Politics
How the Kremlin’s Rotation of Governors Guarantees their Loyalty
November 12, 2024
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Nikolai Petrov
Senior Research Fellow, Head of the Laboratory for the Analysis of Transformational Processes, New Eurasian Strategies Center (NEST)
Political scientist Nikolai Petrov analyzes the latest personnel moves orchestrated by the Kremlin, with federal officials being appointed to governorships, which he sees as well thought out and effective.
With the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, all civilian personnel appointments, including governors, were put on hold. In May 2022, at the last minute before elections in September, five governors were replaced whom the Kremlin did not want to allow to stand for another term.
In the autumn of 2022, contrary to custom, no governors were replaced. The authorities had no time for this amid the Ukrainian counteroffensive and the incorporation of annexed Ukrainian territory into the Russian political space.
The next year, six governors were changed: four in the spring and two in the autumn.
The Kremlin again focused on cadre policy
This year, the Kremlin, feeling more confident still, initiated complex personnel reshuffles. First, in May, governors were called up to the federal government. Before this, there had been no such “return rotation” (from the regions to Moscow and back to the regions), except for the individual cases of Maxim Reshetnikov and former Putin adjutant Dmitri Mironov, who is now responsible for personnel in the Kremlin.
Recall that in 2017, Reshetnikov was sent from Moscow, where he was the economy and development czar for the city of Moscow, to serve as governor in Perm Region, where he had begun his career; then in 2020, he was called back to Moscow to serve as the economy minister in the federal government. Meanwhile, Mironov was sent in 2016 from Moscow, where he was a deputy minister of internal affairs, to Yaroslavl Region, which he headed as governor for a full term before returning to the federal government at the end of 2021, when he was appointed to the Presidential Administration.
In the autumn of 2022, contrary to custom, no governors were replaced. The authorities had no time for this amid the Ukrainian counteroffensive and the incorporation of annexed Ukrainian territory into the Russian political space.
The next year, six governors were changed: four in the spring and two in the autumn.
The Kremlin again focused on cadre policy
This year, the Kremlin, feeling more confident still, initiated complex personnel reshuffles. First, in May, governors were called up to the federal government. Before this, there had been no such “return rotation” (from the regions to Moscow and back to the regions), except for the individual cases of Maxim Reshetnikov and former Putin adjutant Dmitri Mironov, who is now responsible for personnel in the Kremlin.
Recall that in 2017, Reshetnikov was sent from Moscow, where he was the economy and development czar for the city of Moscow, to serve as governor in Perm Region, where he had begun his career; then in 2020, he was called back to Moscow to serve as the economy minister in the federal government. Meanwhile, Mironov was sent in 2016 from Moscow, where he was a deputy minister of internal affairs, to Yaroslavl Region, which he headed as governor for a full term before returning to the federal government at the end of 2021, when he was appointed to the Presidential Administration.
Sergei Tsivilev was appointed federal energy minister in May 2024 after heading Kemerovo Region from September 2018 to May 2024. He is married to Vladimir Putin's niece. Source: Wiki Commons
In mid-May, five governors were called up to Moscow. Four of them, Sergei Tsivilev (Kemerovo Region), Anton Alikhanov (Kaliningrad Region), Roman Starovoit (Kursk Region) and Mikhail Degtyarev (Khabarovsk Region), became federal ministers, while Tula Governor and former Putin bodyguard Alexei Dyumin became a presidential aide and the secretary of the State Council. All of them had worked in Moscow before being appointed governors, with the exception of Tsivilev, who was in the private sector in St Petersburg.
In May-June, three more replacements were announced: the head of Samara Region, Dmitri Azarov, was replaced by Vyacheslav Fedorishchev, who had been Dyumin’s deputy in Tula; the head of Khanty-Mansi Region, Natalya Komarova, was replaced by the former mayor of Tyumen, Ruslan Kukharuk; and the head of the Altai Republic, Oleg Khorokhordin, was replaced by the United Russia General Council secretary, Andrei Turchak. (All the unseated governors, except Khorokhordin, received new assignments.)
