Key Russian ministries have been engaged in laying the groundwork for increased cooperation with the DPRK. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared Kim Jong-un’s visit to Russia. In July 2023, then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu personally traveled to the DPRK to negotiate the main areas of military cooperation. In September 2023, Kim visited Russia, with Putin holding talks with him at the Vostochny Cosmodrome. The main purpose of the visit was to exchange proposals. Russia insisted on steady supplies of artillery shells and troops from the North Korean army to support Russia in Ukraine. However, Kim offered only a limited number of well-trained men. Subsequently, the importance of North Korean manpower to Russia waned.

North Korean troops

By November 2025, more than 15,000 North Korean troops had gone through the war. The contingent was drawn primarily from the 11th Corps of the Korean People’s Army and also included military pilots trained in fighter tactics, technical specialists and engineers supporting the operation of Korean weapons systems, as well as roughly 500 officers and three generals.

The North Korean military received advanced equipment: personal body armor, night vision devices and thermal imagers, as well as illuminated sights, along with training in their use. The Russian Defense Ministry provided them with all necessary intelligence and transport support, as well as military interpreters. 

Even though the North Korean soldiers were relatively skilled, their small number meant they received little attention and ultimately failed to become a significant factor in the war. The commanders of the North Korean contingent were afraid that their soldiers would be captured, so the officers prevented them from engaging in operations deemed excessively dangerous. Russian commanders could not initially use the North Koreans as they might have wanted. Thus, the North Korean contingent was not of special interest to Russian commanders, used only to free up resources for the Russian military, says a source in the Foreign Ministry. 

To optimize the North Korean personnel, it was decided to deploy them to infrastructure tasks. In June 2025, Shoigu – as the secretary of the Russian Security Council – announced that 1,000 North Korean soldiers had been sent to Kursk Region to clear mines, while another 5,000 had been deployed to build fortifications, railways, warehouses, and positions for military equipment and other military infrastructure. As needed, North Korean personnel will also be used to secure communications and guard critical facilities.

In total, Moscow has requested from North Korea more than 50,000 workers for Russia’s construction and forestry sectors. So far, only about 25,000 people have been sent. 

One of the forms of payment from Russia to North Korea has been oil. According to estimates by expert Sergei Smirnov, more than 3 million barrels of oil were supplied to DPRK between March 2024 and November 2025. In addition, whereas Russia had previously provided humanitarian aid to the DPRK free of charge, after a 22-year gap food, agricultural products and civilian equipment have been used as barter in exchange for the military assistance. According to Mikhail Gavrilov, a foreign policy expert who formerly advised the Russian Foreign Ministry, Russia may also consider building oil refineries or providing building materials, but it depends on the scale and duration of North Korea’s military assistance.

For the Kremlin, the DPRK has become an important ally in the fight against the collective West. It is seen as a response to Western support for Ukraine, a demonstration of the Russia-North Korea strategic partnership and an opportunity to break out of geopolitical isolation. Russia has sought to intimidate Washington through information campaigns highlighting its ties with North Korea. Cooperation with North Korea could serve as a bargaining chip for Russia should the US seek negotiations on international security issues. 

The strategic partnership agreement and its political significance

When Putin visited the DPRK in June 2024, the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership was signed. It elevated bilateral relations, as the previous accord of February 9, 2000, was limited to “friendship, good-neighborliness and cooperation.” In addition, the term of the new agreement is indefinite, which hints at the Kremlin’s ambitions, at least in the short and even medium term.

In general, Russian experts positively assessed the agreement. It was, according to many experts in Moscow, both a practical response to the West’s attempts to isolate Russia and a first step toward rebuilding the regional security system.

Gavrilov argues that by strengthening ties with North Korea, Russia has gained an ally in the Western Pacific capable of helping it project power in the region. This, he says, would enable Moscow to balance US influence in the Asia-Pacific. The agreement could also give Russia additional leverage over South Korea, which supplies weapons to Ukraine.

However, even though Russia is gaining more influence on the DPRK, it will not participate in a diplomatic settlement of the conflict on the Korean Peninsula – at least for the next few years, the official from the Russian Foreign Ministry who preferred to remain anonymous says.

