Politics
Will Ivanishvili’s Personalist Regime Resemble Russia and Belarus or Hungary and Turkey?
November 1, 2024
- Boris Grozovsky
Journalist Boris Grozovsky analyzes the results of the recent parliamentary election in Georgia, discusses the peculiarities of Georgian political culture and examines the mistakes of the opposition in the campaign. He paints a bleak picture of Georgia’s democratic backslide.
Bidzina Ivanishvili (right), founder of the Georgian Dream party, Georgian PM in 2012-13. Source: Dzen
Georgian Dream (GD), the ruling party in Georgia since 2012, officially received almost 1.12 million votes (53.9%) in the recent parliamentary election, while an alliance of four opposition parties ended up with 37.8%. The remaining 8.3% went to parties that failed to pass the 5% threshold (the parliament was elected by party list for the first time). Georgian Dream will thus receive 89 seats out of 150.
The founder and honorary chairman of GD is billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, who made his fortune in Russia. Bloomberg estimates his wealth at $7.5 billion, while Forbes puts it at $4.9 billion, about a quarter of the country’s rapidly growing GDP.
In recent years, 68-year-old Ivanishvili has begun to speak the same language as Kremlin propaganda: the world is ruled by a “War Party”; Brussels and Washington dream of Georgia opening a “second front” against Russia; the evil forces in opposition to GD unleashed Georgia’s war against Russia in 2008 and are eager for a new war; opposition parties and NGOs are “foreign agents” and must be stopped before it’s too late.
Besides Ivanishvili, such views are expressed by Georgian PM Irakli Kobakhidze and MPs from GD as well.
The main political opponent of GD since 2012 has been the United National Movement (UNM), the party founded by Mikheil Saakashvili, the previous leader of Georgia. It ran as part of an electoral coalition called Unity-National Movement. All these years, the UNM has failed to seriously compete with GD: Saakashvili and his associates left a bad aftertaste in Georgians’ mouth.
Though UNM carried out successful economic and some political reforms, it also has a track record of torture in prisons, police violence and corruption. It is regarded as being eccentric and populist instead of calculated and measured.
In the recent election, the UNM (as Unity-UNM) found itself in third place (10.2%) for the first time. It was slightly outperformed (11.0%) by the Coalition for Change, made up of several parties founded by politicians who had previously been in the UNM.
The other two parties in the opposition alliance were created recently and represent the “third force” that Georgian politics has sorely lacked. Combined, they gained 16.6% of the vote.
The founder and honorary chairman of GD is billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, who made his fortune in Russia. Bloomberg estimates his wealth at $7.5 billion, while Forbes puts it at $4.9 billion, about a quarter of the country’s rapidly growing GDP.
In recent years, 68-year-old Ivanishvili has begun to speak the same language as Kremlin propaganda: the world is ruled by a “War Party”; Brussels and Washington dream of Georgia opening a “second front” against Russia; the evil forces in opposition to GD unleashed Georgia’s war against Russia in 2008 and are eager for a new war; opposition parties and NGOs are “foreign agents” and must be stopped before it’s too late.
Besides Ivanishvili, such views are expressed by Georgian PM Irakli Kobakhidze and MPs from GD as well.
The main political opponent of GD since 2012 has been the United National Movement (UNM), the party founded by Mikheil Saakashvili, the previous leader of Georgia. It ran as part of an electoral coalition called Unity-National Movement. All these years, the UNM has failed to seriously compete with GD: Saakashvili and his associates left a bad aftertaste in Georgians’ mouth.
Though UNM carried out successful economic and some political reforms, it also has a track record of torture in prisons, police violence and corruption. It is regarded as being eccentric and populist instead of calculated and measured.
In the recent election, the UNM (as Unity-UNM) found itself in third place (10.2%) for the first time. It was slightly outperformed (11.0%) by the Coalition for Change, made up of several parties founded by politicians who had previously been in the UNM.
The other two parties in the opposition alliance were created recently and represent the “third force” that Georgian politics has sorely lacked. Combined, they gained 16.6% of the vote.
