SOCIETY
‘The Most Active Individuals Who Do Not Agree with the System’s Rules Will Simply Be Removed’
January 5, 2026
- Elizaveta StiglizRussia.Post
In his upcoming book Imperfect Equilibrium: Civil-Military Relations in Russian Defense Policymaking, political scientist specializing in civil-military relations in Russia looks at how the structural dynamics between the Russian army, government institutions, business and other civil society actors have evolved during Putin’s time in power. Russia.Post spoke with the book’s author about the book and the outlook for these dynamics.
First, I would like to congratulate you on the upcoming release of your book. Why did you choose the title Imperfect Equilibrium?
The title encapsulates the book’s main thesis. Over the course of 22 years under Vladimir Putin, the Kremlin has failed to achieve the desired quality of its armed forces. While the system reached a certain equilibrium – with both the military and the presidential administration generally satisfied with the situation – it was not ideal, as no one achieved the intended outcomes of the military reforms.
Can you explain in more detail why everyone was satisfied at the time? It seems paradoxical.
Russia underwent two and a half or three military reforms over those 22 years. A great deal of money was spent on attempts to improve the army and solve its problems. Yet the Kremlin rarely succeeded. Some reforms – for example, the 2008-12 reform – were more successful. Even then, many changes were later rolled back, which led to stagnation in the development of the armed forces.
This situation suited everyone – especially the political authorities – because they basically managed to solve the most acute problems that generated social and political discontent. Extreme levels of violence in the army were reduced, petty corruption curbed, military salaries raised, infrastructure modestly improved and some modern weapons procured. For citizens, for elites, for those who did not understand the armed forces, it appeared that the Russian army was becoming more effective, better and stronger.
In practice, this was not entirely true. In the political sphere, however, it created the perception that the president was strengthening Russia and strengthening the Russian army. Everyone was content with this. Some people genuinely believed it, while others understood that disagreeing could be dangerous – at the very least for their careers.
What caused this stagnation? Was it the actors’ interest in personal enrichment?
No. Corruption has, of course, always existed, but it is not sufficient to explain the failure of military reforms in Russia.
In my book, I show how the specifics of civil-military relations in Russia influenced the quality of military reforms. This concerns the military’s ability to control education and access to information about the armed forces, as well as the ability of civilian leaders to understand this information, analyze it critically and use it in policymaking.
The latter capacity has almost always been limited – particularly the ability to understand what is happening within the defense budget and open it up. It is an extremely complicated document. Even the minister of defense still cannot fully understand everything in it. Breaking the defense budget down into its smallest components is very hard.
There is also political dependence. Cities and regional authorities are dependent on defense enterprises, which are often located in single-industry towns. If there are no defense orders, the city effectively ceases to exist. Accordingly, defense orders must be maintained, which reduces incentives for enterprise managers to modernize production.
I also show that Russia’s desire to compete geopolitically with NATO has not always matched its actual capabilities. Had its ambitions been more modest, its resources could have been directed toward areas where greater efficiency and success might have been achieved.
The title encapsulates the book’s main thesis. Over the course of 22 years under Vladimir Putin, the Kremlin has failed to achieve the desired quality of its armed forces. While the system reached a certain equilibrium – with both the military and the presidential administration generally satisfied with the situation – it was not ideal, as no one achieved the intended outcomes of the military reforms.
Can you explain in more detail why everyone was satisfied at the time? It seems paradoxical.
Russia underwent two and a half or three military reforms over those 22 years. A great deal of money was spent on attempts to improve the army and solve its problems. Yet the Kremlin rarely succeeded. Some reforms – for example, the 2008-12 reform – were more successful. Even then, many changes were later rolled back, which led to stagnation in the development of the armed forces.
This situation suited everyone – especially the political authorities – because they basically managed to solve the most acute problems that generated social and political discontent. Extreme levels of violence in the army were reduced, petty corruption curbed, military salaries raised, infrastructure modestly improved and some modern weapons procured. For citizens, for elites, for those who did not understand the armed forces, it appeared that the Russian army was becoming more effective, better and stronger.
