Politics
Putin Wants to Flip On/Off Switch on the War, Military Spending as It Suits Him
July 18, 2025
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Sergei Shelin
Journalist, independent analyst and author of Russia after Putin and Trump
(Freedom Letters, 2025)
Journalist Sergei Shelin, having studied Putin’s recent public remarks, concludes that the Russian leader is upbeat about the prospects for his army in Ukraine this year and believes that his government can continue its wartime strategy of dividing Russia into a minority at war and a majority at peace. Yet this belief has been thrown into doubt by Western plans to ramp up military spending.
The original text in Russian was published in the Moscow Times. A shortened version is being republished here with theauthor’s permission.
Russian invasion of Ukraine from February 22, 2022 to the present.
Source: Wiki Commons
Source: Wiki Commons
Judging by what Putin has said to a wide range of audiences and interlocutors in recent weeks, we can get a fresh idea of his intentions. Earlier this year, many believed that Putin wanted to make peace with Ukraine. But now even Trump admits that that he is “not happy” and “I didn’t make any progress with [Putin].”
An atypical dictator
Putin is being tough with Trump because he believes that Russia’s summer offensive will be a success. But that is not the only thing that can be gleaned from Putin’s latest remarks. In recent weeks, he has explicitly or implicitly announced virtually everything he plans to do not just this year, but in the next 20 years as well.
Let’s begin with the facts that are reported to him and that would guide his decision-making, were he a typical statesman.
The receipts of the federal budget for the first half of 2025 increased in nominal terms only 2.8% year over year (i.e., in real terms, they significantly decreased), while expenditures jumped 20.2%. The war is sucking up more money than planned, and oil and gas revenues were lower than projected, falling 16.7%.
An atypical dictator
Putin is being tough with Trump because he believes that Russia’s summer offensive will be a success. But that is not the only thing that can be gleaned from Putin’s latest remarks. In recent weeks, he has explicitly or implicitly announced virtually everything he plans to do not just this year, but in the next 20 years as well.
Let’s begin with the facts that are reported to him and that would guide his decision-making, were he a typical statesman.
The receipts of the federal budget for the first half of 2025 increased in nominal terms only 2.8% year over year (i.e., in real terms, they significantly decreased), while expenditures jumped 20.2%. The war is sucking up more money than planned, and oil and gas revenues were lower than projected, falling 16.7%.
“The budget deficit for the first six months of the year is already at the level planned for the whole year (RUB 3.7 trillion).”
But war is not just about money. Putin certainly knows the burn rate of human material is rising, too.
The lists of Russian casualties compiled by Mediazona and the BBC – which are compiled by name, meaning they represent only part of the picture – include 18,000 killed in 2022, 38,000 in 2023 and 45,000 in 2024. To get a full picture of Russian losses, these figures are usually multiplied by two. Meanwhile, judging by the available preliminary data, losses in 2025 are no lower than last year’s. Indeed, the real losses this year may approach almost 100,000.
If Putin were a typical statesman, even a typical dictator, in his decisions and appeals to the nation he would take into account that the war is getting more intense and costing his country more and more, both in terms of money and in terms of people. He would try to address the crisis in the economy and in the recruitment of soldiers. For example, he would call on civilians to economize, raise taxes, freeze salaries, stop expensive and irrelevant projects, call the nation to arms, etc.
Or he would really look for a way to end this war. Putin has done none of this. There is a different logic to his actions.
The lists of Russian casualties compiled by Mediazona and the BBC – which are compiled by name, meaning they represent only part of the picture – include 18,000 killed in 2022, 38,000 in 2023 and 45,000 in 2024. To get a full picture of Russian losses, these figures are usually multiplied by two. Meanwhile, judging by the available preliminary data, losses in 2025 are no lower than last year’s. Indeed, the real losses this year may approach almost 100,000.
If Putin were a typical statesman, even a typical dictator, in his decisions and appeals to the nation he would take into account that the war is getting more intense and costing his country more and more, both in terms of money and in terms of people. He would try to address the crisis in the economy and in the recruitment of soldiers. For example, he would call on civilians to economize, raise taxes, freeze salaries, stop expensive and irrelevant projects, call the nation to arms, etc.
Or he would really look for a way to end this war. Putin has done none of this. There is a different logic to his actions.
Putin meeting with Deputy President of South Africa Paul Mashatile on the sidelines of SPIEF. June 2025. Source: Kremlin.ru
Putin is making personal plans for the coming months, years and even decades. He has a vision of a beautiful Russia of the future and is steadily realizing it. We can see the contours of this vision in his latest statements.
