Politics
Is Ukraine’s New Law on ‘Spiritual Sovereignty’ all Bark and no Bite?
September 12, 2024
- Georgy ChizhovHead of Reform Assistance Center (Kyiv)
Ukraine-based political expert Georgy Chizhov lays out his view that the recently adopted Ukrainian religion law, intended to sever ties between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Russian Orthodox Church, will manage to live up to popular expectations.
A Ukrainian court ruled in 2023 that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church may not use the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra after the Ukrainian government refused to extend the contract for the monastery. Source: Wiki Commons
Ukraine long awaited a law that would place restrictions on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC). The problem was that politicians and government officials could not agree on how tough the restrictions should be.
On one hand, there is state security, along with expectations of much of the population; on the other, the constitutional right to freedom of conscience, the traditional dislike in Ukraine for banning things, raised eyebrows of Western partners (they want to ban a Christian Church in Ukraine?!) and many UOC parishioners. In the end, the Rada passed a law that has major symbolic significance but looks rather weak in how it can be enforced.
What is the law about?
Immediately after the final vote in the Rada, the Ukrainian media was full of all sorts of interpretations of the law. Some commentators claimed – joyfully or regretfully – that the UOC was banned; others that the law was not about bans at all, but about bringing official church charters and liturgy into line with national interests. At the same time, few journalists correctly conveyed even the name of the law. It is called “On the Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Sphere of Activities of Religious Organizations,” while the text of the law opens by referencing national and international norms on freedom of conscience (see more Russia.Post articles on this law by other authors here and here).
Nevertheless, the law does speak of a ban, but not of the UOC. Article 3 of the law explicitly bans “activities of the Russian Orthodox Church… the accomplice of the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed on behalf of the Russian Federation and ideology of the ‘Russian world.’”
Theoretically, it envisages bans for other foreign religious organizations – if they are based in a state that is carrying out armed aggression against Ukraine or supporting such aggression. But Article 3 specifically refers only to the Russian Orthodox Church. The Ukrainian dioceses of the two Russian Old Believer churches, which some experts were worried about, need not worry, at least for now; meanwhile, Muslims, whose Religious Administration of Muslims of Ukraine has no formal links with Russia at all, have nothing to worry about at all.
On one hand, there is state security, along with expectations of much of the population; on the other, the constitutional right to freedom of conscience, the traditional dislike in Ukraine for banning things, raised eyebrows of Western partners (they want to ban a Christian Church in Ukraine?!) and many UOC parishioners. In the end, the Rada passed a law that has major symbolic significance but looks rather weak in how it can be enforced.
What is the law about?
Immediately after the final vote in the Rada, the Ukrainian media was full of all sorts of interpretations of the law. Some commentators claimed – joyfully or regretfully – that the UOC was banned; others that the law was not about bans at all, but about bringing official church charters and liturgy into line with national interests. At the same time, few journalists correctly conveyed even the name of the law. It is called “On the Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Sphere of Activities of Religious Organizations,” while the text of the law opens by referencing national and international norms on freedom of conscience (see more Russia.Post articles on this law by other authors here and here).
Nevertheless, the law does speak of a ban, but not of the UOC. Article 3 of the law explicitly bans “activities of the Russian Orthodox Church… the accomplice of the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed on behalf of the Russian Federation and ideology of the ‘Russian world.’”
Theoretically, it envisages bans for other foreign religious organizations – if they are based in a state that is carrying out armed aggression against Ukraine or supporting such aggression. But Article 3 specifically refers only to the Russian Orthodox Church. The Ukrainian dioceses of the two Russian Old Believer churches, which some experts were worried about, need not worry, at least for now; meanwhile, Muslims, whose Religious Administration of Muslims of Ukraine has no formal links with Russia at all, have nothing to worry about at all.
“The law stipulates that a religious organization operating in Ukraine cannot be subordinate to or part of a banned organization (the ROC) or have ‘relations and/or links and/or communication’ with it.”
In addition, a religious organization may be “suspended” in the event it is
“used to propagandize the ‘Russian world’ ideology.”
