SOCIETY
(A)moral War: How Russians use Morality to Justify Differing Positions on the War
September 16, 2024
Sasha Kappinen
Public Sociology Laboratory- Svetlana ErpylevaPublic Sociology Laboratory;
Research Center for East European Studies at the University of Bremen
Having conducted hundreds of interviews and ethnographic fieldwork in Russia, sociologists Sasha Kappinen and Svetlana Erpyleva highlight the importance of moral considerations in the arguments of not only staunchly antiwar Russians but also their apolitical compatriots who seek to come to terms with the war.
Kharkiv after shelling during Russia's invasion. March 18, 2022.
Source: Wiki Commons
Source: Wiki Commons
“I was dumbfounded,” says Alexei (all names have been changed), a 30-year-old engineer from St Petersburg, describing his initial reaction to the news that Russia had launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. “It was unsettling. At times, it brought tears me to tears. So, I think it’s all bad. There should be no war at all. There should be no war in the 21st century.” (italics added here and below).
Alexei is against Russia’s war in Ukraine. His experience parallels that of 30-year-old Liza, a marketing consultant from Moscow: “my first reaction was that I hoped that it would all end quickly, that it was surreal, that it should not be like this, and all the countries should find some quick compromise on everything. In short, I was shocked.” Nevertheless, Liza, unlike Alexei, defends the war.
In 2022-23, the Public Sociology Laboratory conducted nearly 300 in-depth sociological research interviews and dozens of informal conversations with Russians whose attitudes toward the full-scale war in Ukraine spanned the spectrum. Most of our interviewees, however, had one thing in common: all of them, apart from a few staunch supporters of the war, were shocked by February 24, 2022.
‘How can this be?!’
Katya, 31, IT specialist from Moscow, against the war: “my whole family and I were in shock. Just, how can this be? It was impossible to believe.”
Natalya, 35, unemployed from Irkutsk Region, defends the war: “the first [reaction] was, of course, shock, because I could not imagine that some country, no matter which one, would attack another.”
Nadezhda, 48, freelancer from Moscow, against the war: “my reaction, of course, was shock. Why? Well, probably simply because war is shock and horror.”
Boris, 27, architect from Khimki, defends the war: “how is it possible that there is war in the 21st century? How can this even happen?”
What all these emotional statements have in common, besides the memories of shock, is their moral character. The core moral concepts of our interviewees were destroyed: their country started a war, which “should not happen,” attacking first – and a “brotherly” people at that.
“I was brought up decently, but we go and attack our brotherly country,” a pensioner from Vyborg who is more for than against the war had to say.
The crumbling of people’s core moral concepts shook their worldview (“the world turned upside down,” our interviewees said) and triggered such a shock that many could not even put into words.
“Shock – I could not believe it;” “stupor, not understanding why this happened;” “I did not speak for three days” – we heard such phrases again and again in our interviews.
In Russian independent and Western media, Russians who defend the war are often labeled immoral. Yet our research shows that this cliché obscures the logic behind how many Russians perceive the war.
Alexei is against Russia’s war in Ukraine. His experience parallels that of 30-year-old Liza, a marketing consultant from Moscow: “my first reaction was that I hoped that it would all end quickly, that it was surreal, that it should not be like this, and all the countries should find some quick compromise on everything. In short, I was shocked.” Nevertheless, Liza, unlike Alexei, defends the war.
In 2022-23, the Public Sociology Laboratory conducted nearly 300 in-depth sociological research interviews and dozens of informal conversations with Russians whose attitudes toward the full-scale war in Ukraine spanned the spectrum. Most of our interviewees, however, had one thing in common: all of them, apart from a few staunch supporters of the war, were shocked by February 24, 2022.
‘How can this be?!’
Katya, 31, IT specialist from Moscow, against the war: “my whole family and I were in shock. Just, how can this be? It was impossible to believe.”
Natalya, 35, unemployed from Irkutsk Region, defends the war: “the first [reaction] was, of course, shock, because I could not imagine that some country, no matter which one, would attack another.”
Nadezhda, 48, freelancer from Moscow, against the war: “my reaction, of course, was shock. Why? Well, probably simply because war is shock and horror.”
Boris, 27, architect from Khimki, defends the war: “how is it possible that there is war in the 21st century? How can this even happen?”
What all these emotional statements have in common, besides the memories of shock, is their moral character. The core moral concepts of our interviewees were destroyed: their country started a war, which “should not happen,” attacking first – and a “brotherly” people at that.