Putin’s three priorities in the non-Western world
The recent St Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), which attracted a number of non-Western officials, gave Putin an opportunity to showcase his strategic priorities.
Putin’s three priorities in the non-Western world
The recent St Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), which attracted a number of non-Western officials, gave Putin an opportunity to showcase his strategic priorities.
“The first and main priority is China. Beijing sent a third-tier official, Ding Xuexiang, with the rank of vice-premier.”
Putin’s obsequious tone was stunning: “I have already told Comrade Ding Xuexiang: of course, he is a high-ranking leader – a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau – but at the same time, he is vice premier of the State Council… It invariably involves a substantial amount of day-to-day work. I would like to thank you for nevertheless finding it possible – of course, on the instructions of the President of the People’s Republic of China… to come, to step away from your current practical daily duties, to visit us and to participate in SPIEF.”
The second priority for Putin and Russia is the hereditary nobility that rules the Gulf monarchies. With the commander of Bahrain’s Royal Guard, Nasser bin Hamad al-Khalifa, Putin’s intonation is less humiliating, but still flattering: “if I am not mistaken, this is your first visit to St Petersburg, is that correct? I sincerely hope that both you and the members of your delegation will enjoy this city… You are leading a large delegation and you are our guest of honor…”
With OPEC Secretary General Haitham Al Ghais, Putin is businesslike and polite: “we have not just good but very business-like relations with OPEC, we are working together… I am very glad to see you and have the opportunity to share thoughts and opinions on how our collaboration, as well as the situation in the global energy markets, will be developing during these hard times, to put it bluntly.”
These three options and three types of partners encapsulate Putin’s interest in the non-Western world. For example, the deputy president of South Africa, who also came to SPIEF, was honored only with a few indifferent phrases.
In foreign policy, Putin is quite rationally accommodating toward Beijing and bows to oil traders while paying almost no attention to the rest of the non-Western world.
Recall how Putin, hosting the Iranian foreign minister in the middle of the Israeli and US airstrikes on Iran, with which Russia has a strategic partnership agreement, lamented the “completely unprovoked act of aggression against Iran… without foundation or justification” before, in parting, asking him to “extend my warm regards and best wishes to both President Masoud Pezeshkian and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.”
We will talk about relations with the Western world later.
Economic strategy
Putin does not worry about short-term economic matters much. That is why he has technocrats and former “systemic liberals,” so they can cope with inflation, find money for the war, balance the budget, etc.
In recent weeks, Putin has spoken out on economic issues a few times. Here are some typical phrases: “improving the conditions for day-to-day business operations,” “path of balanced growth,” “create conditions that boost the economic activity of our citizens,” “new quality of the investment climate,” “expansion of economic activities,” “build an entire ecosystem around it for discussing, refining and implementing breakthrough ideas.”
It is clear that, firstly, Putin sees that the economy is being distorted by spending on the war; secondly, he believes that this year his economic managers will somehow make ends meet (in this belief, it seems, he is not mistaken); and thirdly, he refuses to announce to the people and the captains of the economy any belt-tightening measures.
The second priority for Putin and Russia is the hereditary nobility that rules the Gulf monarchies. With the commander of Bahrain’s Royal Guard, Nasser bin Hamad al-Khalifa, Putin’s intonation is less humiliating, but still flattering: “if I am not mistaken, this is your first visit to St Petersburg, is that correct? I sincerely hope that both you and the members of your delegation will enjoy this city… You are leading a large delegation and you are our guest of honor…”
With OPEC Secretary General Haitham Al Ghais, Putin is businesslike and polite: “we have not just good but very business-like relations with OPEC, we are working together… I am very glad to see you and have the opportunity to share thoughts and opinions on how our collaboration, as well as the situation in the global energy markets, will be developing during these hard times, to put it bluntly.”
These three options and three types of partners encapsulate Putin’s interest in the non-Western world. For example, the deputy president of South Africa, who also came to SPIEF, was honored only with a few indifferent phrases.
In foreign policy, Putin is quite rationally accommodating toward Beijing and bows to oil traders while paying almost no attention to the rest of the non-Western world.
Recall how Putin, hosting the Iranian foreign minister in the middle of the Israeli and US airstrikes on Iran, with which Russia has a strategic partnership agreement, lamented the “completely unprovoked act of aggression against Iran… without foundation or justification” before, in parting, asking him to “extend my warm regards and best wishes to both President Masoud Pezeshkian and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.”
