Politics
Multilateral Negotiations Around the War in Ukraine
April 18, 2025
- Nikolay MitrokhinАcademic Researcher, Research Center for East European Studies at the University of Bremen (Germany)
Political scientist Nikolay Mitrokhin analyzes recent developments, including ongoing U.S.–Russia talks, mounting U.S. pressure on Ukraine, and a substantial aid package pledged by European countries.
The original text in Russian was published in Republic. A fragment is being republished here with their permission.
President Putin meeting with US President’s Special Envoy Steve Witkoff. St Petersburg, April 11, 2025. Source: Kremlin.ru
At the time of this writing, the political situation around the war in Ukraine is being driven by multilateral negotiations at various venues, with various compositions and on various issues.
Four key tracks
First of all, there are the direct negotiations between Trump and Putin through intermediaries. They have most recently been held in St Petersburg on April 11, when Trump’s diplomatic envoy Steve Witkoff met the Russian leader, and in Istanbul on April 14. These meetings apparently coincided with a deadline set by Trump for Putin to make specific decisions on issues related to a ceasefire.
Fragments of the negotiation process have been leaked to the press by Trump officials and by Trump himself. In particular, on April 11 the plan attributed to Trump’s special envoy to Ukraine, General Keith Kellogg, came out – it envisages essentially dividing Ukraine into zones of influence, with French and UK troops deployed in the west of the country.
The day before, UK Defense Minister John Healey said these troops would have four main tasks, including bolstering air defense, securing maritime routes, maintaining peace on the ground, and reinforcing the Ukrainian army,which is supposed to remain the main deterrent to future Russian aggression.
Judging by President Volodymyr Zelensky’s sharp reaction, the plan would also consolidate Russian control of five Ukrainian regions.
Four key tracks
First of all, there are the direct negotiations between Trump and Putin through intermediaries. They have most recently been held in St Petersburg on April 11, when Trump’s diplomatic envoy Steve Witkoff met the Russian leader, and in Istanbul on April 14. These meetings apparently coincided with a deadline set by Trump for Putin to make specific decisions on issues related to a ceasefire.
Fragments of the negotiation process have been leaked to the press by Trump officials and by Trump himself. In particular, on April 11 the plan attributed to Trump’s special envoy to Ukraine, General Keith Kellogg, came out – it envisages essentially dividing Ukraine into zones of influence, with French and UK troops deployed in the west of the country.
The day before, UK Defense Minister John Healey said these troops would have four main tasks, including bolstering air defense, securing maritime routes, maintaining peace on the ground, and reinforcing the Ukrainian army,which is supposed to remain the main deterrent to future Russian aggression.
Judging by President Volodymyr Zelensky’s sharp reaction, the plan would also consolidate Russian control of five Ukrainian regions.
“Currently, Trump and his entourage are balancing between public statements expressing hope for a swift and effective deal with Putin and gradually hardening rhetoric toward Russia.”
British Defence Secretary John Healey. Source: Facebook
Last week, incidentally, Pastor Mark Burns, described as Trump's one-time spiritual advisor, changed his position on Ukraine after visiting Kryvyi Rih, declaring that the US ought to give military aid to Kyiv, which he had previously opposed.
The second track of negotiations – between Zelensky and Trump (and his representatives) – is supposed to lead to an agreement between Ukraine and the US on the creation of a “joint investment fund,” which would mean de facto US economic control of the rest of Ukraine.
There is a growing list of US demands, including for “privileged access” to mineral deposits and management of oil and gas pipelines. Reuters has been covering this, citing a source with knowledge of the matter who called the atmosphere “antagonistic.”
Interestingly, Poland, the main ally of the US in the EU, has indicated a shift in its relationship with Ukraine, with the Polish prime minister expressing a desire to profit economically from the reconstruction of Ukraine. Judging by comments of US officials, Kyiv is dragging its feet in signing a deal with the US, mostly pointing to a lack of details as the reason for its hesitation.
The third track concerns European military support for Ukraine. Here Zelensky has achieved a major victory, even though an EUR 40 billion EU military aid plan for Ukraine recently fell apart.
On April 11, following another Ramstein-format meeting of defense ministers of Ukraine’s allies (note that this marked the first time that the US secretary of defense did not come in person; he did participate remotely, however), a huge aid package for Ukraine was announced.
This included, in particular, GBP 450 million from the UK in the form of 100,000 drones, radar systems and funds for the repair of previously transferred equipment. Norway said it would cofinance GBP 100 million of the UK aid and provide separate support worth EUR1 billion, including ammunition and air defense systems. Germany promised four IRIS-T air defense missile systems and 300 missiles for them, along with 30 Patriot missiles, 15 Leopard 1 tanks (repaired under a long-term aid program), 25 Marder infantry fighting vehicles and 100,000 shells. Belgium approved EUR 1 billion in aid, and Denmark almost EUR 900 million. The Netherlands pledged EUR 150 million to strengthen Ukrainian air defense.