In practice, this was not entirely true. In the political sphere, however, it created the perception that the president was strengthening Russia and strengthening the Russian army. Everyone was content with this. Some people genuinely believed it, while others understood that disagreeing could be dangerous – at the very least for their careers.
What caused this stagnation? Was it the actors’ interest in personal enrichment?
No. Corruption has, of course, always existed, but it is not sufficient to explain the failure of military reforms in Russia.
In my book, I show how the specifics of civil-military relations in Russia influenced the quality of military reforms. This concerns the military’s ability to control education and access to information about the armed forces, as well as the ability of civilian leaders to understand this information, analyze it critically and use it in policymaking.
The latter capacity has almost always been limited – particularly the ability to understand what is happening within the defense budget and open it up. It is an extremely complicated document. Even the minister of defense still cannot fully understand everything in it. Breaking the defense budget down into its smallest components is very hard.
There is also political dependence. Cities and regional authorities are dependent on defense enterprises, which are often located in single-industry towns. If there are no defense orders, the city effectively ceases to exist. Accordingly, defense orders must be maintained, which reduces incentives for enterprise managers to modernize production.
I also show that Russia’s desire to compete geopolitically with NATO has not always matched its actual capabilities. Had its ambitions been more modest, its resources could have been directed toward areas where greater efficiency and success might have been achieved.
Russian paratroopers on Red Square
Source: Russian Ministry of Defense
Source: Russian Ministry of Defense
Finally, it is important to note the political leadership’s reluctance to clash too directly with the military leadership – for example, over the transition from conscription to contract service. The military leadership never believed in this reform, and the political leadership had little incentive to force it through either. Yet this was one lever that could have made the armed forces better for citizens.
How do you define mechanisms of civilian control? From your previous answer I understood that this includes the Ministry of Defense.
Of course. Now, under Minister Belousov, this process appears irreversible – this is a ministry that is increasingly civilian. Essentially, the Ministry of Defense functions as a layer between the political authority – the president – and the military leadership, headed by the General Staff and its chief.
On the one hand, the ministry translates political demands into military terms – what needs to be done. On the other hand, it listens to the military, understands what is required and tries to calculate how this will look in budgetary terms and in cooperation with other parts of the civilian government. This may involve, for example, the Ministry of Industry and Trade or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, if agreements with foreign governments are concerned. In this way, the Ministry of Defense ensures that the army functions within the broader political system and the system of public administration.
What other actors of civilian control have there been, and were any of them [at least] relatively successful in influencing the Russian army, even temporarily?
It is important to understand that from the Ministry of Defense’s perspective, the concept of “civilian control” is interpreted in a very conservative way. When Vladimir Putin came to power, the appointment of Sergei Ivanov – the first civilian defense minister – initiated the process of making the ministry more civilian.
At the same time, it remains accountable to the president. Because the security agencies have a special status; the security ministries are appointed exclusively by the president. In reality, we are primarily talking about presidential control.
This still falls within the framework of civilian oversight. Ideally, in the Russian system, the prosecutor’s office and the chief military prosecutor’s office should also be part of civilian oversight, as appointments there are civilian actors and these bodies oversee compliance with the law.
The same applies to the Duma and the Federation Council. They are supposed to review and scrutinize the military budget and understand where the money is going. The Duma’s defense committees, for example, can review programs with changes for the armed forces and directly engage with the military leadership if problems or questions arise.
Civil society also played a role, particularly in the early 2000s. It managed to lobby for the introduction of alternative civilian service and for measures to combat hazing in the army. Over time, however, as elsewhere in Russia, the influence of civil society declined to zero. A different form of civil society has since emerged – all these voenkory, who initially wielded some influence, though this influence is now visibly shrinking.
Previously, regional authorities could also exercise a degree of control in terms of the defense industry. Over time, however, this authority was taken away from them and centralized within state corporations – for example, Rostec.
