Politics
Research in Ukraine and Russia Shows Trump’s Mediation Efforts Have Only Sown More Discord
December 11, 2025
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Elena Koneva
Sociologist, ExtremeScan founder and researcher, Chronicles project partner, WAPOR national representative in Russia
Trump’s attempts to act as a peacemaker in the Russia-Ukraine war have failed to deliver the promised end to hostilities. In fact, they have thus far had the opposite effect – deepening mistrust and polarization and undermining the very idea of compromise.
The following is a condensed version of a study by sociologist Elena Koneva from the ExtremeScan project, which will be published by The Russia Program shortly.
High expectations for Trump
Since starting his second term as US president, Donald Trump has sought to mediate between Russia and Ukraine, having repeatedly promised to end the conflict in 24 hours. His efforts, contrary to the expectations of millions, have not produced a ceasefire. In fact, they have intensified radical attitudes on both sides and eroded confidence in the peace process itself.
In the 2024 US presidential campaign, Trump actively promoted his readiness to mediate between Moscow and Kyiv. He would put forward a new negotiating format, exert pressure on both warring parties and secure a lasting ceasefire. These grandiose assurances, amid widespread war fatigue, sparked a surge of hope: in early 2025, polls showed that 61% of Ukrainians and 78% of Russians believed that peace depended on Trump. Millions on both sides invested their hopes in him as an effective mediator who would soon deliver a stop to the bloodshed.
Reality has not kept pace with the expectations. The promised end of the war – on Trump’s first day back in the White House – never materialized, and as the war has dragged on, Trump’s standing among Russians and Ukrainians, who pinned their peace hopes on the new US president, has diminished significantly. Sociological research highlights the paradoxical effect of Trump’s mediation: instead of reducing tensions, it has calcified intransigence. Both in Russia and in Ukraine, radical sentiment is up, and trust in the peace process is down.
High expectations for Trump
Since starting his second term as US president, Donald Trump has sought to mediate between Russia and Ukraine, having repeatedly promised to end the conflict in 24 hours. His efforts, contrary to the expectations of millions, have not produced a ceasefire. In fact, they have intensified radical attitudes on both sides and eroded confidence in the peace process itself.
In the 2024 US presidential campaign, Trump actively promoted his readiness to mediate between Moscow and Kyiv. He would put forward a new negotiating format, exert pressure on both warring parties and secure a lasting ceasefire. These grandiose assurances, amid widespread war fatigue, sparked a surge of hope: in early 2025, polls showed that 61% of Ukrainians and 78% of Russians believed that peace depended on Trump. Millions on both sides invested their hopes in him as an effective mediator who would soon deliver a stop to the bloodshed.
Reality has not kept pace with the expectations. The promised end of the war – on Trump’s first day back in the White House – never materialized, and as the war has dragged on, Trump’s standing among Russians and Ukrainians, who pinned their peace hopes on the new US president, has diminished significantly. Sociological research highlights the paradoxical effect of Trump’s mediation: instead of reducing tensions, it has calcified intransigence. Both in Russia and in Ukraine, radical sentiment is up, and trust in the peace process is down.
Source: ExtremeScan
Public opinion radicalizes
In Russia, before Trump entered the picture, attitudes were relatively balanced: roughly half of respondents supported ending hostilities, while about the same share preferred to continue the war. Trump’s provocative statements in February, however, shifted Russian public opinion toward a more hawkish stance. The proportion of Russians unwilling to accept compromises in a settlement with Kyiv rose from 32% in autumn 2024 to 42% in March 2025. Despite the widespread fatigue with the protracted conflict (around half the population acknowledges that the war is negatively affecting their lives), state propaganda during this period portrayed Trump as a politician who “understands Russia” and is prepared to take its interests into account. This messaging reinforced perceptions of Russia’s military advantage and even encouraged demands to “keep fighting a little longer.” Because of the “Trump effect,” support for the military campaign temporarily increased, rising from roughly 50% to 57% at the peak of his declared peace push in early March.