In addition, an “electronic warfare coalition” has been created under the leadership of Germany, which is developing new electronic warfare capabilities and seems to have emerged as the main supplier of innovative drones to Ukraine.
Rearmament looming
However, the defense industry in Germany and Europe as a whole faces a serious challenge. The war in Ukraine has exposed many weaknesses in current systems and has forced manufacturers urgently to modernize functional and even successful weapons, which now need to be protected against FPV drones and modern electronic warfare systems.
In particular, even the new Leopard tanks, which have proven themselves in combat (unlike older models, whose armor is considered lacking), need to be protected by effective anti-drone systems, like state-of-the-art UK laser cannons. The latter allow for cheap and limitless (in terms of the number of shots) destruction of enemy drones.
But even this is not enough, as lasers do not work in smoke, fog or dust. This means they need to be supplemented with FPV drone killers. In addition, the EU has virtually no fiber optic drones, which have also proven themselves over the past year.
The second track of negotiations – between Zelensky and Trump (and his representatives) – is supposed to lead to an agreement between Ukraine and the US on the creation of a “joint investment fund,” which would mean de facto US economic control of the rest of Ukraine.
There is a growing list of US demands, including for “privileged access” to mineral deposits and management of oil and gas pipelines. Reuters has been covering this, citing a source with knowledge of the matter who called the atmosphere “antagonistic.”
Interestingly, Poland, the main ally of the US in the EU, has indicated a shift in its relationship with Ukraine, with the Polish prime minister expressing a desire to profit economically from the reconstruction of Ukraine. Judging by comments of US officials, Kyiv is dragging its feet in signing a deal with the US, mostly pointing to a lack of details as the reason for its hesitation.
The third track concerns European military support for Ukraine. Here Zelensky has achieved a major victory, even though an EUR 40 billion EU military aid plan for Ukraine recently fell apart.
On April 11, following another Ramstein-format meeting of defense ministers of Ukraine’s allies (note that this marked the first time that the US secretary of defense did not come in person; he did participate remotely, however), a huge aid package for Ukraine was announced.
This included, in particular, GBP 450 million from the UK in the form of 100,000 drones, radar systems and funds for the repair of previously transferred equipment. Norway said it would cofinance GBP 100 million of the UK aid and provide separate support worth EUR1 billion, including ammunition and air defense systems. Germany promised four IRIS-T air defense missile systems and 300 missiles for them, along with 30 Patriot missiles, 15 Leopard 1 tanks (repaired under a long-term aid program), 25 Marder infantry fighting vehicles and 100,000 shells. Belgium approved EUR 1 billion in aid, and Denmark almost EUR 900 million. The Netherlands pledged EUR 150 million to strengthen Ukrainian air defense.
In addition, an “electronic warfare coalition” has been created under the leadership of Germany, which is developing new electronic warfare capabilities and seems to have emerged as the main supplier of innovative drones to Ukraine.
Rearmament looming
However, the defense industry in Germany and Europe as a whole faces a serious challenge. The war in Ukraine has exposed many weaknesses in current systems and has forced manufacturers urgently to modernize functional and even successful weapons, which now need to be protected against FPV drones and modern electronic warfare systems.
In particular, even the new Leopard tanks, which have proven themselves in combat (unlike older models, whose armor is considered lacking), need to be protected by effective anti-drone systems, like state-of-the-art UK laser cannons. The latter allow for cheap and limitless (in terms of the number of shots) destruction of enemy drones.
But even this is not enough, as lasers do not work in smoke, fog or dust. This means they need to be supplemented with FPV drone killers. In addition, the EU has virtually no fiber optic drones, which have also proven themselves over the past year.
“There is a serious need to develop and produce new air defense systems both for destroying heavy strike drones and for repelling mass missile attacks.”
European air defense systems – both German and French/Italian – are too expensive and useless against many types of Russian weapons, especially ballistic missiles.
Western aircraft, transferred to Ukraine and used rather limitedly, have not lived up to the hype, either. Last week, the first Ukrainian F-16 was shot down.
Overall, the world looks poised for a rearmament race in the next two decades, which will incorporate the lessons of this war and the rapid development of drone technology. The countries that can offer the best solutions and mass-produce them at relatively lower cost (drones are still assembled mainly in small batches, which makes them very expensive) stand to earn tens of billions in hard currency.
Against this backdrop, Germany could very well pivot from manufacturing automobiles to producing certain types of weapons, primarily armored vehicles, air defense systems and drones, retaining its global leadership. This could perhaps, thanks to collaboration with France, extend to military aircraft as well.
Truce on the Black Sea
The fourth and final track of negotiations, here involving Russia, Ukraine, the US and Turkey, is a Black Sea truce. This is where the negotiation process has achieved the most progress, perhaps because both Moscow and Kyiv are interested in quickly resuming full-scale exports of grain and other key goods to replenish their depleted budgets.