So does Rostec now have more influence over this entire sphere than regional leaders (including those in regions bordering Ukraine)?
Yes. From the perspective of the federal authorities and the government, state corporations exercise primary control over the military-industrial complex.
At the same time, during the war, small companies have emerged. For now, they are relatively autonomous. We are talking about small private firms involved in the production of small arms, dual-use devices, radars, thermal imagers and sights. These are new civilian industries, and not all of them are directly tied into large state corporations.
How do you define mechanisms of civilian control? From your previous answer I understood that this includes the Ministry of Defense.
Of course. Now, under Minister Belousov, this process appears irreversible – this is a ministry that is increasingly civilian. Essentially, the Ministry of Defense functions as a layer between the political authority – the president – and the military leadership, headed by the General Staff and its chief.
On the one hand, the ministry translates political demands into military terms – what needs to be done. On the other hand, it listens to the military, understands what is required and tries to calculate how this will look in budgetary terms and in cooperation with other parts of the civilian government. This may involve, for example, the Ministry of Industry and Trade or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, if agreements with foreign governments are concerned. In this way, the Ministry of Defense ensures that the army functions within the broader political system and the system of public administration.
What other actors of civilian control have there been, and were any of them [at least] relatively successful in influencing the Russian army, even temporarily?
It is important to understand that from the Ministry of Defense’s perspective, the concept of “civilian control” is interpreted in a very conservative way. When Vladimir Putin came to power, the appointment of Sergei Ivanov – the first civilian defense minister – initiated the process of making the ministry more civilian.
At the same time, it remains accountable to the president. Because the security agencies have a special status; the security ministries are appointed exclusively by the president. In reality, we are primarily talking about presidential control.
This still falls within the framework of civilian oversight. Ideally, in the Russian system, the prosecutor’s office and the chief military prosecutor’s office should also be part of civilian oversight, as appointments there are civilian actors and these bodies oversee compliance with the law.
The same applies to the Duma and the Federation Council. They are supposed to review and scrutinize the military budget and understand where the money is going. The Duma’s defense committees, for example, can review programs with changes for the armed forces and directly engage with the military leadership if problems or questions arise.
Civil society also played a role, particularly in the early 2000s. It managed to lobby for the introduction of alternative civilian service and for measures to combat hazing in the army. Over time, however, as elsewhere in Russia, the influence of civil society declined to zero. A different form of civil society has since emerged – all these voenkory, who initially wielded some influence, though this influence is now visibly shrinking.
Previously, regional authorities could also exercise a degree of control in terms of the defense industry. Over time, however, this authority was taken away from them and centralized within state corporations – for example, Rostec.
So does Rostec now have more influence over this entire sphere than regional leaders (including those in regions bordering Ukraine)?
Yes. From the perspective of the federal authorities and the government, state corporations exercise primary control over the military-industrial complex.
At the same time, during the war, small companies have emerged. For now, they are relatively autonomous. We are talking about small private firms involved in the production of small arms, dual-use devices, radars, thermal imagers and sights. These are new civilian industries, and not all of them are directly tied into large state corporations.
Vladimir Putin and the then-Minister of Defense os Russia Segei Shoigu
Source: Presidential Press and Information Office
Source: Presidential Press and Information Office
From what you are saying it follows that the gap between civilian control and the army is becoming more acute, even though there is a widespread belief that the army has been modernizing in the wake of the shock of February-March 2022. How is this process actually unfolding?
I would not say that the army is modernizing. It is adapting and learning from combat. In my view, the Russian and Ukrainian armies are currently the most experienced in this regard, but this is largely a matter of the principle that if you want to survive, you must be able to adapt. Both armies are learning from each other and trying to anticipate developments.
From this perspective, yes, a large amount of relevant knowledge has emerged – not only within the military, but also among civilian specialists, in both government and civil society.
Many veterans have appeared, some of whom, I believe, will go on to work in civilian enterprises or within the state apparatus. This creates an opportunity to erode the Ministry of Defense’s monopoly. Previously, expertise and knowledge were concentrated primarily among those actively serving. Now, there are those currently serving, those who have retired and those who work for the army while engaging with civil society.