“I was brought up decently, but we go and attack our brotherly country,” a pensioner from Vyborg who is more for than against the war had to say.
The crumbling of people’s core moral concepts shook their worldview (“the world turned upside down,” our interviewees said) and triggered such a shock that many could not even put into words.
“Shock – I could not believe it;” “stupor, not understanding why this happened;” “I did not speak for three days” – we heard such phrases again and again in our interviews.
In Russian independent and Western media, Russians who defend the war are often labeled immoral. Yet our research shows that this cliché obscures the logic behind how many Russians perceive the war.
“Russians, both those who oppose the war and those who defend it, are often guided by similar moral principles, even if they construct their arguments differently.”
Below we shall analyze the general moral aspect of how Russians with very different attitudes toward the war look at it – but it stands to note that, besides this moral logic, there are other components driving their attitudes that are outside the scope of this short article.
A house in Kyiv after being hit by Russian bombs, 2022. Source: Wiki Commons
Antiwar criticism of the conflict
When the invasion happened, some of our interviewees were already part of the opposition movement and followed the news through nongovernmental media. These people were able to turn their negative emotions into a political position and became opponents of the war. Their moral principles violated, they plunged into a state of shock in the first days of the “special operation” before forming a consistent position based on those principles and formulating a rational view of what was going on.
The moral and ethical arguments of the opponents of the war have proved the longest-lasting: their criticism predominated both in the spring of 2022 and in the autumn of 2023. “How can you rejoice at a war, at some military action, where houses fall down and people lose their property and loved ones?” rhetorically asked an indignant 41-year-old transport worker from Krasnodar, Dmitri, in November 2023. In other words: war brings suffering to people, so you should not defend it. Moreover, most opponents of the war, one way or another, argue that war is not just the death of innocent people – it is a barbaric act, it is something that should not exist in the modern civilized world.
For opponents of the war, this is not the only reason to condemn it: some are also outraged by its senselessness and that the war is taking away resources that could be used to solve domestic issues while creating new issues. It is moral critiques, however, that the overwhelming majority of antiwar Russians point out first and most persistently.
When the invasion happened, some of our interviewees were already part of the opposition movement and followed the news through nongovernmental media. These people were able to turn their negative emotions into a political position and became opponents of the war. Their moral principles violated, they plunged into a state of shock in the first days of the “special operation” before forming a consistent position based on those principles and formulating a rational view of what was going on.
The moral and ethical arguments of the opponents of the war have proved the longest-lasting: their criticism predominated both in the spring of 2022 and in the autumn of 2023. “How can you rejoice at a war, at some military action, where houses fall down and people lose their property and loved ones?” rhetorically asked an indignant 41-year-old transport worker from Krasnodar, Dmitri, in November 2023. In other words: war brings suffering to people, so you should not defend it. Moreover, most opponents of the war, one way or another, argue that war is not just the death of innocent people – it is a barbaric act, it is something that should not exist in the modern civilized world.
For opponents of the war, this is not the only reason to condemn it: some are also outraged by its senselessness and that the war is taking away resources that could be used to solve domestic issues while creating new issues. It is moral critiques, however, that the overwhelming majority of antiwar Russians point out first and most persistently.
“Opponents of the war have managed to preserve their initial moral indignation through two years of war and transform it into a conscious position.”
“But it seems to me that in any case, war is bad, [it is bad] when people fight with each other. I myself am against violence,” said a 30-year-old [female] adult education center teacher from the village of Udurg (a fictional name for a real village in Buryatia; the city of Cheryomushkin in Sverdlovsk Region, mentioned below, is also invented) in October 2023.
Echoing her is a 53-year-old accountant from Ulan-Ude: “first of all, I say this is not how it should be. This should not be permitted in the 21st century. I thought that this had been consigned to history. At a time with so much interesting going on [around us], how can we commit such medieval, dark acts?”
Echoing her is a 53-year-old accountant from Ulan-Ude: “first of all, I say this is not how it should be. This should not be permitted in the 21st century. I thought that this had been consigned to history. At a time with so much interesting going on [around us], how can we commit such medieval, dark acts?”
A billboard with a quote attributed to Emperor Alexander III: "Russia has no friends, our vastness is feared. Russia has only two dependable allies - its army and navy." Krasnodar, 2020. Source: VK
Defending the war
Most of our interviewees were uninterested in politics back in February 2022, did not follow the news and certainly did not pay attention to nongovernmental media. They lacked the skills necessary to transform their negative emotions into a “negative” (i.e., critical of the war and the state) political position.
