SOCIETY
How the Kremlin Has Centralized the Russian Nonprofit Space
December 9, 2025
- Sergei Tikhonov
- Ksenia Zinder
After cutting Russian NGOs off from foreign funding, the Kremlin has attempted to reorient them toward its priorities, particularly providing social services and handling crises. A growing network of presidential grants now sustains thousands of organizations while keeping civil society tightly controlled.
The following is a summary of The Russia Program study “Outsourcing Social Policy, Controlling Civil Society: Russia’s Presidential Grants Fund”
Just a decade ago, many Russian NGOs relied on funding from abroad to operate. But starting in Vladimir Putin’s third presidential term, the landscape has changed dramatically. In 2012, the so-called “foreign agents” law was adopted, followed by legislation on “undesirable organizations.” These measures effectively cut off most Western funding and forced many independent NGOs into survival mode. Yet civil society was not destroyed: the government instead decided to rewire it. To replace lost foreign grants and direct NGO activity into politically safe areas, the Kremlin created its own support system. In 2017, a centralized institution called the Presidential Grants Foundation appeared – a tool for financing NGOs as increasingly restrictive regulations squeezed out the rest of the sector.
Just a decade ago, many Russian NGOs relied on funding from abroad to operate. But starting in Vladimir Putin’s third presidential term, the landscape has changed dramatically. In 2012, the so-called “foreign agents” law was adopted, followed by legislation on “undesirable organizations.” These measures effectively cut off most Western funding and forced many independent NGOs into survival mode. Yet civil society was not destroyed: the government instead decided to rewire it. To replace lost foreign grants and direct NGO activity into politically safe areas, the Kremlin created its own support system. In 2017, a centralized institution called the Presidential Grants Foundation appeared – a tool for financing NGOs as increasingly restrictive regulations squeezed out the rest of the sector.
Total Funding Won by Year and Contest Type
Projects of the Presidential Grants Fund Competition Since 2017 Presidential Grants fund; Prepared by To be Precise
Projects of the Presidential Grants Fund Competition Since 2017 Presidential Grants fund; Prepared by To be Precise
Extent of funding
The new foundation immediately led to increase in state support: in 2016, total presidential grant funding was around RUB 4.6 billion; in 2017, it jumped over 30% to RUB 6.0 billion. Since then, annual funding has remained between RUB 6.7-8.7 billion. These funds are allocated through open competitions (usually two per year) to registered Russian NGOs.
Priority goes to socially oriented projects: assistance for people with disabilities, family support, health care, education. Politically sensitive work – for example, protecting human rights or enforcing accountability from the government — rarely receives any support, though.
Even across the foundation’s official categories, a breakdown reveals a strong bias toward everyday social issues. Patriotic categories such as “preserving historical memory” or “supporting the Russian diaspora” are included, but they consistently receive far fewer grants than social-welfare- and family-focused projects. In practice, the foundation’s resources overwhelmingly go toward basic welfare, not ideological or political activism – a deliberate choice aligned with its purpose of outsourcing social tasks to NGOs without empowering civic mobilization.
Special competitions and spin-offs
Over time, the foundation has expanded in scope. The first major turning point was the pandemic. In 2020, the foundation launched an extraordinary, special competition to support NGOs aiding medical workers and vulnerable groups as quickly as possible. An additional RUB 3 billion was allocated beyond regular grants. Thus, in crisis situations the state sees NGOs as a way to act quicker than the regular bureaucracy allows.
A similar, special competition took place in 2022 after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The foundation again distributed an additional RUB 2 billion to support “compatriots,” including residents of occupied territories, refugees and families affected by the war. By 2025, special competitions were no longer limited to crises: new competitions targeted projects in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, regions geopolitically important to Russia despite being internationally recognized as part of Georgia.
Alongside these special competitions, the Kremlin created subsidiary foundations. In 2021, it launched the Presidential Foundation for Cultural Initiatives, spinning cultural and patriotic projects out of the “parent” foundation and significantly increasing their overall financing. A foundation for environmental projects was spun off later. On the back of these moves, total state support for NGOs nearly doubled.
Importantly, though its scope has expanded, the parent Presidential Grants Foundation maintains stable funding in nominal terms. But due to inflation and a weak currency after 2022, the real value of grants has declined. To prevent project budgets from collapsing, the foundation began reducing the number of selected winners instead of the size of individual grants. As a result, annual winners dropped from over 4,400 in 2020 to fewer than 3,200 in 2025.