Russia’s partnerships with North Korea, Iran and China will complicate strategic planning by the US and its allies, forcing them to confront threats on multiple fronts. Russia wants to shift the focus of the US away from Europe toward Asia, with the overall escalating tensions in East Asia diverting US resources from Europe, which should give Russia more freedom of action.

In the past, one of the major obstacles to the development of relations with North Korea was Russia’s effort to maintain constructive dialogue with the West, including in the UN Security Council. Gavrilov says that Russia, guided by its new foreign policy priorities, could now vote against extending sanctions on North Korea in the Security Council, impose a temporary moratorium on sanctions compliance, and/or implement barter, free-of-charge and humanitarian assistance schemes. Gavrilov pointed out that Russia had already vetoed resolutions on North Korea and would continue to veto them if they interfered with Russian cooperation. Now the most heavily sanctioned country in the world, Russia is not afraid of further sanctions because of its cooperation with North Korea. 

According to German Barukh, an aide to a Duma deputy, Pyongyang is also of economic interest to Moscow, owing to its labor resources, opportunities for joint infrastructure and transportation projects, and potential cooperation in energy and agriculture sectors. Under sanctions, the DPRK represents an alternative economic route that does not rely on Western financial mechanisms.

However, some experts fear active opposition in the region to military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK.

Military-technical cooperation

After signing the partnership agreement, Putin said that Russia does not exclude the possibility of military-technical cooperation with North Korea. So far, Russia is trying to develop cooperation with the DPRK in a way that formally complies with restrictions. The economic provisions of the treaty cover several strategic sectors, including advanced and dual-use technologies.

What North Korea needs

In February 2025, a delegation from North Korea’s National Aviation Administration visited a drone training center at Moscow State Technical University of Civil Aviation and participated in the National Aviation Infrastructure Show. Indeed, this was a demonstration of Moscow’s willingness to share dual-use technologies.

Russia and North Korea signed an agreement to produce Shahed/Geran drones in North Korea, which complemented an earlier agreement for Russia to recruit 12,000 North Korean workers by the end of 2025 to produce these drones at a plant in Yelabuga, Tatarstan. According to a source at Rostec, Russia’s defense conglomerate, this is expected to increase drone production by 16-17%.

In addition to access to the blueprints, North Korean workers will receive knowledge and skills needed to build drones, which will be applied in the domestic production program in North Korea. Some of the Russian production team will travel to the DPRK to consult at the initial stages of production. The DPRK has also received several attack and reconnaissance drone units as engineering samples, as well as technology for producing unmanned aerial vehicles such as the Lancet.

Russian military officials also noted the North Korean side’s interest in technologies for improving the success of missile warhead reentry, solidifying fuel, reducing missile weight, simplifying the transport of ICBMs, building satellites, producing modern, low-noise submarines, launching missiles underwater, developing targeting software and hardware and electromagnetic weapons, and modernizing engine-building and aviation.
Roscosmos has been tasked with developing elements of the DPRK’s satellite system. A North Korean technical delegation consisting of 20 scientists from the National Aerospace Technologies Administration was in Russia in late 2023 to study the satellite production and obtain technical documentation for production. The North Koreans were studying the production of communication equipment, signal processing systems and high-resolution imaging. According to a source in Roscosmos, the delegation visited several satellite companies. In addition, according to the source in the Defense Ministry, next year Russian technical specialists will visit the DPRK to advise their North Korean colleagues on satellite production.

According to the Defense Ministry source, Russia has transferred short-range Pantsir, Tor or Buk mobile air defense and advanced electronic warfare systems, including jamming equipment, to the DPRK. They were sent as examples of Russian technology rather than as military supplies. Russian experts have also advised the DPRK on ballistic missile technology.

Barukh, the aide to the Duma deputy, confirmed that Moscow has shared technical and engineering solutions allowing Pyongyang to make progress in the field of high-precision systems and dual-use technologies. In addition, he said Russia also assists the DPRK in the development of satellite and navigation systems, as well as in the modernization of rocket engines. The Russian side also provides consulting and engineering support for the integration of combat systems, training of specialists and optimization of technological processes. This support is intended to enable the North Koreans to replicate the technology independently. Russia is not transferring its most advanced systems, instead limiting assistance to samples from previous generations.