There have also been significant advances in the development of unmanned systems – ground, aerial and naval – because the war has demonstrated the critical importance of this area. It is clear that the current minister of defense is paying close attention to this and creating what might be called “pockets of effectiveness” – units that are not formally legal but, because they generate ideas and combat capability on the front lines, are nevertheless allowed to operate.
At the same time, the Ministry of Defense retains political control and has even strengthened it during the war, especially after Prigozhin’s rebellion. Structural factors, however, are changing.
To what extent might special military operation veterans who go on to build civilian careers influence this equilibrium?
Those who can genuinely alter the equilibrium are individuals who reach senior command positions in the armed forces or high-level management roles in the civilian part of the government or in politics. This means becoming generals or – in the civilian sphere – deputy ministers, ministers, vice-premiers or directors of major enterprises.
It takes time for people to reach this level. During that time, they will adapt to the system in which they operate and become more “systemic” actors. It seems to me that the system will select for primarily those who understand how it functions.
In other words, change is impossible without a political mandate – without a decision to reform the training and education system, to change management norms and, ultimately, to revise the mechanisms of co-optation, recruitment and employment in government service. The system operates in such a way that the most active individuals who do not agree with its rules will simply be dismissed or removed – for managerial or political reasons.
I would not say that the army is modernizing. It is adapting and learning from combat. In my view, the Russian and Ukrainian armies are currently the most experienced in this regard, but this is largely a matter of the principle that if you want to survive, you must be able to adapt. Both armies are learning from each other and trying to anticipate developments.
From this perspective, yes, a large amount of relevant knowledge has emerged – not only within the military, but also among civilian specialists, in both government and civil society.
Many veterans have appeared, some of whom, I believe, will go on to work in civilian enterprises or within the state apparatus. This creates an opportunity to erode the Ministry of Defense’s monopoly. Previously, expertise and knowledge were concentrated primarily among those actively serving. Now, there are those currently serving, those who have retired and those who work for the army while engaging with civil society.
There have also been significant advances in the development of unmanned systems – ground, aerial and naval – because the war has demonstrated the critical importance of this area. It is clear that the current minister of defense is paying close attention to this and creating what might be called “pockets of effectiveness” – units that are not formally legal but, because they generate ideas and combat capability on the front lines, are nevertheless allowed to operate.
At the same time, the Ministry of Defense retains political control and has even strengthened it during the war, especially after Prigozhin’s rebellion. Structural factors, however, are changing.
To what extent might special military operation veterans who go on to build civilian careers influence this equilibrium?
Those who can genuinely alter the equilibrium are individuals who reach senior command positions in the armed forces or high-level management roles in the civilian part of the government or in politics. This means becoming generals or – in the civilian sphere – deputy ministers, ministers, vice-premiers or directors of major enterprises.
It takes time for people to reach this level. During that time, they will adapt to the system in which they operate and become more “systemic” actors. It seems to me that the system will select for primarily those who understand how it functions.
In other words, change is impossible without a political mandate – without a decision to reform the training and education system, to change management norms and, ultimately, to revise the mechanisms of co-optation, recruitment and employment in government service. The system operates in such a way that the most active individuals who do not agree with its rules will simply be dismissed or removed – for managerial or political reasons.
Russian troops in northeastern Ukraine
Source: Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation
Source: Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation
Can voenkory influence anything in this context? They seem to retain an aura of activism. How prepared is the system to accommodate them?
At present, the system accommodates only the voenkory who comply with censorship rules. For example, criticism of the president is prohibited, and criticism of the army must be framed with extreme caution, focusing only on narrowly defined areas for improvement.
After the war, many voenkory will simply lose their source of income and will have to look for other work. There will no longer be a war to cover. Some voenkory will certainly remain, but they will work within the media holdings of Zvezda, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Izvestia and similar outlets. Those operating independently will need to find other areas for work. Some may be hired as advisors to company managers, integrating into the system in that way.