We will talk about relations with the Western world later.
Economic strategy
Putin does not worry about short-term economic matters much. That is why he has technocrats and former “systemic liberals,” so they can cope with inflation, find money for the war, balance the budget, etc.
In recent weeks, Putin has spoken out on economic issues a few times. Here are some typical phrases: “improving the conditions for day-to-day business operations,” “path of balanced growth,” “create conditions that boost the economic activity of our citizens,” “new quality of the investment climate,” “expansion of economic activities,” “build an entire ecosystem around it for discussing, refining and implementing breakthrough ideas.”
It is clear that, firstly, Putin sees that the economy is being distorted by spending on the war; secondly, he believes that this year his economic managers will somehow make ends meet (in this belief, it seems, he is not mistaken); and thirdly, he refuses to announce to the people and the captains of the economy any belt-tightening measures.
“But next year, it will no longer be possible to avoid belt-tightening if the regime intends to continue fighting the war in Ukraine with the same approach.”
Putin at the Agency for Strategic Initiatives forum. July 2025. Source: Kremlin.ru
Putin’s talk of a “transition to a high-wage economy” indicates that he does not want – at least for now – to demand economic sacrifices from Russians. He seems to be banking on getting by without them.
Meanwhile, he is not scratching his pet projects from the agenda. Take the Moscow-St Petersburg high-speed railway. The other day, in a meeting with government ministers, Putin demanded an update on it.
The reassuring prattle uttered in response masked the main problem: to really start construction, a lot of money is needed, but where is it supposed to come from? After all, there is a war. Thus, it’s no surprise that, as one of the deputy prime ministers said, “in the process of implementing such a complex project, individual difficulties arise that necessitate in-depth solutions (uglublonnoy prorabotki).”
Yet Putin insists by the end of March 2026 “to receive specific proposals on the deadlines and parameters of each project as part of the high-speed railway.” And he received the answer he was looking for: “according to your approved plan, new lines will connect Moscow with Minsk, Yekaterinburg via Kazan, Adler and Ryazan. By 2045, the total length of the high-speed network will exceed 4,500 kilometers.”
Perhaps Putin believes that he will personally open the railway. He would celebrate the 50th anniversary of his rule in the late 2040s.
Ideology construction
In the three weeks of statements that we have been looking at, Putin has found time for a fair number of events with a short- and long-term ideological focus.
He cautioned the authors of propagandistic history textbooks at a meeting against complacency, since “the textbooks you have developed will be used for year five onward. But what about earlier years? A child’s worldview begins forming much sooner… even at the preschool level… All schools now conduct flag-raising ceremonies and hold corresponding lessons. However, implementing this with younger children presents greater challenges…”
At an Agency for Strategic Initiatives forum, Putin told the gathered bureaucrats that “since you are active in the most different areas and you are smart and very creative people,” “I would like to ask you to find ways to promote the family, large families, to find ways to support motherhood and childhood… Only your efforts with your creative spirit can turn a good, large, traditional family into an in-style trend of Russia’s development.”
Joining remotely to open youth centers in the provinces, he walked through the whole propaganda system being built: “all our projects are interconnected and engage youngsters of all ages… Thus, starting from elementary school, children are sincerely welcome in the Movement of the First… Schoolchildren and college students can try their hand at the Bolshaya Peremena contest; those who study at universities can go for the Russian national student project, Your Move… And of course, the revived Znaniye (Knowledge) Society, has become a reliable support for all those aspiring for professional, personal and creative growth.”
Ideology construction on such a scale assumes that the war will not be all-consuming for the country. That the countrywill have enough strength and attention for everyday formative propaganda activities.
The war is not the priority?
Meanwhile, he is not scratching his pet projects from the agenda. Take the Moscow-St Petersburg high-speed railway. The other day, in a meeting with government ministers, Putin demanded an update on it.
The reassuring prattle uttered in response masked the main problem: to really start construction, a lot of money is needed, but where is it supposed to come from? After all, there is a war. Thus, it’s no surprise that, as one of the deputy prime ministers said, “in the process of implementing such a complex project, individual difficulties arise that necessitate in-depth solutions (uglublonnoy prorabotki).”
Yet Putin insists by the end of March 2026 “to receive specific proposals on the deadlines and parameters of each project as part of the high-speed railway.” And he received the answer he was looking for: “according to your approved plan, new lines will connect Moscow with Minsk, Yekaterinburg via Kazan, Adler and Ryazan. By 2045, the total length of the high-speed network will exceed 4,500 kilometers.”
