Politics
Armenia’s Current Political Crisis and the Implications for Democratic Consolidation
July 17, 2025
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Jean-François Ratelle
Affiliated researcher and adjunct professor at the University of Ottawa
Political scientist Jean-François Ratelle argues that the ongoing standoff between the Armenian Apostolic Church and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is a prelude to what promises to be a contentious 2026 parliamentary election and suggests that the discord creates an opening for Moscow to interfere in Armenian domestic affairs.
Protests in Yerevan against the terms of a ceasefire agreement with Azerbaijan. November 2020. Source: Wiki Commons
In June, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan launched a direct political attack against Catholicos Karekin II, the leader of the Armenian Apostolic Church. What had started as a rhetorical exchange with the clergy has now swiftly escalated into a deeply polarizing confrontation.
The conflict stems from the 2018 Velvet Revolution, which brought to power Pashinyan, along with his domestic and international reformist agenda. Immediately after the revolution, Pashinyan targeted the clergy, which he labeled as a political tool supporting the previous government and former Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan.
Karekin II and the Church emerged as a leading opposition force, aligning with other political groups. After Armenia’s defeat in the 2020 Second Karabakh War, Karekin II and other clerics participated in protests demanding Pashinyan's resignation and accusing him of national betrayal.
The clergy under the leadership of Karekin II has also directly challenged the government on the peace process with Azerbaijan, particularly regarding the decision to not to go to war for Nagorno-Karabakh and the failure to protect its cultural heritage.
In 2024, Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan spearheaded protests and acts of civil disobedience to contest the government’s decision to accept land concessions in border villages between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The conflict stems from the 2018 Velvet Revolution, which brought to power Pashinyan, along with his domestic and international reformist agenda. Immediately after the revolution, Pashinyan targeted the clergy, which he labeled as a political tool supporting the previous government and former Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan.
Karekin II and the Church emerged as a leading opposition force, aligning with other political groups. After Armenia’s defeat in the 2020 Second Karabakh War, Karekin II and other clerics participated in protests demanding Pashinyan's resignation and accusing him of national betrayal.
The clergy under the leadership of Karekin II has also directly challenged the government on the peace process with Azerbaijan, particularly regarding the decision to not to go to war for Nagorno-Karabakh and the failure to protect its cultural heritage.
In 2024, Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan spearheaded protests and acts of civil disobedience to contest the government’s decision to accept land concessions in border villages between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
“Citing threats to Armenia’s national historical identity, the clergy in Armenia largely oppose the normalization process with Azerbaijan and Turkey, denouncing concessions.”
Karekin II, Supreme Patriarch and Catholicos of All Armenians. Source: Wiki Commons
Karekin II, for example, has voiced his support for protecting Armenian cultural heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh and for Armenian political prisoners facing trial in Azerbaijan. Additionally, Pashinyan's initiatives like downgrading Armenian diplomatic efforts to pressure other states to officially recognize the Armenian Genocide and promoting as opposed to “historical Armenia” have galvanized nationalist forces against the prime minister.
The announced potential accord over the Zangezur corridor – for a proposed road and railway link connecting Azerbaijan with its Nakhichevan exclave through Armenia’s Syunik Region – is a major point of contention. While the accord could foster greater regional integration and connectivity between Armenia, Turkey and Azerbaijan, and serve as a cornerstone for broader normalization, it remains a highly divisive issue within Armenia.
Church crackdown
The confrontation between Pashinyan and the clergy occurs on the cusp of the 2026 parliamentary election and coincides with Pashniyan’s historically low approval ratings. In the wake of what the government has labeled a failed coup attempt, Pashniyan launched a broad campaign against opposition forces. Armenia’s National Security Service raided the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin, the headquarters of the Armenian Apostolic Church and the residence of Catholicos Karekin II.
Armenia’s Investigative Committee has ordered dozens of arrests of clergy members, political actors and businessmen. Notable arrestees include Archbishop Galstanyan, Archbishop Mikayel Ajapahian, an MP and Russian-Armenian businessman Samvel Karapetyan, whose company, Electric Networks of Armenia (ENA), is now facing threats of nationalization.