In Ukraine, too, hope for a quick ceasefire initially rose, with a significant segment of society expressing readiness to make concessions for the sake of ending the war. In early 2025, about 40% of Ukrainians were willing to consider suspending offensive operations if it helped secure a peace agreement. Yet the infamous meeting between Zelensky and Trump on February 28 in the White House – which many Ukrainians viewed as humiliating for their country – sharply altered public sentiment: the share of respondents willing to compromise for peace fell to 33%, while support for fighting until full liberation of Russia-occupied territory rose from approximately 49% to 57%. In other words, most Ukrainians became markedly more uncompromising after that episode, rejecting the notion of a “bad peace,” on terms perceived as favorable to the Kremlin.
A mediator lacking trust
The pro-Russia tilt of Trump’s peace proposals went unnoticed neither in Kyiv nor in Moscow. The majority of Ukrainians, as well as a significant share of Russians, believed that Trump was acting in Russia’s interests. Earlier in the year, 72% of respondents in Ukraine and 43% in Russia held this view; by autumn, the latter figure had sunk to 32%. Overall trust in the US president remains extremely low: only about 12% of Ukrainians and 20% of Russians trust him. Many in Russia see him as a foxy and inconsistent politician, with more than half of Russians opining that even Putin does not trust him (and vice versa). As of autumn, only a third of Russians now say that Trump is genuinely seeking a ceasefire, versus the three quarters who believe in Putin’s peaceful intentions. In Ukraine, over 50% of the population believes that Trump is trying to pressure Kyiv into making dangerous territorial concessions to satisfy the Kremlin.
Overall, the upshot is that, in these conditions, no mediation can succeed: the mistrust on each side means that Trump’s initiatives have been seen by Russians as unreliable and by Ukrainians as forced on them and as threatening their country’s sovereignty.
In Russia, before Trump entered the picture, attitudes were relatively balanced: roughly half of respondents supported ending hostilities, while about the same share preferred to continue the war. Trump’s provocative statements in February, however, shifted Russian public opinion toward a more hawkish stance. The proportion of Russians unwilling to accept compromises in a settlement with Kyiv rose from 32% in autumn 2024 to 42% in March 2025. Despite the widespread fatigue with the protracted conflict (around half the population acknowledges that the war is negatively affecting their lives), state propaganda during this period portrayed Trump as a politician who “understands Russia” and is prepared to take its interests into account. This messaging reinforced perceptions of Russia’s military advantage and even encouraged demands to “keep fighting a little longer.” Because of the “Trump effect,” support for the military campaign temporarily increased, rising from roughly 50% to 57% at the peak of his declared peace push in early March.
In Ukraine, too, hope for a quick ceasefire initially rose, with a significant segment of society expressing readiness to make concessions for the sake of ending the war. In early 2025, about 40% of Ukrainians were willing to consider suspending offensive operations if it helped secure a peace agreement. Yet the infamous meeting between Zelensky and Trump on February 28 in the White House – which many Ukrainians viewed as humiliating for their country – sharply altered public sentiment: the share of respondents willing to compromise for peace fell to 33%, while support for fighting until full liberation of Russia-occupied territory rose from approximately 49% to 57%. In other words, most Ukrainians became markedly more uncompromising after that episode, rejecting the notion of a “bad peace,” on terms perceived as favorable to the Kremlin.
A mediator lacking trust
The pro-Russia tilt of Trump’s peace proposals went unnoticed neither in Kyiv nor in Moscow. The majority of Ukrainians, as well as a significant share of Russians, believed that Trump was acting in Russia’s interests. Earlier in the year, 72% of respondents in Ukraine and 43% in Russia held this view; by autumn, the latter figure had sunk to 32%. Overall trust in the US president remains extremely low: only about 12% of Ukrainians and 20% of Russians trust him. Many in Russia see him as a foxy and inconsistent politician, with more than half of Russians opining that even Putin does not trust him (and vice versa). As of autumn, only a third of Russians now say that Trump is genuinely seeking a ceasefire, versus the three quarters who believe in Putin’s peaceful intentions. In Ukraine, over 50% of the population believes that Trump is trying to pressure Kyiv into making dangerous territorial concessions to satisfy the Kremlin.
Overall, the upshot is that, in these conditions, no mediation can succeed: the mistrust on each side means that Trump’s initiatives have been seen by Russians as unreliable and by Ukrainians as forced on them and as threatening their country’s sovereignty.