They could not permanently live in a state of shock, so to get over it, they began to defend the war (we have previously described the mechanisms for such justification of the war).
They attribute the moral shock they felt in the first days after the invasion to their own political naivety. They said that they did not know back then that wars are a normal part of international affairs, they happen all over the world, the Russian government had solid reasons to start this war, and most importantly, other countries are responsible for it, forcing the Russian leadership to take such an extreme step.
Having thus shaken off the moral shock, they nevertheless do not reject morality as such. On the contrary, it is precisely their commitment to morality – which says war in general, and especially unprovoked and aggressive war, is bad – that makes them seek justifications for this war, the war with Ukraine, for which they turn to official rhetoric and propaganda.
In real conversations, many apolitical Russians switch between defending and criticizing the war. When conducting such conversations as part of ethnographic research in Russia’s regions, we have noticed that people most often start to defend the war when someone mentions that Russia attacked Ukraine, talks about the death of innocent people or suggests that starting the war was Russia’s mistake.
For example, during an informal sit-down in the city of Cheryomushkin (Sverdlovsk Region) among our researcher, her friend Tonya, who was privy to the details of the project, and Tonya’s apolitical friends, at some point everyone present began to slam the Russian military leadership, accusing it of sending “ordinary guys” to their deaths for no reason.
But as soon as our researcher mentioned that maybe in that case the war should be ended, the mood in the room changed. “The US, they are pounding civilians!” one of Tonya’s friends began to shout emotionally, defending Russia’s actions. “They are just killing civilians and blaming it all on Russia! And it’s a fucking lie!”
‘It’s not our fault’
Talking to a priest, Father Valentin, this time in a suburb of Cheryomushkin, our researcher offered her view that human deaths are always a tragedy. “Look,” she said, “people live in Kharkiv, let’s say, and suddenly the war starts, there are battles, people die.” “We are not to blame for this,” Father Valentin replied. “Those who unleashed this war are to blame, the devil did it.” Our researcher tried again: “But many civilians are dying there, children and old people, women, completely innocent.” “Look, we are not to blame for this, we do not kill civilians.”
Mentioning that Russia attacked Ukraine often forces our interviewees to defend the war (for example, as a defensive war rather than an aggressive one).
Most of our interviewees were uninterested in politics back in February 2022, did not follow the news and certainly did not pay attention to nongovernmental media. They lacked the skills necessary to transform their negative emotions into a “negative” (i.e., critical of the war and the state) political position.
They could not permanently live in a state of shock, so to get over it, they began to defend the war (we have previously described the mechanisms for such justification of the war).
They attribute the moral shock they felt in the first days after the invasion to their own political naivety. They said that they did not know back then that wars are a normal part of international affairs, they happen all over the world, the Russian government had solid reasons to start this war, and most importantly, other countries are responsible for it, forcing the Russian leadership to take such an extreme step.
Having thus shaken off the moral shock, they nevertheless do not reject morality as such. On the contrary, it is precisely their commitment to morality – which says war in general, and especially unprovoked and aggressive war, is bad – that makes them seek justifications for this war, the war with Ukraine, for which they turn to official rhetoric and propaganda.
In real conversations, many apolitical Russians switch between defending and criticizing the war. When conducting such conversations as part of ethnographic research in Russia’s regions, we have noticed that people most often start to defend the war when someone mentions that Russia attacked Ukraine, talks about the death of innocent people or suggests that starting the war was Russia’s mistake.
For example, during an informal sit-down in the city of Cheryomushkin (Sverdlovsk Region) among our researcher, her friend Tonya, who was privy to the details of the project, and Tonya’s apolitical friends, at some point everyone present began to slam the Russian military leadership, accusing it of sending “ordinary guys” to their deaths for no reason.
But as soon as our researcher mentioned that maybe in that case the war should be ended, the mood in the room changed. “The US, they are pounding civilians!” one of Tonya’s friends began to shout emotionally, defending Russia’s actions. “They are just killing civilians and blaming it all on Russia! And it’s a fucking lie!”
‘It’s not our fault’
Talking to a priest, Father Valentin, this time in a suburb of Cheryomushkin, our researcher offered her view that human deaths are always a tragedy. “Look,” she said, “people live in Kharkiv, let’s say, and suddenly the war starts, there are battles, people die.” “We are not to blame for this,” Father Valentin replied. “Those who unleashed this war are to blame, the devil did it.” Our researcher tried again: “But many civilians are dying there, children and old people, women, completely innocent.” “Look, we are not to blame for this, we do not kill civilians.”