What Russia needs

Russia initially wanted to receive self-propelled artillery, portable anti-aircraft missile systems, multiple rocket launchers, tactical missiles, anti-tank missiles, rockets and artillery shells from North Korea. 

As of November 2025, as estimated by the Rostec source, North Korea had supplied about 250 Hwasong-11A and Hwasong-11B ballistic missiles and about 21 million rounds of 82-, 122-, 130-, 152- and 170-millimeter ammunition for various weapons systems. 

Russia has also received more than 300 self-propelled artillery units and long-range multiple rocket launch systems, as well as D-20, D-30, M-30 and M-46 towed howitzers, D-74 field guns, Bulsae-4 anti-tank missiles, rocket-propelled grenades and mortars.

Training cooperation

For decades, there had been no known cases of North Korean military personnel studying at Russian military academies. However, representatives of the Russian Defense Ministry say that such exchanges are taking place now. In 2024, a delegation from the North Korean army, headed by the rector of the Kim Il-sung Military University, visited Russia. The parties agreed that North Korean soldiers would be trained at the Military Academy of General Staff and other military educational institutions.

Information cooperation

The experts surveyed believe that Russian support for North Korean information and communication technologies will increase. In particular, a Russian state-owned satellite company, SatGate, has provided North Korea with access to the global internet. In 2024, North Korea switched from China’s ChinaSat 12 satellite to Russia’s Express 103 satellite for broadcasts by Korean Central Television.

The Defense Ministry source says the partnership agreement served as the basis for other deals on military intelligence and communications, potentially including increased Russian technical support for North Korea’s satellite program. The initial deal was reached during the meeting between Putin and Kim in September 2023. Following this, a large number of Russian experts from various agencies traveled to the DPRK to advise on the launch of domestic reconnaissance satellites. The Russian experts pressed for a series of additional engine tests, while the technical documentation for the Russian RD-191 engine was also provided.

In addition, operational cooperation on hacking Western companies has started between the Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff and the Reconnaissance General Bureau of the Korean People’s Army. Cybersecurity company Gen Digital has confirmed that hacker groups from both countries share resources and have a common infrastructure. The anonymous Russian Foreign Ministry source said that the parties were still exchanging information and could carry out a joint attack if their goals coincided. 

The China factor

According to Gavrilov, for a long time one of the obstacles to resuming military cooperation with the DPRK was Russia’s unwillingness to encroach on China’s sphere of influence. The emergence of closer military ties between Russia and North Korea thus became possible only after Moscow reached an understanding with Beijing to divide up their spheres of influence.

The Russian Foreign Ministry official believes that while China will remain North Korea’s principal trading partner for the foreseeable future, Russia may emerge as its primary military ally. Over time, this dynamic could lay the groundwork for a trilateral alignment between Russia, China and North Korea. Establishing something of the sort faces many problems. All three countries have nuclear weapons and different interests. The Russian Defense Ministry proposes conducting trilateral military exercises with Russia, North Korea and China. According to the Defense Ministry source, however, North Korea’s participation in military operations depends on China rather than Russia, and China is unlikely to give its approval to that in coming years.

At a minimum, Gavrilov argues that for China, a strong alliance with Russia and North Korea would mean additional regional support and a more unified front against US influence in East Asia. A rapprochement between Moscow and Pyongyang could help stabilize the situation in the region by increasing the risks for US allies there.

Outlook

Many experts argue that Russia may rapidly scale back its military ties with North Korea once the war in Ukraine ends. According to the Rostec source, an end to the conflict would halt the revival of North Korea’s military-industrial complex, as Russia is currently the largest consumer of North Korean ammunition, meaning demand would dry up. In the postwar period, Moscow would instead focus on investing in its own defense manufacturing.

Moreover, by opting for a partnership agreement rather than a formal alliance, Russia has preserved the option to reduce its obligations to North Korea if it so chooses, Gavrilov notes. At the same time, Russia’s limited number of external partners makes complete disengagement from the DPRK unlikely. Seeking to build alternatives to Western coalitions, Moscow is expected to continue involving North Korea in joint military exercises. However, Russian policymakers recognize that Pyongyang offers limited economic value to Russia, which constrains the depth of future cooperation.