On November 4, National Unity Day, four more governors were replaced.
The first five replacements in May were not due to a bad situation in the respective regions, but rather the next government was being formed, and the Kremlin needed to ensure a balance between key groups of influence: Rostec chief Sergei Chemezov (Alikhanov is his protégé), the billionaire and Putin’s friend Arkady Rotenberg (Starovoit) and the oligarch Gennady Timchenko (Tsivilev).
As for the last four replacements, however, there seems to be no single logic. We break them down below.
Rostov
Rostov Governor Vasily Golubev’s third term was ending in 2025. Along with Chechnya’s Ramzan Kadyrov and Tatarstan’s Rustam Minnikhanov, Golubev was one of the longest-serving governors. It was time to replace him, and a good candidate had emerged: Yuri Slyusar.
Previously, Slyusar, who had followed in his father’s footsteps in the aviation industry, rose to the post of deputy minister of industry and trade at the federal level. He was responsible for aviation and electronics there before being selected in 2015 to head United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), which is part of Rostec.
In 2022, the government, at Putin’s behest, adopted a deliberately unrealistic program for the development the national aviation industry through 2030, which envisaged quickly replacing Western aircraft, which account for 95% of Russian passenger traffic, with domestic planes (see Russia.Post about it here).
The deadlines have been pushed back, one after another, and the program has been adjusted, but so far not a single fully domestic aircraft has even passed testing, let alone gone into production. At the beginning of 2024, Chemezov announced that mass deliveries of the MC-21 passenger aircraft, planned for 2023-24, would commence only in 2025-26.
In a bureaucratic system, there must be a person personally responsible for every serious failure. Slyusar, as the top man at UAC, became the scapegoat. This is life for a bureaucrat. Yet, instead of being punished, Slyusar has been transferred to a new line of work.
In May-June, three more replacements were announced: the head of Samara Region, Dmitri Azarov, was replaced by Vyacheslav Fedorishchev, who had been Dyumin’s deputy in Tula; the head of Khanty-Mansi Region, Natalya Komarova, was replaced by the former mayor of Tyumen, Ruslan Kukharuk; and the head of the Altai Republic, Oleg Khorokhordin, was replaced by the United Russia General Council secretary, Andrei Turchak. (All the unseated governors, except Khorokhordin, received new assignments.)
On November 4, National Unity Day, four more governors were replaced.
The first five replacements in May were not due to a bad situation in the respective regions, but rather the next government was being formed, and the Kremlin needed to ensure a balance between key groups of influence: Rostec chief Sergei Chemezov (Alikhanov is his protégé), the billionaire and Putin’s friend Arkady Rotenberg (Starovoit) and the oligarch Gennady Timchenko (Tsivilev).
As for the last four replacements, however, there seems to be no single logic. We break them down below.
Rostov
Rostov Governor Vasily Golubev’s third term was ending in 2025. Along with Chechnya’s Ramzan Kadyrov and Tatarstan’s Rustam Minnikhanov, Golubev was one of the longest-serving governors. It was time to replace him, and a good candidate had emerged: Yuri Slyusar.
Previously, Slyusar, who had followed in his father’s footsteps in the aviation industry, rose to the post of deputy minister of industry and trade at the federal level. He was responsible for aviation and electronics there before being selected in 2015 to head United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), which is part of Rostec.
In 2022, the government, at Putin’s behest, adopted a deliberately unrealistic program for the development the national aviation industry through 2030, which envisaged quickly replacing Western aircraft, which account for 95% of Russian passenger traffic, with domestic planes (see Russia.Post about it here).
The deadlines have been pushed back, one after another, and the program has been adjusted, but so far not a single fully domestic aircraft has even passed testing, let alone gone into production. At the beginning of 2024, Chemezov announced that mass deliveries of the MC-21 passenger aircraft, planned for 2023-24, would commence only in 2025-26.