Government-affiliated media have characterized Karapetyan's arrest as a necessary intervention to dismantle a deep conspiracy to overthrow the government alongside the clergy and former presidents Robert Kocharyan and Sargsyan.
Pashinyan addressed the arrests on his Facebook page, characterizing them as a successful police intervention that prevented the destabilization of the government and thwarted acts of terrorism.
Pashinyan's gamble
Pashinyan finds himself in a precarious position as he gears up for the 2026 parliamentary election. With his recent attack on the clergy and its political links, he has continued his offensive to dismantle the remnants of the prerevolution political system.
The Armenian government and the Armenian Apostolic Church are accusing each other of violating the constitutional separation of church and state. The prime minister is moving to establish a parallel structure to elect a new Church leader instead of Karekin II.
Even though the clergy is a prominent opponent of Pashinyan’s political agenda and his reforms in Armenia, such a direct and unprecedented attack on its members and headquarters represents a major polarizing moment in Armenia’s recent political history.
The announced potential accord over the Zangezur corridor – for a proposed road and railway link connecting Azerbaijan with its Nakhichevan exclave through Armenia’s Syunik Region – is a major point of contention. While the accord could foster greater regional integration and connectivity between Armenia, Turkey and Azerbaijan, and serve as a cornerstone for broader normalization, it remains a highly divisive issue within Armenia.
Church crackdown
The confrontation between Pashinyan and the clergy occurs on the cusp of the 2026 parliamentary election and coincides with Pashniyan’s historically low approval ratings. In the wake of what the government has labeled a failed coup attempt, Pashniyan launched a broad campaign against opposition forces. Armenia’s National Security Service raided the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin, the headquarters of the Armenian Apostolic Church and the residence of Catholicos Karekin II.
Armenia’s Investigative Committee has ordered dozens of arrests of clergy members, political actors and businessmen. Notable arrestees include Archbishop Galstanyan, Archbishop Mikayel Ajapahian, an MP and Russian-Armenian businessman Samvel Karapetyan, whose company, Electric Networks of Armenia (ENA), is now facing threats of nationalization.
Government-affiliated media have characterized Karapetyan's arrest as a necessary intervention to dismantle a deep conspiracy to overthrow the government alongside the clergy and former presidents Robert Kocharyan and Sargsyan.
Pashinyan addressed the arrests on his Facebook page, characterizing them as a successful police intervention that prevented the destabilization of the government and thwarted acts of terrorism.
Pashinyan's gamble
Pashinyan finds himself in a precarious position as he gears up for the 2026 parliamentary election. With his recent attack on the clergy and its political links, he has continued his offensive to dismantle the remnants of the prerevolution political system.
The Armenian government and the Armenian Apostolic Church are accusing each other of violating the constitutional separation of church and state. The prime minister is moving to establish a parallel structure to elect a new Church leader instead of Karekin II.
Even though the clergy is a prominent opponent of Pashinyan’s political agenda and his reforms in Armenia, such a direct and unprecedented attack on its members and headquarters represents a major polarizing moment in Armenia’s recent political history.
“Concerns are mounting that Pashinyan is using state resources to undermine his political opponents, which would dent Armenia’s democratic progress.”
Etchmiadzin Cathedral, the headquarters of the Armenian Apostolic Church. Source: Wiki Commons
The standoff with the Church has weakened Pashinyan's position, despite his efforts to portray the crackdown as a necessary measure to protect the constitutional order, enforce the separation of Church and state and prevent terrorist acts. This strategy might backfire on Pashinyan.
It seems to contradict Pashinyan's consistent public commitment to the rule of law, respect for the Constitution, and fair and free elections. It also challenges Armenia's international campaign to promote itself as the sole democratic nation in the South Caucasus.
