Some believe that Trump is bluffing or out of his depth and has started something that is doomed to fail. But you recently wrote that the US is going through its own version of perestroika. Will Trump’s “perestroika” ultimately repeat the fate of Gorbachev’s, even though their goals and agendas are fundamentally different?

I do not think Trump is insane. And even if he were insane, it does not matter in politics. Because in the end, in politics even madmen embody long-term historical trends. At the same time, I definitely do not believe that today’s trends have no alternatives.

It is like any revolution. The question is never whether a revolution is possible. If it is ripe, it will happen sooner or later. The only question is whether this way of solving the problem is the only possible and the optimal one. Or whether there are other ways through which the same objectives can be achieved with less blood and fewer losses.

The same applies to Trump. We are dealing with a “phase transition” that has been building up for decades, at the very least. We are dealing with a reaction to the economic, ideological and political excesses and imbalances of the previous period.
When contradictions accumulate over decades, there always comes a moment when everything erupts. Apparently, under Trump we have reached the point when these contradictions of the previous period have become so acute that it is no longer possible to pretend that nothing is happening. In my view, we are now in the early stages of a revolutionary process that will change the paradigms that defined the last 80 years.

Does this mean it will be a linear process? Not necessarily.

Trump will clearly not be able to end the Russia-Ukraine war in his first 100 days in office. Overall, it seems the war interests him less and less; the main thing is to get the US out as quickly as possible. Judging by recent events, where might Russia-US relations go next?

The disappointment that nothing has been solved in a day is somewhat unjustified.

Trump is advancing an entirely coherent narrative. The premise is the USSR ceased to exist long ago but, according to Trump, the US has all this time been fighting a nonexistent strategic adversary.

This view has long existed in certain circles in the US. It used to be a marginal position, but Trump has brought it into the political mainstream.

It was opposed by inertia: to a large extent, US policy has been made be people who could not move beyond the Cold War.

From Trump’s perspective, Russia is a relatively small country in terms of economic potential that has long ceased to be a global rival of the US. Yet the US has supposedly made Russia out to be its main adversary – even though its real adversary is elsewhere.

What is getting in the way of this view? Russia is undermining the system of international relations, rules, values and institutions established at enormous human cost in the 20th century. That makes Russia a disruptor. As such, it needs to be reined in.

So it turns out that things are not so bad for the Kremlin. There is no real economic or ideological basis for conflict with the US. Trump has identified not just China but also Europe as his main opponents – which perfectly suits the Kremlin.

The inertia of the war remains. The Kremlin has certain geopolitical issues. There is an understandable concern that a ceasefire before agreements are reached would be a repeat of the 1990s.

That is why the most unrealistic thing the Kremlin could do now is to accept a ceasefire proposal and only then start negotiating. I do not believe that is likely.

More likely is a peace agreement. The Kremlin will agree to a ceasefire only under pressure – and so far, we see no pressure. If it does emerge, it will be leverage we do not know about, do not foresee and do not factor into our assessments.

Even if US interest in the Russia-Ukraine situation is waning, the EU definitely could replace the US. But to what extent? Trump publicly told Zelensky, “you do not have the cards.” But perhaps Zelensky has some cards? Otherwise, Ukraine would not have resisted this long and would not support Zelensky. What do you think?

There are too many unknowns. Chief among them is the ability of Europe – assuming it can muster a unified will, which is never a given – to replace the US as Ukraine’s military backer. I am not expert in defense technology or strategy, so I cannot say.

It is theoretically possible for Europe to take on full financial responsibility for the war, to become Ukraine’s sole sponsor. But because it lacks real military resources of its own to share with Ukraine, it has to strike a deal with Trump for him not to oppose US arm sales to Ukraine. In theory, this scheme is possible. In practice, I do not know – it does not seem very realistic. If it does happen, Zelensky will have achieved a real breakthrough.

Working in the opposite direction is that it has been almost two months since the Munich Security Conference. The aid package approved by Biden will run out around June. Trump, despite his talk about sanctions against Russia, has yet to take the one and only step that could actually make the Kremlin nervous – proposing an extension of that military aid. Europe too is dragging its feet publicly.

Later, the situation began to change as Europe gained economic agency. It has been an uneven process, but the trajectory is clear. Europe emerged as an independent economic actor, especially after the European bureaucracy became entrenched. Europe started moving not parallel to, but at times perpendicular to US interests.

This was already evident during Trump’s first term, causing him great consternation. His response was predictable: what is the US paying for?

So the US was guided for a while by this “Potsdam logic” of being obligated to defend Europe. But this could not continue forever. European societies are now more comfortable and prosperous than the US. There is a lot more socialism, in a positive sense, in Europe. And the US leadership asks: why are we underwriting that? Hence the effort to break with the “Potsdam logic.”

There is a fork in the road ahead. Europe could pair its economic agency with political sovereignty. A new, more balanced relationship could emerge with the US; a new alliance could be built, with more considered, more rational and more weighted European participation in all issues.

Or the Americans and Europeans may fail to find common ground. In that case, the split will be long term, and Europe will begin drifting toward China. Trump’s adventure would then end in a serious geopolitical loss for the US.

Still, I remain cautiously optimistic. I believe there will be a reset of the relationship and, after a period of turbulence, the two pillars of Western civilization will find a new basis for relations.

Trump has fingered China as the principal rival or even enemy of the US. China has seemingly taken the Soviet Union’s place in this new cold war – or at least this tariff war. Is Trump seeking to make a deal or is this a manifestation of long-standing antagonism? Could it escalate into something beyond tariffs?

In US-China relations, the problem lies not with China, but with the US. It is not China advancing; it is the US retreating. This is reminiscent of the USSR’s collapse. All was calm, and then the imperial center suddenly collapsed, disappeared.

That is what is happening now with the US. The difference is its turn has not come yet. China is not doing anything extraordinary. The pressure is slowly rising, but China is not rising in a very aggressive way.