In a bureaucratic system, there must be a person personally responsible for every serious failure. Slyusar, as the top man at UAC, became the scapegoat. This is life for a bureaucrat. Yet, instead of being punished, Slyusar has been transferred to a new line of work.
“This decision, unusual for the Kremlin, shows the logic of wartime: cadres should not be squandered but rather given a different area to manage where they can be most useful to the system.”
Slyusar is undoubtedly a capable manager, and he also worked for a time in Rostov Region, where he and his family have deep roots.
Rostov Region is one of the largest in the country in terms of population and a base for operations in Ukraine. Army headquarters, as well as major aviation manufacturing facilities, is located there, including Rostvertol, which is part of Rostec and makes combat and transport helicopters. Slyusar’s father was the company’s general director from 2000 to 2014, and Yuri previously served as its commercial director.
Komi
In 2015, the entire regional elite in Komi was sacked, along with the head of the region, Vyacheslav Gaizer, and declared an “organized crime group.” (Gaizer and a number of regional officials were subsequently sentenced to long prison terms.) Since then, the political situation in the region has been in disarray.
Whereas election results in Komi had been satisfactory for the Kremlin previously, the political machine broke down after the purge, and two “outsider” governors – Sergei Gaplikov (2015-20) and Vladimir Uyba (2020-24) – proved unable to establish control over the local elite and the region broadly.
Rostov Region is one of the largest in the country in terms of population and a base for operations in Ukraine. Army headquarters, as well as major aviation manufacturing facilities, is located there, including Rostvertol, which is part of Rostec and makes combat and transport helicopters. Slyusar’s father was the company’s general director from 2000 to 2014, and Yuri previously served as its commercial director.
Komi
In 2015, the entire regional elite in Komi was sacked, along with the head of the region, Vyacheslav Gaizer, and declared an “organized crime group.” (Gaizer and a number of regional officials were subsequently sentenced to long prison terms.) Since then, the political situation in the region has been in disarray.
Whereas election results in Komi had been satisfactory for the Kremlin previously, the political machine broke down after the purge, and two “outsider” governors – Sergei Gaplikov (2015-20) and Vladimir Uyba (2020-24) – proved unable to establish control over the local elite and the region broadly.
Rostislav Goldstein was appointed acting head of Komi Region in November 2024, coming over from the Jewish Autonomous Region, where he had been governor. Source: Wiki Commons
The new man in charge, Rostislav Goldstein, appointed in November, is no stranger to Komi. In the 2000s, he ran his own business there, and in 2007 he was deputy chairman of the regional parliament.
After completing the “school of governors” (a program, launched in 2017, for training top-level cadres for the regions), he was appointed head of the Jewish Autonomous Region in 2019. Thus, by the time the Gaizer elite in Komi was sacked, Goldstein had already moved to the Far East, where, importantly, his team included people from Komi.
This team managed to build a political machine that made the Jewish Autonomous Region a model region from the Kremlin’s point of view. The Kremlin is now betting on Goldstein to finally regain control over Komi.
Tambov
Tambov Region, which is predominantly agricultural and whose population has been shrinking in recent years, is hardly visible at the national level. Maxim Egorov, appointed governor in 2021, was a match for it. He was first a regional and then a federal official from the team of Vladimir Yakushev, who himself is part of the patronal network of Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin. When Yakushev resigned as minister of construction, housing and utilities in 2020, Egorov, who was his deputy, lost his position too.
In Tambov Region, Egorov tried to demonstrate effectiveness and loyalty in the hope of returning to Moscow. It seems that this has paid off, since Yakushev’s career has taken off: he has replaced the once very influential Turchak, “exiled” to the Altai Republic, as acting secretary of the United Russia General Council and first vice speaker of the Federation Council. Now, Yakushev is assembling his team, and Egorov is likely to again be his deputy in the party.
The figure of the new Tambov governor, Yevgeny Pervyshov, is much more interesting than his predecessor.