You speak about “after the war” as though it were a relatively near-term scenario.
An end to the war? Yes. I believe there will be serious progress toward that in 2026. This assessment is based on my understanding of processes in Moscow and on what I observe in US and European politics.
Russia has the military advantage, and Ukraine’s position continues to deteriorate. Thus, Russia can press its demands. The Russian economy, however, has slowed, and over time political problems will begin to emerge as a consequence.
Milk and bread will remain on the shelves in Russia, but it will become increasingly hard to finance certain federal programs and some regions will require debt bailouts to maintain fiscal stability. People working in the financial and economic sphere understand this. The only real question now is when the president will decide economic risks are too high from the standpoint of political stability.
At the same time, I see the influence of the US. The goal of the US, as part of its new national strategy, is to end the war in Ukraine, begin stabilizing Europe and bring it to heel before shifting focus toward China and the Pacific region.
In my view, we will soon reach a point where the warring sides will have to reach an agreement. I would not risk predicting what this agreement will look like. It could be very unfavorable for Ukraine and Europe. Who knows where Russian troops will be under such an arrangement.
Would you venture a prediction about the impact that the mass return of veterans will have on Russian society?
This impact is already being felt as some soldiers are wounded and discharged from the army. In my view, the most serious problem is the safety of others – especially their wives, children, close relatives and friends.
Problems will arise where they already existed. For example, if a veteran returns to his apartment – most likely not in Moscow – and cannot cope with the psychological trauma he experienced while fighting, he may begin drinking. This can lead to violence. It is already happening, particularly among soldiers recruited from penal colonies and prisons.
This is a serious social problem, though I am not certain it will become a political issue. For it to be articulated politically, society would need political leaders capable of explaining what is happening. This could occur on social media – if platforms even remain accessible in Russia by that point. They are already being blocked, and the space for free exchange of information and opinions is narrowing by the day.
Another question concerns what condition the Russian state will be in – especially its economy and system of public administration. Mid-level officers, for example battalion commanders, have now forged strong bonds with mobilized men and volunteers. The same applies to regional authorities and businesses, as it is sometimes easier to negotiate directly with them than to procure supplies through the Ministry of Defense. The ministry may take six months to solve a problem, whereas a business can solve it in two weeks.
These are serious connections. People help one another and will continue to do so. The military, business and regional authorities have helped each other to survive. Such relationships are rare and can later be tapped for political gain. This is particularly true if the economy deteriorates and the state’s capacity to enforce its decisions weakens. In that case, connections linking men with military experience to business, regional authorities and other elites will help solve problems. This represents substantial capital.
Does this mean the risk of creating a pool of private military companies and further militarizing society?
Militarization is already under way – it is state policy. I am referring to something slightly different. Imagine a factory facing severe economic headwinds. Production stops; the owner leaves and makes no effort to resolve the situation. In this context, certain actors may be able to negotiate directly with the regional governor or business figures who might acquire the factory for themselves.
If nationalization fails, takeover through raiding is an option. If a governor has strong ties to the security services or to siloviki, his political weight increases accordingly. Such figures can communicate with the Security Council or the FSB leadership far more effectively than some Moscow-appointed outsider sent to the regions. This enhances the influence of actors who want to capitalize on these connections. In the past, security actors were more isolated from politics.
So it is like the 1990s, but now the military has lots of influence?
I do not think this will be a repeat of the 1990s, because I do not expect an economic collapse of comparable magnitude. In the 1990s, many problems stemmed from the transition from a planned to a market economy and from the failure of the economic system. People could not afford basic goods or meet essential needs. I do not expect that to happen again in Russia, as the transition to a market economy has already taken place and the market will continue supplying goods.
In 2022, the market economy helped stabilize the country – a useful lesson for everyone. Rolling back the market would be both strange and foolish for the authorities. Thus, the economy will be left to continue providing basic goods. They may be expensive and of poor quality, but they will be available.
