NATO expansion as a consequence not only of the resolution of the Ukraine conflict, but also of the broader discussion about European unity.
“It's become clear what the frontier between Russia and NATO is going to be, and it will be a line that is drawn from the Barents, through the Baltic Sea down to the Black Sea.”
That's one.
Two, I think it's important to remember that there are very few countries that are left outside of NATO that are also European. So what we're talking about, obviously, is Ukraine, which I don't believe is going to become part of NATO, certainly not in the near term, but I would argue most likely never; Belarus; the three countries in the Caucuses; and then there are two or three countries in the Balkans.
If I were predicting or looking into a crystal ball, I think you will see NATO expand into the Balkans. Bosnia and Herzegovina will become a member of NATO. I don't rule out that in time Serbia will become a member of NATO. And this is all part of the consolidation of Europe inside NATO and inside the European Union.
As I said, it is unlikely that we'll see Ukraine as part of NATO. Again, I can't imagine a scenario, under which Belarus becomes part of NATO. And the Caucasus states are problematic, to say the least. So, I think it's quite possible that the United States and Russia, Russia and NATO could reach an agreement on what the limits of NATO expansion are. And I would argue we’ve pretty much seen the limits so far.
So the resolution of this conflict will determine the line that divides Russia from the West, and there will be no NATO expansion beyond that line. And I would argue that on the Western side of that line, Ukraine will be dealt with in a way that is short of full membership.
Two, I think it's important to remember that there are very few countries that are left outside of NATO that are also European. So what we're talking about, obviously, is Ukraine, which I don't believe is going to become part of NATO, certainly not in the near term, but I would argue most likely never; Belarus; the three countries in the Caucuses; and then there are two or three countries in the Balkans.
If I were predicting or looking into a crystal ball, I think you will see NATO expand into the Balkans. Bosnia and Herzegovina will become a member of NATO. I don't rule out that in time Serbia will become a member of NATO. And this is all part of the consolidation of Europe inside NATO and inside the European Union.
As I said, it is unlikely that we'll see Ukraine as part of NATO. Again, I can't imagine a scenario, under which Belarus becomes part of NATO. And the Caucasus states are problematic, to say the least. So, I think it's quite possible that the United States and Russia, Russia and NATO could reach an agreement on what the limits of NATO expansion are. And I would argue we’ve pretty much seen the limits so far.
So the resolution of this conflict will determine the line that divides Russia from the West, and there will be no NATO expansion beyond that line. And I would argue that on the Western side of that line, Ukraine will be dealt with in a way that is short of full membership.
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