“Thus, the UNM has ceased to be the main opposition force in Georgia, which marks the most significant change in the country’s party landscape since 2012.”
A prominent role in one of the other two parties is played by Mamuka Khazaradze, cofounder of Georgia’s largest bank, TBC, who in the late 2010s headed an American-Georgian consortium that was supposed to build a deepwater port in Anaklia. After the project began, the GD government canceled the contract with the consortium due to changing geopolitical priorities. In June 2024, it was transferred to a Chinese state-owned company.
The final party is led by Giorgi Gakharia, who served as economy economy, interior minister and PM in 2016-21. He was implicated in police violence during the 2019 protests against GD policies and rising Russian influence in Georgia. Given this biography, some opposition politicians doubt whether Gakharia is truly ready to offer steadfast opposition to GD.
Cold civil war
None of the four opposition parties have recognized the election results. Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili has claimed there was “total falsification, a seizure of votes using modern technologies,” adding: “we are both witnesses and victims of a new kind of Russian special operation – hybrid warfare – carried out against our people.”
Georgian Dream has copied Kremlin strategy and tactics before. It has completely subjugated the courts to the executive branch, persecuted independent media, pitted society against “liberals who do not accept traditional Georgian values” and labeled all dissenters as “foreign agents.” In addition, as Bloomberg has reported, on the watch of GD, Russian intelligence hacked Georgian electricity companies, oil terminals, media platforms and government departments between 2017 and 2020. Zurabishvili is now calling on the West not to recognize the election results.
At the end of 2018, Zurabishvili ran for president as a representative of GD, but she has gradually distanced herself from the party and since February 2022, in opposition to Ivanishvili’s line, has defended Georgia’s European choice.
All opposition parties have announced that they will give up their seats in the parliament so as not to legitimize a falsified election.
The opposition’s American and European partners do not approve of the move. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken advised political leaders to “ address deficiencies in the electoral process together.” Meanwhile, EU foreign affairs chief Josep Borrell called for “constructive and inclusive dialogue across the political spectrum.”
The problem is the government and opposition are not at all ready for dialogue. Georgian Dream warned back in the summer: after the parliamentary election, “the UNM, all its satellites and successor parties” would be declared unconstitutional. The “collective UNM,” as GD brands its opponents, is to be banned from politics and its leaders prosecuted for “criminally unleashing the war against Russia” in 2008.
Gakharia’s party, the least radical in the opposition, is also to be banned. Ivanishvili called him a “scumbag”(podonok) and accused him of preparing the country for war in 2021: “they deserve severe punishment and,believe me, they will get it.” He claims the opposition is “supported by a huge force from outside.”
Intolerance as a political culture
For its part, the opposition does not intend to negotiate with GD. In many ways, this categoricalness is attributable to GD’s own political style: submit or you are an enemy. Yet the leaders of Unity-UNM have never been inclined to compromise either.
The government and the opposition see each other as mortal enemies, traitors and cheaters, and they have no business being in the same parliament, says political analyst David Zurabishvili. After the 2020 parliamentary election, the opposition also made accusations of falsification and refused to take its seats in the parliament. Only GD deputies were present at the first session.
The EU and the US stepped in to facilitate talks between GD and the opposition. The disputes lasted for more than six months, and eventually the opposition entered parliament but, Zurabishvili underlines, had no power to stop GD from passing repressive laws. Perhaps it was then that the warring political camps missed the last opportunity for a compromise that would have brought the “cold civil war” to an end.
The opposition is unlikely to achieve much in the current parliament either. It will be able merely to stop bills that require a three-fourths majority – for example, to change the constitution to remove the article on Georgia’s aspiration to join the EU.
The final party is led by Giorgi Gakharia, who served as economy economy, interior minister and PM in 2016-21. He was implicated in police violence during the 2019 protests against GD policies and rising Russian influence in Georgia. Given this biography, some opposition politicians doubt whether Gakharia is truly ready to offer steadfast opposition to GD.
Cold civil war
None of the four opposition parties have recognized the election results. Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili has claimed there was “total falsification, a seizure of votes using modern technologies,” adding: “we are both witnesses and victims of a new kind of Russian special operation – hybrid warfare – carried out against our people.”