Thirty days after President Zelensky signs the law (coming up at the end of September), the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience will be able to investigate religious organizations in Ukraine for ties to the ROC. If such ties are discovered by the authorities, the organization in violation will receive an order to sever them within a month. If the alleged ties persist, the government will file a case in court to ban the organization. A period of nine months has to pass before legal proceedings may begin.
In addition, the law introduces many amendments to regulatory acts. One of the most important is that a banned religious organization may not use state or municipal property, meaning the inevitable termination of agreements for historic churches and buildings, as already happened with the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra.
It is not entirely clear from the text of the law whether such sanctions apply to “nonstate” churches that belong to legal entities or individuals, religious communities, etc.
Help from Constantinople
Even without delving deeper into the details of the law, it is easy to see that, in an attempt to combine political will with a legal approach, Ukrainian lawmakers have created something that is quite difficult to apply in practice, not guaranteed to be effective and fraught with many interpretations and disputes. President Zelensky calls it the “law on spiritual sovereignty” of Ukraine, but not everyone is so optimistic.
Naturally, a warning is expected to be issued to the UOC based on the law. Recall, however, that the Council of the UOC in May 2022 adopted “appropriate amendments to its [Charter] with regard to the Administration of the UOC, all of which testify to the full independence and autonomy of the UOC.”
“used to propagandize the ‘Russian world’ ideology.”
Thirty days after President Zelensky signs the law (coming up at the end of September), the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience will be able to investigate religious organizations in Ukraine for ties to the ROC. If such ties are discovered by the authorities, the organization in violation will receive an order to sever them within a month. If the alleged ties persist, the government will file a case in court to ban the organization. A period of nine months has to pass before legal proceedings may begin.
In addition, the law introduces many amendments to regulatory acts. One of the most important is that a banned religious organization may not use state or municipal property, meaning the inevitable termination of agreements for historic churches and buildings, as already happened with the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra.
It is not entirely clear from the text of the law whether such sanctions apply to “nonstate” churches that belong to legal entities or individuals, religious communities, etc.
Help from Constantinople
Even without delving deeper into the details of the law, it is easy to see that, in an attempt to combine political will with a legal approach, Ukrainian lawmakers have created something that is quite difficult to apply in practice, not guaranteed to be effective and fraught with many interpretations and disputes. President Zelensky calls it the “law on spiritual sovereignty” of Ukraine, but not everyone is so optimistic.
Naturally, a warning is expected to be issued to the UOC based on the law. Recall, however, that the Council of the UOC in May 2022 adopted “appropriate amendments to its [Charter] with regard to the Administration of the UOC, all of which testify to the full independence and autonomy of the UOC.”
The signing of the Agreement on Cooperation and Interaction between Ukraine and the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. Istanbul, November 3, 2018. Source: Wiki Commons
Few in Ukraine took this seriously. The UOC will probably be required to officially appeal to the leadership of the ROC about breaking off ties and to announce its new status. But this could cause problems.
The established practice in world Orthodoxy (one can also refer to canon law, but unfortunately it is not fully formalized) does not provide for any “independent and autonomous” Church. It can be either autonomous (as part of another Local Church) or autocephalous, i.e. one that, in theory, is not subordinate to anyone. The UOC cannot receive the latter status, as, in line with the tomos (a decree from the head of the church on a particularly important issue) issued by Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, since January 2019 an Autocephalous Local Church already exists in the country – the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU).
The political leadership of Ukraine has indicated that the optimal option is a merger of the OCU and the UOC (meaning the OCU would absorb the UOC).
The established practice in world Orthodoxy (one can also refer to canon law, but unfortunately it is not fully formalized) does not provide for any “independent and autonomous” Church. It can be either autonomous (as part of another Local Church) or autocephalous, i.e. one that, in theory, is not subordinate to anyone. The UOC cannot receive the latter status, as, in line with the tomos (a decree from the head of the church on a particularly important issue) issued by Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, since January 2019 an Autocephalous Local Church already exists in the country – the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU).
The political leadership of Ukraine has indicated that the optimal option is a merger of the OCU and the UOC (meaning the OCU would absorb the UOC).
“Yet today a merger does not seem realistic: neither the hierarchs of the UOC nor ordinary parishioners are ready for rapprochement with the OCU.”