Mentioning that Russia attacked Ukraine often forces our interviewees to defend the war (for example, as a defensive war rather than an aggressive one).
“Meanwhile, suggesting that the war is senseless and should be stopped actually evokes emotional statements about Russia’s infallibility.”
A multistory building in Donetsk damaged by Ukrainian shelling. January 4, 2024. Source: VK
The specific arguments used to justify the war remain the same: it is said to be a step to protect the population of the Donbas from Ukraine or, what is heard even more often, to protect Russia from the NATO threat. Still, many of our interviewees voice them uncertainly, often going back and forth between them and clearly experiencing difficulties when trying to make the case. In other words, these explanations are not elements of a formed position.
When someone mentions Russia’s responsibility or, even more so, guilt in relation to Ukraine, these people want first and foremost to defend Russia, with the specific arguments of secondary importance. (Geo)political rhetorical formulas are borrowed from state propaganda and used by people as moral arguments – their political substance becoming secondary to their justifying function. Since the antiwar rhetoric is based on morality, condemning the war as a crime of Russia against Ukraine forces Russians who are not opposed to the war to defend it with moral arguments.
Unable to separate themselves from the authoritarian state that started the war or affect its decision-making, our interviewees take the accusations against Russia and its political leadership personally and therefore seek to defend the war.
This need to defend the war does not stem from ideology, such as the idea of Russia’s infallibility, but from a universal morality that condemns mass violence.
Precisely because these people share the morality that war and the killing of civilians “should not be,” they seek to protect their country and themselves from accusations of violating this morality. So, paradoxically, the moral rhetoric of opponents of the war acts to strengthen the desire of apolitical Russians “without a position” to defend the war.
Implicit condemnation of the war
In the statements of many apolitical Russians, dissatisfaction with the war, alongside its justification, is also based partly on moral arguments, though they are of a completely different nature.
When someone mentions Russia’s responsibility or, even more so, guilt in relation to Ukraine, these people want first and foremost to defend Russia, with the specific arguments of secondary importance. (Geo)political rhetorical formulas are borrowed from state propaganda and used by people as moral arguments – their political substance becoming secondary to their justifying function. Since the antiwar rhetoric is based on morality, condemning the war as a crime of Russia against Ukraine forces Russians who are not opposed to the war to defend it with moral arguments.
Unable to separate themselves from the authoritarian state that started the war or affect its decision-making, our interviewees take the accusations against Russia and its political leadership personally and therefore seek to defend the war.
This need to defend the war does not stem from ideology, such as the idea of Russia’s infallibility, but from a universal morality that condemns mass violence.
Precisely because these people share the morality that war and the killing of civilians “should not be,” they seek to protect their country and themselves from accusations of violating this morality. So, paradoxically, the moral rhetoric of opponents of the war acts to strengthen the desire of apolitical Russians “without a position” to defend the war.
Implicit condemnation of the war
In the statements of many apolitical Russians, dissatisfaction with the war, alongside its justification, is also based partly on moral arguments, though they are of a completely different nature.
“People can apply the habit of judging others’ behavior in moral categories to the war – without putting themselves at risk.”
For example, when considering the choice of those they know who, leaving behind their families to chase good money, went to Ukraine, our interviewees (especially women) often agree that the life and well-being of loved ones are more important than money.
During an informal conversation in Cheryomushkin, a nurse named Zhanna complained about her husband’s desire to go to Ukraine: “I told him: ‘you know you have a small child, you have me. If you leave, you will be gone – and what? Who will raise your child?’” In other words, when weighing the risks to her family, Zhanna essentially asserts that war destroys families while implicitly criticizing others who deviate from the moral norm.
It is generally accepted that people go to Ukraine in three cases: first, for money, second, if they are forced or have an obligation to do so, and third, “if their life has not worked out,” i.e., to give their life at least some meaning.
“Men who want to go there – who are they? It’s for money, for a good salary, for stability. Who else goes there? Those who are sent – they do not want to go, they are sent. So, these people are moved around like pawns, like cogs, and they will not say anything,” says, for example, 50-year-old Maria, a teacher from Cheryomushkin.
“Yes, indeed, what is left for them? They do not have a trade, they cannot get their life going, they cannot adjust to society, they cannot communicate with people… There are men who are upset with their life, just upset with everything,” adds 65-year-old Cheryomushkin pensioner Larisa Petrovna, a former librarian.