Georgian Dream has copied Kremlin strategy and tactics before. It has completely subjugated the courts to the executive branch, persecuted independent media, pitted society against “liberals who do not accept traditional Georgian values” and labeled all dissenters as “foreign agents.” In addition, as Bloomberg has reported, on the watch of GD, Russian intelligence hacked Georgian electricity companies, oil terminals, media platforms and government departments between 2017 and 2020. Zurabishvili is now calling on the West not to recognize the election results.
At the end of 2018, Zurabishvili ran for president as a representative of GD, but she has gradually distanced herself from the party and since February 2022, in opposition to Ivanishvili’s line, has defended Georgia’s European choice.
All opposition parties have announced that they will give up their seats in the parliament so as not to legitimize a falsified election.
The opposition’s American and European partners do not approve of the move. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken advised political leaders to “ address deficiencies in the electoral process together.” Meanwhile, EU foreign affairs chief Josep Borrell called for “constructive and inclusive dialogue across the political spectrum.”
The problem is the government and opposition are not at all ready for dialogue. Georgian Dream warned back in the summer: after the parliamentary election, “the UNM, all its satellites and successor parties” would be declared unconstitutional. The “collective UNM,” as GD brands its opponents, is to be banned from politics and its leaders prosecuted for “criminally unleashing the war against Russia” in 2008.
Gakharia’s party, the least radical in the opposition, is also to be banned. Ivanishvili called him a “scumbag”(podonok) and accused him of preparing the country for war in 2021: “they deserve severe punishment and,believe me, they will get it.” He claims the opposition is “supported by a huge force from outside.”
Intolerance as a political culture
For its part, the opposition does not intend to negotiate with GD. In many ways, this categoricalness is attributable to GD’s own political style: submit or you are an enemy. Yet the leaders of Unity-UNM have never been inclined to compromise either.
The government and the opposition see each other as mortal enemies, traitors and cheaters, and they have no business being in the same parliament, says political analyst David Zurabishvili. After the 2020 parliamentary election, the opposition also made accusations of falsification and refused to take its seats in the parliament. Only GD deputies were present at the first session.
The EU and the US stepped in to facilitate talks between GD and the opposition. The disputes lasted for more than six months, and eventually the opposition entered parliament but, Zurabishvili underlines, had no power to stop GD from passing repressive laws. Perhaps it was then that the warring political camps missed the last opportunity for a compromise that would have brought the “cold civil war” to an end.
The opposition is unlikely to achieve much in the current parliament either. It will be able merely to stop bills that require a three-fourths majority – for example, to change the constitution to remove the article on Georgia’s aspiration to join the EU.
“Georgia has a parliamentary form of government, but parliamentary democracy has yet to be formed. There has not been a single coalition government since independence.”
Protests against the "foreign agents" bill in Tbilisi. May 2024. Source: Wiki Commons
The winners of elections do not consider it necessary to listen to the opinions of the losers. The winners have been those who most effectively used political polarization to divide the country between “us” and “them.”
Meanwhile, there are few political benefits for a junior partner to join a government with the winner. Both the UNM and GD, when they have needed it, have formed coalitions with small parties, before subjugating them and denying them an opportunity to share in the spoils of victory. Then the winner would fuse with the bureaucracy. That is why fistfights are more common in the Georgian parliament than meaningful debates and agreements.
If the opposition had won the recent election, the opposition parties would have had to negotiate hard to form a majority government, which would have helped develop skills for sharing power in a parliamentary democracy. But Ivanishvili’s party has been declared the winner.
The scale of falsification
The polling that the opposition relied on (see here, here and here) suggested a 52-55% result for the alliance of four parties and 33-35% for GD. Edison Research exit polls indicated 41% for GD and a similar 52% for the opposition. In the four previous elections, Edison Research exit poll data basically matched the official results. Against this backdrop, the opposition began to celebrate what looked like a victory. The preliminary official results, announced by the Central Election Commission a few hours later, turned out to be a cold shower for the opposition parties and their supporters.