There will be no 1990s scenario, though the system may become less coherent (rykhly). Formally, it will remain highly centralized. In practice, however, there will be points at which this power falters and diminishes.
At the same time, I look at current developments – internet restrictions and criminal cases against elites – and it appears the Kremlin is already concerned about emerging risks and is trying to head them off by silencing all potentially disloyal actors. Blocking messaging platforms may also be part of preparations for some social turmoil. This represents very serious political control. I cannot imagine how mass protests could be organized in Russia today, even if they were formally permitted. The authorities would shut off the internet and no one would come out.
This means civil society will be forced to recall the experience of the 1980s, before the internet became widespread. Organizing resistance will be harder and harder. The government now has technological tools, such as facial recognition, that shift the balance of power decisively. Elites themselves are afraid – every one fears imprisonment or poisoning. Every week brings news of corruption cases and arrests.
I think the president will soon face a dilemma. On the one hand, centralization is essential to prevent resistance from those who oppose any proposed peace deal. This opposition is likely to come from radical extremists who just love war. On the other hand, if the leadership starts to prepare for further confrontation [with the outside world], repression will have to intensify – especially against those blamed for Russia’s failures.
Society knows how to behave under such conditions, but I no longer envy the old elites. Those who left did so at the right time. Those who remain may find themselves increasingly unsafe.
In any scenario, we arrive at a fork in the road with two scenarios for how the screws will be tightened.
Yes. I cannot think of a real political leader who would willingly give up the kind of power currently held by the Russian president. If such a decision were made, it would likely be part of a managed transition.
Why would such a transition be necessary? First, it would require great wisdom.
Second, relinquishing control over this entire system would be extremely risky after everything that has happened. Those who come to power next might decide to hold the current leadership accountable for its decisions.
At present, the system accommodates only the voenkory who comply with censorship rules. For example, criticism of the president is prohibited, and criticism of the army must be framed with extreme caution, focusing only on narrowly defined areas for improvement.
After the war, many voenkory will simply lose their source of income and will have to look for other work. There will no longer be a war to cover. Some voenkory will certainly remain, but they will work within the media holdings of Zvezda, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Izvestia and similar outlets. Those operating independently will need to find other areas for work. Some may be hired as advisors to company managers, integrating into the system in that way.
You speak about “after the war” as though it were a relatively near-term scenario.
An end to the war? Yes. I believe there will be serious progress toward that in 2026. This assessment is based on my understanding of processes in Moscow and on what I observe in US and European politics.
Russia has the military advantage, and Ukraine’s position continues to deteriorate. Thus, Russia can press its demands. The Russian economy, however, has slowed, and over time political problems will begin to emerge as a consequence.
Milk and bread will remain on the shelves in Russia, but it will become increasingly hard to finance certain federal programs and some regions will require debt bailouts to maintain fiscal stability. People working in the financial and economic sphere understand this. The only real question now is when the president will decide economic risks are too high from the standpoint of political stability.
At the same time, I see the influence of the US. The goal of the US, as part of its new national strategy, is to end the war in Ukraine, begin stabilizing Europe and bring it to heel before shifting focus toward China and the Pacific region.
In my view, we will soon reach a point where the warring sides will have to reach an agreement. I would not risk predicting what this agreement will look like. It could be very unfavorable for Ukraine and Europe. Who knows where Russian troops will be under such an arrangement.
Would you venture a prediction about the impact that the mass return of veterans will have on Russian society?
This impact is already being felt as some soldiers are wounded and discharged from the army. In my view, the most serious problem is the safety of others – especially their wives, children, close relatives and friends.
Problems will arise where they already existed. For example, if a veteran returns to his apartment – most likely not in Moscow – and cannot cope with the psychological trauma he experienced while fighting, he may begin drinking. This can lead to violence. It is already happening, particularly among soldiers recruited from penal colonies and prisons.