Neither Maria nor Larisa Petrovna approves of the motivation of men who go to Ukraine (even if they try not to condemn but to understand them): those who go “for money” or those who are incapable of living a normal life outside the military. These judgements allow them to indirectly condemn the war: people do not need it – they are saying in effect – people are forced to go.
During an informal conversation in Cheryomushkin, a nurse named Zhanna complained about her husband’s desire to go to Ukraine: “I told him: ‘you know you have a small child, you have me. If you leave, you will be gone – and what? Who will raise your child?’” In other words, when weighing the risks to her family, Zhanna essentially asserts that war destroys families while implicitly criticizing others who deviate from the moral norm.
It is generally accepted that people go to Ukraine in three cases: first, for money, second, if they are forced or have an obligation to do so, and third, “if their life has not worked out,” i.e., to give their life at least some meaning.
“Men who want to go there – who are they? It’s for money, for a good salary, for stability. Who else goes there? Those who are sent – they do not want to go, they are sent. So, these people are moved around like pawns, like cogs, and they will not say anything,” says, for example, 50-year-old Maria, a teacher from Cheryomushkin.
“Yes, indeed, what is left for them? They do not have a trade, they cannot get their life going, they cannot adjust to society, they cannot communicate with people… There are men who are upset with their life, just upset with everything,” adds 65-year-old Cheryomushkin pensioner Larisa Petrovna, a former librarian.
Neither Maria nor Larisa Petrovna approves of the motivation of men who go to Ukraine (even if they try not to condemn but to understand them): those who go “for money” or those who are incapable of living a normal life outside the military. These judgements allow them to indirectly condemn the war: people do not need it – they are saying in effect – people are forced to go.
Posters with Russian war heroes in Ryazan. Source: VK
Conclusion
In the first days and weeks of the so-called special operation, many Russians experienced moral shock, as their country’s actions against a neighboring, “brotherly” country contradicted their core concepts about what is acceptable.
Some of them, those at least somewhat familiar with the oppositional agenda and interested in politics, were able to turn these emotions into a position, becoming conscious opponents of the war. Today, as at the beginning of the conflict, they criticize the Russian invasion on moral and ethical grounds, calling it a crime and barbarity that is unacceptable in the 21st century.
Others (the majority) did not have the skills to form their own positions, especially in opposition to the official state narrative. They rejected their initial emotions as “childish” and “naive” and began to look for justifications for the war, with the “oppositional,” moral criticism of the war fundamentally alien to them. Moreover, when they hear such criticism, they feel an even greater need to defend Russia.
Socialized in a depoliticized society and uninterested in politics, they do not always differentiate between the responsibility of the state and that of its citizens. They are even less inclined to think in terms of “the state is accountable to citizens,” as more politicized Russians do.
But they no less share the universal human morality that wars and the killing of innocent civilians are bad. That is why, when told that Russia is waging a criminal war and killing people, they tend to take such claims personally: it is them, Russians, who are committing the crimes.
Seeing this as unfair – after all, they did not decide to go to war and are unable to stop it – they begin to deny the very fact of the crime: Russia did not start the war; we were defending ourselves from the NATO threat; and in general, wars are going on all around us.
In the first days and weeks of the so-called special operation, many Russians experienced moral shock, as their country’s actions against a neighboring, “brotherly” country contradicted their core concepts about what is acceptable.
Some of them, those at least somewhat familiar with the oppositional agenda and interested in politics, were able to turn these emotions into a position, becoming conscious opponents of the war. Today, as at the beginning of the conflict, they criticize the Russian invasion on moral and ethical grounds, calling it a crime and barbarity that is unacceptable in the 21st century.
Others (the majority) did not have the skills to form their own positions, especially in opposition to the official state narrative. They rejected their initial emotions as “childish” and “naive” and began to look for justifications for the war, with the “oppositional,” moral criticism of the war fundamentally alien to them. Moreover, when they hear such criticism, they feel an even greater need to defend Russia.
Socialized in a depoliticized society and uninterested in politics, they do not always differentiate between the responsibility of the state and that of its citizens. They are even less inclined to think in terms of “the state is accountable to citizens,” as more politicized Russians do.
But they no less share the universal human morality that wars and the killing of innocent civilians are bad. That is why, when told that Russia is waging a criminal war and killing people, they tend to take such claims personally: it is them, Russians, who are committing the crimes.
Seeing this as unfair – after all, they did not decide to go to war and are unable to stop it – they begin to deny the very fact of the crime: Russia did not start the war; we were defending ourselves from the NATO threat; and in general, wars are going on all around us.
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