Perhaps Putin believes that he will personally open the railway. He would celebrate the 50th anniversary of his rule in the late 2040s.
Ideology construction
In the three weeks of statements that we have been looking at, Putin has found time for a fair number of events with a short- and long-term ideological focus.
He cautioned the authors of propagandistic history textbooks at a meeting against complacency, since “the textbooks you have developed will be used for year five onward. But what about earlier years? A child’s worldview begins forming much sooner… even at the preschool level… All schools now conduct flag-raising ceremonies and hold corresponding lessons. However, implementing this with younger children presents greater challenges…”
At an Agency for Strategic Initiatives forum, Putin told the gathered bureaucrats that “since you are active in the most different areas and you are smart and very creative people,” “I would like to ask you to find ways to promote the family, large families, to find ways to support motherhood and childhood… Only your efforts with your creative spirit can turn a good, large, traditional family into an in-style trend of Russia’s development.”
Joining remotely to open youth centers in the provinces, he walked through the whole propaganda system being built: “all our projects are interconnected and engage youngsters of all ages… Thus, starting from elementary school, children are sincerely welcome in the Movement of the First… Schoolchildren and college students can try their hand at the Bolshaya Peremena contest; those who study at universities can go for the Russian national student project, Your Move… And of course, the revived Znaniye (Knowledge) Society, has become a reliable support for all those aspiring for professional, personal and creative growth.”
Ideology construction on such a scale assumes that the war will not be all-consuming for the country. That the countrywill have enough strength and attention for everyday formative propaganda activities.
The war is not the priority?
“Putin assumes the war in Ukraine can be continued with a limited contingent of Russian boots.”
The majority of the country can thus exist separately and live more or less the same as before, the only condition being continually paying homage to Putin’s war.
Addressing high school graduates recently, Putin obviously did not want to make them nervous, much less call on them to sign up as kontraktniki: “before you – as before all young people in our country – lie the broadest opportunities today. This enables you to… make the right choice and find a profession that truly resonates with you.
Addressing high school graduates recently, Putin obviously did not want to make them nervous, much less call on them to sign up as kontraktniki: “before you – as before all young people in our country – lie the broadest opportunities today. This enables you to… make the right choice and find a profession that truly resonates with you.
Putin hosting graduates of military academies at the Kremlin. June 2025. Source: Kremlin.ru
Naturally, it is very important to find like-minded people and to see inspiring examples in others – those around you, including young individuals, almost your peers, who are already contributing to our nation’s strength, enriching its finest traditions and safeguarding its true values and national interests.”
Even at a meeting with recent graduates of military and law enforcement academies, Putin spoke about NATO’s machinations but refrained from encouraging them to go and fight in Ukraine. He acknowledged the need for “utmost concentration when addressing key objectives,” like “combatting the attempts to destabilize the sociopolitical situation, terrorism, fighting crime and corruption…” Again, the “special military operation” is not cited as the top priority.
Even at a meeting with recent graduates of military and law enforcement academies, Putin spoke about NATO’s machinations but refrained from encouraging them to go and fight in Ukraine. He acknowledged the need for “utmost concentration when addressing key objectives,” like “combatting the attempts to destabilize the sociopolitical situation, terrorism, fighting crime and corruption…” Again, the “special military operation” is not cited as the top priority.
“The strategy that Putin is pursuing implies that his project for Russia’s long-term development is compatible with a limited war, whose scale and intensity he can personally turn up or down.”
Today, fiscal and human resources are running out. This means, in Putin’s logic, it is high time to attack on all fronts, sneering at peace proposals coming from “foreign partners.” If in a few months there are disruptions in the flow of money or people, or both, Putin will feign constructiveness and stop the war. For a while at least, but on the condition that all the levers remain in his hands.
Putin loses his composure
In recent weeks, Putin has only once been visibly irritated. At the end of June, after the Eurasian Economic Union summitin Minsk, Putin, supposedly in response to the question of a Russian reporter, gave a long and angry speech on NATO’s plan to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP in a few years.