Though reports from election monitors point to numerous violations, none assert that they could have significantly affected the outcome of the election.
Statistical analysis (see here and here) shows that there was a high probability of ballot-stuffing at approximately 400 out of the 3,111 polling stations (13%). Whereas there were few polling stations that deviated from the normal distribution of votes in large cities, there were a large number in the rest of the country. It is likely that any fraud was concentrated there.
Election monitors have reported schemes whereby people voted multiple times using other people’s IDs, supposedly knowing in advance which table to go. A Georgian election-monitoring group, My Vote, registered violations at 189 polling stations (6.0%), where approximately 300,000 voters (8.6%) are registered.
The International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) also noted numerous cases of pressure on voters, intimidation and vote buying. This is confirmed by other observers, but determining the impact of violations on the final results has proved impossible so far. Another problem is bad election rolls, in particular the presence of citizens who have long passed away.
All this is not enough for the West to heed the opposition’s call and recognize the election as illegitimate, however.
Mistakes of the opposition
It was not just fraud that allowed GD to win.
Meanwhile, there are few political benefits for a junior partner to join a government with the winner. Both the UNM and GD, when they have needed it, have formed coalitions with small parties, before subjugating them and denying them an opportunity to share in the spoils of victory. Then the winner would fuse with the bureaucracy. That is why fistfights are more common in the Georgian parliament than meaningful debates and agreements.
If the opposition had won the recent election, the opposition parties would have had to negotiate hard to form a majority government, which would have helped develop skills for sharing power in a parliamentary democracy. But Ivanishvili’s party has been declared the winner.
The scale of falsification
The polling that the opposition relied on (see here, here and here) suggested a 52-55% result for the alliance of four parties and 33-35% for GD. Edison Research exit polls indicated 41% for GD and a similar 52% for the opposition. In the four previous elections, Edison Research exit poll data basically matched the official results. Against this backdrop, the opposition began to celebrate what looked like a victory. The preliminary official results, announced by the Central Election Commission a few hours later, turned out to be a cold shower for the opposition parties and their supporters.
Though reports from election monitors point to numerous violations, none assert that they could have significantly affected the outcome of the election.
Statistical analysis (see here and here) shows that there was a high probability of ballot-stuffing at approximately 400 out of the 3,111 polling stations (13%). Whereas there were few polling stations that deviated from the normal distribution of votes in large cities, there were a large number in the rest of the country. It is likely that any fraud was concentrated there.
Election monitors have reported schemes whereby people voted multiple times using other people’s IDs, supposedly knowing in advance which table to go. A Georgian election-monitoring group, My Vote, registered violations at 189 polling stations (6.0%), where approximately 300,000 voters (8.6%) are registered.
The International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) also noted numerous cases of pressure on voters, intimidation and vote buying. This is confirmed by other observers, but determining the impact of violations on the final results has proved impossible so far. Another problem is bad election rolls, in particular the presence of citizens who have long passed away.
All this is not enough for the West to heed the opposition’s call and recognize the election as illegitimate, however.
Mistakes of the opposition
It was not just fraud that allowed GD to win.
“The opposition, lacking money, has practically no presence in small towns and rural municipalities.”
Georgian Dream rally before the parliamentary election. October 2024. Source: Telegram
As a result, in Tbilisi and large cities like Kutaisi, Rustavi, Batumi, Poti and Zugdidi, it defeated GD or lost by a narrow margin. But in other areas, especially those with many ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis, the opposition suffered a resounding defeat.
During the campaign, the opposition did not radiate strength or feel like a winner, argues political scientist Ghia Nodia. Poor Georgians in the provinces do not know why they need Europe, while they highly value the peace that, as they see it, GD has brought to Georgia. The capital also is home to many people of the same mind, especially among public-sector workers, pensioners and low-skilled workers.
The opposition seems to have misjudged both its chances of unseating GD and the lengths that GD was prepared to go to preserve and strengthen its hold on power. Hence the jubilation of opposition leaders (see here, here and here) literally an hour before they learned of their complete fiasco.