The Ukrainian army, having won the war in the Black Sea and now de facto in control of its northwestern part, has effective ly stopped what had previously been its frequent attacks and landings on Russian positions along the coast and on drilling rigs, as well as on Crimean ports, though two weeks ago the Ukrainians reported recent successful drone strikes on military hardware in the interior of Crimea.
For example, on April 4 Newsweek reported that the Kerch shipyard is building an Ivan Rogov-class landing ship that is significantly larger than the cruiser Moskva, which was sunk by the Ukrainian army in 2022. Its first trials are scheduled for 2027. Surprisingly, the ship has yet to be targeted in an attack, unlike its predecessors, which were destroyed or seriously damaged by Ukrainian missiles and drones in 2023-24 while still on the slipways.
The Russian army, for its part, has practically ceased missile and drone attacks on Odesa and other Black Sea and Danube ports (Izmail and Reni).
Western aircraft, transferred to Ukraine and used rather limitedly, have not lived up to the hype, either. Last week, the first Ukrainian F-16 was shot down.
Overall, the world looks poised for a rearmament race in the next two decades, which will incorporate the lessons of this war and the rapid development of drone technology. The countries that can offer the best solutions and mass-produce them at relatively lower cost (drones are still assembled mainly in small batches, which makes them very expensive) stand to earn tens of billions in hard currency.
Against this backdrop, Germany could very well pivot from manufacturing automobiles to producing certain types of weapons, primarily armored vehicles, air defense systems and drones, retaining its global leadership. This could perhaps, thanks to collaboration with France, extend to military aircraft as well.
Truce on the Black Sea
The fourth and final track of negotiations, here involving Russia, Ukraine, the US and Turkey, is a Black Sea truce. This is where the negotiation process has achieved the most progress, perhaps because both Moscow and Kyiv are interested in quickly resuming full-scale exports of grain and other key goods to replenish their depleted budgets.
The Ukrainian army, having won the war in the Black Sea and now de facto in control of its northwestern part, has effective ly stopped what had previously been its frequent attacks and landings on Russian positions along the coast and on drilling rigs, as well as on Crimean ports, though two weeks ago the Ukrainians reported recent successful drone strikes on military hardware in the interior of Crimea.
For example, on April 4 Newsweek reported that the Kerch shipyard is building an Ivan Rogov-class landing ship that is significantly larger than the cruiser Moskva, which was sunk by the Ukrainian army in 2022. Its first trials are scheduled for 2027. Surprisingly, the ship has yet to be targeted in an attack, unlike its predecessors, which were destroyed or seriously damaged by Ukrainian missiles and drones in 2023-24 while still on the slipways.
The Russian army, for its part, has practically ceased missile and drone attacks on Odesa and other Black Sea and Danube ports (Izmail and Reni).
“This, in particular, has allowed Ukraine quietly to launch ferry service with Georgia. Two trips have been made from the port of Chornomorsk in Odesa Region to Batumi.”
On April 13-16, a series of consultations (Russia/Turkey/US and Ukraine/Turkey/France/UK) on security in the Black Sea took place in Istanbul and Ankara (at the headquarters of the Turkish Naval Forces Headquarters), the goal of which was possibly to consolidate and formalize the emerging positive trends toward ending hostilities at sea.
It is possible that the increasingly difficult situation for Russia in the Baltic Sea, through which it is having trouble sending petroleum exports, is also working in favor of an agreement in the Black Sea. First, Germany confiscated a Russian oil tanker belonging to a shadow fleet that had been discovered adrift off its coast; then, on April 11, Estonia stopped and detained another oil tanker with forged documentation – the ship’s crew falsely declared that it was registered in Djibouti.
Russia’s Baltic neighbors, including new NATO members Sweden and Finland, had recently been drilling countermeasures to Russian naval activity, even blocking Russian ships from entering the Gulf of Finland. This “privet” to Moscow (after a number of Baltic undersea cables were cut by shadow tankers) was quite unambiguous.
Russia now needs to ensure unimpeded sea access for its tankers from Novorossiysk and other ports in Krasnodar Region to hedge against potential further problems with its oil exports through the Baltic Sea.
It is possible that the increasingly difficult situation for Russia in the Baltic Sea, through which it is having trouble sending petroleum exports, is also working in favor of an agreement in the Black Sea. First, Germany confiscated a Russian oil tanker belonging to a shadow fleet that had been discovered adrift off its coast; then, on April 11, Estonia stopped and detained another oil tanker with forged documentation – the ship’s crew falsely declared that it was registered in Djibouti.
Russia’s Baltic neighbors, including new NATO members Sweden and Finland, had recently been drilling countermeasures to Russian naval activity, even blocking Russian ships from entering the Gulf of Finland. This “privet” to Moscow (after a number of Baltic undersea cables were cut by shadow tankers) was quite unambiguous.
Russia now needs to ensure unimpeded sea access for its tankers from Novorossiysk and other ports in Krasnodar Region to hedge against potential further problems with its oil exports through the Baltic Sea.
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