As I have already written in Russia.Post, in retrospect it seems that the Ukrainian authorities during the presidency of Petro Poroshenko were too hasty in creating the OCU. Almost all the leadership positions in the young Church went to representatives of dissolved noncanonical jurisdictions, such as Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and there were simply no spots left in the church hierarchy for UOC bishops, who theoretically could have joined later. In addition, the UOC has repeatedly branded the OCU as schismatics and, following the ROC’s lead, has ended Eucharistic communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.
Metropolitan Onufriy, the primate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Source: Wiki Commons
Nevertheless, a few days after the religion law was adopted, a delegation from the Ecumenical Patriarchate, consisting of hierarchs of Ukrainian origin, arrived in Kyiv. They talked with the leaders of all the main Christian jurisdictions while also starting a series of meetings with Metropolitan Onufriy, who heads the UOC, which, in OCU circles, caused some mistrust.
The delegation did not publicly voice any proposals aimed at a compromise for Ukrainian Orthodoxy. The OCU continues to offer the UOC negotiations without preconditions, but for the local clergy this is seen as an appeal from a position of strength. The UOC, on the contrary, has put forward a number of conditions, which ultimately boil down to renouncing the very creation of the OCU.
Orthodox at a crossroads: Where things go from here
The ROC could grant autocephaly to the UOC and thus relieve the headache of the Ukrainian Church that motivated the recent law. True, in that case, there would be two autocephalous churches in the country (one recognized by Moscow, the other by Constantinople), but given the alternative of a permanent schism like now, such an arrangement would be healthier.
The problem is the complete absence of good will on the part of Moscow, which is interested in deepening the schism and disorienting Ukrainian Orthodox. Cooperation from the ROC should not be expected before the end of the war. Meanwhile, a merger, or rather the absorption of the UOC, as discussed above, also does not seem plausible at this point.
An exarchate is another form for a Church, representing a union of dioceses that are part of another Church. The Ecumenical Patriarchate could be considered the “mother” Church – and rumors about this heated up after the meetings between the Constantinople delegation and the UOC leadership. This option has been called into question, however, chiefly because Constantinople has already created one jurisdiction in Ukraine and is unlikely to grant a second.
Formally, this is not quite true – after all, the right of the Ecumenical Patriarchate to create exarchates in Ukraine is enshrined in the tomos on the autocephaly of the OCU. But it is hard to imagine that Constantinople would deal such a blow to its creation, the OCU, and the UOC would agree to the modest role of an exarchate.
A similar situation is currently playing out in Estonia, where there is currently no autocephalous Orthodox Church. The Estonian Orthodox Church (EOC) – until last month the EOC MP (Moscow Patriarchate) – is negotiating with secular authorities on how to break off relations with the ROC in a way that the state would find convincing. These negotiations, however, have made little headway so far, and a similar effort by the UOC could prove equally fruitless.
Firstly, the Kremlin-controlled ROC is unlikely to agree to strike the UOC from its Charter, which, from the point of view of the recent Ukrainian law, would mean that the UOC remains part of a banned foreign religious organization. Secondly, even if the UOC proclaims a complete break with the ROC in no uncertain terms, it will turn into a self-proclaimed Church, not recognized by anyone, which is likely to upset its followers, for whom “canonicity” has traditionally been important.
The delegation did not publicly voice any proposals aimed at a compromise for Ukrainian Orthodoxy. The OCU continues to offer the UOC negotiations without preconditions, but for the local clergy this is seen as an appeal from a position of strength. The UOC, on the contrary, has put forward a number of conditions, which ultimately boil down to renouncing the very creation of the OCU.
Orthodox at a crossroads: Where things go from here
The ROC could grant autocephaly to the UOC and thus relieve the headache of the Ukrainian Church that motivated the recent law. True, in that case, there would be two autocephalous churches in the country (one recognized by Moscow, the other by Constantinople), but given the alternative of a permanent schism like now, such an arrangement would be healthier.
The problem is the complete absence of good will on the part of Moscow, which is interested in deepening the schism and disorienting Ukrainian Orthodox. Cooperation from the ROC should not be expected before the end of the war. Meanwhile, a merger, or rather the absorption of the UOC, as discussed above, also does not seem plausible at this point.