Some NGOs are more equal than others
Though thousands of organizations apply, the funding is far from evenly distributed. According to the researchers, 42% of all money goes to just 5% of NGOs. This small “elite” consists of experienced, well-connected organizations that regularly win grants – often every year. Some are affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church, others with influential officials or politically connected actors.
These elite NGOs have dramatically higher success rates, at 50-60% versus 10-15% for the rest of the applicant pool. They also receive far larger grants, at an average of RUB 6.5 million versus RUB 1.5 million, with the biggest to date exceeding RUB 118 million.
The steady funding allows these NGOs to run long-term programs and build up an infrastructure around them. At the same time, it creates dependence on state money, further binding them to the government and its priorities. Meanwhile, thousands of smaller organizations must compete for the remaining money.
The new foundation immediately led to increase in state support: in 2016, total presidential grant funding was around RUB 4.6 billion; in 2017, it jumped over 30% to RUB 6.0 billion. Since then, annual funding has remained between RUB 6.7-8.7 billion. These funds are allocated through open competitions (usually two per year) to registered Russian NGOs.
Priority goes to socially oriented projects: assistance for people with disabilities, family support, health care, education. Politically sensitive work – for example, protecting human rights or enforcing accountability from the government — rarely receives any support, though.
Even across the foundation’s official categories, a breakdown reveals a strong bias toward everyday social issues. Patriotic categories such as “preserving historical memory” or “supporting the Russian diaspora” are included, but they consistently receive far fewer grants than social-welfare- and family-focused projects. In practice, the foundation’s resources overwhelmingly go toward basic welfare, not ideological or political activism – a deliberate choice aligned with its purpose of outsourcing social tasks to NGOs without empowering civic mobilization.
Special competitions and spin-offs
Over time, the foundation has expanded in scope. The first major turning point was the pandemic. In 2020, the foundation launched an extraordinary, special competition to support NGOs aiding medical workers and vulnerable groups as quickly as possible. An additional RUB 3 billion was allocated beyond regular grants. Thus, in crisis situations the state sees NGOs as a way to act quicker than the regular bureaucracy allows.
A similar, special competition took place in 2022 after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The foundation again distributed an additional RUB 2 billion to support “compatriots,” including residents of occupied territories, refugees and families affected by the war. By 2025, special competitions were no longer limited to crises: new competitions targeted projects in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, regions geopolitically important to Russia despite being internationally recognized as part of Georgia.
Alongside these special competitions, the Kremlin created subsidiary foundations. In 2021, it launched the Presidential Foundation for Cultural Initiatives, spinning cultural and patriotic projects out of the “parent” foundation and significantly increasing their overall financing. A foundation for environmental projects was spun off later. On the back of these moves, total state support for NGOs nearly doubled.
Importantly, though its scope has expanded, the parent Presidential Grants Foundation maintains stable funding in nominal terms. But due to inflation and a weak currency after 2022, the real value of grants has declined. To prevent project budgets from collapsing, the foundation began reducing the number of selected winners instead of the size of individual grants. As a result, annual winners dropped from over 4,400 in 2020 to fewer than 3,200 in 2025.
Some NGOs are more equal than others
Though thousands of organizations apply, the funding is far from evenly distributed. According to the researchers, 42% of all money goes to just 5% of NGOs. This small “elite” consists of experienced, well-connected organizations that regularly win grants – often every year. Some are affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church, others with influential officials or politically connected actors.
These elite NGOs have dramatically higher success rates, at 50-60% versus 10-15% for the rest of the applicant pool. They also receive far larger grants, at an average of RUB 6.5 million versus RUB 1.5 million, with the biggest to date exceeding RUB 118 million.
The steady funding allows these NGOs to run long-term programs and build up an infrastructure around them. At the same time, it creates dependence on state money, further binding them to the government and its priorities. Meanwhile, thousands of smaller organizations must compete for the remaining money.
Total Funding by Year and Fund (in millions USD)
- Projects of the Presidential Grants Fund Competition since 2017 Presidential Grants Fund; Prepared by To be Precise
- Regional co-funding by Presidential Grants Fund since 2021
- Projects of the Presidential Fund for Cultural Initiatives since 2021
Competition and barriers to entry
Competition intensifies each year. Applications number in the tens of thousands, and the chances of winning have steadily declined. After peaking at 23% in 2020, they fell below 16% from 2023 onward.
For new applicants, the situation is rough. The share of first-time applicants among winners dropped below 10% in 2024. The main reason is the foundation’s scoring system: nearly 40% of points depend on previous experience, implemented projects and organizational capacity. It is a catch-22: to win a grant, an NGO needs a strong track record, but to build a strong track record, it needs a grant.