Indeed, Pashinyan's foreign policy has focused on garnering support from Western countries by emphasizing Armenia's adherence to international norms, human rights and liberal democracy. Pashinyan has often contrasted his government with Ilham Aliyev's authoritarian regime, painting Azerbaijan as unwilling to abide by international law and lacking democratic checks and balances.
Thus, as he fights to win next year’s election, Pashinyan risks jeopardizing his foreign policy approach, which could further weaken his negotiating position vis-à-vis Azerbaijan in peace talks in general and over the Zangezur corridor in particular.
Russia’s role
The current political crisis in Armenia not only threatens Armenia's standing with Western nations but also presents an opportunity for Moscow to interfere in Armenian domestic affairs or, at the very least, rehabilitate its diminished prestige within Armenia after its failure to stop the Azerbaijani seizure of Nagorno-Karabakh.
The Kremlin has already begun to exploit Karapetyan's arrest and the alleged persecution of the Church. Its propaganda machine has branded the government as corrupt and betraying Armenia’s history, alongside a Matryoshka bots attack on Pashinyan.
It seems to contradict Pashinyan's consistent public commitment to the rule of law, respect for the Constitution, and fair and free elections. It also challenges Armenia's international campaign to promote itself as the sole democratic nation in the South Caucasus.
Indeed, Pashinyan's foreign policy has focused on garnering support from Western countries by emphasizing Armenia's adherence to international norms, human rights and liberal democracy. Pashinyan has often contrasted his government with Ilham Aliyev's authoritarian regime, painting Azerbaijan as unwilling to abide by international law and lacking democratic checks and balances.
Thus, as he fights to win next year’s election, Pashinyan risks jeopardizing his foreign policy approach, which could further weaken his negotiating position vis-à-vis Azerbaijan in peace talks in general and over the Zangezur corridor in particular.
Russia’s role
The current political crisis in Armenia not only threatens Armenia's standing with Western nations but also presents an opportunity for Moscow to interfere in Armenian domestic affairs or, at the very least, rehabilitate its diminished prestige within Armenia after its failure to stop the Azerbaijani seizure of Nagorno-Karabakh.
The Kremlin has already begun to exploit Karapetyan's arrest and the alleged persecution of the Church. Its propaganda machine has branded the government as corrupt and betraying Armenia’s history, alongside a Matryoshka bots attack on Pashinyan.
“Increasing radicalization in Armenia because of recent conflicts and political tensions has created fertile ground for foreign actors to meddle in the 2026 election.”
As discussed during the second Yerevan Dialogue, the Armenian government is keenly aware of Moscow's readiness to try to influence the election.
Russia has interfered in recent elections in Poland, Moldova and Bulgaria, as well as the 2024 European Parliament election.
The Kremlin looks to capitalize on moments of national polarization and political crises using AI and social media. The unfolding situation in Armenia, where nationalist forces are accusing the incumbent government of national betrayal, seems tailor-made for this strategy. Furthermore, the alleged persecution of the Church provides Moscow with an ideal pretext to champion traditional values and portray itself as a bulwark against supposed Western liberalism and decadence.
Russia has interfered in recent elections in Poland, Moldova and Bulgaria, as well as the 2024 European Parliament election.
The Kremlin looks to capitalize on moments of national polarization and political crises using AI and social media. The unfolding situation in Armenia, where nationalist forces are accusing the incumbent government of national betrayal, seems tailor-made for this strategy. Furthermore, the alleged persecution of the Church provides Moscow with an ideal pretext to champion traditional values and portray itself as a bulwark against supposed Western liberalism and decadence.
Putin meeting with Pashinyan. Moscow, 2022. Source: Kremlin.ru
To advance its political agenda across Eastern Europe, the Kremlin has systematically blurred the lines between political and illicit activities by leveraging local criminal and nefarious actors. The population of disgruntled veterans and refugees from the Second Karabakh War, coupled with the involvement of Armenian fighters alongside Russian forces in Ukraine – particularly within the Wagner Group and other mercenary units such as the Arbat Battalion – offers a considerable pool of recruits and fertile ground for disseminating Kremlin propaganda.