An exarchate is another form for a Church, representing a union of dioceses that are part of another Church. The Ecumenical Patriarchate could be considered the “mother” Church – and rumors about this heated up after the meetings between the Constantinople delegation and the UOC leadership. This option has been called into question, however, chiefly because Constantinople has already created one jurisdiction in Ukraine and is unlikely to grant a second.
Formally, this is not quite true – after all, the right of the Ecumenical Patriarchate to create exarchates in Ukraine is enshrined in the tomos on the autocephaly of the OCU. But it is hard to imagine that Constantinople would deal such a blow to its creation, the OCU, and the UOC would agree to the modest role of an exarchate.
A similar situation is currently playing out in Estonia, where there is currently no autocephalous Orthodox Church. The Estonian Orthodox Church (EOC) – until last month the EOC MP (Moscow Patriarchate) – is negotiating with secular authorities on how to break off relations with the ROC in a way that the state would find convincing. These negotiations, however, have made little headway so far, and a similar effort by the UOC could prove equally fruitless.
Firstly, the Kremlin-controlled ROC is unlikely to agree to strike the UOC from its Charter, which, from the point of view of the recent Ukrainian law, would mean that the UOC remains part of a banned foreign religious organization. Secondly, even if the UOC proclaims a complete break with the ROC in no uncertain terms, it will turn into a self-proclaimed Church, not recognized by anyone, which is likely to upset its followers, for whom “canonicity” has traditionally been important.
“The ‘inertia scenario’ – playing for time and wearing down opponents in the current political and legal impasse – still seems to be the most likely one.”
Safety valves
The UOC may continue to insist that it has already severed all ties to the ROC, so the recent law does not apply to it. The State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience, so as not to disappoint the opponents of the “Moscow” church (two thirds of the country, according to an April survey by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology) will have to issue a warning, though it is not entirely clear to whom, as the UOC is not registered as a legal entity.
Apparently, warnings will be issued to regional dioceses, many of which are already under pressure. Even before the law was adopted, the UOC was banned in Rivne, Lviv, Khmelnytskyi and Volyn regions by regional lawmakers. It is also unclear how the dioceses should sever ties to the Moscow Patriarchate. As a result, disputes may go on for a while and wind up in the courts.
Once the clergy exhausts all legal options in Ukraine, they will go to the European Court of Human Rights, while the authorities will be able to start annulling contracts for the use of churches. Meanwhile, the government has virtually no basis to interfere in the activities of churches that are privately owned. Article 4 of the law envisages sanctions by decision of the National Security and Defense Council – but only for foreign religious organizations. For example, Deputy Yevgeniya Kravchuk from the Servant of the People faction in the Rada is confident that private property will remain inviolable: “these religious organizations, even after being liquidated, can transfer [their property] to a public organization, to an individual... this is a European norm, we do not determine where people pray.”
Ukrainian legislation will not stop people from gathering and praying, even if the Ethnopolitics Service brings each of the 6,000-7,000 parishes to court, as another deputy, Volodymyr Ariev, from the European Solidarity faction, believes.
Of course, many believers may find it uncomfortable to receive spiritual guidance in a banned Church. But a mass outflow of religious communities and parishioners to the OCU is unlikely in the near future. In the first year and a half after Russia’s full-scale invasion, there was a major migration, but then it gradually faded.
The UOC may continue to insist that it has already severed all ties to the ROC, so the recent law does not apply to it. The State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience, so as not to disappoint the opponents of the “Moscow” church (two thirds of the country, according to an April survey by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology) will have to issue a warning, though it is not entirely clear to whom, as the UOC is not registered as a legal entity.
Apparently, warnings will be issued to regional dioceses, many of which are already under pressure. Even before the law was adopted, the UOC was banned in Rivne, Lviv, Khmelnytskyi and Volyn regions by regional lawmakers. It is also unclear how the dioceses should sever ties to the Moscow Patriarchate. As a result, disputes may go on for a while and wind up in the courts.
Once the clergy exhausts all legal options in Ukraine, they will go to the European Court of Human Rights, while the authorities will be able to start annulling contracts for the use of churches. Meanwhile, the government has virtually no basis to interfere in the activities of churches that are privately owned. Article 4 of the law envisages sanctions by decision of the National Security and Defense Council – but only for foreign religious organizations. For example, Deputy Yevgeniya Kravchuk from the Servant of the People faction in the Rada is confident that private property will remain inviolable: “these religious organizations, even after being liquidated, can transfer [their property] to a public organization, to an individual... this is a European norm, we do not determine where people pray.”