Despite these barriers, the presence of state funding still incentivizes the formation of new NGOs. Since 2017, 10,000-12,000 new socially oriented organizations have been registered annually. More than half of these organizations do not participate in state competitions, with only 21.6% having ever won one.
Lack of a political agenda
Given Russia’s political climate, many expected that patriotic language would help applicants to win grants. Indeed, applications increasingly use themes like patriotism, tradition and historical memory, but the data shows that such rhetoric does not significantly increase the chances of success. The number of winning “patriotic” applications remains stable at around 400-500 a year (there was one exception – 2020, the 75th anniversary of the end of World War II, when the number surged to about 700).
Even after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the overall breakdown of grant distribution did not shift dramatically toward militarized or ideological projects. Social welfare remains the priority. While some new patriotic and prowar categories have won, they constitute only a small portion of funded projects. Many leading NGOs continue to operate in their traditional areas without pivoting to ideological themes. Thus, despite rising militarism in society, the foundation’s core mission remains intact: delegating social assistance tasks rather than mobilizing political loyalty.
The Russian model of NGO support through presidential grants is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it injects substantial resources into the nonprofit sector, acknowledging that the state cannot solve all social problems on its own. Hundreds of valuable initiatives have been funded, improving the lives of vulnerable groups across the country. Volunteerism has grown, and many NGOs now function as informal partners of the state.
On the other hand, the system keeps civil society under tight control, with financial dependence limiting independence. Sensitive topics rarely get funding, while organizations adapt to meet the Kremlin’s expectations. An elite circle of loyal, state-aligned NGOs receives most of the resources. Newcomers and independent NGOs face very high barriers to entry and competition.
The researchers conclude that the Kremlin has effectively outsourced social welfare while creating a new mechanism to drive political loyalty. NGOs handle many social services and crisis response, allowing the state to avoid direct responsibility. The Kremlin, meanwhile, retains the power to shape priorities and determine who gets funded.
Overall, presidential grants are both a lifeline for Russia’s nonprofit sector and a tether binding it to the state.
Competition intensifies each year. Applications number in the tens of thousands, and the chances of winning have steadily declined. After peaking at 23% in 2020, they fell below 16% from 2023 onward.
For new applicants, the situation is rough. The share of first-time applicants among winners dropped below 10% in 2024. The main reason is the foundation’s scoring system: nearly 40% of points depend on previous experience, implemented projects and organizational capacity. It is a catch-22: to win a grant, an NGO needs a strong track record, but to build a strong track record, it needs a grant.
Despite these barriers, the presence of state funding still incentivizes the formation of new NGOs. Since 2017, 10,000-12,000 new socially oriented organizations have been registered annually. More than half of these organizations do not participate in state competitions, with only 21.6% having ever won one.
Lack of a political agenda
Given Russia’s political climate, many expected that patriotic language would help applicants to win grants. Indeed, applications increasingly use themes like patriotism, tradition and historical memory, but the data shows that such rhetoric does not significantly increase the chances of success. The number of winning “patriotic” applications remains stable at around 400-500 a year (there was one exception – 2020, the 75th anniversary of the end of World War II, when the number surged to about 700).
Even after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the overall breakdown of grant distribution did not shift dramatically toward militarized or ideological projects. Social welfare remains the priority. While some new patriotic and prowar categories have won, they constitute only a small portion of funded projects. Many leading NGOs continue to operate in their traditional areas without pivoting to ideological themes. Thus, despite rising militarism in society, the foundation’s core mission remains intact: delegating social assistance tasks rather than mobilizing political loyalty.
The Russian model of NGO support through presidential grants is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it injects substantial resources into the nonprofit sector, acknowledging that the state cannot solve all social problems on its own. Hundreds of valuable initiatives have been funded, improving the lives of vulnerable groups across the country. Volunteerism has grown, and many NGOs now function as informal partners of the state.
On the other hand, the system keeps civil society under tight control, with financial dependence limiting independence. Sensitive topics rarely get funding, while organizations adapt to meet the Kremlin’s expectations. An elite circle of loyal, state-aligned NGOs receives most of the resources. Newcomers and independent NGOs face very high barriers to entry and competition.
The researchers conclude that the Kremlin has effectively outsourced social welfare while creating a new mechanism to drive political loyalty. NGOs handle many social services and crisis response, allowing the state to avoid direct responsibility. The Kremlin, meanwhile, retains the power to shape priorities and determine who gets funded.
Overall, presidential grants are both a lifeline for Russia’s nonprofit sector and a tether binding it to the state.
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