This is a serious social problem, though I am not certain it will become a political issue. For it to be articulated politically, society would need political leaders capable of explaining what is happening. This could occur on social media – if platforms even remain accessible in Russia by that point. They are already being blocked, and the space for free exchange of information and opinions is narrowing by the day.
Another question concerns what condition the Russian state will be in – especially its economy and system of public administration. Mid-level officers, for example battalion commanders, have now forged strong bonds with mobilized men and volunteers. The same applies to regional authorities and businesses, as it is sometimes easier to negotiate directly with them than to procure supplies through the Ministry of Defense. The ministry may take six months to solve a problem, whereas a business can solve it in two weeks.
These are serious connections. People help one another and will continue to do so. The military, business and regional authorities have helped each other to survive. Such relationships are rare and can later be tapped for political gain. This is particularly true if the economy deteriorates and the state’s capacity to enforce its decisions weakens. In that case, connections linking men with military experience to business, regional authorities and other elites will help solve problems. This represents substantial capital.
Does this mean the risk of creating a pool of private military companies and further militarizing society?
Militarization is already under way – it is state policy. I am referring to something slightly different. Imagine a factory facing severe economic headwinds. Production stops; the owner leaves and makes no effort to resolve the situation. In this context, certain actors may be able to negotiate directly with the regional governor or business figures who might acquire the factory for themselves.
If nationalization fails, takeover through raiding is an option. If a governor has strong ties to the security services or to siloviki, his political weight increases accordingly. Such figures can communicate with the Security Council or the FSB leadership far more effectively than some Moscow-appointed outsider sent to the regions. This enhances the influence of actors who want to capitalize on these connections. In the past, security actors were more isolated from politics.
So it is like the 1990s, but now the military has lots of influence?
I do not think this will be a repeat of the 1990s, because I do not expect an economic collapse of comparable magnitude. In the 1990s, many problems stemmed from the transition from a planned to a market economy and from the failure of the economic system. People could not afford basic goods or meet essential needs. I do not expect that to happen again in Russia, as the transition to a market economy has already taken place and the market will continue supplying goods.
In 2022, the market economy helped stabilize the country – a useful lesson for everyone. Rolling back the market would be both strange and foolish for the authorities. Thus, the economy will be left to continue providing basic goods. They may be expensive and of poor quality, but they will be available.
There will be no 1990s scenario, though the system may become less coherent (rykhly). Formally, it will remain highly centralized. In practice, however, there will be points at which this power falters and diminishes.
At the same time, I look at current developments – internet restrictions and criminal cases against elites – and it appears the Kremlin is already concerned about emerging risks and is trying to head them off by silencing all potentially disloyal actors. Blocking messaging platforms may also be part of preparations for some social turmoil. This represents very serious political control. I cannot imagine how mass protests could be organized in Russia today, even if they were formally permitted. The authorities would shut off the internet and no one would come out.
This means civil society will be forced to recall the experience of the 1980s, before the internet became widespread. Organizing resistance will be harder and harder. The government now has technological tools, such as facial recognition, that shift the balance of power decisively. Elites themselves are afraid – every one fears imprisonment or poisoning. Every week brings news of corruption cases and arrests.
I think the president will soon face a dilemma. On the one hand, centralization is essential to prevent resistance from those who oppose any proposed peace deal. This opposition is likely to come from radical extremists who just love war. On the other hand, if the leadership starts to prepare for further confrontation [with the outside world], repression will have to intensify – especially against those blamed for Russia’s failures.
Society knows how to behave under such conditions, but I no longer envy the old elites. Those who left did so at the right time. Those who remain may find themselves increasingly unsafe.
In any scenario, we arrive at a fork in the road with two scenarios for how the screws will be tightened.
Yes. I cannot think of a real political leader who would willingly give up the kind of power currently held by the Russian president. If such a decision were made, it would likely be part of a managed transition.
Why would such a transition be necessary? First, it would require great wisdom.
Second, relinquishing control over this entire system would be extremely risky after everything that has happened. Those who come to power next might decide to hold the current leadership accountable for its decisions.
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