Opposition supporters are understandably worried about Georgia’s European choice: will Putin react like he did to Ukraine’s European choice? So it’s not just Russian propagandists that scared Georgian voters with the threat of war, “like in Ukraine.”
The opposition underestimated the extent to which Ivanishvili’s propaganda had undermined the popularity of joining the EU and NATO. A year ago, according to the Caucasus Barometer research project, 71% of Georgian respondents supported the idea of the country joining the EU and 57% NATO (in previous years, the figures had been about 80% and 70%, respectively). Nevertheless, in the same year, about a third of Georgians agreed with the statements that the war between Russia and Ukraine had been provoked by the West, that the West wants to drag Georgia into the war and that the Georgian opposition wants the same thing. The opposition proved unable to dissuade them.
Nodia thinks the fear of war has outweighed the attractiveness of Europe. The upshot: Georgia will be Eurasian, not European: Tbilisi will refuse to take a clear foreign policy course, combining anti-Western rhetoric with agreement with the West on specific issues. This will allow Ivanishvili to take the gloves off at home, suppressing freedoms and attacking the opposition, NGOs, universities and the media.
Perhaps the opposition’s “Europe or Russia” line was a mistake. For the average Georgian voter, both Europe and Russia are of secondary importance, and the opposition parties spoke little about social and economic problems, especially local ones.
The opposition never formulated an alternative vision for Georgia’s development, while its attempt to outplay GD on the issue of geopolitics was doomed. Voters have long tired of bombastic rhetoric.
Back in 2022-23, the Georgian opposition was weak, and its old leaders put off a shakeup of cadres and ideology, notes Dimitri Moniava, the head of the Strategic Communications Center, a research group. Young people were poorly integrated into party structures, while uniting opposition forces and forming new parties proceeded very slowly. Overall, the entire opposition was focused on European integration and differed only in the figures of party leaders. The mutual hatred between the opposition and the authorities fueled further polarization in one segment of society and a loss of interest in politics in another. The upshot: even in Tbilisi, GD received about 40%, 2.5 times the vote of the second-place opposition party.
What comes next?
Seeking to overturn the election results, the opposition is appealing to both the Georgian street and the West. But opposition voters are more disappointed than angry right now, noted MP David Zurabishvili: “disappointed people do not make revolutions: to make a revolution, you have to be very angry.”
Seeing Georgia as his personal property, Ivanishvili has come to the conclusion that behind the words about democratization lies the intention of Washington and Brussels to take away his power, with vassalage to Moscow representing the only chance to avoid that.
During the campaign, the opposition did not radiate strength or feel like a winner, argues political scientist Ghia Nodia. Poor Georgians in the provinces do not know why they need Europe, while they highly value the peace that, as they see it, GD has brought to Georgia. The capital also is home to many people of the same mind, especially among public-sector workers, pensioners and low-skilled workers.
The opposition seems to have misjudged both its chances of unseating GD and the lengths that GD was prepared to go to preserve and strengthen its hold on power. Hence the jubilation of opposition leaders (see here, here and here) literally an hour before they learned of their complete fiasco.
Opposition supporters are understandably worried about Georgia’s European choice: will Putin react like he did to Ukraine’s European choice? So it’s not just Russian propagandists that scared Georgian voters with the threat of war, “like in Ukraine.”
The opposition underestimated the extent to which Ivanishvili’s propaganda had undermined the popularity of joining the EU and NATO. A year ago, according to the Caucasus Barometer research project, 71% of Georgian respondents supported the idea of the country joining the EU and 57% NATO (in previous years, the figures had been about 80% and 70%, respectively). Nevertheless, in the same year, about a third of Georgians agreed with the statements that the war between Russia and Ukraine had been provoked by the West, that the West wants to drag Georgia into the war and that the Georgian opposition wants the same thing. The opposition proved unable to dissuade them.
Nodia thinks the fear of war has outweighed the attractiveness of Europe. The upshot: Georgia will be Eurasian, not European: Tbilisi will refuse to take a clear foreign policy course, combining anti-Western rhetoric with agreement with the West on specific issues. This will allow Ivanishvili to take the gloves off at home, suppressing freedoms and attacking the opposition, NGOs, universities and the media.