These combatants maintain significant ties with Russian organized crime, which echoes Moscow's documented use of similar criminal and mercenary proxies in Western Europe in recent years. Note that last year, Armenian authorities accused a group of people of training Armenians at a military base in Russia to oust Pashinyan’s government, with Armenia’s Investigative Committee launching cases against seven suspects.
This highlights the complex interplay of foreign-based influence networks operating within Armenia and the significant challenges the nation faces in the coming year. While the risk of election interference from Moscow is a tangible and critical threat to Armenia's democratic survival, Pashinyan has used this threat to target opposition forces.
A notable instance was in May 2024, when the prime minister publicly characterized the Armenian Church as an "agent of foreign influence.” Such actions, perceived as abusive, could undermine his image as a reformer committed to democratic governance, thereby weakening his contrast with the previous regime and its corrupt elites.
Conclusion
The current political crisis in Armenia represents a significant challenge to the resilience of its democratic institutions. It is compounded by a historic potential normalization of relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, as well as a possible conclusion of the long-lasting Karabakh conflict.
These combatants maintain significant ties with Russian organized crime, which echoes Moscow's documented use of similar criminal and mercenary proxies in Western Europe in recent years. Note that last year, Armenian authorities accused a group of people of training Armenians at a military base in Russia to oust Pashinyan’s government, with Armenia’s Investigative Committee launching cases against seven suspects.
This highlights the complex interplay of foreign-based influence networks operating within Armenia and the significant challenges the nation faces in the coming year. While the risk of election interference from Moscow is a tangible and critical threat to Armenia's democratic survival, Pashinyan has used this threat to target opposition forces.
A notable instance was in May 2024, when the prime minister publicly characterized the Armenian Church as an "agent of foreign influence.” Such actions, perceived as abusive, could undermine his image as a reformer committed to democratic governance, thereby weakening his contrast with the previous regime and its corrupt elites.
Conclusion
The current political crisis in Armenia represents a significant challenge to the resilience of its democratic institutions. It is compounded by a historic potential normalization of relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, as well as a possible conclusion of the long-lasting Karabakh conflict.
“Armenia is likely to experience serious turbulence due to ‘traditional elites’, ‘reactionary factions’ and ‘nationalist groups’ alarm at the diplomatic shifts initiated by the current government.”
In this context, cultivating resilience to foreign interference and entrenching a robust culture of democratic governance are necessary so Armenia does not go down the same path as neighboring Georgia.
European governments are currently supportive of Armenia's government and refrain from criticizing it. They commend Pashinyan's diplomatic approach both on the Zangezur corridor and on the Karabakh conflict as consistent with international law. Furthermore, regarding his handling of the Church and opposition forces, Pashinyan presently enjoys the benefit of the doubt.
The risk is that democratic backsliding may insidiously emerge in Armenia through attacks on political opponents and legislation curtailing media freedom and human rights.
Georgia's failure to safeguard its nascent democracy ought to serve as a warning to Armenians and more broadly to European nations. Armenia has made democratic progress, but this should not preclude European governments from taking a critical view of developments in the country.
The period leading up to Armenia's 2026 parliamentary election will show whether its institutions possess the resilience to navigate the current crisis and foreign influence.
European governments are currently supportive of Armenia's government and refrain from criticizing it. They commend Pashinyan's diplomatic approach both on the Zangezur corridor and on the Karabakh conflict as consistent with international law. Furthermore, regarding his handling of the Church and opposition forces, Pashinyan presently enjoys the benefit of the doubt.
The risk is that democratic backsliding may insidiously emerge in Armenia through attacks on political opponents and legislation curtailing media freedom and human rights.
Georgia's failure to safeguard its nascent democracy ought to serve as a warning to Armenians and more broadly to European nations. Armenia has made democratic progress, but this should not preclude European governments from taking a critical view of developments in the country.
The period leading up to Armenia's 2026 parliamentary election will show whether its institutions possess the resilience to navigate the current crisis and foreign influence.
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