Source: ExtremeScan
This year, Washington has sponsored several rounds of negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv, culminating in a personal meeting between Putin and Trump in August. Yet the Russian media has been reluctant to endorse the idea of a ceasefire. An analysis of major Telegram channels shows that at the early-March peak of Trump’s peace efforts, only about 7% of posts supported talks, while approximately 30% sharply rejected them as a “mistake” and a “sign of weakness.” Meanwhile, propaganda presented talks as futile and even harmful, tantamount to defeat. Only occasionally did the tone soften following signals sent from above – for example, Putin’s comment on the importance of dialogue on August 1 briefly lowered the intensity of the vitriol. Overall, the state media has maintained a restrained, cool tone, with negative comments about peace voiced far more frequently than positive ones.
This information campaign seems to reveal the Kremlin’s lack of a genuine desire for a negotiated end to the war where Russia must make concessions.
Bad peace/good peace
Russian propaganda has even introduced a marker to determine whether a peace is “bad” and “good.” The former is any peace in which Ukraine participates as an equal party in the negotiations; the latter, in contrast, is one in which Ukraine is reduced to an object, lacking agency, and the outcome of the conflict is determined by the two “responsible players” – Moscow and Washington. It is within this imagined “big deal” that propaganda discusses “long-term solutions” and a durable “peace architecture.”
For example, Russian coverage of the recently floated 28-point peace plan was uniformly positive. It was framed not as a concession to Kyiv but rather as a sweeping agreement between the US and Russia, designed to impose terms on Kyiv and ensure geopolitical stability. Meanwhile, direct negotiations with Kyiv have been portrayed as futile, conflict-prone and inevitably doomed. This messaging is reflected in the data: up to 75% of opinion media content (publitsistika) in recent months depicts Ukraine as a passive object – only 15-20% attributes any agency to Ukraine (and even then, often in a negative light). As a result, the masses are left with the impression that direct dialogue with Bankova Street is impossible and that a backroom deal between the Kremlin and the White House is the only viable path to peace.
Ultimately, Trump’s efforts to reconcile the two warring sides have produced the opposite effect. Instead of helping bring about a quicker end to the war, they have triggered a new wave of mistrust and resentment. Both Russians and Ukrainians have lost confidence in the “peacemaker” in the White House: for some he remains an outsider (chuzhak), for others an unreliable ally. Having failed to secure the trust of either side and entangled himself in a web of contradictory propaganda, the self-proclaimed peacemaker has only postponed a genuine Russia-Ukraine settlement.
This experience demonstrates that without trust and a real willingness to compromise, even the most high-profile peace initiatives can backfire – deepening divisions instead of encouraging reconciliation.
This information campaign seems to reveal the Kremlin’s lack of a genuine desire for a negotiated end to the war where Russia must make concessions.
Bad peace/good peace
Russian propaganda has even introduced a marker to determine whether a peace is “bad” and “good.” The former is any peace in which Ukraine participates as an equal party in the negotiations; the latter, in contrast, is one in which Ukraine is reduced to an object, lacking agency, and the outcome of the conflict is determined by the two “responsible players” – Moscow and Washington. It is within this imagined “big deal” that propaganda discusses “long-term solutions” and a durable “peace architecture.”
For example, Russian coverage of the recently floated 28-point peace plan was uniformly positive. It was framed not as a concession to Kyiv but rather as a sweeping agreement between the US and Russia, designed to impose terms on Kyiv and ensure geopolitical stability. Meanwhile, direct negotiations with Kyiv have been portrayed as futile, conflict-prone and inevitably doomed. This messaging is reflected in the data: up to 75% of opinion media content (publitsistika) in recent months depicts Ukraine as a passive object – only 15-20% attributes any agency to Ukraine (and even then, often in a negative light). As a result, the masses are left with the impression that direct dialogue with Bankova Street is impossible and that a backroom deal between the Kremlin and the White House is the only viable path to peace.
Ultimately, Trump’s efforts to reconcile the two warring sides have produced the opposite effect. Instead of helping bring about a quicker end to the war, they have triggered a new wave of mistrust and resentment. Both Russians and Ukrainians have lost confidence in the “peacemaker” in the White House: for some he remains an outsider (chuzhak), for others an unreliable ally. Having failed to secure the trust of either side and entangled himself in a web of contradictory propaganda, the self-proclaimed peacemaker has only postponed a genuine Russia-Ukraine settlement.
This experience demonstrates that without trust and a real willingness to compromise, even the most high-profile peace initiatives can backfire – deepening divisions instead of encouraging reconciliation.
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