After completing the “school of governors” (a program, launched in 2017, for training top-level cadres for the regions), he was appointed head of the Jewish Autonomous Region in 2019. Thus, by the time the Gaizer elite in Komi was sacked, Goldstein had already moved to the Far East, where, importantly, his team included people from Komi.
This team managed to build a political machine that made the Jewish Autonomous Region a model region from the Kremlin’s point of view. The Kremlin is now betting on Goldstein to finally regain control over Komi.
Tambov
Tambov Region, which is predominantly agricultural and whose population has been shrinking in recent years, is hardly visible at the national level. Maxim Egorov, appointed governor in 2021, was a match for it. He was first a regional and then a federal official from the team of Vladimir Yakushev, who himself is part of the patronal network of Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin. When Yakushev resigned as minister of construction, housing and utilities in 2020, Egorov, who was his deputy, lost his position too.
In Tambov Region, Egorov tried to demonstrate effectiveness and loyalty in the hope of returning to Moscow. It seems that this has paid off, since Yakushev’s career has taken off: he has replaced the once very influential Turchak, “exiled” to the Altai Republic, as acting secretary of the United Russia General Council and first vice speaker of the Federation Council. Now, Yakushev is assembling his team, and Egorov is likely to again be his deputy in the party.
The figure of the new Tambov governor, Yevgeny Pervyshov, is much more interesting than his predecessor.
“Pervyshov is the first serious bureaucratic manager to be appointed to a high post after serving in Ukraine.”
Yevgeny Pervyshov at a meeting of Time of Heroes program participants with Vladimir Putin in June 2024. In November 2024, Pervyshov was appointed governor of Tambov Region. Source: VK
The former mayor of Krasnodar (2016-21), who is remembered rather fondly, and a Duma MP (2021-24), he volunteered for the so-called special military operation in October 2022. According to TASS, Pervyshov served in the Cascade OBTF (a Russian abbreviation for “operational-combat tactical formation”), but other sources say it was the LNR militia (seemingly backed up by the fact that Pervyshov received an order from the LNR).
Cascade is a drone reconnaissance detachment where representatives of the elite can safely demonstrate their loyalty and patriotism on a fixed-term contract (for three or six months). Drone operators work across the whole combat zone, staying a safe 50-70 km away from the front line. Service in Cascade is one of the elements of a revamped cadre policy – the brainchild of Presidential Administration First Deputy Chief of Staff Sergei Kiriyenko – whereby candidates selected by the Kremlin for public leadership positions are trained. Other elements include the aforementioned “school of governors,” Leaders of Russia (described as an “open competition for the leaders of a new generation”) and the “school of mayors” launched in 2023.
Pervyshov, after serving in Cascade, during which time he remained a Duma MP, became one of 83 Ukraine veterans selected to join the first group of the Time of Heroes program, based at the Higher School of Public Administration at RANEPA (also home to the “school of governors”). Launched in May of this year and lasting two years, it includes four one-month training modules, where high-ranking officials speak to program participants; between modules, internships in various government agencies are provided.
Pervyshov was appointed to the Tambov governor’s post “ahead of schedule” – after the first module, a voyage on an icebreaker to the North Pole and an internship in the Moscow city government. (Until elections in September 2025, Pervyshov, like the other appointees, is acting governor, but this looks set to be a formality.)
A month before, two dozen Time of Heroes participants had been appointed by the Kremlin to various high-profile, but not critical, positions.
The governorship of Tambov Region, though significantly smaller in population than the Pervyshov-led city of Krasnodar, is the first “real” post occupied by a representative of the new elite of Ukraine veterans, trumpeted by Putin.
Whereas years ago the “school of governors” included jumping off of a seven-meter cliff and testing tanks at a military training ground, now candidates for bureaucratic career growth will be put through a real war, albeit a lighter version of it.
Jewish Autonomous Region
Maria Kostyuk, who heads Time of Heroes, also received a governorship. Her appointment as head of the Jewish Autonomous Region looks not just rational but also old-school.