Perhaps the opposition’s “Europe or Russia” line was a mistake. For the average Georgian voter, both Europe and Russia are of secondary importance, and the opposition parties spoke little about social and economic problems, especially local ones.
The opposition never formulated an alternative vision for Georgia’s development, while its attempt to outplay GD on the issue of geopolitics was doomed. Voters have long tired of bombastic rhetoric.
Back in 2022-23, the Georgian opposition was weak, and its old leaders put off a shakeup of cadres and ideology, notes Dimitri Moniava, the head of the Strategic Communications Center, a research group. Young people were poorly integrated into party structures, while uniting opposition forces and forming new parties proceeded very slowly. Overall, the entire opposition was focused on European integration and differed only in the figures of party leaders. The mutual hatred between the opposition and the authorities fueled further polarization in one segment of society and a loss of interest in politics in another. The upshot: even in Tbilisi, GD received about 40%, 2.5 times the vote of the second-place opposition party.
What comes next?
Seeking to overturn the election results, the opposition is appealing to both the Georgian street and the West. But opposition voters are more disappointed than angry right now, noted MP David Zurabishvili: “disappointed people do not make revolutions: to make a revolution, you have to be very angry.”
Seeing Georgia as his personal property, Ivanishvili has come to the conclusion that behind the words about democratization lies the intention of Washington and Brussels to take away his power, with vassalage to Moscow representing the only chance to avoid that.
“Georgia’s current return to the Chinese/Russian sphere of influence leaves the EU and the US with fewer opportunities to influence Georgian Dream policies.”
Opposition rally. Opposition parties have refused to admit defeat in the parliamentary election. October 2024. Source: Telegram
Until recently, Ivanishvili maintained a democratic facade, behind which was an autocratic structure in which institutions are subordinated to the will of an authoritarian leader and human rights are systematically suppressed, argues Eduard Marikashvili, who heads the NGO Georgian Democracy Initiative. The Putin regime did exactly the same in the 2000s, concealing its essence with institutions that outwardly resembled democratic ones.
Now, Ivanishvili’s task is to root out “foreign agents” – the political forces and NGOs “with the help of which Georgia’s government can be appointed from outside.” In other words, he seeks to deprive of influence all those who are opposed to Georgia’s transformation into an autocracy. The perception of opponents as traitors has become typical across the Georgian opposition as well.
Ivanishvili’s goal is to strengthen his personalist regime, rule for life and secure guarantees for his heirs. Putin has made much more progress toward that goal in Russia, but Ivanishvili, following in his wake, has already enthralled all Georgian government institutions.
Now, the only question is how bloodthirsty or “vegetarian” Ivanishvili’s personalistic regime will be – whether it will resemble Russia and Belarus or Hungary and Turkey. The latter scenario allows for the opposition to holdpower at the local level and for at least some independent universities, NGOs and media to endure. In Turkey, the opposition runs the largest cities, while the same is true of Budapest in Hungry. This seems to be the best that the Georgian opposition can hope for in the coming years.
Now, Ivanishvili’s task is to root out “foreign agents” – the political forces and NGOs “with the help of which Georgia’s government can be appointed from outside.” In other words, he seeks to deprive of influence all those who are opposed to Georgia’s transformation into an autocracy. The perception of opponents as traitors has become typical across the Georgian opposition as well.
Ivanishvili’s goal is to strengthen his personalist regime, rule for life and secure guarantees for his heirs. Putin has made much more progress toward that goal in Russia, but Ivanishvili, following in his wake, has already enthralled all Georgian government institutions.
Now, the only question is how bloodthirsty or “vegetarian” Ivanishvili’s personalistic regime will be – whether it will resemble Russia and Belarus or Hungary and Turkey. The latter scenario allows for the opposition to holdpower at the local level and for at least some independent universities, NGOs and media to endure. In Turkey, the opposition runs the largest cities, while the same is true of Budapest in Hungry. This seems to be the best that the Georgian opposition can hope for in the coming years.
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