Ukrainian legislation will not stop people from gathering and praying, even if the Ethnopolitics Service brings each of the 6,000-7,000 parishes to court, as another deputy, Volodymyr Ariev, from the European Solidarity faction, believes.
Of course, many believers may find it uncomfortable to receive spiritual guidance in a banned Church. But a mass outflow of religious communities and parishioners to the OCU is unlikely in the near future. In the first year and a half after Russia’s full-scale invasion, there was a major migration, but then it gradually faded.
“The OCU (unlike the UOC) has very high support in Ukraine, yet something is keeping many actively practicing Orthodox Christians from going over to it.”
One reason is the long-time propaganda of the ROC and UOC about canonicity/non-canonicity (even though there is no single canon to be found in the history
of the Local Orthodox churches). Another reason is the status of the OCU as a metropolitanate associated with Constantinople, instead of a completely autonomous Ukrainian Patriarchate. Orthodox are also hesitant simply because of the short independent history of the OCU, which lacks either historically sacred churches or its own glorified saints.
The young Church is trying to meet the demands of the times, and therefore attracts young, educated, energetic residents of large cities, who, however, traditionally are not the bulk of regular parishioners in Ukrainian Orthodoxy.
One Church – two worlds
There is an opinion that Orthodox Churches are more stable than states. Both the Constantinople and Moscow patriarchates are obvious examples of this. Clearly, the recent Ukrainian law does not worry the leaders of the UOC too much, though it is certainly unpleasant for them.
A skillful legal defense, together with propaganda, might delay real changes for many years. For its part, the Ukrainian state should be careful and delicate when applying the law, so as not to turn ordinary Orthodox Christians into an implacable opposition (not to the current president, but to the state itself!) in an attempt to expel “pro-Moscow demons” (or “Moscow devils,” as Zelensky has called them).
Today, there are examples of UOC parishioners and clergy patriotically and heroically serving their country, while there are other examples of them covertly or actively supporting a hostile government. It is impossible by administrative methods to achieve a situation where adherents of both viewpoints feel uncomfortable in one Church.
For almost two years now, the Ukrainian state, which, at a huge toll, has been fighting back Russia’s aggression, has laid down “red lines,” which even those wearing vestments are not to cross. This seems justified, yet it is important not to overdo it with strict measures that would invite unexpected and undesirable consequences.
of the Local Orthodox churches). Another reason is the status of the OCU as a metropolitanate associated with Constantinople, instead of a completely autonomous Ukrainian Patriarchate. Orthodox are also hesitant simply because of the short independent history of the OCU, which lacks either historically sacred churches or its own glorified saints.
The young Church is trying to meet the demands of the times, and therefore attracts young, educated, energetic residents of large cities, who, however, traditionally are not the bulk of regular parishioners in Ukrainian Orthodoxy.
One Church – two worlds
There is an opinion that Orthodox Churches are more stable than states. Both the Constantinople and Moscow patriarchates are obvious examples of this. Clearly, the recent Ukrainian law does not worry the leaders of the UOC too much, though it is certainly unpleasant for them.
A skillful legal defense, together with propaganda, might delay real changes for many years. For its part, the Ukrainian state should be careful and delicate when applying the law, so as not to turn ordinary Orthodox Christians into an implacable opposition (not to the current president, but to the state itself!) in an attempt to expel “pro-Moscow demons” (or “Moscow devils,” as Zelensky has called them).
Today, there are examples of UOC parishioners and clergy patriotically and heroically serving their country, while there are other examples of them covertly or actively supporting a hostile government. It is impossible by administrative methods to achieve a situation where adherents of both viewpoints feel uncomfortable in one Church.
For almost two years now, the Ukrainian state, which, at a huge toll, has been fighting back Russia’s aggression, has laid down “red lines,” which even those wearing vestments are not to cross. This seems justified, yet it is important not to overdo it with strict measures that would invite unexpected and undesirable consequences.
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