Kostyuk was born and made her career in the region, where she rose to the position of chief of staff of Governor Goldstein’s administration. After her son died in the war (he was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of Russia), she was noticed in Moscow, where she was appointed head of regional relations at the federal fund Defenders of the Fatherland, which was established to support Ukraine war veterans and is headed by Putin’s niece (Sergei Tsivilev’s wife, Anna). Now, a year later, Kostyuk has been sent back to her home region.
Conclusions
The latest round of gubernatorial appointments shows that, more than two years after the start of the war in Ukraine, the Presidential Administration has fully overcome the shock. The domestic political situation, though not back to the old norm, has stabilized.
Candidates for regional head posts are being selected more carefully than before – the Kremlin is trying to avoid risky steps while acting proactively and with a long-term view. We are seeing a kind of personnel solitaire being played, with each replacement looking well thought out and, at first glance, effective.
In recent years, the Kremlin has managed to turn the regions into divisions of a huge corporation. Regional leaders are interchangeable with federal bureaucrats, and the Kremlin constantly rotates them, thus guaranteeing their loyalty.
Cascade is a drone reconnaissance detachment where representatives of the elite can safely demonstrate their loyalty and patriotism on a fixed-term contract (for three or six months). Drone operators work across the whole combat zone, staying a safe 50-70 km away from the front line. Service in Cascade is one of the elements of a revamped cadre policy – the brainchild of Presidential Administration First Deputy Chief of Staff Sergei Kiriyenko – whereby candidates selected by the Kremlin for public leadership positions are trained. Other elements include the aforementioned “school of governors,” Leaders of Russia (described as an “open competition for the leaders of a new generation”) and the “school of mayors” launched in 2023.
Pervyshov, after serving in Cascade, during which time he remained a Duma MP, became one of 83 Ukraine veterans selected to join the first group of the Time of Heroes program, based at the Higher School of Public Administration at RANEPA (also home to the “school of governors”). Launched in May of this year and lasting two years, it includes four one-month training modules, where high-ranking officials speak to program participants; between modules, internships in various government agencies are provided.
Pervyshov was appointed to the Tambov governor’s post “ahead of schedule” – after the first module, a voyage on an icebreaker to the North Pole and an internship in the Moscow city government. (Until elections in September 2025, Pervyshov, like the other appointees, is acting governor, but this looks set to be a formality.)
A month before, two dozen Time of Heroes participants had been appointed by the Kremlin to various high-profile, but not critical, positions.
The governorship of Tambov Region, though significantly smaller in population than the Pervyshov-led city of Krasnodar, is the first “real” post occupied by a representative of the new elite of Ukraine veterans, trumpeted by Putin.
Whereas years ago the “school of governors” included jumping off of a seven-meter cliff and testing tanks at a military training ground, now candidates for bureaucratic career growth will be put through a real war, albeit a lighter version of it.
Jewish Autonomous Region
Maria Kostyuk, who heads Time of Heroes, also received a governorship. Her appointment as head of the Jewish Autonomous Region looks not just rational but also old-school.
Kostyuk was born and made her career in the region, where she rose to the position of chief of staff of Governor Goldstein’s administration. After her son died in the war (he was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of Russia), she was noticed in Moscow, where she was appointed head of regional relations at the federal fund Defenders of the Fatherland, which was established to support Ukraine war veterans and is headed by Putin’s niece (Sergei Tsivilev’s wife, Anna). Now, a year later, Kostyuk has been sent back to her home region.
Conclusions
The latest round of gubernatorial appointments shows that, more than two years after the start of the war in Ukraine, the Presidential Administration has fully overcome the shock. The domestic political situation, though not back to the old norm, has stabilized.
Candidates for regional head posts are being selected more carefully than before – the Kremlin is trying to avoid risky steps while acting proactively and with a long-term view. We are seeing a kind of personnel solitaire being played, with each replacement looking well thought out and, at first glance, effective.
In recent years, the Kremlin has managed to turn the regions into divisions of a huge corporation. Regional leaders are interchangeable with federal bureaucrats, and the Kremlin constantly rotates them, thus guaranteeing their loyalty.
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