The increase in military spending and the militaristic fervor you mentioned are based on a single premise: the alleged aggressiveness of Russia. But in reality, the exact opposite is true… How did it begin? It began with them deceiving us, blatantly lying to us, or as our people say, simply “conned” us regarding NATO’s non-expansion eastward… When we responded that we considered it a threat, what did they say? Nothing at all. They simply dismissed our concerns, refusing to acknowledge or even consider our position… Against the backdrop of this rhetoric about Russia’s imaginary aggressiveness, they start talking about the need to arm themselves. Let them arm themselves… We are not aggressive, it is the collective West that is aggressive… Are they idiots, or do they take us for simpletons? … As if they were innocent infants born yesterday… And what will they spend their 5% [of GDP] on? On arms purchases from the US… But this is not our problem, it’s theirs. If they want, let them do it.
Now we are coming to the main thing. We are planning to cut the defense expenses next year and the year after, as well during the next three years…
So, who is getting ready for any aggressive actions, us or them? … Yes, we do want to complete the special military operation with the result we need. Certainly. This is what we take into account when planning our defense expenses, not aggressive aspirations against Europe and NATO countries.
Let’s start with the supposed reduction in Russian military spending. Putin is promising nothing new; he is merely recalling that the current three-year budget (for 2025-27), from the very beginning, has included a slight cut in military spending starting in 2026. Moreover, all previous three-year budgets had cuts to military spending penciled into them, but they never materialized.
Still, this is not a 100% lie. Putin really wants to retain the ability to cut Russia’s military spending any time he deems that advantageous for himself. If he does, then cuts will be included in the next annual budget; if he does not, then they will not be included.
Putin loses his composure
In recent weeks, Putin has only once been visibly irritated. At the end of June, after the Eurasian Economic Union summitin Minsk, Putin, supposedly in response to the question of a Russian reporter, gave a long and angry speech on NATO’s plan to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP in a few years.
The increase in military spending and the militaristic fervor you mentioned are based on a single premise: the alleged aggressiveness of Russia. But in reality, the exact opposite is true… How did it begin? It began with them deceiving us, blatantly lying to us, or as our people say, simply “conned” us regarding NATO’s non-expansion eastward… When we responded that we considered it a threat, what did they say? Nothing at all. They simply dismissed our concerns, refusing to acknowledge or even consider our position… Against the backdrop of this rhetoric about Russia’s imaginary aggressiveness, they start talking about the need to arm themselves. Let them arm themselves… We are not aggressive, it is the collective West that is aggressive… Are they idiots, or do they take us for simpletons? … As if they were innocent infants born yesterday… And what will they spend their 5% [of GDP] on? On arms purchases from the US… But this is not our problem, it’s theirs. If they want, let them do it.
Now we are coming to the main thing. We are planning to cut the defense expenses next year and the year after, as well during the next three years…
So, who is getting ready for any aggressive actions, us or them? … Yes, we do want to complete the special military operation with the result we need. Certainly. This is what we take into account when planning our defense expenses, not aggressive aspirations against Europe and NATO countries.
Let’s start with the supposed reduction in Russian military spending. Putin is promising nothing new; he is merely recalling that the current three-year budget (for 2025-27), from the very beginning, has included a slight cut in military spending starting in 2026. Moreover, all previous three-year budgets had cuts to military spending penciled into them, but they never materialized.
Still, this is not a 100% lie. Putin really wants to retain the ability to cut Russia’s military spending any time he deems that advantageous for himself. If he does, then cuts will be included in the next annual budget; if he does not, then they will not be included.
“Putin lost his composure in Minsk precisely because a sharp increase in European military spending, if it happens, would deprive him of the freedom of action that he currently enjoys.”
He would need to adapt to the change in the external backdrop and spend on the military not in accordance with what is advantageous for him at a given moment, but as much as is necessary to maintain balance with a rearming Europe.
This would mean an end to the division of Russia into a minority at war and a majority at peace, which is convenient for the regime. Forget high-speed railways. It would mean reducing benefits for the majority at peace, forcing them to tighten their belts or even instituting mobilization. It would mean taking away some of the fortune of billionaires close to the throne. Maybe even cutting back on the network of propaganda centers. This would no longer be the Russia that Putin envisions.
A changing external backdrop may, over time, even get Russia out of the rut that Putin has created. The country today does not have the power to get out of it itself.
This would mean an end to the division of Russia into a minority at war and a majority at peace, which is convenient for the regime. Forget high-speed railways. It would mean reducing benefits for the majority at peace, forcing them to tighten their belts or even instituting mobilization. It would mean taking away some of the fortune of billionaires close to the throne. Maybe even cutting back on the network of propaganda centers. This would no longer be the Russia that Putin envisions.
A changing external backdrop may, over time, even get Russia out of the rut that Putin has created. The country today does not have the power to get out of it itself.
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